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p. 36, line 11:  for Chapter 5, … , … , represents read In Chapter 5, … , … , the 
reinsertion represents 
p. 125, line 11:  for cultural volumes read sculptural volumes 
p. 141, line 13:  for of all time read of all time, published by the MIT Press, 
p. 158, line 25:  for editorial staff read editorial staff of Casabella Continuità 
p. 184, line 29:  for Ellin has pointed out that the Venice Triennale of 1973, organised 
by Rossi, the publication of Moneo’s article in Oppositions in 1976 
read Ellin has pointed out that the translation of Rossi’s texts into 
English, the first one in Oppositions in 1975, originally published in 
the catalogue for the 1973 Milan Triennale 
p. 184, line 33:  for to the expansion of Rossi’s influence and to the translation of his 
book into English. read to the expansion of Rossi’s influence. 
p. 243, line 8:  for Public Construction and Property Management read Directorate 
of Public Construction and Property 
p. 277, line 1:  for Riksantikvaren, the Directorate for Cultural Heritage, read FAD 
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Preface   
The explosion that severely damaged the Government Quarter in Oslo on 22 
July 2011 sparked a heated debate in which professionals, authorities, and 
organisations have contended over whether or not to tear down, restore, or 
continue to build on the architectural remains. The arguments rested on 
postulations such as ‘the quarter documents Norway’s political history of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century’, ‘the two buildings designed by Erling 
Viksjø are important contributions to the history of architecture and art’, and 
‘if the buildings are torn down the perpetrator gets his way’. A dispute like 
the one in Oslo demonstrates how architecture, which previously only had 
sustained inert, disciplinary memory for architectural historians and 
professional rituals of state officials, overnight can come to be regarded as an 
essential vehicle for national remembrance and sentiments. In the opinions 
voiced in the public sphere, buildings that were previously defined through 
their everyday function could be seen to transfigure into spatial concepts, to 
multiply, and to turn into cues for associated memories of political history, 
architecture, and terrorism. Triggered by the destruction that was unleashed 
by the bomb, the intense media dissemination and the dispute have 
contributed to altering and spreading spatial representations of the 
Government Quarter. These travel between groups, transform in the minds of 
individuals and are exchanged with other images of the national community 
and of an international community. In this thesis I will argue that 
representations of architecture in memory are not stable and permanent, but 
rather dynamic and on the move. Whereas architecture usually exists as just 
one material building or site, its counterparts in people’s minds can only be 
said to exist as a plurality of entities, employed as they are to structure 
everyday and institutional remembrance. It is the latter that I will turn to in 
order to address the role of architecture as a societal mnemonic. 
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Over the last three decades an interdisciplinary field of scholarship has 
emerged, reappraising the work of pioneers and establishing a new 
theoretical apparatus to assess cultures’ engagement with the past. 
Humanistic memory studies has seen the development of a gamut of concepts 
for addressing cultures and politics of place-bound remembrance in post-
traditional and post-war societies. This thesis will look into one such concept 
by one of the field’s pioneers. The spatial framework of memory – le cadre 
spatial de la mémoire – was conceived by French sociologist Maurice 
Halbwachs as an integral component of the theory of collective memory, 
developed over three books from the 1920s to the 1940s. Different from the 
writing of history, according to Halbwachs, to study collective memory does 
not refer to explorations of the past as such, but to investigations of 
mechanisms of social psychology in the present, and how these shape every 
group’s engagement with the past. To regard architecture as a spatial 
framework of memory means to enquire into its role in such acts of social 
memory. Following Halbwachs I am less interested in how we recall 
environments as phenomena in themselves than in how we shape notions of 
them to support us in the remembrance of other things. I assess the concept in 
relation to the overarching theory of collective memory and appraise its 
indebtedness to Halbwachs’s three main intellectual forefathers: Henri 
Bergson, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Émile Durkheim. Through a 
rereading of the spatial framework of memory in its original context this 
study suggests the usefulness of the Halbwachsian concept. 
The spatial framework of memory would become one of the sociocultural 
conceptualisations of architecture and memory from outside of architectural 
theory to establish itself in the critique of the functionalist city in the 1960s, 
especially through the considerations of Kevin Lynch and Aldo Rossi. It 
would also come to stand at the centre of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s model of 
communicative memory and cultural memory, drawn up in the 1980s and 
1990s. Understood in the light of the elaborations of the term by Lynch, 
Rossi, and Aleida and Jan Assmann I propose the spatial framework of 
memory as a contribution to a theoretical framework for investigating 
architecture in processes of remembering, for instance how they come to the 
surface in disputes like that over the Government Quarter in Oslo or in other 
contexts relating to the ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a society 
rather than to the phenomenal experience of individuals. In addition to the 
postulation of a general concept, the thesis elaborates on a number of 
distinctions to address a variety of societal contexts. With the postulation of 
the spatial framework of memory the thesis stands with one leg in the 
architectural discourse and one in memory studies, transporting perspectives 
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between them. The study aims to champion humanistic views in the theory 
and practice of architecture and urban planning. 
With the conceptualisation of the multifarious spatial frameworks of 
memory the thesis challenges ideas of permanence and singularity, and 
recognises a shift in focus to the transitory character of architecture and to its 
associated plurality of perspectives. It is in relation to such an understanding 
that the title of the thesis should be understood: Edifices rather than buildings 
points to the dual nature of architecture as, on the one hand, a mind-external, 
material construction and, on the other, a structure of thought in memory. 
Edifices and not edifice points to the multitude of spatial frameworks of 
memory that exist for every physical environment, spread among different 
groups and change over time. The plural form further implies the dispersion 
of the architectural object over mobile media, such as texts, photographs and 
drawings, the latter exerting influence over the alterations of the mental 
representations of the environment. It is with a three-fold appreciation of 
architecture as physical constructions, as images in memory, and as textual 
and pictorial artefacts that I will commence the studies of the spatial 
framework of memory. 
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Introduction 
I emphasise the thought that memory architecture was invisible: it 
used buildings for its purposes, but we can never see into the 
actual memories in which these buildings were reflected. It raises 
the rather interesting thought, that a building lives, not only by its 
actual visible existence, but by its invisible reflection in the 
memories of generations of men.  
— Frances Yates, ‘Architecture and the Art of Memory’, 19801 
I am certain that those who presently see my theatre are few with 
respect to the infinite number who will see it in the future; for I 
am even more certain that the written version, by means of the 
printing press, will endure many centuries … Those who will 
come after us (even if the house is ruined) will see it still standing 
inside their minds because writing has the ability quickly to build 
every great edifice and instantly to paint all that one says about it 
and designs for it.  
— Francesco Doni, Pitture, 15642 
In the early 2000s I visited Vukovar, a city in Croatia that had been heavily 
damaged in the Balkan conflicts of the early 1990s. Disturbed by the all-
encompassing devastation of the urban environment I made the city the study 
case of my diploma project at the Architectural Association School of 
Architecture (the AA) in London. Through visits, interviews, and readings I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 F A Yates, ‘Architecture and the Art of Memory’, AA Quarterly, 12/4 (1980), 12. 
2 Engl. transl. from L Bolzoni, The Gallery of Memory: Literary and Iconographic Models in the Age of the 
Printing Press (Toronto, UTP, 2001), 200–01. 
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came to understand how, to the residents who were rebuilding the historical 
city while living in the midst of debris, ruins, rats, and undetonated mines, 
the city was necessarily something more than its current material state.3 Only 
by looking back to the history of the town and looking forward in time to 
what it could become once more, the inhabitants could face the struggle of 
the day. This was not easy, a woman told me, because at the return to 
Vukovar after a few years as an internally displaced person, the access to her 
past life was blocked by the total alteration of the environment. She could not 
localise the places where her former social life had played out. The piles of 
rubble, at first, did little to remind her of where the houses of her friends or 
her former workplaces had previously stood. 
Architecture, memory, and the AA 
At the time when I worked with the diploma project, the AA was one of the 
architecture schools where the issue of memory was on the agenda as one of 
the concepts that supported a promotion of humanistic perspectives in 
architecture. As we shall see in chapters three and four, in architecture theory 
the term ‘memory’ largely came to be linked to sociologist Maurice 
Halbwachs’s theory of collective memory, introduced by architects Kevin 
Lynch and Aldo Rossi in the 1960s. Another scholar who acted as an 
instigator and source of inspiration, almost with a magical appeal, for those 
concerned with memory in architecture was historian Frances A. Yates 
(1899–1981). She had for several decades been affiliated with the Warburg 
Institute, founded by art historian Aby Warburg and since 1944 incorporated 
in the University of London. For the appreciation of spatial conceptions to 
aid memory as well as of memory’s role in architecture, her studies of the 
classical Greek and Roman mnemotechnic ars memoriae, and its tradition 
and legacy in the Renaissance art of memory, have proved immensely 
influential, also in ways, she admitted, she could not predict herself.4 Some of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 At the time I was unaware of Aldo Rossi’s formulation of the architecture of cities: ‘By architecture I mean 
not only the visible image of the city and the sum of its different architectures, but architecture as a 
construction, the construction of the city over time. I believe that this point of view, objectively speaking, 
constitutes the most comprehensive way of analyzing the city; it addresses the ultimate and definite fact in the 
life of the collective, the creation of the environment in which it lives’. A Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 
ed. P Eisenman, tr. D Ghirardo & J Ockman (1st Amer. edn, Cambridge, Opposition books/MIT Press, 1982) 
[It. orig. (4th edn, 1978)], 21. Cf. ch. 4. 
4 Yates, ‘Architecture and the Art of Memory [1980]’, 4. The study of the forms of art of memory has, after 
Yates, become a research field in itself. William Engel explains that ‘Mnemology is concerned primarily with 
how the classical Art of Memory was figured and reconfigured during the Middle Ages and Renaissance … 
Mnemology, therefore, with respect to literary criticism and intellectual history, concerns the various ways 
such systems of thought have been conceived, implemented, and discussed’. W E Engel, ‘What’s New in 
Mnemology’, Connotations, 11/2–3 (2001–2002), 241–42. Also if Yates’s work received the most attention 
she was neither the first to initiate critical, historical studies of the art of memory in modern times, nor was 
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her writings, notably the 1966 publication The Art of Memory, stand as 
milestones in memory studies of many disciplines.5 References to her work 
appear at several places in the thesis. 
With the essay ‘Collage City’, written together with Fred Koetter for The 
Architectural Review in 1975, Colin Rowe was one of the first to apply the 
insights from the study of the art of memory to architectural theory. Rowe 
had studied the history of architecture under Rudolf Wittkower at the 
Warburg Institute in the 1940s, the same institution with which Yates was 
affiliated.6 She had been a member of the jury that assessed Rowe’s 
dissertation.7 Compared to utopian projects like those of Superstudio, Rowe 
and Koetter asked rhetorically if architecture could also be a theatre of 
memory, not only a theatre of prophecy. With reference to Yates’s The Art of 
Memory they argued that 
The bibles and encyclopaedias of both the illiterate and the literate, [the 
Gothic cathedrals] were intended to articulate thought by assisting 
recollection, and to the degree that they acted as Scholastic classroom aids, it 
becomes possible to refer to them as having been theatres of memory. And the 
designation is a useful one, because, if today we are only apt to think of 
buildings as necessarily prophetic, such an alternative mode of thinking may 
serve to correct our unduly prejudiced naiveté. The building as theatre of 
prophecy, the building as theatre of memory – if we are able to conceive of 
the building as one, we must, inherently be able to conceive of it as the other; 
and while recognising that without benefit of academic theory, these are both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
she, at the time of the publication of The Art of Memory in 1966, working alone. Yates acknowledges an 
important forerunner, Helga Hajdu, who in 1936 published a treatise on the art of memory in antiquity and the 
Middle Ages. H Hajdu, Das mnemotechnische Schrifttum des Mittelalters (1936; facs. edn, Amsterdam, E. J. 
Bonset, 1967). Yates published a brief sketch of the book: F A Yates, ‘The Ciceronian Art of Memory’, in 
Istituto di filosofia dell’università di Roma (ed), Medioevo e rinascimento. Studi in onore di Bruno Nardi, ii 
(Florence, G. C. Sansoni, 1955). Herwig Blum offered a comprehensive and systematic study of the art of 
memory in antiquity in his 1964 doctoral dissertation from the University of Tübingen. It contains an 
exhaustive description of the mnemonic places, loci, in the classical art of memory. H Blum, Die antike 
Mnemotechnik (Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1969). For an English summary of the rules of places according to 
Blum, see M Ekman, ‘Edifices of Memory. Topical Ordering in Cabinets and Museums’, in J Hegardt (ed), 
The Museum Beyond the Nation (Stockholm, The National Historical Museum, 2012), 66–68. Writing at the 
same time as Yates, Paolo Rossi was preoccupied with the art of memory in the early modern period. 
Publications include P Rossi, Logic and the Art of Memory, tr. S Clucas (London, Athlone Press, 2000) [It. 
orig., Clavis universalis (2nd edn, 1983)]; P Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, tr. S Rabinovitch 
(1968; facs. edn, London, Routledge, 2009) [It. orig. (1957)]. On the communication and interchange of ideas 
between Rossi and Yates, see P Rossi, ‘Preface to the Second Edition’, tr. S Clucas [It. orig. (2nd edn, 1983)], 
in P Rossi, Logic and the Art of Memory (2nd edn, London, Athlone Press, 2000), xxvii–xxviii. Other notable 
contributions to mnemology include M Carruthers, The Book of Memory: a Study of Memory in Medieval 
Culture (1990; 2nd edn, Cambridge, CUP, 2008). Bolzoni, The Gallery of Memory. 
5 F A Yates, The Art of Memory (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966). 
6 Dictionary of Art Historians & L Sorenson, ‘Rowe, Colin’ [website], 
<http://www.dictionaryofarthistorians.org/rowec.htm> accessed 18 Oct. 2012.  
7 S Marot, Conversation with M Ekman, 26 Oct. 2012. 
Edifices 
 4 
of them the ways in which we habitually interpret buildings, this memory-
prophecy theatre distinction might then be carried over into the urbanistic 
field.8 
For Rowe and Koetter the theatre of prophecy referred to how the Modern 
Movement saw architecture production. As an alternative they proposed an 
approach to architectural design and urban planning that did not attempt to 
build utopias with total disregard for what they with Claude Lévi-Strauss 
referred to as the ‘collection of oddments left over from human endeavours’, 
but which should base itself on the Popperian idea that traditions play critical 
roles as incipient theories in the betterment of society.9 Instead of the 
scientist architect producing prophetic schemes of total design, they called 
for a bricoleur architect who could assemble new orders from cultural 
leftovers. The latter would produce a collage city that supports memory as 
well as prophecy, within a plurality of systems. 
In chapter three I discuss how in the 1950s and 1960s architects began to 
reevaluate the Modern Movement’s conception of the past and offer 
alternative models of thought with the help of terms like ‘tradition’ and 
‘memory’. When Rowe and Koetter published ‘Collage City’ in 1975 the 
discourse had been going on for more than a decade and their contribution 
lied in their synthetic postulation. If forms of historicism and the return to 
architectural traditions were offered as antitheses to the Modern Movement, 
the collage city attempted to learn from both and conceive a theory for a 
middle way. Memory, in their conception, is at best aligned with prophecy. 
Three years before ‘Collage City’, in his book What Time is This Place?, 
Kevin Lynch included a short passage to the general principles of the art of 
memory and the memory theatre conceived and built by Giulio Camillo in the 
sixteenth century.10 He referred to an article Yates had published in 
Architectural Design (AD) in 1968, under the editorship of architect Rebecca 
Pidgeon and architectural historian Robin Middleton.11 In 1973 Middleton 
was appointed head of General Studies (studies in history and theory) at the 
AA.12 As with AD at the time, the AA was (and still is) based in Bloomsbury 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 C Rowe & F Koetter, ‘Collage City’, The Architectural Review, 158/942 (Aug. 1975), 76. 
9 ibid., 83. 
10 K Lynch, What Time is This Place? (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1972), 54. On Camillo’s memory theatre see 
e.g. F A Yates, The Art of Memory (1966; repr. edn, London, Pimlico, 1992), 135–74; R Bernheimer, 
‘Theatrum mundi’, The Art Bulletin, 38/4 (1956). Later accounts of Yates and the art of memory in 
architectural theory include A Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny. Essays in the Modern Unhomely 
(Cambridge, MIT Press, 1992), 178–79; M C Boyer, The City of Collective Memory: Its Historical Imagery 
and Architectural Entertainments (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1994), 133. 
11 F A Yates, ‘Architecture and the Art of Memory’, Architectural Design, /38 (Dec. 1968). 
12 A Higgott, ‘The Subject of Architecture: Alvin Boyarsky and the Architectural Association School ’ 
[conference paper], The Cultural Role of Architecture, University of Lincoln, 23–25 June 2010. 
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in central London, the same area that houses the Warburg Institute. Around 
1980, in the period before Yates passed away, she was invited to lecture on 
several occasions, the papers of which were published in the school 
periodicals AA Quarterly and AA Files.13 
Yates’s ideas would see their distribution to several generations of 
architecture students at the AA, particularly through the teaching of Pascal 
Schöning, unit master of Diploma unit 3, which ran from 1992 to 2008.14 The 
unit studied architecture with emphasis on ‘image, space-time, memory, 
contradiction, narrative, overlay, projection, light and film, all seen not in a 
static but a processual way’, as Schöning put it.15 On various levels and with 
a variety of definitions, memory was decidedly a central term in the video-
based student projects, and the reading lists for the students included Yates’s 
The Art of Memory, Henri Bergson’s Matter and Memory, and Marcel 
Proust’s In Search of Lost Time.16 It was in this intellectual environment, 
during my pre-diploma and diploma studies 2001–2002 and 2003–2004, that 
I was introduced to Yates and the art of memory, as well as to Bergson’s 
individualistic theory of memory. 
During my diploma year AA Publications published the English translation 
of Sébastien Marot’s book on memory and architecture, which reviews the art 
of memory of Yates and the conceptualisations of space in Halbwachs’s 
works.17 Marot had lectured on issues of memory at the AA in the winter 
1997–1998, presenting aspects of Yates and the art of memory and 
reflections on works by Robert Smithson and Georges Descombes.18 The 
1999 book was based on these talks.19 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The talks were: ‘The Architecture and the Art of Memory’, ‘City of Truth’, ‘The Vitruvian Subjects’, ‘The 
Globe Theatre’, and ‘Chapman and Dürer on Inspired Melancholy’, several of which touched on issues of the 
art of memory. Yates, ‘Architecture and the Art of Memory [1980]’; F A Yates, ‘Architectural Themes’, AA 
Files, 1/1 (Autumn 1981). 
14 Cf. the literature about the unit: P Schöning, et al. (eds), Drawing the Line of Thought: Scenario (London, 
AA, 1999). P Schöning, Manifesto for a Cinematic Architecture (London, AA, 2006). P Schöning, et al. (eds), 
Cinematic Architecture (London, AA, 2009). 
15 P Schöning, ‘Marginalia’, in P Schöning et al. (eds), Cinematic Architecture (London, AA, 2009), 12. 
16 Schöning, Manifesto for a Cinematic Architecture, 14, 17, 23. See also the comments on memory by 
Schöning’s colleagues: J Attali, ‘Future Perfect/Time Transparency’, in P Schöning et al. (eds), Cinematic 
Architecture (London, AA, 2009); B Hatton, ‘Memories of the Future’, in P Schöning et al. (eds), Cinematic 
Architecture (London, AA, 2009). 
17 S Marot, Sub-urbanism and the Art of Memory (London, AA, 2003) [Fr. orig., ‘L’Art de la mémoire, le 
territoire et l’architecture’ (1999)]. 
18 Marot, Conversation with M Ekman. 
19 Marot, Sub-urbanism and the Art of Memory, [88]. 
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Object of study 
Virtually all studies in sociocultural memory refer to Halbwachs. On 
Collective Memory offered me the first introduction to his writings. The 
easiest available source in English, it includes the translation of selected parts 
of Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire and of the concluding chapter of La 
Topographie légendaire des évangiles en terre sainte: Étude de mémoire 
collective (hereafter referred to as La Topographie légendaire). It was not, 
however, until I had read the complete German translation of Les Cadres 
sociaux de la mémoire, Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen that 
I became aware that the concept cadre spatial de la mémoire (spatial 
framework of memory) could provide a systematic tool for addressing issues 
of architecture and memory in situations like the one I had encountered in 
Vukovar.20 
In Halbwachs’s three works on memory, Les Cadres sociaux de la 
mémoire, published in 1925, La Topographie légendaire, published in 1941, 
and La Mémoire collective, posthumously published in 1947/1950 and 
appearing in a critical edition in 1997, the spatial framework of memory is 
elaborated into a multifaceted concept for the assessment of space and its role 
for group-bound remembering. The spatial framework of memory, the 
concept of space that individuals hold of the physical environment, is a stable 
construct of the mind that is employed to localise and reconstruct other 
memories. Halbwachs maintains that space essentially is a notional construct 
in the memory of society’s individuals, at all times in interplay with those of 
affiliated social groups, like the family, the profession, or the religious 
community. The view on space, he posits, is always multi-perspectival, for 
the individual as well as for the group and for society. In the interplay with 
the spatial frameworks of the different groups, the materiality of the built 
environment can be considered as the deposit of the former structures and 
remainders with a significant impact on social orders and politics of memory. 
In the rereading of the concept in Halbwachs’s original texts I consider the 
intellectual context that surrounded him, the evolution of the term and its 
multiple facets. I demonstrate how the construal of Halbwachs’s concept of 
the spatial framework of memory (as well as of the collective memory) 
depends on a careful appreciation of the different origins of the elements of 
his thought, especially with respect to his three intellectual forefathers 
Bergson, Leibniz, and Durkheim. Especially with regard to his thinking on 
space I am of the opinion that Leibniz’s influence has been underestimated.21 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  M Halbwachs, Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen, tr. L Geldsetzer (1965; repr. edn, Berlin, 
Suhrkamp, 1985) [Fr. orig., Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire (2nd edn, 1952)]. 
21 Jean-Pierre Cléro forms an exception. 
Introduction 
 7 
In this respect, the thesis offers a different perspective from previous 
architectural readings. It aims to contribute to methods of assessing the 
politics of place-bound memory in the discipline of architecture as well as in 
other fields that may share such concerns. I assert the relevance of 
Halbwachs’s theories for the critical construal of architecture’s role in 
societal remembering. 
With The Image of the City and What Time is This Place? by Kevin Lynch 
(1918–1984) and L’Architettura della città by Aldo Rossi (1931–1997) the 
theories of Halbwachs are introduced to the architectural discourse. There the 
notion of the spatial framework of memory transforms and takes on new 
meanings, and towards the end of the last century Halbwachs’s conception, 
seen through the lens of architectural theory, meanwhile, became a 
commonplace reference when dealing with memory in architecture. The 
spatial framework of memory appears, although rarely under that name, 
among other places, in the writings of Christine Boyer, Dolores Hayden, 
Wolfgang Sonne, Sébastien Marot, and Adrian Forty. Its new forms in the 
architectural context place more emphasis on the built environment than 
Halbwachs did. For instance, I will argue that the concept fatto urbano has 
not been grasped in its useful complexity, notably in the construal of Rossi’s 
theory by Rafael Moneo and Peter Eisenman, as a definition of a culturally 
significant architectural object that needs to be assessed both with respect to 
its physical materiality and to the multitude of collective representations and 
associations in the memory of the citizens.22 
The thesis also argues for the merit of its development within the theory of 
kommunikatives und kulturelles Gedächtnis (communicative and cultural 
memory), developed by literary scholar Aleida Assmann (b. 1947) and 
Egyptologist Jan Assmann (b. 1938) from the 1980s until today. Their 
systematic assessment of Halbwachs’s theories makes it possible to draw a 
crucial distinction between mind-internal and mind-external spatial 
frameworks, both acting as mnemonic tools, and to differentiate between the 
use of architecture for everyday social and formalised cultural remembering, 
respectively. Their elaborations prove valuable and the thesis suggests that 
the breadth of their conceptualisations may be useful in assessing contentious 
cases like that of the debate on the Government Quarter in Oslo, as well as 
for other considerations of memory and architecture. I read Aleida and Jan 
Assmann’s theory of the cultural memory through the lens of the spatial 
framework of memory. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Cf. Critique of the Rossian theory of memory in ch. 4. 
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In the context of scientific studies of spatial memory, psychologists Amy 
Shelton and Naohide Yamamoto have formulated a task for their field:   
The challenge for future research is to come up with a theoretical framework 
for organizing the many different types of spatial representations and how 
they might complement, interact, or interfere with one another. This new 
framework will need to account for different types of experiences, different 
degrees of familiarity, different goals for spatial learning and memory, and 
individual differences in spatial skills. Clearly, visual representations in 
perception and memory will play a critical role in many of the processes and 
representations.23 
A corresponding challenge could be posed for the studies of architecture and 
memory in the humanities. The spatial framework of memory may contribute 
to a response to such a challenge. Halbwachs’s original concept, to my 
meaning, is complex and promising; with its elaborations by Lynch, Rossi, 
and Aleida and Jan Assmann it becomes broader and more dynamic. It could 
provide a ‘theoretical framework for organizing the many different types of 
spatial representations and how they might complement, interact, or interfere 
with one another’ in the engagement with places, buildings, and landscapes 
in sociocultural memory, or in issues of memory in architecture. The focus 
will need to shift from the individual differences of spatial skills to social and 
cultural mechanisms and developments. Although visual representations will 
have to play a central role, the theoretical framework especially needs to 
address how architecture is abstracted into cultural notions and how it takes 
on symbolic values. Together with the contributions by Lynch, Rossi, and 
Aleida and Jan Assmann I propose the spatial framework of memory as a 
concept of architecture and memory, which rests on postulations of the more 
general theories of collective memory (Halbwachs) and communicative and 
cultural memory (Aleida and Jan Assmann). 
This thesis is motivated by a tendency in architecture as well as in memory 
studies to equate physical buildings with the spatial representations that 
individuals and groups form of them in their minds, and by what I see as 
insufficient appreciation of the relevance of the latter. It is my belief that the 
theoretical framework presented here can explicate such issues as well as 
move the attention from theories of architecture and memory that ask how we 
remember space to those that look at for what reasons we remember space 
and at what we recall or associate by means of spatial remembrance. I believe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 A L Shelton & N Yamamoto, ‘Visual Memory, Spatial Representation, and Navigation’, in J R Brockmole 
(ed), The Visual World in Memory (Hove, Taylor & Francis, 2009), 164. 
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that it could prove relevant for, at least, three areas that I am presently 
associated with. 
In the field of humanistic memory studies the spatial framework of 
memory could address the pluralities of spatial images and memories that 
societal groups associate with architecture. As I will argue later in this 
chapter, the concept goes hand in hand with a critique of theories that 
consider the built environment as representing permanence and singularity. A 
building may exist as only one material unicum in one unique location, but 
the corresponding spatial frameworks of memory necessarily only exist in 
plural – for its users and over time. As such, the theoretical framework offers 
itself as a contribution to a self-critical turn in the field towards studies of 
‘multidirectional memory’ (Michael Rothberg), ‘travelling memory’ (Astrid 
Erll), and ‘dynamic memory’ (Erll and Ann Rigney). The spatial framework 
of memory could further offer a method of analysing different forms of 
specialised spatial remembering from commemoration practices at historic 
sites to the ordering of knowledge by means of library or museum 
architecture. Related to memory studies is the growing concern with 
diaspora, migration, and displacement. I have previously attempted to apply 
Halbwachs’s thinking of memory and space to such issues and believe that 
the spatial framework of memory carries a potential for addressing the 
various notions and connotations of the environment that can appear as a 
reality to migrants.24 
In studies of cultural heritage and in the professional realm of cultural 
heritage administration the spatial framework of memory could provide a 
theoretical framework for ordering systematically and evaluating the plethora 
of existing theories and concepts. It may also, for instance, offer tools for 
analysis of intangible values and memories that our societies let be denoted 
and connoted by material remnants. 
For the discipline and profession of architecture and urban planning the 
theoretical framework contributes to an increased valuing of humanistic 
perspectives. With the spatial framework of memory comes an awareness of 
memory functions of architecture, conscious as well as unconscious. A 
predominant emphasis on form and structure could be balanced with 
assessments of cultural and political values that are not discernible in the 
building’s materiality but nonetheless associated with it. The concept does 
not, however, only need to be assigned to critical academic studies, but could 
be employed in architectural production or policymaking. While it potentially 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 M Ekman, ‘Remembering Home. Displacement, Return, and Spatial Frameworks of Memory’, in J Muñoz-
Basols & M David (eds), Defining and Re-Defining Diaspora: From Theory to Reality (Oxford, Inter-
Disciplinary Press, 2011). Cf. also Familial places – Generationenorte and Heimat in ch. 5. 
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could come handy in culturally complex design tasks, the spatial framework 
of memory may prove better suited as an analytical tool in processes that 
precede the design phase: education, critique, writing of reports and plans, 
etc. Thus, the thesis is a contribution to the recognition of the relevance of 
humanistic perspectives in architectural theory and practice. 
I have pointed to three academic and professional areas in which the spatial 
framework of memory could be useful. I welcome other professionals and 
scholars to criticise and broaden my perspectives. 
Context 
In the following I will introduce the intellectual context of the thesis: the 
interdisciplinary field of humanistic memory studies. Although it is written at 
a school of architecture, in an environment of history and theory, the study 
has built its theoretical foundation outside of the conventional boundaries of 
architecture. This is by no means unique, as we shall see with architects 
Lynch and Rossi, but it requires careful delineation of the landscape in which 
it operates. I will give an overview of memory studies in the last three 
decades before addressing how the concept history surfaces in different 
disguises in the various discourses of the thesis. I will also consider political 
and ideological implications of memory studies for the different theorists of 
the thesis. 
‘The past is everywhere’, David Lowenthal reassured us in the 1980s.25 
And for two decades or so, an increasing number of scholars told us that our 
memory of the past, as well as the study of memory, also pervades everything 
we do. We are obsessed with memory and live in the midst of a memory 
boom, Andreas Huyssen proclaimed in 1995.26 Jay Winter argues that we 
have inherited the fascination with the past from previous memory 
generations. The first, according to him, focused on the formation of national, 
social, and cultural identities and spanned from the 1890s to the 1920s. The 
second addressed the remembrance and forgetting of WWII and the 
Holocaust and emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.27 We live the third. 
The recent upsurge of memory, at least when it comes to the humanities, 
has to a large degree moved the emphasis from the individual to society and 
culture. The early attempts in this direction were made, often independently, 
in the decennia around 1900. If Halbwachs was one of the first to write 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 D Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge, CUP, 1985), xv. 
26 A Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia (New York, Routledge, 1995), 5. 
27 J Winter, Remembering War. The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 2006), 18. 
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explicitly and systematically about social and cultural aspects of memory, 
scholars from various disciplines shared the curiosity about the interaction of 
individual memory and society, including the likes of Henri Bergson, Aby 
Warburg, Émile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, Arnold Zweig, Karl Mannheim, 
Frederic C. Bartlett, Walter Benjamin, Ernest Renan, and Marc Bloch.28 
In the decades after the war – the same period that sees its renaissance in 
the architectural discourse – the term ‘memory’ had a marginal role in the 
social sciences.29 
In the last two decades of the twentieth century and until today, when the 
interest in memory has declined in architecture, a renaissance of memory 
issues arose in the humanities. Older theoretical models of memory have 
been re-evaluated and new ones developed in order to address historical and 
contemporary phenomena. With the exchange of old terms for new ones, 
novel epistemological perspectives have surfaced. Halbwachs’s writings on 
memory stand at the very centre of these changes. The reappraisals of his 
work in the 1980s by Yosef Yerushalmi, Gérard Namer, Pierre Nora, Paul 
Connerton, and Aleida and Jan Assmann have rearranged the theoretical 
landscape. Notions like ‘history’, ‘myth’, and ‘tradition’ now compete with a 
whole range of concepts, subsumed under umbrella terms like ‘social 
memory’, ‘collective memory’, ‘communicative memory’, and ‘cultural 
memory’. ‘Memory’ has become a leading term; historical sites now seem 
less attractive to scholars than do sites of memory (lieux de mémoire), even if 
they refer to the same topographical place and the same societal mechanisms. 
In a similar fashion as the slightly earlier interest for memory in 
architecture, the attention to space in memory studies in the 1980s and 1990s 
appears not only to be linked to the revival of Halbwachsian thinking but also 
to Yates’s writings. Aleida Assmann has testified to the relevance of her 
thesis on the art of memory for German literary studies. The rediscovery of 
the ancient mnemotechnic strongly influenced the study of memory in 
literature in the early 1990s, she explains, and people like Renate Lachmann 
and Anselm Haverkamp would link it with theories of intertextuality, 
psychoanalysis, and deconstruction.30 In Nora’s article ‘Mémoire collective’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Cf. A Erll, ‘Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction’, tr. S B Young, in A Erll & A Nünning (eds), 
Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 
8; J K Olick & J Robbins, ‘Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of 
Mnemonic Practices’, Annual Review of Sociology, 24 (1998), 106–7; J K Olick, et al. (eds), The Collective 
Memory Reader (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011). 
29 For a discussion on the marginality of the term, see K L Klein, ‘On the Emergence of Memory in Historical 
Discourse’, Representations, /69 (Winter 2000), 131. 
30  A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization. Functions, Media, Archives, tr. D H Wilson 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2011) [Ger. orig., Erinnerungsräume (1999)], 18. A Haverkamp & R Lachmann, 
Gedächtniskunst: Raum, Bild, Schrift. Studien Zur Mnemotechnik (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1991); A 
Edifices 
 12 
in the 1978 encyclopaedia La Nouvelle histoire Yates is mentioned as the one 
notable exception to a generation of historians who have not concerned 
themselves with memory.31 She is listed in the company of other contributors 
to the study of memory in other disciplines: psychoanalysts and philosophers 
like Freud, Bergson, and Lukács, writers like Proust, Joyce, Conrad, and 
Svevo, and the Durkheimian sociologist Halbwachs. Nora will later draw on 
Yates and Halbwachs in his conception of les lieux de mémoire, the realms of 
national memory in France.32 
The editors of the comprehensive The Collective Memory Reader (2011) 
argue that the memory boom is no mere fad: ‘far from declining in relevance, 
many of the analytical frameworks with which scholars have approached the 
issues highlighted under the rubric of memory studies represent the outlines 
of an increasingly important paradigm that unifies diverse interests across 
numerous disciplines, and consolidates long-standing perspectives within 
them, in perspicuous ways’.33 Memory scholar Astrid Erll suggests that 
memory culture around the turn of the millennium covered the whole cultural 
sphere and had become a leading concept in the humanities worldwide.34 
Interdisciplinary positions dominate contemporary studies in sociocultural 
memory, and contributions from areas such as history, sociology, literature, 
media studies, cultural studies, cultural history, and philosophy are brought 
together in the same conferences, volumes, and journals.35 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Haverkamp, et al., Memoria: Vergessen und Erinnern, Poetik und Hermeneutik (Munich, Fink, 1993); R 
Lachmann, Memory and Literature: Intertextuality in Russian Modernism, tr. R Sellars & A Wall, Theory and 
History of Literature (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997) [Ger. orig. (1990)].  
31	  P Nora, ‘Mémoire collective’, in J Le Goff et al. (eds), La Nouvelle histoire (Paris, Retz, 1978), 398–401, 
400. 
32	  P Nora, ‘From Lieux de mémoire to Realms of Memory. Preface to the English-language edition’, in P Nora 
& L D Kritzman (eds), Realms of Memory. The Construction of the French Past, i: Conflicts and Divisions 
(New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), 15. P Nora (ed), Les Lieux de mémoire, 3 vols. (Paris, 
Gallimard, 1984–1992).	  The legacy of Halbwachs in the lieux de mémoire is discussed in Existing scholarship 
in this chapter. The concept and its relation to the spatial framework of memory are treated in Affirmative 
places – Gedenkorte in ch. 5. 
33	  J K Olick, et al., ‘Introduction’, in J K Olick et al. (eds), The Collective Memory Reader (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 5. For a comprehensive, yet concise, review and historiography, see Olick & Robbins, 
‘Social Memory Studies’. For a review of the concept of memory in the historical discourse, see Klein, ‘On the 
Emergence of Memory’. 
34 A Erll, Memory in Culture, tr. S B Young (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) [Ger. orig., Kollektives 
Gedächtnis und Erinnerungskulturen (2005)], 1–2. 
35 Significant volumes, encyclopaedias, and surveys of the field include S J Schmidt, Gedächtnis: Probleme 
und Perspektiven der interdisziplinären Gedächtnisforschung (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1991); A 
Assmann & D Harth (eds), Mnemosyne: Formen und Funktionen der kulturellen Erinnerung (Frankfurt am 
Main, Fischer Wissenshaft, 1993); N Pethes & J Ruchatz (eds), Gedächtnis und Erinnerung. Ein 
interdisziplinäres Lexikon (Reinbek, Rowohlt, 2001); A Erll & A Nünning (eds), Medien des kollektiven 
Gedächtnisses: Konstruktivität, Historizität, Kulturspezifität (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2004); P Ricœur, 
Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago, UCP, 2004) [Fr. orig. (2000)]; H Krapoth & D Laborde (eds), 
Erinnerung und Gesellschaft. Mémoire et Société, Jahrbuch für Soziologiegeschichte (Wiesbaden, VS, 2005); 
M Rossington & A Whitehead (eds), Theories of Memory: a Reader (Edinburgh, EUP, 2007); A Erll & A 
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The new engagement with the past does not stop there; some voices call for 
the field of memory studies to integrate the perspectives of social and natural 
sciences with the humanities.36 This approach holds promises, not so much of 
finding one definition of memory or reducing several disciplinary 
perspectives into one unified, but of regarding memory as one discursive 
construct that can problematise, research, and describe the same subject from 
different angles and in different languages.37 It will need to be aware of the 
limitations that each vantage point will bring with it, as well as to 
differentiate between the realm of memory that is offered to us as an 
anthropological given (Huyssen) and the realm that is subject to change in 
different societies: a cultural given. The first depends on stable biological 
configurations of the human brain over tens of thousands of years, and the 
knowledge of it gradually increased through new empirical research.38 The 
second concerns the brain’s adaptation to specific cultural contexts: the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Nünning (eds), Cultural Memory Studies: an International and Interdisciplinary Handbook (Berlin, Walter de 
Gruyter, 2008); N Pethes, Kulturwissenschaftliche Gedächtnistheorien zur Einführung (Hamburg, Junius, 
2008); A Erll & A Rigney (eds), Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory (Berlin, 
Walter de Gruyter, 2009); Erll, Memory in Culture; Olick, et al. (eds), The Collective Memory Reader. 
Journals include History and Memory and Memory Studies. In the Nordic academic environment, the context 
in which this research project has been executed, networks for humanistic and interdisciplinary memory 
studies include Towards a Common Past? (Lund Univ. et al.) and Danish Network for Cultural Memory 
Studies (Aarhus Univ., Copenhagen Univ., et al.). Research projects include MemS and National Myths and 
Collective Memory in a Global Age (Stavanger Univ. et al.) and Time, Memory, Representation (Södertörn 
Univ. et al.). Publications from these environments include F Tygstrup & U Ekman (eds), Witness: Memory, 
Representation, and the Media in Question (Copenhagen, Museum Tusculanum Press, 2008); A Dessingué, et 
al., Krigsminner: Sola krigsgraver (Stavanger, Hertervig, 2009); A Dessingué, et al. (eds), Flerstemte minner 
(Stavanger, Hertervig, 2010); A Dessingué & O Ryckebusch, Dunkerque: ville-mémoire (Stavanger, 
Hertervig, 2011); H Ruin & A Ers (eds), Rethinking Time: Essays on History, Memory, and Representation 
(Huddinge, Södertörns högskola, 2011); B Törnquist-Plewa & N Bernsand (eds), Painful Pasts and Useful 
Memories. Remembering and Forgetting in Europe (Lund, The Centre for European Studies at Lund 
University, 2012). 
36 Cf. A D Brown, et al., ‘Introduction: is an Interdisciplinary Field of Memory Studies Possible?’, 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 22/2 (2009); S D Brown, ‘The Quotation Marks Have a 
Certain Importance: Prospects for a ‘Memory Studies’’, Memory Studies, 1/3 (2008); C Gudehus, et al., 
Gedächtnis und Erinnerung. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch (Stuttgart, J. B. Metzler, 2010); H J 
Markowitsch & H Welzer, Warum Menschen sich erinnern können: Fortschritte in der interdisziplinären 
Gedächtnisforschung (Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 2006); Y Dudai, Memory from A to Z: Keywords, Concepts, and 
Beyond (Oxford, OUP, 2002). 
37	  N Pethes & J Ruchatz, ‘Zur Einführung – anstelle der Stichworte “Gedächtnis” und “Erinnerung”’, in N 
Pethes & J Ruchatz (eds), Gedächtnis und Erinnerung: Ein interdisziplinäres Lexikon (Reinbek, Rowohlt, 
2001), 5–19, 13. 
38 Halbwachs emphasised this point. In Esquisse d’une psychologie des classes sociales he writes, ‘we must 
acknowledge that, taking into account our bodies, structure, organic life, senses and nervous system only, there 
is no such difference between us and the men preserved by the ashes of Herculaneum and Pompeii, or even 
prehistoric men, as to make us deny that we are their kin … Every new branch on the tree of humanity is of the 
same substance; the leaves are shaped in the same pattern, the blossoms and fruits are indistinguishable’. 
Quote from the Engl. translation: M Halbwachs, The Psychology of Social Class, tr. C Delavenay (London, 
Heinemann, 1958) [Fr. orig., Esquisse d’une psychologie des classes sociales (1955)], 2. 
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processes of enculturation.39 Huyssen has suggested that ‘closely tied as it is 
to the ways a culture constructs and lives its temporality’, this realm of the 
memory faculty changes over time and makes remembering different today 
from yesterday, here from there.40 This study, following Halbwachs in his 
three books on memory as well as Aleida and Jan Assmann in their writings, 
explores territories on both sides of this hypothetical divide of the memory 
faculty. On the one hand, it acknowledges attempts to address aspects of the 
spatial framework of memory as constants in human cognition. These pertain 
to the general functioning of human memory, such as, for instance, how 
children learn to use the spatial representations of their childhood 
environment to structure and retrieve memories of the world and social 
relations, or how humans orient themselves by means of spatial 
representations. Such topics are today studied empirically by the social and 
natural sciences but are also integral to the theory of the communicative 
memory (Aleida and Jan Assmann). On the other hand, this study will look at 
assessments of culture-specific and historical variations of the collective 
memory, especially through the work of Halbwachs, Rossi, and Aleida and 
Jan Assmann. 
Whereas readings in cognitive psychology, geography, and neuroscience 
have accompanied the development of the thesis, the theories themselves 
have not been employed in the argument. My study remains an 
interdisciplinary enterprise based in the humanities. 
History in memory 
In Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben (1874) Friedrich 
Nietzsche addresses the need of every man and every people for certain 
knowledge of the past. History can offer that in three ways, he suggests. For 
the acting and striving man there exists a monumental kind of history, for the 
preserving and admiring man an antiquarian kind, and for the man that 
suffers and needs liberation there is the critical kind. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Psychologist Merlin Donald argues that cognition and culture are in many ways mirror images. On the one 
hand, they limit themselves to knowledge in the minds of individuals. On the other, they share that knowledge, 
which it is possible to transmit across generations, in social and public domains. ‘Collectivity depends 
ultimately on individual capacity; but this is a reciprocal relationship; [in the course of human evolution] 
enculturation has become more and more important in setting the parameters of human capacity at the 
individual level’. M Donald, ‘Hominid Enculturation and Cognitive Evolution’, in C Renfrew & C Scarre 
(eds), Cognition and Material Culture: the Archaeology of Symbolic Storage (Cambridge, Oxbow Books, 
1998), 11. Social psychologist and interdisciplinary memory scholar Harald Welzer argues that the brain is 
configured to adapt to social and cultural situations and it constantly develops, immersed as it is in social life. 
H Welzer, Das kommunikative Gedächtnis: Eine Theorie der Erinnerung (2002; 2nd edn, Munich, CH Beck, 
2005), 117–18. 
40 Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia, 2. In this context I use cultural given 
as the corresponding term to Huyssen’s anthropological given. 
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If the man who wants to achieve something great needs the past at all he will 
master it through monumental history; who on the other hand likes to persist 
in the traditional and venerable will care for the past as an antiquarian 
historian; an only he who is oppressed by some present misery and wants to 
throw off the burden at all costs has a need for critical, that is judging and 
condemning history.41 
Nietzsche’s three kinds of relations to history – one ideological and creative, 
one traditional and preserving, and one judging and condemning – return in 
different forms in subsequent models of history and social memory.42 With 
its concern for the relations with the past that individuals and societies enter 
into, rather than for the reconstruction of the past as such, the text has 
consequently been included as one of the classics in the theoretical 
development of theories of collective memory.43 The current study adopts 
this distinction in directing its attention to the social and cultural mechanisms 
that characterise how individuals and societies remember and enter into a 
relation with the past, not to whether the past that is conjured up is true or 
verifiable, or to the past as a kind of hypothetical realm that can be critically 
reassembled to become history. This thesis is not a history thesis and does not 
primarily address theories of history. However, ‘history’, as a term and as a 
concept, appears in most of the theories and discourses that I relate to. This 
section gives an overview of the different understandings that ‘history’ may 
take in the various parts of the thesis.44 
In an evocative passage Nietzsche describes the relation between the 
antiquarian and the city: 
By tending with loving hands what has long survived he intends to preserve 
the conditions in which he grew up for those who will come after him – and 
so he serves life. … The history of the city becomes for him the history of his 
self; he understands the wall, the turreted gate, the ordinance of the town 
council, the national festival like an illustrated diary of his youth and finds 
himself, his strength, his diligence, his pleasure, his judgement, his folly and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 F Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, tr. P Preuss (Indianapolis, Hackett, 
1980) [Ger. orig. (1874)], 18–19. 
42 Also in the context of architectural history this text has recently been given prominence as an early and 
‘impassioned critique of historicist culture’. B Bergdoll, European Architecture 1750–1890, Oxford History of 
Art (Oxford, OUP, 2000), 269. 
43 F Nietzsche, ‘From “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”’, tr. R J Hollingdale [Ger. orig. 
(1874)], in J K Olick et al. (eds), The Collective Memory Reader (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011). 
44 For other discussions addressing the relation between memory/memory studies and history/the history 
discipline, see e.g. A Funkenstein, ‘Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness’, History & Memory, 1/1 
(1989); Olick & Robbins, ‘Social Memory Studies’, 110–12; Klein, ‘On the Emergence of Memory’; J V 
Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering (Cambridge, CUP, 2002), 18–20, 40–44; Erll, ‘Cultural Memory 
Studies: An Introduction’, 6–7; N Gedi & Y Elam, ‘Collective Memory – What is it?’, History & Memory, 8/1 
(1996). 
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rudeness, in all of them. Here one could live, he says to himself, for here one 
can live and will be able to live, for we are tough and not to be uprooted over 
night. And so, with this ‘We’, he looks beyond the ephemeral, curious, 
individual life and feels like the spirit of the house, the generation, and the 
city. Occasionally he will greet the soul of his people as his own soul even 
across wide, obscuring and confusing centuries.45 
The quote could illustrate Halbwachs’s description of the role the city 
architecture takes in the processes of collective memory. For the individual 
the houses become the supportive framework of three kinds of remembering. 
One aspect of what he calls autobiographical memory pertains to the self and 
his own life (‘… history of his self … his strength, his diligence, his pleasure, 
his judgement, his folly and rudeness …’). The individual memory is 
intermingled with the collective memory, the other aspect of the 
autobiographical memory. It refers to a reconstruction of the past and 
understanding in the present defined by the inscription of the individual in 
frameworks of thought defined by social groups he is embedded in, like 
language, time, and space (‘… with this “We”, he looks beyond the 
ephemeral, curious, individual life and feels like the spirit of the house, the 
generation, and the city …’). As a third kind, the historical memory covers 
his subjective and intersubjective understanding of the general history of his 
city or country, internalised conceptions of an external history that can be 
imagined but not remembered (‘The history of the city …; he understands the 
wall, the turreted gate, the ordinance of the town council, the national festival 
…’). 
History, in Halbwachs’s writings on memory, does not have a prominent 
position, despite the many historic study cases that he brings into his writings 
in order to shed light onto social mechanisms of memory. Historic cases, it 
seems to me, are equated with cases of the present, at least in their position as 
study material, as material for scholarly analysis. Historiography, on the 
other hand, is viewed as society’s endeavour to construct a temporal frame of 
reference for collective use. Marc Bloch has pointed to the scepticism about 
the word ‘history’ in Halbwachs’s circles: 
Even the sociologists of the Durkheim school make room for it. They do so, to 
be sure, only in order to relegate it to one poor corner of the sciences of man – 
a sort of secret dungeon in which, having first reserved for sociology all that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Nietzsche, Advantage and Disadvantage of History, 19. 
Introduction 
 17 
appears to them susceptible of rational analysis, they shut up the human facts 
which they condemn as the most superficial and capricious of all.46 
La Mémoire collective is the book in which Halbwachs goes farthest in 
discussing the relation between history and collective memory.47 In this 
passage Halbwachs distinguishes between two forms of history. One is 
written down in books and forms schematic descriptions of periods and 
chronological successions of events and dates. This written or general history 
is not supported by any group’s biological memory. It exists only in the form 
of artefacts, although available as mind-external frameworks for the group in 
its reconstruction of the past as well as for positioning the past of the self and 
of the group in relation to a wider frame of reference. Because general history 
is not bound to living people, Halbwachs sees it as essentially different from 
collective memory. Ideally, he argues, historians add detail to detail to form a 
whole in a total record of the past. In this way history is unitary. 
The second form of history is the historical memory, the internalised 
general history, carried by the members of groups as internal frameworks of 
the mind. While the historical memory theoretically could take what 
Nietzsche refers to as monumental, antiquarian, or critical form, for each 
group and for each individual, in the discussion in La Mémoire collective 
Halbwachs does not go further in analysing its ideological implications. 
General history and historical memory exist for any person as an external and 
an internal framework, and it is to their structural influence on remembering 
that Halbwachs turns his attention. Hence, history is innocent, for it is only 
the schematic reconstruction of the past by historians, who attempt to create a 
fuller description of a unitary history. In this way he avoids treating the 
implications of how history may be used for ideological reasons in the 
collective memory. 
It may be said, however, that in other parts of Halbwachs’s oeuvre on 
memory, he goes further in describing power structures and political uses of 
the past through the collective memory, although not referred to by the term 
‘history’. Such studies include the chapter on religion and collective memory 
and a passage on the noble system of feudalism in Les Cadres sociaux de la 
mémoire48 and, to some degree, the discussion of the crusaders’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 M Bloch, The Historian’s Craft. Reflections on the Nature and Uses of History and the Techniques and 
Methods of Historical Writing (Manchester, The University Press, 1954) [Fr. orig., Apologie pur l’Histoire, ou 
Métier d’Historien (1949)], 20. 
47 See ch. 3 Mémoire collective et mémoire historique in M Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, ed. G Namer 
(1950; crit. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997) [orig., ‘Mémoire et société’ (1947)], 97–142. 
48	  M Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, ed. G Namer (1925; facs. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 
1994), 178–221, 22–40. 
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establishment of altars and churches in the Holy Land to mark out the 
topography of their creed.49 
In the architectural discourse of the 1950s and 1960s, into which 
Halbwachs’s ideas enter through the writings of Lynch and Rossi, ‘history’, 
as the historians of the Modern Movement had defined the term, finds itself 
under siege by practitioners and intellectuals alike. A construction of 
architectural history by art historians like Sigfried Giedion and Nikolaus 
Pevsner, serving to legitimise contemporary architectural practice and its 
liberation from the past, is attacked and replacement conceptions of the past 
are offered in the form of new definitions of ‘history’ and the reintroduction 
of concepts like ‘tradition’, ‘culture’, and ‘memory’. With the Modern 
Movement ‘history’ had been taken to justify principles of rational 
architecture and urban planning, which in their comprehensive application in 
the twentieth century had come to be perceived as a threat to the life 
conditions in many cities. The break with the past needed to be mended and 
the roots in tradition re-established, Ernesto Nathan Rogers argued. Others 
likewise offered their new conceptions of architecture’s history and its 
relation to the past, voices as different as Jane Jacobs, Robert Venturi, and 
Manfredo Tafuri. 
Rossi’s approach to history forms one idiosyncratic perspective. His use of 
‘history’ and ‘collective memory’ acquires the status of structural elements in 
his conception of the city. He does not allow the terms to be ideologically 
loaded, and in this respect the approach resembles Halbwachs’s. The city, 
Rossi explains, is a repository of the history that has played out there. 
Consequently, history is closely linked to architecture. From one point of 
view architecture is the trace of human activities, artefacts built over time. 
Archaeologists, architectural historians, and urban historians could find 
information in the material of the architecture. From a second point of view, 
history studies the formation and structure of the city architecture. The 
collective memory, on the other hand, Rossi describes with the consciousness 
of the collective that makes up the city. It is a rational operation that 
actualises and interprets history. In a similar fashion to Halbwachs, Rossi 
avoids any analysis of power relations. Even in references to clearly 
politically loaded examples, such as Haussmann’s reorganisation of Paris, he 
neutralises the ideological implications with reference to the developments in 
the city in the nineteenth century. Subscribing to Halbwachs’s analysis, Rossi 
suggests that Haussmann’s plan ‘is one of the greatest successes ever … 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 155–60. 
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above all because its precise reflection of the urban evolution at that moment 
in history’.50 
Differently, Christine Boyer rereads Halbwachs and Rossi with ideological 
glasses. For her, ‘history’ is the public history that the ruling groups define 
and manifest in official monuments and in the collections of museums. 
Collective memory is its opposite: a different conception of the past 
circulated among dominated groups. With Boyer, ‘history’ and ‘collective 
memory’ are not descriptions of different forms of relations to the past that 
each individual and each group may entertain, but ideological polarities in a 
power struggle in society. 
In their conceptualisation of cultural memory Aleida and Jan Assmann turn 
against the dichotomy between collective memory and history of Halbwachs, 
arguing that no history is completely devoid of memory work, that is, of 
interpretation, partiality, and identity. Instead they offer a perspectival model 
of cultural memory. On the one hand, the storage memory contains all kinds 
of traces of the past, heterogenic and contradictory, fragmentary and 
uninhabited. On the other, the functional memory represents the selection of 
those traces for the construction of meaning in the present, the inhabited. 
Inherent in this model are tools for the analysis of power relations; the 
specialists responsible for the selection of the canons of the functional 
memory – scholars, priests, politicians, etc. – stand in the service of power to 
define the past and supply the group with identity. This is the monumental 
history of Nietzsche, made operational for the discipline, the Church, or the 
nation. Aleida Assmann describes how the selection and even obliteration of 
areas of the past becomes a tool for legitimisation and suppression of 
oppositions in totalitarian regimes. Equally, for oppositional groups the 
storage memory could serve the construction of alternative narratives to 
critique and counteract oppression. Leaning on Halbwachs, Aleida and Jan 
Assmann replace the dichotomy of memory and history by the idea of 
inhabited and uninhabited memory. In this way, the general or written history 
(Halbwachs) cannot be considered neutral. Like the historical memory of the 
group, it could be selected, inhabited, and employed in its active construction 
of the past. 
 Ideology and politics are main objects of analysis in contemporary 
memory studies, concerned as they are with struggles over what versions of 
the past should be accepted. If Halbwachs’s theory of social memory did not 
assess power relations, his detailed studies nonetheless came to have an 
impact on recent scholarship that does. With the model of communicative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 146. 
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memory and cultural memory (Aleida and Jan Assmann) the tools for 
analysis are sharpened. 
History, in an architectural memory study like this one, is not defined as 
something opposite or different from memory (although it is clearly not the 
same, conceptually). Memory theories and concepts provide the lenses 
through which this study sees the world to be examined; history appears in 
several places, but then as specific distinctions, either with reference to the 
writing of history (political, artistic, architectural) as an academic discipline 
or to the contents of the history that resulted from such activities, often as it is 
known by societal groups. The theoretical framework for studies of 
architecture and memory that I propose, through its system of concepts, will 
reveal a multitude of relationships that an individual or a group may form to 
the past by means of architecture, several more than Nietzsche’s 
monumental, antiquarian, and critical kinds of history. These implications of 
such relationships, inherent in the different concepts, are of highest 
relevance. Whether they are denoted by terms like ‘history’ or ‘memory’ or 
by something else is a less intriguing question. 
Objectives 
In her article ‘Travelling Memory’, published in 2011, Erll addresses an 
imminent ‘third phase’ of cultural memory studies.51 The first phase in the 
early twentieth century, she explains, saw protagonists like Halbwachs, 
Warburg, Benjamin, and Bartlett. A second started around the time of the 
publication of Nora’s Les lieux de mémoire and has continued into the early 
twenty-first century (compare Winter’s third phase of memory generations 
mentioned above). While some see the demise of memory studies, Erll argues 
that, for the future, ‘we cannot afford the luxury of not studying memory’ if 
we want to understand the central motives of some of the pressing issues: 
terrorism, Islam and the West, wars, the rise of China and India, global 
warming, etc.52 The second phase, Erll argues, has been characterised by the 
study of the sites of national memory, following in the footsteps of Nora and 
failing to see the nation as anything but an ethnically homogeneous society. 
She calls for studies of memory that travel across and beyond nations and 
that take on transcultural and transnational perspectives. Rather than 
following the line of singular cultural identities, in her view provided by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Erll employs a broader definition of ‘cultural memory’ than Aleida and Jan Assmann, subsuming under the 
term the various notions of social memory, collective memory (Halbwachs), and communicative and cultural 
memory (Aleida and Jan Assmann). 
52 A Erll, ‘Travelling Memory’, Parallax, 17/4 (2011), 5. 
Introduction 
 21 
Halbwachs’s conceptualisation of the frameworks of memory, Erll argues to 
focus on the movement of symbols across time and space in the spirit of 
Warburg and his study of the transmission of gestures of emotion from pagan 
antiquity to the Renaissance and into the present, as he demonstrates in the 
Mnemosyne atlas. ‘What we are dealing with, therefore’, she says, ‘is not so 
much (and perhaps not even metaphorically) “sites” of memory, lieux de 
mémoire, but rather the “travels” of memory, les voyages or les mouvements 
de mémoire’.53 Taking as its premise that the production of cultural memory 
is in constant motion, Erll argues that the third phase of memory studies 
should be the investigation of ‘the paths which certain stories, rituals and 
images have taken; and not so much by echoing what social groups may 
claim as their roots: the alleged origins of a cultural memory’.54 
Such a prophecy of future memory studies and rejection of studies of the 
attachment of cultural memory to places could be read as a disapproval of a 
study of the spatial frameworks of memory like that of this thesis. What can 
architecture, place, and landscape – by Erll and others seen to epitomise the 
antithesis of the transience of physical and temporal movement – offer 
studies of travelling memory? But what are journeys if not movements from 
place to place? Also, when in motion memory needs to temporarily settle 
down somewhere to in fact work as memory figures, as Jan Assmann has 
pointed out.55 Abstract thought, at least so Halbwachs has taught us, needs to 
be localised in places, real or imaginary, as well as in the carriers of groups 
and points in time to be upheld and passed down.56 In memory studies place 
is often regarded as a permanent and stable feature of culture. But when 
science has replaced the Euclidean three-dimensional space with a four-
dimensional space-time continuum, and thinkers like Leibniz since long have 
asserted the character of space as entia mentalia, a mental entity existing in 
the mind of the observer, how could the humanities disassociate space from 
time and thinking minds? Ruth Klüger has searched for a term to denote a 
place in a particular period, for a particular group of people. A concentration 
camp is not the same for the interned when it is in operation as for the visitors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 ibid., 11. Michael Rothberg has recently put forward a similar perspective. With the concept multidirectional 
memory he rethinks collective memory in multicultural and transnational contexts and in the malleable 
discursive space of the public sphere in an attempt ‘to draw attention to the dynamic transfers that take place 
between diverse places and times during the act of remembrance’. When I refer to travelling architecture and 
les mouvements de mémoire later in the thesis I also refer to Rothberg’s perspectives. M Rothberg, 
Multidirectional Memory (Stanford, SUP, 2009), 11. 
54 Erll, ‘Travelling Memory’, 11. 
55 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization. Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination, tr. 
D H Wilson (Cambridge, CUP, 2011) [Ger. orig., Das kulturelle Gedächtnis (1992)], 24. 
56	  M Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire des évangiles en Terre sainte. Étude de mémoire collective, ed. 
M Jaisson, Quadrige (1941; 1971; rev. 2nd edn, Paris, PUF, 2008), 124. 
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to it once it has become a memorial site: ‘Landscape, seascape – there should 
be a word like timescape to indicate the nature of a place in time, that is, at a 
certain time, neither before not after’.57 Similarly, this study points to the 
multifarious spatial frameworks of memory that connect to the singularity of 
one physical place, over time as well as in relation to the plurality of groups. 
While the characteristics and associations of the spatial frameworks change 
with alterations to the memory of the group that uses it, the frameworks also 
differ between groups. In chapters one and two I will illustrate how, with 
Halbwachs, the concepts of space come to differ between individuals of a 
group and between the group and other groups. In chapters two, four, and 
five I will address different configurations that the spatial framework of 
memory may establish with the physical environment. I demonstrate in 
chapter five, with the help of Aleida and Jan Assmann, that the same place 
may provide various kinds of spatial frameworks of memory, for the same 
group and at the same time, fulfilling different social and cultural needs. In 
chapter six, in the particular context of the dispute over the bombed buildings 
in the Government Quarter in Oslo, I will point to how the spatial images 
change due to physical changes to the buildings, media exposure, and the 
interchange of ideas in the public sphere. 
This thesis argues that architecture, place, and landscape are not permanent 
or stable features of culture. I leave out the consideration that the materiality 
of architecture and landscape constantly changes, from one material state to 
the next, regardless if it is left untouched or if it is ‘preserved’. What is 
important for this proposition is that the mental representations of a given 
place only exist in plural and demonstrate a transient rather than a fixed 
character. Further, considering the way in which the use of places as 
frameworks for the cultural memory takes after and influences the practice of 
other groups in similar sites in other places, one may ask if, indeed, 
architecture and the spatial frameworks of memory themselves do not travel? 
Following in the spirit of Erll’s travelling memory, I will propose a travelling 
architecture as part of an alternative approach to any perspective of static 
places of memory. Just because the materiality of architecture may appear 
singular, solid, and permanent, it does not mean that its image, in a multitude 
of minds and groups, and in different periods, can be reduced to a singular 
and stable representation. The thesis contributes to shifting the focus from the 
singular materiality of space to a plurality of spatial construct(ion)s in 
memory. The title reflects this: Edifices (and not edifice) refers to the plural 
representations of one place and one architectural object. Edifices (rather than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 R Klüger, Landscapes of Memory. A Holocaust Girlhood Remembered (London, Bloomsbury, 2003), 73. 
Klüger is discussed in Time and the spatial framework of memory in ch. 2. 
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buildings) further points to the ambiguity of architecture as, on the one hand, 
constructions of form and material and, on the other, structures of thought. 
Mental representations of architecture, the spatial framework of memory, 
give shape to the materiality of the environment, but the opposite is just as 
true. As a consequence of this line of thought, built architecture can be 
regarded as a representation of certain collective mental images of space and 
not only the instigator of its representations in people’s memory. It is in the 
dynamic interplay between the former and the latter, this thesis argues, that a 
cultural definition of an architectural artefact can be found. No architecture is 
neutral; it shapes and is shaped by the interests of groups. 
Approach 
Architecture, as a profession as well as in academia, spans several areas of 
knowledge. Aesthetic, social, cultural, technological, and economic concerns 
need to be taken into account, and theory from the humanities as well as from 
the social and natural sciences can be found in the syllabi of architecture 
schools. It suggests a multidisciplinary character of studies and research in 
architecture, both for the discipline seen as a whole and for each student and 
scholar. With it comes a potential for interdisciplinarity. Multidisciplinarity, 
according to Julie Thompson Klein, can be understood as an encyclopaedic 
endeavour, for example through side-by-side collections of different 
disciplinary perspectives. She argues that only when ‘integration and 
interaction become proactive, the line between multidisciplinarity and 
interdisciplinarity is crossed’.58 Literature from outside of the discipline is 
commonplace in architecture, and some of it has been taken up in the 
informal canon of architectural thought.59 It is questionable, though, with 
reference to Thompson Klein’s definition, if theories that have been made 
native to architectural thinking really make architectural research 
interdisciplinary. I do not necessarily believe so. 
By taking the step to study memory in architecture, as an architect it is 
inevitable to turn to other disciplines, discourses, and scholars than those of 
the theories of architecture, regardless if one wants to explore neurological, 
phenomenological, social, or cultural aspects. The stock of scholarship on 
memory in architecture is limited and often restricts itself to perspectives 
established in the trade and the discipline. This problem is by no means 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 J T Klein, ‘A Taxonomy of Interdisciplinarity’, in R Frodeman et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Interdisciplinarity (Oxford, OUP, 2010), 18. 
59 In an architect’s bookshelf such assimilated literature could be represented by the likes of historian Frances 
Yates, literary critic and philosopher Walter Benjamin, geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, philosophers Gaston 
Bachelard, Ed Casey, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and sociologist Henri Lefebvre. 
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limited to architecture. Memory studies, humanistic and scientific, have over 
the last three decades become an interdisciplinary concern. The awareness of 
the limitations of any discipline with regard to addressing such a multifaceted 
notion as ‘memory’ is evident in most areas of the humanities, in social and 
political sciences, in geography, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. To 
transport perspectives across disciplinary borders, from science to the 
humanities and back, seems beneficial, and even necessary. 
This study finds its contextualisation in a multi- and interdisciplinary 
landscape. The theoretical protagonists brought together here represent 
disciplinary points of departure in sociology (Halbwachs), architecture 
(Lynch, Rossi), literature studies (Aleida Assmann), Egyptology (Jan 
Assmann), and history (Yates, Nora), but common for them seems to be that 
they have transcended any disciplinary circumscriptions in their own work. 
To follow the paths of concepts in an attempt to understand their lineage has 
meant to travel from mnemonic techniques over logic and philosophy to 
sociology, architecture, and history, or from biology via art history to 
Egyptology and literature studies. 
Also in their own work they represent an interdisciplinary approach. In 
addition to references to a wide range of theories from philosophy, 
psychology, and sociology, Halbwachs makes use of autobiographical 
accounts by people like Chateaubriand or Goethe to illustrate phenomena and 
support his arguments. Frequently, he also recounts his own memories, 
inducing general laws from the reflections on such instances. Lynch surveys 
a comprehensive literature from anthropology, psychology, and sociology, 
Rossi borrows from geographers, sociologists, and historians, and Aleida and 
Jan Assmann turn to a plethora of humanistic theories as well as to art and 
literature. Halbwachs’s and Aleida and Jan Assmann’s turn to 
autobiographical accounts to complement academic theories may represent 
an intriguing strategy for concretising theoretical postulations. In the context 
of this study, where I aim to shift the focus from the physicality of 
architecture to its forms in memory, we may ask if the treatment of 
autobiographical records on a par with scholarly theories may contribute to a 
better conceptualisation of the architecture of the mind. 
In my work I have considered Mieke Bal’s idea of the travelling concept as 
a useful model for the study of the spatial framework of memory and related 
conceptualisations. Bal argues that concepts can be miniature theories which 
can 
be brought in [from other disciplines] as an alternative for the idea of 
coverage. Within interdisciplinary settings, coverage – of the classics, of all 
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periods or ‘centuries,’ of all major theories used within a field – is no longer 
an option. Nor is ‘sloppy scholarship.’60 
Concepts travel, she insists, ‘between disciplines, between individual 
scholars, between historical periods, and between geographically dispersed 
academic communities’, and the scholar can track these movements and 
assess their differing qualities ‘before, during, and after each “trip.”’61 Also, 
if I, for the most part, have attempted to stay within a loosely defined region 
of the humanities and the social sciences, the itineraries of the concepts have 
occasionally led the thesis into areas of the natural sciences. It has not been 
my intention, however, to perform a fully integrative interdisciplinary study. 
To find your way in a multidisciplinary landscape requires patience. While 
it may be fairly straightforward to follow references from one text to another 
until one has mapped the important voices of a discourse, it may be harder to 
identify discourses or concepts that one does not know about. Also, concepts 
do not always allow themselves to be studied in isolation from the field 
around them, and so I have found myself studying the wider contexts of 
concepts I have investigated, fields as diverse as spatial cognition, museum 
studies, and diaspora studies. The different discussions in the thesis, 
therefore, present themselves as analyses and definitions of concepts as much 
as historiographies of an interrelated group of cultural concepts. 
Underlying the development of the argument of the thesis are three aims 
that concern academia and the architectural profession. First, I want to 
expose the concerns of memory in the theory and history of architecture, 
subsuming under the term also related fields like urban planning, landscape 
architecture, interior architecture, and cultural heritage – to humanistic 
memory studies. Architecture’s engagement with the built environment on 
levels of morphology, materiality, and planning processes could benefit the 
more social, societal, and cultural studies of space in the humanities and 
social sciences. Exponents like Lynch and Rossi are in this way introduced to 
readers who are not native to architecture.  
Second, the study attempts to reinforce and advocate a flow of influence 
from the interdisciplinary discourse on memory into the theory and history of 
architecture. Theories that have previously made their way into the 
architectural discourse, like those of Halbwachs, will be brought in anew, this 
time understood and applied differently. Other theories, which previously 
have attracted little or no attention, are introduced, like those of Aleida and 
Jan Assmann. This thesis travels out from architecture and back again. As a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 M Bal, Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide (Toronto, UTP, 2002), 7–8. 
61 ibid., 24. 
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result of the engagement with memory studies in this thesis I hope to 
contribute to establishing a platform for interdisciplinary memory studies in 
architecture, a mirador for outlooks into foreign, disciplinary landscapes and 
likewise a beacon for the signalling of things architectural. 
Third, I want to promote a humanistic orientation among practicing 
architects and planners. In the design- and technology-oriented profession, 
cultural and historical awareness sometimes seems to be considered 
extraneous. With the thesis I argue for the relevance of cultural and historical 
perspectives in the shaping of the physical environments to complement 
advancements towards market adaption and bureaucratisation. History and 
memory studies ought not only to remain the concern of heritage 
conservators and scholars. They should come to the forefront of architectural 
thinking and production. The neglect by the Modern Movement of such 
issues contributed to a legitimacy crisis in the 1960s. I believe it is vital that 
the profession of architecture develops an increased cultural responsibility to 
avoid ending up in a similar situation. In contemporary practice critical 
humanistic awareness should be radical. 
The analysis of the debate on the Government Quarter in Oslo 
Chapter six turns in a different direction than the previous chapters. In it I 
assess the ongoing debate that concerns the future state of the buildings in the 
Government Quarter in Oslo after a bomb damaged them on 22 July 2011. I 
will apply the theoretical perspectives I develop in the thesis to the material 
in order to demonstrate their usefulness. 
I have used the Norwegian media database Retriever to identify and get 
access to feature articles, interviews, letters to the editor, etc. in the daily and 
weekly printed press. I have also relied on journal articles, books, and official 
documents and reports published on the web pages of the government, 
especially those by FAD and Statsbygg.62 To some degree, I have also 
referred to spoken statements on radio and television, but my impression is 
that they are most often less elaborate than written statements. The discussion 
limits itself to the Norwegian discourse and almost all sources are written or 
formulated in Norwegian. All translations from Norwegian are mine and 
where they exist I have used the official English names of organisations etc.  
The analysis is further based on my own experience as a contributor to and 
observer of the debate.63 Over the course of the first half year after 22 July, I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fad/pressesenter/pressemeldinger/2012/rkv.html?id=670543 and 
http://www.statsbygg.no 
63 The chapter was written and edited in the period November 2012 to March 2013. 
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wrote three articles for Norwegian newspapers and I was interviewed once.64 
I organised and lectured at two public seminars at my institution of 
affiliation, the Oslo School of Architecture and Design (AHO).65 In 
November 2011 Elisabeth Seip, at the time secretary general for The Society 
of the Preservation of Norwegian Ancient Monuments (hereafter referred to 
as Fortidsminneforeningen), asked me to advise her in the process of writing 
the part of the Statsbygg report that concerned the Government Quarter 
architecture and cultural perspectives.66 Finally, I presented a paper at the 
conference Towards a Common Past? at Lund University in May 2012.67 To 
the best of my knowledge, this chapter offers the first comprehensive 
assessment of the debate.68 
Different from the other chapters of the thesis chapter six includes several 
illustrations. They are brought in to help create an understanding of the 
architecture of the Government Quarter and related issues for readers who 
have no previous knowledge of the site and to remind those who already 
know it. Thus, they could be said to help build a spatial framework in the 
mind of the reader, which can be employed as a set of mental places, loci, for 
memorising the different arguments that I will make in relation to the 
buildings.69 
Existing scholarship 
At the time of writing, and to the best of my knowledge, no exhaustive 
reviews of Halbwachs’s oeuvre, with regard to issues of space or the spatial 
framework of memory, seem to exist.70 However, several valuable 
assessments of selected aspects do exist, often in the form of journal articles 
or book sections. Despite a widespread interest in Halbwachs and the theory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 M Ekman, ‘Et sted for å minnes’, Aftenposten Aften, 11 Aug. 2011, sec. Debatt, 16. M Ekman, ‘Merket av 
minner’, Stavanger Aftenblad, 10 Sept. 2011, sec. Debatt, 37. The same article was also published as M 
Ekman, ‘Til minne av våre verdier’, Bergens Tidende, 11 Sept. 2011, 32. I H Amundsen, ‘– Høyblokka bør bli 
minnested’, Dagsavisen, 3 Nov. 2011, sec. Samfunn, 7. M Ekman, ‘Regjeringskvartalet og minner’, 
Dagsavisen, 21 Dec. 2011, sec. Meninger, 4. 
65 The first seminar on 2 November 2011 was organised by art historian Hans-Henrik Egede-Nissen and 
myself. The second, on 12 March 2012, was organised by architects Christian Ebbesen, Lothar Diem, and 
myself. My presentations from these seminars, ‘Forsøk til resymé av perspektiver i 
Regjeringskvartaldebatten’, ‘Regjeringskvartalet og minnet om andre ting’, and ‘Site of Heritage and Site of 
Memory’ are available at http://aho.academia.edu/MattiasEkman/Papers. 
66 Statsbygg & E Seip, Regjeringskvartalet etter 22.7.2011 (Oslo, FAD, 2012). 
67 M Ekman, ‘A New Norwegian “lieu de mémoire”? The Contestation over Meaning after 22 July in the 
Government Quarter in Oslo’, Towards a Common Past?, Lund University, 14–16 May 2012. 
68 A master thesis has addressed planning policies in Oslo after 22 July 2011, touching also on some aspects of 
the debate. F Paizs, ‘Urban Planning after Terrorism. The Case of Oslo’, M.Sc. thesis, Technische Universität, 
Berlin, 2012, esp. 20–48. 
69 Cf. A memory walk through the Government Quarter in ch. 6. 
70 This study covers English and German, and, to some extent, French literature on Halbwachs.  
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of the collective memory, the spatial framework of memory has been studied 
only to a limited degree, even seen in relation to the comparable subconcept 
‘the social framework of memory’ (le cadre social de la mémoire). In the 
following I will summarise what I consider the most important of the existing 
reviews of the term. The existing assessments can, for the most part, be found 
in sociocultural memory studies and Halbwachs studies, some also in 
sociology and geography. Other assessments can be found in the history and 
theory of architecture; these will all be addressed in chapters three and four. 
In Mémoire et société, published in 1987, Gérard Namer (1928–2010) 
reviews Halbwachs’s theory of memory, including the aspects of space.71 He 
leaves aside all that is said about space and the spatial framework in Les 
Cadres sociaux de la mémoire and focuses exclusively on spatial matters in 
La Topographie légendaire and La Mémoire collective. In relation to the 
former, he stresses the dual nature of space as a framework for the memory: 
on the one hand, as an internal representation, on the other, as physical 
buildings and immovable locations, both contributing to the localisation and 
unification of disparate memory contents.72 The distinction, as I will 
demonstrate in chapter two, in relation to Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, 
is what I consider to be essential to the understanding of frameworks in 
general and to the spatial framework of memory in particular. In chapter five, 
by means of reflection on the theories of Aleida and Jan Assmann, I will 
argue for the distinction between mind-internal and mind-external 
frameworks, in this manner explicating the Halbwachsian ruminations 
assessed by Namer. 
In his analysis of La Mémoire collective Namer dwells on the construction 
of social and virtual structures of legal and economic space, which he regards 
as the truly novel aspects of Halbwachs’s thought. The notables of memory, 
for instance, notaries and their professional milieu, become the centre point 
for a society’s collective memory. As an administrator of a spatial order that 
is legitimised by the group consensus, Namer summarises Halbwachs, the 
notable guarantees ownership and control over land, of physical space, for 
the members of the group. I will return to this discussion in Notables of 
memory in chapter two. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The title of Namer’s book is the title that Maurice Halbwachs’s La Mémoire collective was prepublished 
under in L’Année sociologique. Cf. the discussion in Editions of the works by Maurice Halbwachs in this 
chapter. 
72 G Namer, Mémoire et société (Paris, Méridiens Klincksieck, 1987), 115–24. In some respects Namer’s 
reading differs from mine. I argue that for Halbwachs the spatial framework is primarily a mental order that 
societal groups deposit in material space. Out of these deposits the same group as well as others build or revise 
their spatial frameworks of memory. Cf. ch. 2, esp. Social morphology and Dual nature of space. 
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In his book History as an Art of Memory historian Patrick Hutton has 
looked at the role of space in Halbwachs’s three books on memory.73 Places 
of memory in Halbwachs’s thinking, Hutton argues, are not repositories of 
individual memory images. Instead, they enable the individual reconstruction 
of the past by their status as accumulated landmarks and points of 
convergence for social frameworks of the collective memory.74 He 
distinguishes between habit and recollection in Halbwachs’s theory: 
In habit, we bear memories forward unreflectively as commonplaces. In 
recollection, we reconstruct the past retrospectively by localizing specific 
images in relationships to these well-formed places of memory. The 
reciprocity between these two moments of memory is dynamic and ongoing. 
Places of memory, therefore, are like crossroads where habits of mind and 
particular recollections encounter and reshape one another.75 
Hutton’s formulations do not clearly indicate if the places referred to are 
physical or mental, maybe suggesting they are interrelated amalgamates. He 
does not explicitly distinguish between physical space and a spatial 
framework of memory. Nonetheless, he conveys a distinction through his 
suggestion that 
Like the mnemonists of the old [the practitioners of the art of memory], 
Halbwachs suggested that memory is a problem of mental geography in which 
the past is mapped in our minds according to its most unforgettable places … 
Halbwachs’s La Topographie [légendaire] is a study of how the memorialist 
transposes a mental map onto a topographical plane, where it becomes a 
visible landscape of memory.76 
His introduction to Halbwachs’s thinking on space in the collective memory 
includes a ten-page review of La Topographie légendaire.77 He suggests that 
Halbwachs, who had been ‘the sociologist of collective memory in Les 
Cadres sociaux in the 1920s becomes Halbwachs the historian of 
commemoration in La Topographie by the 1940s’.78 The study he regards as 
an inaugural model for historical studies of commemorative landscapes and 
of the history of tradition. 
Despite the many references to Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire Hutton 
uses the reference to the art of memory to distinguish between mental and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 P H Hutton, History as an Art of Memory (Hanover, University Press of New England, 1993), 78–84. 
74 I will return to Halbwachs’s notion of landmarks in Collective landmarks in chapter two. 
75 Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, 79. 
76 ibid., 80.  
77 ibid., 73–90. 
78 ibid., 77. 
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physical locations in Halbwachs’s writings.79 Hutton thus makes the 
suggestion that Halbwachs could be considered to stand in the tradition of the 
art of memory. My intuition, after having dealt with Halbwachs’s writings for 
some time, similarly tells me that he may have been knowledgeable of at 
least some of the basic principles of place-bound remembering in the art of 
memory. I will return to this conjecture in the section on Leibniz in chapter 
one. Hutton’s treatment of Halbwachs remains a valuable introduction to 
some of the central aspects of the spatial framework of memory as well as to 
a wider contextualisation of Halbwachs’s work in relation to later scholarship 
on architecture, memory, and history. 
Another thorough critique in French of space in Halbwachs’s thinking has 
been offered more recently by philosopher Jean-Pierre Cléro as a 
supplementary chapter in the 2008 edition of La Topographie légendaire.80 
Central to Cléro’s argument is the Leibnizian legacy in Halbwachs’s 
conception of spatial cognition and memory. With reference to Leibniz’s 
understanding of space as an entia mentalia, a mental entity, rather than a 
Cartesian space, Cléro points to the limitation of regarding space as a 
physical entity and thus a percept. At all times, larger spatial entities, 
buildings or cities, must be conceived by the help of the spatial framework of 
memory. Only a fragment of the total conception of the environment can be 
perceived at a time, leaving the rest of the conception to be constructed out of 
existing concepts. One consequence of such thinking, Cléro suggests, is that 
physical cities where we can set foot are just as fictional as cities of the 
imagination, like those of Babylon, Balbek, or Héliopolis.81 Larger entities of 
space are mental constructions and constructs, entia mentalia. I will look 
closer at his critique in the section Leibnizian influence in chapter one. 
David Middleton and Steven Brown have written an elaborated summary 
of Halbwachs’s theory of memory, with special attention to space and the 
localisation of remembering. In their argument it is clear that the spatial 
framework of memory, like the other frameworks of collective memory, are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Hutton uses Yates and the art of memory as a point of departure for tracing the mnemonic techniques into 
modern age. In his 1987 article ‘The Art of Memory Reconceived’ he sets out to ‘inquire into [the] revisioning 
of the art of memory since the eighteenth century. It will search for correspondences between the art of 
memory as it was practiced in the rhetorical tradition that culminated in the Renaissance and the use of 
memory as a technique of soul-searching in the Romantic tradition of psychology that culminates in 
psychoanalysis’. P H Hutton, ‘The Art of Memory Reconceived: From Rhetoric to Psychoanalysis’, Journal of 
the History of Ideas, 48/3 (1987), 373. Hutton’s proposal that the essential principles of the art of memory 
continue in the history discipline forms the basis of History as an Art of Memory (1993), a book with which he 
aims to be ‘raising memory in the midst of history’. Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, xv. 
80 J-P Cléro, ‘Halbwachs et l’espace fictionnel de la ville’, in M Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire des 
évangiles en Terre sainte: Étude de mémoire collective, Quadrige (1941; 1971; rev. 2nd edn, Paris, PUF, 
2008). 
81 ibid., 45*. 
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mental constructs, ‘a series of images of the past and a set of relationships 
that specify how these images are to be ordered’.82 Communities, they argue, 
let the spatial framework of the group memory inscribe itself into the 
physical space that the group occupies. Thus, they bring forward the aspect of 
territorialisation of the physical environment by the collective memory. In 
my opinion, this dynamic of the interrelation between the spatial framework 
of one group’s memory and the physical setting is of greatest importance to 
the thesis of Halbwachs, expressed in different forms in all of his three books 
on memory. However, the interrelation goes two ways. Not only does the 
spatial framework of memory alter the physical environment; the built or 
natural environment in the first place gives rise to a spatial framework of 
memory, as its topography is internalised and acted upon by the group. 
The other side of the territorialisation of memory, or the investment by 
memory in objects and places, which Middleton and Brown point to in 
Halbwachs’s theory, comes to view when the material counterpart of the 
framework disappears. In cases of displacement of people, destruction in war, 
or the demolition and redevelopment of city areas, for instance, the 
perceptual supports for the framework are destroyed, forcing the group to 
more actively sustain a spatial framework of memory that cannot anymore 
rely on an external representation of the framework. I will return to this 
aspect of Halbwachs’s thinking at different places in this study. 
The review by Middleton and Brown of space and the spatial framework of 
memory brings out some of the most relevant aspects for those with a 
concern for the built environment, like architects and urban planners, who 
wish to study Halbwachs. Because of this, and because of its 
contextualisation within the larger theory of memory, their critique offers a 
concise, and recommendable, introduction to Halbwachs and the spatial 
framework of memory. 
The article ‘Memory of Places and Places of Memory’, published by 
Gérôme Truc in 2012, differs from the other assessments in that it applies 
Halbwachs’s thinking to discussions on contemporary commemoration at 
sites of terrorism, thereby displaying motives similar to those of this thesis. It 
gives a detailed introduction to space and the spatial framework in the 
collective memory. With reference to passages in Les Cadres sociaux de la 
mémoire Truc points to Halbwachs’s distinction between vivid memory 
images of space and accumulatively acquired and abstract spatial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 D Middleton & S D Brown, ‘Memory and Space in the Work of Maurice Halbwachs’, in P Meusburger et al. 
(eds), Cultural Memories: The Geographical Point of View (Dordrecht, Springer, 2011), 33. The role of 
frameworks in the act of recollection for the individual, they assert, is the real contribution to the study of 
social memory by Halbwachs. Middleton & Brown, ‘Memory and Space’, 47. 
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frameworks. For Truc this is the difference between two different kinds of 
spatial frameworks, the one corresponding to a familiar physical 
environment, the other to a robust notion of a distant place or monument. In 
his words, it is the difference between ‘memory of places’ and ‘places of 
memory’.83 In this thesis I will argue for a different reading, suggesting that 
the spatial framework of memory’s mind-internal notion of space is 
employed by the memory, regardless if the person is present in the 
environment or is in a different location. Only by activating the 
representation in memory can an external environment be recognised as a 
place one has seen before. 
Truc contributes with a thorough introduction to Halbwachs’s thoughts on 
space and, most importantly, gives his theories a prominent place in relation 
to contemporary studies of commemorative places in sociology, 
anthropology, and history. As such, the article offers a plethora of references 
to scholars and discourses to which Halbwachs should be considered as one 
of the pioneers. I will return to Truc’s article in chapter six when I address 
the dispute over the Government Quarter in Oslo. 
Separate from scholarship on general aspects of space in Halbwachs’s 
writings on memory, the concept of topographie from La Topographie 
légendaire has been very influential in the humanities, especially in history. 
It has its own entry in the encyclopaedia Gedächtnis und Erinnerung, where 
it is defined as ‘Space, which makes the contents of the collective memory 
experienceable’.84 
Nora’s notion of les lieux de mémoire is commonly regarded as an 
elaboration of Halbwachs’s La Topographie légendaire, despite the fact that 
Nora only mentions Halbwachs en passant in his work. Tilmann Robbe 
argues convincingly that Halbwachs’s study is a central influence for Nora in 
his conception of ‘sites’, understood in a figurative sense, with which the 
nation’s most significant symbols and memories are associated.85 Jan 
Assmann suggests that there is a straight line from Halbwachs’s studies of the 
places of memory in the Holy Land to Nora and the lieux de mémoire,86 and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 G Truc, ‘Memory of Places and Places of Memory: For a Halbwachsian Socio-ethnography of Collective 
Memory’, International Social Science Journal, /203–204 (2012), 149. 
84	  G Wolf, ‘Topographie’, in N Pethes & J Ruchatz (eds), Gedächtnis und Erinnerung: Ein interdisziplinäres 
Lexikon (Reinbek, Rowohlt, 2001), 582–84, 582. My transl. 
85	  T Robbe, Historische Forschung und Geschichtsvermittlung: Erinnerungsorte in der deutschsprachigen 
Geschichtswissenschaft (Göttingen, V&R, 2009), 99–103.	  Nora and les lieux de mémoire are discussed in 
various places in chapter five, especially in Affirmative places – Gedenkorte. Cf. Nora (ed), Les Lieux de 
mémoire. For an abridged Engl. edn, see P Nora & L D Kritzman (eds), Realms of Memory: The Construction 
of the French Past, tr. A Goldhammer, 3 vols. (abridged edn, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996–
1998) [Fr. orig., Les Lieux de mémoire (1984–1992)]. 
86 J Assmann, ‘Maurice Halbwachs’, in N Pethes & J Ruchatz (eds), Gedächtnis und Erinnerung: Ein 
interdisziplinäres Lexikon (Reinbek, Rowohlt, 2001), 247–49, 248. 
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Dessingué maintains that Halbwachs, with La topographie légendaire, gives 
birth to the concept of lieux de mémoire.87 Hutton is even bolder, stating that 
‘Acknowledging the significance of Halbwachs’s work directly, Nora follows 
his method in working backward from the present – upstream if you will – to 
inventory the many traditions that have enshrined the French national 
memory’.88 This thesis, however, will pursue the study of Nora’s lieux only 
as a central reference in humanistic memory studies and for its implication 
for the writings of Aleida Assmann (see chapter five). Because of the 
comprehensive scholarship that has dealt with such sites of memory, an in-
depth investigation in this context is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Shorter introductions to the Halbwachsian conceptualisations of space and 
the spatial framework of memory have also appeared. Of the French 
contributions can be mentioned the nuanced introduction to the collective 
memory by Jean-Christophe Marcel and Laurent Mucchielli, which reviews a 
wide range of Halbwachs’s writings and gives an introduction to 
Halbwachs’s conception of space, among other aspects, not only in the three 
books on memory but also in other texts, especially in Morphologie sociale.89 
English assessments include Paul Connerton’s90 and Suzanne Vromen’s.91 
German evaluations include Jan Assmann’s,92 Dietmar Wetzel’s,93 and that of 
Wolfgang Grünberg and Anna Körs.94 There is also one Hungarian review of 
Halbwachs’s thinking, which has been translated into English.95 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 A Dessingué, ‘Towards a Phenomenology of Memory and Forgetting’, Études Ricœuriennes/Ricœur Studies, 
2/1 (2011), 169. 
88 Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, 88. 
89 J-C Marcel & L Mucchielli, ‘Un fondament du lien social: la mémoire collective selon Maurice Halbwachs’, 
Technologies. Idéologies. Pratiques. Revue d'anthropologie des connaissances, 13/2 (1999). In German as J-C 
Marcel & L Mucchielli, ‘Eine Grundlage des lien social: das kollektive Gedächtnis nach Maurice Halbwachs’, 
tr. J Ohnacker [Fr. orig. (1999)], in S Egger (ed), Maurice Halbwachs – Aspekte des Werks (Konstanz, UVK, 
2003). Cf. M Halbwachs, Morphologie sociale (Paris, Armand Colin, 1938). In English as M Halbwachs, 
Population and Society. Introduction to Social Morphology, tr. O D Duncan & H W Pfautz (Illinois, The Free 
Press, 1960) [Fr. orig., Morphologie sociale (1938)]. Abridged Ger. transl. as M Halbwachs, Soziale 
Morphologie. Ausgewählte Schriften, ed. S Egger (abridged edn, Konstanz, UVK, 2002) [Fr. orig. (1938)]. 
90 P Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge, CUP, 1989), 37. 
91 S Vromen, ‘The Sociology of Maurice Halbwachs’, Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, New York, 
1975, 216–18. 
92	  J Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen 
(1992; special edn, Munich, C.H. Beck, 1997), 38–39, 59–60.	  English translation as J Assmann, Cultural 
Memory and Early Civilization, 24–25, 44–45. 
93 D J Wetzel, Maurice Halbwachs (Konstanz, UVK, 2009), 65, 69–76. Wetzel predominantly treats space in 
La Topographie légendaire. 
94 W Grünberg & A Körs, ‘“Symbolkirchen” as Bridges or Boundary Stones in a Merging Europe’, in S 
Bergmann (ed), Theology in Built Environments (New Brunswick, Transaction, 2009), 84–87. 
95 M Zombory, Maps of Remembrance. Space, belonging and politics of memory in eastern Europe, tr. R 
Robinson (Budapest, L’Harmattan, 2012) [Hungarian orig. (2011)], 55–58. 
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Editions, translations, languages 
The major works of Halbwachs were originally published in French. Aldo 
Rossi published in Italian and Aleida and Jan Assmann’s main titles first 
appeared in German. The following will introduce the study’s selection and 
handling of source material: the choice of works, editions employed, and 
English translations. I will also discuss principles for dealing with the 
different languages as well as give an introduction to terminology. 
Editions of the works by Maurice Halbwachs 
Halbwachs published widely, often on issues of space and the city.96 This 
thesis does not attempt to cover all aspects of his theories on space, but 
focuses on the conception of space in the theory of the collective memory, 
especially seen through the lens of the spatial framework of memory. Three 
texts by Halbwachs are selected for the analysis. They constitute his major 
works on memory. 
Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire was the first work on memory that 
Halbwachs published. According to Namer, Halbwachs’s notebooks show 
that he started writing and compiling the text in 1921.97 The section that 
would become the first chapter was published in 1923 in Revue 
philosophique as ‘Le Rêve et les images-souvenirs. Contribution á une 
théorie sociologique de la mémoire’ (‘The Dream and the Memory Images. 
Contribution to a Sociological Theory of Memory’).98 The book was 
published in 1925 by Librairie Felix Alcan and reissued in 1935, 1952, 1962, 
and 1976. In 1994 Albin Michel published a facsimile of the first edition with 
a postface by Namer. I refer to the 1994 facsimile edition in this study. 
In the same year that Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire appeared 
Halbwachs started the preparations for the topic of La Topographie 
légendaire. Between 1925 and 1927, and again from 1935, he systematically 
prepared lectures on topics from the New Testament, the testimonies of 
pilgrims, etc. In 1927, and again in 1939, he travelled to Palestine.99 Presses 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 For an exhaustive bibliography of Halbwachs’s publications in French, see S Egger, ‘Bibliographie’, in S 
Egger (ed), Maurice Halbwachs – Aspekte des Werks (Konstanz, UVK, 2003). I will mainly rely on Egger’s 
bibliography. For German translations and secondary literature on Halbwachs, cf. Wetzel, Maurice 
Halbwachs, 109–20. 
97 G Namer, ‘Postface’, in M Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire (Paris, Albin Michel, 1994), 313, 
24. Namer’s postscript offers a thorough contextualisation of the coming into being of Les Cadres sociaux de 
la mémoire. 
98 M Halbwachs, ‘Le Rêve et les images-souvenirs. Contribution á une théorie sociologique de la mémoire’, 
Revue philosophique, /95 (Jan.–Feb. 1923). 
99	  M Jaisson, ‘Introduction’, in M Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire des évangiles en Terre sainte: 
Étude de mémoire collective, Quadrige (1941; 1971; rev. 2nd edn, Paris, PUF, 2008), 7*.	  Jaisson’s 
introduction provides the context for its production and publication. 
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Universitaires de France (PUF) published the book in 1941. A second 
edition, based on the same original text, was published by PUF in 1971 with 
a preface by Fernand Dumont and a bibliography.100 This thesis will rely on 
the recent edition, prepared by Marie Jaisson and published by PUF in 2008. 
It is based on and paginated like the widely referenced 1971 edition, but it 
excludes the preface and bibliography.101 Typographical errors are corrected 
and the present edition is supplemented with five essays elaborating various 
issues of Halbwachs and the concerns of La Topographie légendaire, 
including the earlier mentioned article by Cléro on space in Halbwachs’s 
work.102 It also includes a dossier on Halbwachs as well as supplementary 
material on La Topographie légendaire, such as photographs, a map, and four 
indexes to the publication. 
Directly after the publication of Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire 
Halbwachs also started to work on the manuscript for La Mémoire collective 
that would not appear until after his death. It was initiated as a sequel to Les 
Cadres sociaux de la mémoire and would partly respond to some of the 
criticism of the latter. Namer argues that it is not a continuation of his 
reasoning in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, but the opposite of it and its 
complement.103 Halbwachs produced and edited four manuscripts over a 
period of twenty years from 1925 to 1944.104 By the third manuscript of 
1935–1938 the text more or less had the form in which it is published.105 The 
manuscript of 1944, probably intended for publication, but not in a completed 
state, was first published posthumously in 1947 in L’Année sociologique 
under the title ‘Mémoire et société’.106 It would be known, however, under 
the title it had when reissued as a separate publication in 1950: La Mémoire 
collective.107 Maurice Halbwachs’s sister Jeanne Alexandre, née Halbwachs, 
and Georges Gurvitch prepared the publication. The first chapter, which had 
been published separately in Revue philosophiques in 1939, was excluded.108 
Subtitles to the chapters, which had not been originally intended, were added, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  M Jaisson, ‘Note sur l’établissement du texte’, in M Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire des évangiles 
en Terre sainte: Étude de mémoire collective, Quadrige (1941; 1971; rev. 2nd edn, Paris, PUF, 2008), 167. 
101	  ibid., 168. 
102	  J-P Cléro, ‘Halbwachs et l’espace fictionnel de la ville’, in M Halbwachs, ibid. 
103	  G Namer, ‘Postface’, in M Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective (crit. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997), 266–
67. 
104 ibid., 239–40. 
105 ibid., 253. In her notice introducing the 1950 publication of La Mémoire collective Halbwachs’s sister 
Jeanne Alexandre points to that Halbwachs, over the years of editing, neither revised the overall structure, nor 
polished the style or supplemented the manuscript with an introduction and a conclusion. J Alexandre, 
‘Avertissement’, in M Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective (Paris, PUF, 1950), [i]. 
106	  M Halbwachs, ‘Mémoire et société’, L’Année sociologique (1940–1948), 3rd ser., 1 (1947). 
107	  M Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, ed. J Alexandre & G Gurvitch (Paris, PUF, 1950) [orig., ‘Mémoire 
et société’ (1947)]. 
108	  M Halbwachs, ‘La Mémoire collective chez les musiciens’, Revue philosophiques, /127 (Mar.–Apr. 1939). 
Edifices 
 36 
and passages that the editors called ‘too unaccomplished’ (trop inachevés) 
were omitted, accounting to about thirty pages.109 It does not consider the 
various versions of the manuscript. A second, revised edition appeared in 
1968 on PUF. 
In 1997 a critical edition appeared on Albin Michel, prepared by Namer in 
collaboration with Jaisson and had the title La Mémoire collective under 
which the book had become known. The excluded chapter, ‘La mémoire 
collective chez les musiciens’, was reintroduced as the first chapter. The 
subtitles were removed; the same applied to typographical changes made by 
the earlier editors. The omitted passages were brought back into the text. 
Chapter 5, ‘La mémoire collective et l’espace’, the most relevant for this 
study, represents approximately seven pages. The last insertion extends the 
conclusion from less than two pages to more than five, compared to the 1950 
edition. 189 variations of the text in the different manuscripts were inserted 
as notes on the pages; 45 of those concern the chapter on space. Namer says 
of the first critical edition that it is as complete as possible with regard to 
variations of the set of manuscripts available.110 This study will use the 1997 
critical edition for reference. 
Translations of the works by Maurice Halbwachs 
One reason for the limited concern with the term spatial framework of 
memory in the English-speaking field of memory studies seems to be that 
Halbwachs’s texts have only in part been translated into English. I will 
introduce the various complications that concern the English translations, as 
these are the reason why I will rely on the French texts in this study and, 
consequently, my own translations of original quotations.  
Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire exists only in an abbreviated English 
translation. The 1952 edition appeared in 1992 as ‘The Social Frameworks of 
Memory’ in Coser’s anthology On Collective Memory at the University of 
Chicago Press.111 Whereas the last four chapters are translated in the full, the 
first four, which cover 145 pages in the first French edition, are condensed 
into thirteen pages.112 In total, only about half of the original text has been 
translated. The omitted sections in chapter three include some of 
Halbwachs’s main elaborations of the frameworks of the collective memory, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Alexandre, ‘Avertissement [La Mémoire collective 1950]’, [i]; G Namer, ‘Préface’, in M Halbwachs, La 
Mémoire collective (crit. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997), 8. 
110	  G Namer, ‘Avertissement’, in M Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective (crit. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997), 
13. 
111	  M Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. L A Coser (abridged edn, Chicago, UCP, 1992) [Fr. orig., Les 
Cadres sociaux de la mémoire (2nd edn, 1952), La Topographie légendaire des évangiles en Terre Sainte 
(1941)]. 
112 See the comments on the editing in ibid., 37, 41, 43, 46, 52, 54, and 193. 
Introduction 
 37 
including some of the central discussions of the spatial framework of 
memory.113 Some parts of the omissions with a reference to space and the 
city have been translated into English in Marot’s Sub-urbanism and the Art of 
Memory.114 Because of its title, On Collective Memory, Coser’s anthology 
has also been mistaken for the translation of La Mémoire collective.115 
Of La Topographie légendaire only the concluding chapter of ten in the 
first 1941 edition has been translated. It is included as ‘The Legendary 
Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land’ in Coser’s On Collective 
Memory. The short translated text has been mistaken for the whole original 
book.116 While most of his theoretical reflections are summarised in the final 
chapter, there are also valuable reflections in other parts of the book, 
especially in the introduction that outlines the objectives of the study. 
A full translation of the 1950 publication of La Mémoire collective was 
published as The Collective Memory in 1980.117 It was rendered into English 
by Francis J. Ditter Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter. An excerpt from the translation 
has appeared in Theories of Memory: A Reader, and another in The 
Collective Memory Reader.118 The Collective Memory has been mistaken for 
the translation of Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire.119 
John Sutton argues that inadequate translations are one of the reasons for 
the critique of Halbwachs’s concepts as vague and for the ‘ongoing and 
damaging lack of contact between the cognitive and the social sciences’ on 
the topic of Halbwachs.120 The editors of the Collective Memory Reader have 
pointed to the incomplete English translations of Halbwachs’s original texts 
as well as to the lack of full-length critical studies of his works in English.121 
They have also pointed to the lack of English translations of recent French 
and German scholarship on Halbwachs.122 Furthermore, even if the limited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 83–113. John Sutton points out that the omitted passages also include most 
of the relevant material that could help bridge the gap between cognitive and social sciences. J Sutton, 
‘Remembering’, in P Robbins & M Aydede (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 2009), 224. 
114 Marot, Sub-urbanism and the Art of Memory, 30–32. 
115 Dessingué, ‘Towards a Phenomenology of Memory and Forgetting’, 172–73. 
116 Middleton & Brown, ‘Memory and Space’, 36. 
117 M Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, ed. M Douglas, tr. F J Ditter Jr. & V Y Ditter (New York, Harper & 
Row, 1980) [Fr. orig. (1950)]. It is out of print at the time of writing and costly to buy used. 
118 M Halbwachs, ‘From The Collective Memory’ [Fr. orig. (1950)], in M Rossington & A Whitehead (eds), 
Theories of Memory: a Reader (Edinburgh, EUP, 2007); M Halbwachs, ‘From The Collective Memory’ [Fr. 
orig. (1950)], in J K Olick et al. (eds), The Collective Memory Reader (New York, Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
119 Brown, et al., ‘Introduction’, 119. 
120 Sutton, ‘Remembering’, 224. 
121 Olick, et al., ‘Introduction’, 25. This thesis supports their argument, displaying references to numerous 
German and French studies of Halbwachs but fewer to English. 
122 J K Olick, et al., ‘Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945)’, in J K Olick et al. (eds), The Collective Memory 
Reader (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011), 139. 
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translations could explain the limited number of studies of the spatial 
framework of memory, it would not explain why there is so little interest in 
the spatial framework, also by French and German scholars, who have the 
full texts at their disposal.123 
Because of the variable extent to which the texts have been translated and 
the use of a simpler language than in the original, in particular of the 
translation of La Mémoire collective, I will refer to the French original texts 
throughout the thesis. All translations from French are mine and any incorrect 
rendering or misinterpretation is my responsibility. The French original 
quotations have not been included for comparison in the footnotes to avoid 
increasing the size of the study unnecessarily. Yet, I have included the 
original wordings of specific terms, phrases, and concepts, where 
appropriate, for comparison and better understanding. The three French 
editions used for reference are readily available in bookshops and libraries 
for anyone who should wish to compare with the original. Those who have 
previously read Halbwachs in English translation may react to some of the 
translations. Often cited passages appear in different guise in this context, 
especially those from La Mémoire collective. For the sake of clarity in the 
argumentation I have opted for literal translations rather than idiomatic, 
where there was a choice, gaining in the resemblance with the original style 
of Halbwachs, but maybe losing in eloquence. I will attempt to compensate 
for the many omissions in the existing English translation of Les Cadres 
sociaux de la mémoire by being generous in my quoting from the French 
original, demonstrating the complexity and detail of Halbwachs’s thinking on 
space, aspects of which have been overlooked or neglected in previous 
attempts to review and apply his theory. 
With regard to the central terminology of Halbwachs, the term ‘collective 
memory’ has established itself as the translation of ‘mémoire collective’, 
leaving aside the different connotations of the term in different discourses. 
Similarly, ‘cadre’ has been established as ‘framework’ in English, giving the 
‘social’, ‘temporal’, and ‘spatial framework of memory’. The English 
translations of Halbwachs’s three books on memory all consistently refer to 
‘collective memory’ and the ‘frameworks of memory’. I will follow this 
established practice. In the recent English translations of Aleida and Jan 
Assmann’s main works, the German ‘Rahmen’ – Assmann’s translation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 German publications include, but are not restricted to, full translations of the three books on memory: 
Halbwachs, Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen; M Halbwachs, Stätten der Verkündigung im 
Heiligen Land: Eine Studie zum kollektiven Gedächtnis, ed. S Egger (Konstanz, UVK, 2003) [Fr. orig., La 
Topographie légendaire des évangiles en Terre sainte (1941)]; M Halbwachs, Das kollektive Gedächtnis, tr. H 
Lhoest-Offermann (1967; repr. edn, Frankfurt am Main, Fischer Wissenschaft, 1985) [Fr. orig. (1950)]. 
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‘cadre’ – has alternately been translated into ‘framework’ and ‘frame’.124 The 
inconsistency may limit the reader’s possibility of spotting the specific 
Halbwachsian concept behind the term. 
The works and translations of Kevin Lynch and Aldo Rossi 
Kevin Lynch’s The Image of the City was published by MIT Press in 1960 
and it is, by the time of writing, still available in new prints of the first 
edition.125 What Time is This Place? first appeared on MIT Press in 1972, and 
subsequent reissues have appeared in 1976, 1985, and 1998. I refer to the first 
edition.126 
Aldo Rossi’s L’architettura della città first appeared on Marsilio in 1966, 
in the same series as the Italian translation of Lynch’s The Image of the City. 
Subsequent Italian editions appeared in 1970, 1973, and 1978, the last of 
which supplied the book with many new illustrations and references and 
included several forewords from different Italian and foreign editions. In 
1995, in collaboration with Rossi, the book was re-edited, removing 
forewords, illustrations, and added citations.127 The 1995 edition was reissued 
by Quodlibet in 2011 and complemented with a bibliography as well as an 
index of places and architectural works as well as one of names. 
An English translation, based on the fourth Italian edition from 1978, 
appeared as The Architecture of the City on MIT Press in 1982.128 Paperback 
prints of that edition are still for sale at the time of writing. I regret that my 
non-existent proficiency in Italian has meant that I have had to rely on the 
English edition. In some cases, where appropriate, I have provided the 
original wordings, in the same manner as for Halbwachs. For the main 
concepts I will refer to the Italian terms in the 2011 edition. The impossibility 
of studying the Italian original is admittedly a weakness. Without training in 
Italian, though, I can observe that shorter passages in the Italian original 
simply have been omitted in the English edition.129 Because of the main 
emphasis on Halbwachs in this thesis, and since the study of Rossi deals with 
the historiography and conceptual evolution of Halbwachs’s theory, I have 
not prioritised the issue, but hope that the present study nevertheless 
contributes to a re-evaluation of Rossi’s treatment of Halbwachs’s theories. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Cf. e.g. J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 22–23; J Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis, 
36–37. 
125 K Lynch, The Image of the City (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1960). 
126 Lynch, What Time is This Place? 
127	  A Rossi, L’architettura della città (1966; repub. 1st edn, Macerata, Quodlibet, 2011), [viii]–[ix]. 
128 On the translation of the book, see Critique of the Rossian theory of memory in ch. 4. 
129 E.g. most of the first paragraph of the section on the collective memory has been left out in the English 
translation: Rossi, L’architettura della città, 148; Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 130. 
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The works and translations of Aleida Assmann and Jan Assmann 
Both prominent memory students in the humanities, literature scholar Aleida 
Assmann and Egyptologist Jan Assmann have since the late 1980s produced 
a significant body of work that outlines and elaborates their jointly conceived 
model of communicative memory and cultural memory. Introduced in three 
articles in 1988, the theory was established in detail by the publication of Jan 
Assmann’s Das kulturelle Gedächtnis in 1992 and Aleida Assmann’s 
Erinnerungsräume in 1999, both by C.H. Beck.130 In 2011 the latter two were 
published in English as Cultural Memory and Early Civilization and Cultural 
Memory and Western Civilization.131 Few of their other publications have 
appeared in English. In 2008, however, the anthology Cultural Memory 
Studies, edited by Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, introduced their theory to 
English readers with Jan Assmann’s ‘Communicative and Cultural Memory’ 
and Aleida Assmann’s ‘Canon and Archive’. The two texts offer concise 
summaries of some of the main theoretical points in Das kulturelle 
Gedächtnis and Erinnerungsräume and can be recommended as introductions 
to their theories.132 
My study will be based on Das kulturelle Gedächtnis and 
Erinnerungsräume, but will occasionally refer to other publications when I 
believe that they complement or expand the conceptualisations of the main 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 J Assmann, ‘Kollektives Gedächtnis und kulturelle Identität’, in J Assmann & T Hölscher (eds), Kultur und 
Gedächtnis (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1988); A Assmann & J Assmann, ‘Schrift, Tradition und Kultur’, 
in W Raible (ed), Zwischen Festtag und Alltag. Zehn Beiträge zum Thema ‘Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit’ 
(Tübingen, Narr, 1988); J Assmann, ‘Stein und Zeit. Das “monumentale” Gedächtnis der altägyptischen 
Kultur’, in J Assmann & T Hölscher (eds), Kultur und Gedächtnis (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1988). 
‘Kollektives Gedächtnis und kulturelle Identität’ has appeared in English as J Assmann, ‘Collective Memory 
and Cultural Identity’, tr. J Czaplicka, New German Critique, /65 (1995). Although Aleida and Jan Assmann 
can be credited with the prevailing definition of the term cultural memory, at least in the German discourse, it 
should be noted that the second part of Namer’s book Mémoire et société (1987) is titled Les instutitions de 
mémoire culturelle and contains chapters on the practice of the cultural memory of institutions like libraries 
and museums. His concept bears strong resemblance to that of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s, and like their 
concept it is suggested as an extension and complementary term to Halbwachs’s collective memory, treated in 
depth in the first part of his book. Namer, Mémoire et société. Jan Assmann has mentioned that the term was 
first proposed at the end of the 1970s within the context of a conference on the literary text. J Assmann, 
Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 7. 
131 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization; A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western 
Civilization. According to Jan Assmann, the two books had been planned as a common enterprise. ‘It is only 
now, in its English version and at its new home with Cambridge University Press, that our original concept is 
realized and the two parts reunite, not between two covers but as a pair belonging together and complementing 
each other’. J Assmann, ‘Foreword (2010)’, tr. D H Wilson, in J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early 
Civilization. Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination (Cambridge, CUP, 2011), xii. 
132 A Assmann, ‘Canon and Archive’, tr. S B Young, in A Erll & A Nünning (eds), Cultural Memory Studies: 
An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2008); J Assmann, 
‘Communicative and Cultural Memory’, tr. S B Young, in A Erll & A Nünning (eds), Cultural Memory 
Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2008). 
Introduction 
 41 
books.133 With Jan Assmann’s book I will sketch out the model of 
communicative memory and cultural memory, with Aleida Assmann the 
model of function memory and storage memory. I will also base the study of 
terms that function as distinctions of the spatial framework of memory on the 
latter. 
The translations by David Henry Wilson come in clear and fluent English, 
and I will generally use them as references for the study. The terms 
‘communicative memory’ and ‘cultural memory’ work well in English and 
the link to the original German terms is obvious.134 The same applies to 
‘functional memory’ (‘Funktionsgedächtnis’) and ‘storage memory’ 
(‘Speichergedächtnis’).135 I will use these terms. 
When it comes to Aleida Assmann’s terminology of places and spaces of 
memory, it becomes more complex. Even if Wilson’s language transports the 
general meaning of the original text, he and the authors cannot compensate 
for the fact that the German and English terms have their own linguistic and 
culture-specific connotations. ‘Ort’ may translate as ‘place’, but in some 
contexts it can read as ‘location’, ‘locality’, or ‘site’. When it comes to 
concepts like ‘Erinnerungsorte’, ‘Gedenkorte’, or ‘Gedächtnisorte’, Aleida 
Assmann’s terminology runs the risk of losing its precision when it takes a 
new form with already heavily coloured concepts like ‘sites of memory’, 
‘places of commemoration’, or ‘places of memory’. They could literally 
imply the same, but have been construed differently in the German and 
Anglo-American memory discourses.136 While the translation of the two 
books contributes to the fusion of discourses, it also risks contributing to the 
confusion of them. The fact that some German terms unfortunately have been 
translated into the same English terms adds to this. For example, ‘Örter der 
Gedächtniskunst’, ‘Erinnerungsorte’, and ‘Gedenkorte’ have all been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 In their many texts elaborating on the communicative memory and cultural memory, naturally, there are 
also differences and changes in the concepts and the terminology. It is not within the scope of this thesis to 
address critically such divergences. When I make use of formulations from other texts than the specified I will 
regard them as supplementary definitions or clarifications of the one Assmann theory. On this topic, cf. e.g. H 
Winkler, ‘Das Unbewusste der Kultur?’, Erwägen Wissen Ethik, 13/2 (2002), 270; G Winthrop-Young, 
‘Zwischen Nil und Net’, Erwägen Wissen Ethik, 13/2 (2002), 272. 
134 Even though ‘Kultur’ and ‘culture’ have their own conceptual history. Erll comments on the English 
translation of the German term ‘kulturelles Gedächtnis’: ‘the term “cultural” does not designate a specific 
affinity to Cultural Studies as conceived and practiced by the Birmingham School (although this discipline has 
certainly contributed to cultural memory studies). Our notion of culture is instead more rooted in the German 
tradition of the study of cultures (Kulturwissenschaft) and in anthropology, where culture is defined as a 
community’s specific way of life, led within its self-spun webs of meaning’. Erll, ‘Cultural Memory Studies: 
An Introduction’, 4. 
135 They have previously been translated as ‘working memory’ and ‘reference memory’ as well as ‘canon’ and 
‘archive’. See A Assmann, ‘Canon and Archive’. 
136 Nora’s term ‘lieu de mémoire’ and its English and German translations have contributed to the formation of 
the German as well as the English concepts treated here. Therefore, throughout the thesis I will refer to the 
French ‘lieu de mémoire’ when I refer specifically to his concept. 
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translated into ‘places of memory’ in different places in the text.137 Similarly, 
‘Erinnerungsorte’ finds its equivalent not only in ‘places of memory’ but 
also ‘places of historical memory’, and ‘sites of memory’.138 In the thesis, 
consequently, I will refer to the English edition for general reference. For 
specific references to the conceptualisations of space and memory, like those 
exemplified above, I will use the original German terms. I quote from the 
English translation but indicate within brackets the original terms, for 
example: ‘… places of memory [Erinnerungsorte] …’. By doing so, I hope to 
make the text accessible to English readers, while at the same time adhering 
to the specificity of Aleida Assmann’s original terminology.139 I refer to the 
2003 special paperback edition (broschierte Sonderausgabe) of 
Erinnerungsräume. 
Use of terms 
I generally use ‘term’ to refer to a specific wording and ‘concept’ to denote a 
small-scale theory implied by the term of a specific scholar. This distinction 
lies behind my usage of single quotation marks around a word (e.g. 
‘memory’) to point to the specific use of the term and italics the first time I 
introduce a concept that may carry quite different connotations than its 
general understanding (e.g. environmental image). Italics are further used for 
foreign words (e.g. kulturelles Gedächtnis). 
Some of the specific terminology has been addressed in the previous 
section. Concepts like mémoire collective, environmental image, fatto 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 296, 322; A Assmann, Erinnerungsräume: 
Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses (1999; special edn, Munich, C.H. Beck, 2003), 313, 
37. The German formulation ‘Das Gedächtnis der Orte unterscheidet sich jedoch deutlich von den Örtern des 
Gedächtnisses. Während nämlich das Gedächtnis der Orte an eine bestimmte Stelle fixiert ist … zeichnen sich 
die Örter der Gedächtniskunst gerade durch ihre Übertragbarkeit aus’ has been translated into ‘The memory of 
places, however, is very different from places of memory. Whereas the memory of places is firmly fixed to one 
particular location … places of memory are distinguished by the very fact that they are transferable’. The 
translation misses the point that the ‘Örter des Gedächtnisses’ and ‘Örter der Gedächtniskunst’ connote the 
mental places, loci, in the tradition of the art of memory. A Assmann, Erinnerungsräume, 313; A Assmann, 
Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 296. A place of memory, as in the translation of the term 
Erinnerungsort, comparably, is not at all transferable but fixed: ‘Sites of memory [Erinnerungsorte] differ 
from monuments [Denkmäler], memorials [Gedenkstätten], and rituals [Gedenkrituale] in that they are never 
fully congruous with the meaning given to them in retrospect. As historical sites [historische Schauplätze] with 
their sparse material relics, they are still, for all the symbolic interpretation and exploitation, more than just 
symbols because they are also themselves. While cultural symbols [kulturelle Zeichensetzungen] may be built 
up and pulled down, the durability of places [Persistenz von Orten] – which cannot be made to disappear 
completely even in a new geopolitical order – demands a longterm memory’. A Assmann, Erinnerungsräume, 
337; A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 321. 
138 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 321, 22, 23; A Assmann, Erinnerungsräume, 337, 
38. 
139 Furthermore, it should be noted that Aleida Assmann also sometimes alternates the use of the terms, 
especially between different texts. To a certain degree, thus, this study will create its own idiosyncratic 
construal of her conceptualisations. 
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urbano, or kulturelles Gedächtnis will be defined as the argument develops. 
Some more general terms, however, may require a brief explanation. While 
the use of language is dynamic and changes according to the context, the 
following indicates general positions rather than clear definitions. 
There is an important distinction in the thesis between mental 
representations or images of space in memory, which Halbwachs’s referred 
to as spatial framework of memory (cadre spatial de la mémoire), and 
environments that can be seen, touched, built, or razed, and which appear to 
the mind as percepts. Halbwachs refers to the latter as material framework 
(cadre matériel), external environment (milieu exterieur), or material 
surrounds (entourage matériel). I also refer to it with terms like ‘built 
environment’, ‘physical surroundings’, ‘material environment’, and the like. 
As the argument develops, for acts of remembering I will suggest a 
distinction between the former as mind-internal and the latter as mind-
external frameworks of memory. 
The term ‘architecture’ I keep as a more general term to refer to material 
and form aspects as well as to cultural and historical aspects, in the spirit of 
Rossi’s L’architettura della città. The same applies to ‘city’. I also let 
‘architecture’ refer to products of design and planning processes and denote 
the profession of architects and the discipline of architectural history and 
theory. ‘Space’ and ‘spatial’ I use in a general sense for any three-
dimensional structure. ‘Place’ and ‘site’ are reserved for topographical 
distinctions, to refer to here and not there. Therefore, two identical houses in 
a street may provide the same spatial experience, but in two different places. 
In addition to the specific concepts of memory, any text needs the general 
terminology. I use ‘memory’ (without article) to indicate the faculty of 
remembering, the capacity of the mind to encode, store, and retrieve 
information.140 Figuratively I use the word also for the processes of groups, 
societies, and cultures, then in relation to the specific terms used in the 
particular context. ‘A memory’, ‘the memory’, ‘memories’, ‘memory image(-
s)’, ‘remembrance(-s)’, and ‘recollection(-s)’ denote a hypothetical object or 
unit in ‘memory’, information stored or retrieved.141 However, as will 
become clear in chapters one and five, this thesis subscribes to theories of 
memory that see remembering as processes of reconstruction and 
interpretation in the present rather than the retrieval of original and 
untouched memory images. Consequently, I may speak of the memory(-ies) 
of my parents or of a certain event as a convenient abstraction and not with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Cf. the distinctions of ‘memory’ proposed in E Tulving, ‘Concepts of Memory’, in E Tulving & F I M 
Craik (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Memory (Oxford, OUP, 2000), 36. 
141 Biologist Richard Semon referred to such units as engrams. Cf. Cultural Memory in ch. 5. 
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reference to a store of memory images in my mind. Finally, ‘memory 
activity’, ‘remember’, ‘recall’, ‘recollect’, ‘retrieve’, ‘reconstruct’, and 
inflections of these words refer to processes of activating and making 
understandable such ‘memories’. I use ‘social’, ‘societal’ and ‘sociocultural 
memory’ as general terms referring to socially and culturally conditioned 
remembering, but keep ‘collective memory’ exclusively to refer to 
Halbwachs’s concept mémoire collective and ‘communicative memory’ and 
‘cultural memory’ as the English terms for Aleida and Jan Assmann’s 
concepts kommunikatives Gedächtnis and kulturelles Gedächtnis. 
‘Image’ is a multifaceted word. I cannot discuss all aspects of it here, but I 
can at least point to some of them. I primarily employ the word as a synonym 
for the spatial framework of memory, to refer to a representation or 
construction of space in mind. Thus, I follow the practices of Halbwachs (Fr. 
‘image’) as well as Rossi (It. ‘immàgine’).142 When I use image, 
consequently, it does not for the most part refer to vivid and two-dimensional 
picture-like objects of the mind, but rather to three-dimensional, abstract, and 
collage-like conceptions that people have of an environment. The other 
central meaning of the term ‘image’ is in many respects related to 
Halbwachs’s. It is the image that is defined by people like Kepes, Lynch, and 
K. E. Boulding and which will be discussed in chapter three.143 
I have no rule for the use of ‘I’ and ‘we’. I try to use ‘I’ when I refer to my 
arguments or my reading of other people’s arguments (but I may occasionally 
also use ‘the thesis’ or ‘the study’ instead of ‘I’). With ‘we’ I tend to include 
myself in the readership of other authors; occasionally I use ‘we’ in the hope 
of drawing the reader along with me in the argument. 
Thesis structure 
The thesis contains a preparatory introduction, six chapters with the treatise 
and a conclusion that summarises and discusses the findings. The 
Introduction addresses the conditions for the study. Chapter one introduces 
the collective memory as a theoretical basis for the spatial framework of 
memory. Chapter two makes a reading of the original concept. Chapters 
three and four contextualise the term as it enters architectural theory and 
looks at its developments. Chapter five expands the theory through its 
transformation in newer theories in memory studies. Altogether, the five 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Cf. generally ch. 2 and specifically Maurice Halbwachs and L’architettura della città in ch. 4. 
143 For a historiography of the term in this context, see A Rapoport, Human Aspects of Urban Form. Towards a 
Man-Environment Approach to Urban Form and Design (Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1977), 40–47. Cf. also K 
Wagner, ‘Die visuelle Ordnung der Stadt. Das Bild der Stadt bei Kevin Lynch’, in C Jöchner (ed), Räume der 
Stadt. Von der Antike bis heute (Berlin, Reimer, 2008), esp. 319. 
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chapters establish the spatial framework of memory as a theoretical 
framework for studies of architecture and memory. It is a construal and 
amalgamation of thought and a historiography of the concept’s development. 
Chapter six exemplifies the applicability of the theoretical framework on a 
concrete case and lets the empirical material contribute to the discussion of 
the terminology. The Conclusion summarises and points to complementary 
studies and applications. 
Chapter contents 
The Introduction has established the intellectual background for the thesis 
and outlined the areas of scholarship in which it finds its theoretical 
foundation. It has further introduced the object of study and touched on its 
objectives, the interdisciplinary approach, existing scholarship, and source 
material. It has given the reader an indication of the aim of the thesis and how 
I propose to get there. 
Chapter one establishes an understanding of the scholar Maurice 
Halbwachs and his memory theory. I trace the legacy of his thought in three 
intellectual forefathers, Bergson, Leibniz, and Durkheim. After that I 
introduce the collective memory and the frameworks on which the theory 
depends. I touch on the conceptual pairs of ‘memory’-‘history’ and 
‘remembering’-‘forgetting’ and appraise some of the critique of the collective 
memory. The chapter provides a theoretical contextualisation needed in order 
to appreciate the spatial framework of memory in its complexity. 
In chapter two I treat the spatial framework of memory that Halbwachs 
developed in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, La Topographie légendaire, 
and La Mémoire collective. I follow the continuation of thought throughout 
the works and let each book elaborate on different facets of the term. I 
understand the development of the spatial framework of memory in the three 
books to be complementary. In my reading, the three books offer a concept of 
general postulations and specific distinctions. 
 Chapter three discusses the intellectual environment of the architectural 
discourse in the 1950s and 1960s and changes to conceptions of the past, 
including terms like ‘history’, ‘tradition’, and ‘memory’. I follow the spatial 
framework of memory and the theory of the collective memory as they enter 
the architectural discourse through the writings of Lynch and into the 
intellectual environment of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). 
I look at The Image of the City and What Time is this Place? and consider the 
legacy of Halbwachs in Lynch’s conceptualisation of the environmental 
image. I argue that, despite promising theoretical reflections on questions 
initially raised by Halbwachs, Lynch does not manage to make productive the 
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sociocultural implications of the environmental image. However, Lynch 
establishes an understanding of a basic level of perception and way-finding 
for the concept spatial framework of memory. 
Next, in chapter four, I turn to Rossi’s L’architettura della città, one of the 
most influential books on postmodern architecture. I argue that the spatial 
framework of memory comes to occupy a prominent position at the centre of 
Rossi’s conceptualisation of the city as a product of cultural collectives. I 
argue that Rossi has a better appreciation of Halbwachs’s theory than he is 
able to put into words, or the translators are able to render into English, and I 
point to some valuable distinctions to the concept fatto urbano, the potential 
of which, to my meaning, has not been fully recognised. I discuss the critique 
of Rossi’s and Halbwachs’s theories of memory in architecture and argue 
against the problematic construal of space and collective memory that Rossi’s 
book wrongfully has spurred. 
Chapter five follows a different itinerary, as Halbwachs’s theories enter the 
memory studies in the German Kulturwissenschaften, where they come to 
make up the backbone of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s joint theory of 
communicative memory and cultural memory. The chapter enables a two-
fold elaboration of the spatial framework of memory. In the first place, with 
Aleida and Jan Assmann’s conceptual pair, it is possible to distinguish 
between two modes of operation: the communicative memory addresses the 
role of architecture in informal and everyday remembering and the cultural 
memory its status in the formation and formalisation of society and culture. I 
propose to distinguish between mind-internal and mind-external frameworks 
of memory. The former correspond to Halbwachs’s frameworks of memory 
(social, spatial, temporal, linguistic, historical, etc.), the latter to his notion of 
external or material frameworks; they are artefacts like books, buildings, or 
cities, which act as cognitive catalysts in acts of recollection. 
Further, I propose to distinguish between explicit frameworks, where the 
materiality of architecture points to the past by means of decoration, style, or 
physical marks, and implicit frameworks, where architecture forms the 
reference point for mnemonic activities, but do not bear witness to the 
memory function in its form. I further show, with Aleida and Jan Assmann, 
how it is possible to replace the Halbwachsian ‘memory’-‘history’ dichotomy 
with a perspectival model of functional memory and storage memory, with 
the prospect of addressing issues of both memory and history and of 
remembering and forgetting in relation to the spatial framework of memory. I 
follow up the considerations with a review of a selection of conceptual 
distinctions in the writings of Aleida Assmann, exact notions in a cultural 
memory landscape that offer concise shortcuts to the general concept. 
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Chapter six takes on a different character than the previous. Based on 
empirical material and first-hand observation it addresses the debate about 
the buildings of the Government Quarter in Oslo after a bomb damaged them 
on 22 July 2011. I argue that the debate essentially is an expression of the 
contestation over meaning associated with architecture, and that it can be 
dissected and analysed with the help of the theoretical framework of the 
spatial framework of memory. A number of conceptual distinctions, which 
have been developed in the thesis, I bring to bear on the debate to point to the 
many kinds of spatial frameworks of memory that come to establish a 
connection to the singular, material site, the material framework. The chapter 
indicates the prospect of distinguishing between the many roles architecture 
can take when it is employed as a spatial framework for societal memory. It 
argues that the processes involving the spatial framework of memory in the 
dispute suggest that they are changing and on the move, over time and 
between groups and in relation to other cultural contexts. I argue that 
architecture in culture is not fixed and permanent, but dynamic and 
travelling. 
The Conclusion summarises the spatial framework of memory and 
provides a schematic overview of the central postulations and distinctions. It 
further suggests possible areas of study that could outline additional aspects 
of the concept. I discuss how the spatial framework of memory can be used 
to address the gamut of architecture’s dynamic roles in social and cultural 
remembering, for use in architecture, urban planning, cultural heritage 
studies, and memory studies. 
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Collective memory 
Like the Pantheon in the Roman Empire accommodates all cults, 
provided that they are cults, society accepts all traditions (also the 
most recent) provided that they are traditions. It also accepts all 
ideas (also the most ancient) provided that they are ideas, that is, 
that they have a place in its thought and that they still interest the 
people of today who appreciate them. From this follows that social 
thought is essentially a memory, and that its entire contents is 
made of nothing but collective recollections, but that among them 
only those subsist that are possible to reconstruct in every period 
of society, working within the current frameworks. 
— Maurice Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, 19251 
With theories of collective memory the academic study of remembrance 
changed scales. In the early 1900s memory was primarily analysed as an 
individual capability. With scholars like Maurice Halbwachs enquiries into 
memory took on more complex challenges.2 Not only does his theory assume 
as a fact that individual memory in essence is conditioned by social milieus, 
but it also comes to address recollection from the perspective of society. It 
enables analyses of how religions, professions, and families fundamentally 
are social aggregates of individuals who remember in groups, institutionally 
or informally. 
This chapter lays the theoretical foundation on which the spatial framework 
of memory rests. In the Introduction I pointed to how theoretical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 M Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, ed. G Namer (1925; facs. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1994), 
296. 
2 Other voices also advocated social and cultural perspectives of memory before Halbwachs and in his lifetime. 
See e.g. the selection of texts in ‘Part I. Precursors and Classics’ in J K Olick, et al. (eds), The Collective 
Memory Reader (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011), 63–176. Cf. also Context in the Introduction. 
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developments in the twentieth century have established a sociocultural 
vantage point for contemplating memory. Halbwachs’s postulation of a 
socially conditioned memory stands as one of the central premises. Most 
subsequent scholarship on social memory builds on or positions itself in 
relation to Halbwachs. To isolate the study of the spatial framework of 
memory from the collective memory is therefore not practicable, nor 
desirable. In my reading of the concept, therefore, the collective memory 
stands as a premise. I will give a portrait of the key postulates of the theory, 
addressing its merits and shortcomings, in order to lay the foundation for the 
theoretical framework of studies of architecture and memory that I propose. 
One must subscribe to the general validity of the former in order to recognise 
the virtues of the latter. Considering the remarkable success of Halbwachs’s 
memory theory in the humanities and social sciences, I do not believe that it 
is to take it too far, especially not if the premise is accepted on the condition 
that subsequent scholarship, which critically reformulates some of his 
positions, is welcomed and appreciated.3 
To understand the coming into being of the theory of collective memory I 
will first outline the intellectual context in which Halbwachs developed his 
thinking and from where it drew its logic. What role did the thinking of his 
mentors play in his formulation of a collective memory? Subscribing to the 
collective memory as a foundational theory has certain implications for the 
understanding of the spatial framework of memory. One important aspect, 
which I will discuss at length, is the collective aspect of memory and how it 
ought to be construed not to run the risk of being interpreted as a categorical 
position that favours social perspectives over individual. Neither should the 
social be regarded as the antithesis of the individual or as a metaphor. 
Another aspect is the central role that the frameworks of memory take in 
Halbwachs’s thinking. While he shares the assumption with some other 
contemporaries, it certainly opposes fundamentally the prominent theory of 
memory put forward by his teacher Henri Bergson. This chapter will address 
the general role of frameworks for collective remembering and describe their 
general characteristics. Woven into these discussions I will also touch on 
issues of history in relation to collective memory and of how forgetting 
becomes closely bound up to the sustenance of the frameworks. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In this chapter, such contributions are discussed in Critique of the collective memory and Frameworks of 
memory. The model of communicative memory and cultural memory by Aleida and Jan Assmann remains the 
most relevant in the context of this thesis. See esp. Communicative memory in ch. 5. 
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Maurice Halbwachs and the intellectual environment 
Maurice Halbwachs (Fr.: [mɔˈʁis ˈalbvaks]) was born on 11 March 1877 in 
Reims, the son of German teacher Gustave Halbwachs and Félicie 
Halbwachs, née Clerc.4 The family was of Catholic German-Alsatian origin 
and not Jewish, which has sometimes been claimed.5 Even so, he pursued an 
interest in Jewish life and culture, and after he married French-Jewish 
Yvonne Basch in 1913 he lived a Jewish family life.6 The family moved to 
the French capital when he was two years old, and there he would grow up in 
an environment of Parisian intellectuals.7 In his formative years two figures 
profoundly inspired him as teachers and collaborators: the philosopher Henri 
Bergson (1859–1941) and the scientist and founder of academic sociology in 
France Émile Durkheim (1858–1917).8 A third and major source of 
inspiration was the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). I 
shall briefly introduce their influence on Halbwachs and his conceptions of 
memory and space. 
Bergsonian influence 
In the 1890s Halbwachs was enrolled as a pupil at the Parisian secondary 
schools Lycée Michelet and Lycée Henri IV. At the latter he studied 
philosophy under Bergson, who would soon become an important figure in 
French philosophy.9 As Halbwachs’s first intellectual master, Bergson came 
to inspire him thoroughly, and traces of his thinking are recognisable 
throughout Halbwachs’s career, also at times when he had turned 
Durkheimian in his thought. Mary Douglas points to the fact that ‘when 
Halbwachs’s own approach was formulated it opposed nearly everything that 
Bergson taught, courteously but uncompromisingly’.10 Still, as Dietmar 
Wetzel argues, although ‘Halbwachs again and again quotes Bergson in his 
works, the quotations seem rather to have served as a source of inspiration for 
him and, above all, for delimitation and self-assurance of his own position, 
indeed increasingly so the more he turned to Durkheim and the social 
sciences on the whole’.11 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 D J Wetzel, Maurice Halbwachs (Konstanz, UVK, 2009), 15. 
5 Cf. A Funkenstein, ‘Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness’, History & Memory, 1/1 (1989), 9. 
6 For an overview of the Basch-Halbwachs family, see A Becker, Maurice Halbwachs. Un intellectuel en 
guerres mondiales 1914–1945 (Paris, Agnès Viénot, 2003), 454. 
7 L A Coser, ‘Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs 1877–1945’, in M Halbwachs, On Collective Memory 
(Chicago, UCP, 1992), 3. 
8 For a more general overview of the intellectual influences, see esp. Wetzel, Maurice Halbwachs. 
9 ibid., 16. 
10 M Douglas, ‘Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945)’, in M Halbwachs, The Collective Memory 
(New York, Harper & Row, 1980), 1. 
11 Wetzel, Maurice Halbwachs, 50. My transl. 
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In 1896 Bergson published Matière et mémoire in which he formulated a 
theory of memory that is essentially bound to the subjectivity of the 
individual through two kinds of memories: the one in the form of searchable 
memory images, the other as habit: 
the first records, in the form of memory-images, all the events of our daily life 
as they occur in time; it neglects no detail; it leaves to each fact, to each 
gesture, its place and date. Regardless of utility or of practical application, it 
stores up the past by the mere necessity of its own nature. [Our repeated return 
to the memory images] modify the organism and create in the body new 
dispositions toward action. Thus is formed an experience of an entirely 
different order …; this consciousness of a whole past of efforts stored up in 
the present is indeed also a memory, but a [second kind of] memory 
profoundly different from the first, always bent upon action, seated in the 
present and looking only to the future.12 
For Bergson place and time are inherent properties of singular memory 
images of events. This is greatly challenged by Halbwachs, who in Les 
Cadres sociaux de la mémoire posits the independent character of more 
stable memory constructs pertaining to space, time, and social relations as 
well as language and general ideas. These social and cultural frames of 
reference, which the individual depends on in the act of recollection, he calls 
les cadres de la mémoire, the frameworks of memory.13 The function of the 
frameworks could be illustrated with historical remembering. For Bergson 
historical facts can only acquire meaning when appropriated and given 
significance by the individual intellect. For Halbwachs it is the other way 
around. Individual images could be regarded as incomplete fragments that 
only through localisation in the frameworks of time, space, and the social 
milieu can be made meaningful. With the postulation that frameworks are 
fundamental premises for recollection and with the belittlement of memory 
images, Halbwachs takes a position explicitly against Bergson, using the 
latter’s arguments to rhetorically propose his own theory. But even if taking 
such a position means that he ‘undermines his first teacher’s theories more 
critically than would appear out of context’, Bergson remains a significant 
point of departure and inspiration for Halbwachs’s thinking, especially in Les 
Cadres sociaux de la mémoire and La Mémoire collective.14 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 H Bergson, Matter and Memory (New York, Zone Books, 1988) [Fr. orig. (5th edn, 1908)], 81–82. First 
emphasis is mine. 
13 Halbwachs explicitly formulates this hypothesis against Bergson’s. Cf. Frameworks of memory in this 
chapter. 
14 Douglas, ‘Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs’, 5. 
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One example is Halbwachs’s view on forgetting. For Bergson, obstacles in 
the brain hinder remembrance and cause forgetting. For Halbwachs, 
forgetting is a result of vague and piecemeal impressions that are not 
reconstructed under the conditions of suitable frameworks. Instead, it seems 
that Leibniz is the one who comes to provide Halbwachs with the idea of the 
fragmentary character of memory images and the importance of correct 
stimuli for their actualisation. 
Leibnizian influence 
From 1898 to 1901 Halbwachs studied at École Normale Supérieure. In 1902 
Halbwachs was appointed the position as lecturer at the University of 
Göttingen in Germany.15 There he became a member of a German–French 
commission for an international publication of the writings of Leibniz (1646–
1716), which marks the start of his scholarly career. Nominated to be one of 
the editors, Halbwachs left for Hanover to catalogue Leibniz’s unpublished 
papers, but due to the outbreak of WWI the publication was never realised.16 
Despite this, Halbwachs’s engagement resulted in a textbook on Leibniz, 
published as a volume in a book series on famous philosophers.17 
This shift in Halbwachs’s career may suggest a shift from Bergson, as his 
intellectual source of influence, to Leibniz. It may even have been Bergson 
who originally proposed to Halbwachs to engage with Leibnizian thought.18 
If that is true, it is ironic that the Leibnizian thinking would support 
Halbwachs in his later criticism of Bergson’s subjectivist theory of 
knowledge. 
Douglas has pointed out that Halbwachs refers to how Leibniz conceives 
the human mind as a system in which nothing is ever forgotten; perceptions 
are stored as ‘conscious memories and indistinct reminiscences’, which, at a 
later stage, can be summoned up with new attention directed to them.19 
Halbwachs’s theory of memory bears a certain resemblance to Leibniz’s 
ideas, in that the past is remembered through fragments of percepts and 
concepts, which can only be reconstructed as memories by activating inner 
frameworks or external stimuli. This opposes Bergson’s view of memory as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Wetzel, Maurice Halbwachs, 18. 
16 Douglas, ‘Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs’, 4. Cf. Y Halbwachs, ‘Einleitung. Maurice Halbwachs 1877–
1945’ [Fr. orig. (1964)], in M Halbwachs, Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen (Berlin, Suhrkamp, 
1985), 12. 
17 M Halbwachs, Leibniz, Les philosophes (Paris, Librairie Paul Delaplane, [1907]). There is widespread 
disagreement in the literature and in libraries about whether the first edition of the book was published in 1906 
or 1907. It seems to me that 1907 is the correct year. The second, expanded edition from 1928 is sometimes 
also mistaken for the first, see e.g. Douglas, ‘Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs’, 4–5. 
18 Douglas, ‘Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs’, 3. 
19 Halbwachs, Leibniz, 37. 
Edifices 	  
 54 
containing full representations of past experiences in memory images. Other 
themes occur in Halbwachs’s writing on Leibniz, which will perhaps exert 
influence on his later conception of memory. For instance, the engagement 
with a social conditioning of individual thought may precede his commitment 
to Durkheim’s social theories: 
Experience therefore plays a vital role in our knowledge. It is true that the 
only way of thinking that has some value and that can found any truth is the 
demonstration. Expectations or beliefs born of experience are uncertain. Even 
internal experience does not suffice. ‘Consciousness’, says Leibniz, ‘is not the 
only means to form personal identity, the relationships with other people or 
even other imprints can supplement it.’20 
Another form of influence may come from Leibniz’s conceptualisation of 
space. Leibniz turns against Newton and his assumption of an absolute space 
that would have an existence of its own as a substantial reality outside of our 
minds. Instead he conceives of space as an ideal construction of the mind, 
which is to be considered as an imaginary construct, both in and outside the 
world.21 According to Ernst Cassirer, Leibniz’s notion of space, like that of 
time, is part ‘of the universe of logical forms or, as Leibniz calls it, of the 
“intellectus ipse”,’ of the intellect itself, and stems from the creative power of 
the human mind.22 
Leibniz posits that ‘Space is the order of coexisting things, or the order of 
existence for things which are simultaneous’, while, correspondingly, ‘Time 
is the order of existence of those things which are not simultaneous’ or ‘the 
universal order of changes’.23 The notion of space is strictly relational; it is 
informed by the observation of how bodies coexist in time, their relative 
places, and the rules according to which these relations change.24 Space is the 
paragon of all possible situations. It is not the order of space that enables the 
situation of bodies; instead all positions that bodies could exist in make up 
the notion of space as an ‘order of situations’.25 Markus Schroer suggests that 
the consequences of such a definition of space cannot be overestimated, with 
its idea of a pluralism of perspectives. Every situation will give rise to a point 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 ibid., 45–46. 
21 G W Leibniz, ‘The Controversy Between Leibniz and Clarke’ [orig., A Collection of Papers Which Passed 
between the Late Learned Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke (1717)], in L E Loemker (ed), Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz. Philosophical Papers and Letters (1956; 2nd edn, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1969), 701. 
22 E Cassirer, ‘Newton and Leibniz’, The Philosophical Review, 52/4 (July 1943), 386. 
23 G W Leibniz, ‘The Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics’ [orig. after 1714; Ger. Mathematische 
Schriften (1849–1855)], in L E Loemker (ed), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Philosophical Papers and Letters 
(1956; 2nd edn, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1969), 666. 
24 Leibniz, ‘The Controversy Between Leibniz and Clarke’, 703. 
25 ibid., 714. 
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of view that will differ from all other points of view: ‘With Leibniz’s 
conception of space nothing less than the contingency of every observation 
comes into play’.26 Such an understanding stands at the centre of 
Halbwachs’s memory theory. In the same way that there are as many 
collective memories of a given event as there are groups, and there are as 
many views on the collective memory as there are members of the group, the 
spatial frameworks of groups’ memory are the multiple viewpoints on a 
physical environment, which could never be defined outside of these social 
conceptualisations. 
In the first and second editions of Halbwachs’s book on Leibniz about two 
pages summarise the conception of space.27 Halbwachs stresses Leibniz’s 
postulation of space, time, and numbers as entia mentalia, mental entities, 
which only exist as constructions of the mind. In the second edition he 
explains that ‘Continuity and discontinuity [in Leibniz’s notion of space] 
relate more to the operations of the mind trying to calculate space itself. 
Space lends itself to these calculations, as a white sheet ready to receive signs 
... Therefore, it is natural to consider it [space] as a symbol, or rather as an 
opportunity of undefined symbols of a certain order’.28 In my opinion, this 
view of space opens up for the contingency of the idea of (inter-)subjective 
perspectives in Halbwachs’s later writings on memory; there exist as many 
conceptions of a given space as there are individuals who maintain a relation 
to it.29 It also opens up for the emphasis on the mental conception of space, 
rather than on material space, in Halbwachs’s spatial framework of memory. 
Jean-Pierre Cléro has written an essay in which he addresses Halbwachs’s 
rejection of Cartesian space and embrace of Leibnizian space.30 With 
Descartes, Cléro explains, space is full, so no piece of matter can occupy the 
place that is occupied by another piece of matter. For Leibniz, he continues, 
space can never be full, as it consists of relations and the relations of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 M Schroer, Räume, Orte, Grenzen. Auf dem Weg zu einer Soziologie des Raums (Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp, 2009), 40. My transl. 
27 The passage is titled ‘L’espace, ordre des situations; son caractère ideal’ (‘Space, order of situations, its 
ideal character’). 
28 M Halbwachs, Leibniz ([1907]; 2nd rev. edn, Paris, Librairie Mellottée, [1928]), 92. 
29 In Monadology Leibniz uses an analogy of the city that evokes Halbwachs’s spatial framework of memory: 
‘And as one and the same town viewed from different sides looks altogether different, and is, as it were, 
perspectively multiplied, it similarly happens that, through the infinite multitude of simple substances, there 
are, as it were, just as many different universes, which however are only the perspectives of a single one 
according to the different points of view of each monad’. G. W. Leibniz’s Monadology. An Edition for 
Students, ed. N Rescher (Pittsburgh, UPP, 1991) [orig. Fr. 1714], 200–01. The passage was brought to my 
attention in M Löw, Raumsoziologie (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2001), 28. 
30 J-P Cléro, ‘Halbwachs et l’espace fictionnel de la ville’, in M Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire des 
évangiles en Terre sainte: Étude de mémoire collective, Quadrige (1941; 1971; rev. 2nd edn, Paris, PUF, 
2008), 46*. 
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relations. One point in space can maintain any number of relations. Cléro 
argues that Halbwachs shows a deep concern for the questions of space in his 
book on Leibniz, and that these questions come to resonate throughout 
Halbwachs’s oeuvre. Consequently, walls, streets, and houses are created in 
the minds and constitute a backdrop for social relations and functions. For 
Halbwachs, Cléro explains, each point in space, like the home, provides a 
spatial interlacing of a number of social domains: the family lives there, 
somebody legally owns the house, and the bank in which the mortgage is 
based is economically tied to the house. Thus, space for Halbwachs is a set of 
relationships, and it ‘is designed to stabilise and channel flows of thoughts, of 
feelings; and the true function of stones is … to speak’.31 Leibniz’s 
conception of space, so Cléro’s argument goes, inspires Halbwachs to 
conceive the space of the city in a new fashion: as symbolic and imaginary. 
The notion of space as a mental entity, symbolic and imaginary, reappears in 
the guise of the spatial framework of memory in Les Cadres sociaux de la 
mémoire and the subsequent books on memory. In the reading of his 
conceptualisation of the spatial framework of memory I will stress the 
emphasis on the character of space as a mental entity and carrier of symbols.  
The art of memory 
A further aspect I would like to point to in Leibniz’s work is his relation to 
classical and Renaissance mnemotechnics. I have found no explicit 
references in Halbwachs’s work to the art of memory, but I will briefly 
appraise the possibility that he, through Leibniz, may have been exposed to 
the principles of use of memorised places, loci in the ars memoriae. Passages 
like this one, published in 1938 in Morphologie sociale, have made me 
speculate: 
In the place of the Roman Forum, with its basilicas, courts, and statues, one 
can see only a limited portion of the totality and a collection of physical 
objects. The political activity that took place there transports us to a different 
plane. But how can we understand the development of history outside of the 
physical framework? All the successive generations of Rome put their stamp 
on the Forum. They had it before their eyes, and they made representations of 
it.32 
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32 M Halbwachs, Morphologie sociale (Paris, Armand Colin, 1938), 11.  
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The last sentence makes me wonder if Halbwachs alludes to the rhetoric 
practice in Imperial Rome, employing the architecture of the Forum as loci 
according to the teachings of Ad herennium, Cicero, and Quintilian.33 
I would suggest that it is feasible, maybe even plausible, that Halbwachs 
learnt about the memory tradition when he prepared the two publications on 
Leibniz.34 As I have already mentioned, he had travelled to Hanover to 
catalogue Leibniz’s unpublished papers. In the seventeenth century Leibniz 
was one of the major exponents of the art of memory. According to Paolo 
Rossi, it is in the unpublished manuscripts in Hanover that he exposes his 
deep interest in, and knowledge of, the classical and Renaissance art of 
memory, including the principle of loci, the places in memory.35 Rossi argues 
that  
[the Ciceronian art of memory] had a profound influence on the formation of a 
new intellectual culture, which prepared the ground for the development of 
new logical methods, from those of Francis Bacon to those of Gottfried 
Leibniz. The treatises on artificial memory were at the centre of a complex of 
discussions and problems: developments in the arts of discourse and 
techniques of persuasion, attempts at constructing encyclopaedias of 
knowledge …, medicine and physiognomy: a range of questions which 
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concerned not just rhetorical theorists, but philosophers, logicians, occult 
scientists, physicians and encyclopaedists of different kinds.36 
With reference to the unpublished notes in Hanover, Rossi demonstrates that 
Leibniz had detailed knowledge of the contemporary discourse on the art of 
memory.37 Frances Yates further describes Leibniz as ‘the most remarkable 
example’ of the advocators of the art of memory in the seventeenth century.38 
Memory, the rules for which he borrowed from Aristotle and Ad herennium, 
Leibniz saw as an integral part of his work on science, logic, and the 
universal language. 
Leibniz knew the memory tradition extremely well; he had studied the 
memory treatises and had picked up, not only the main lines of the classical 
rules, but also complications which had grown up around these in the memory 
tradition. And he was interested in the principles on which the classical art 
was based.39 
In his writings on memory Halbwachs leaned on Leibniz’s conception of 
space as symbolic and relational rather than Cartesian, as a product of the 
mind, an entia mentalia. If, through Leibniz, or elsewhere, Halbwachs had 
learnt about the art of memory and its organisation of memory cues by means 
of memorised sequences of places, it may have contributed to his distinction 
between the environment as a physical and material framework and the 
spatial framework in people’s memory, the representations of space 
distributed in the minds of individuals. This operative view of space as an 
instrument in the art of memory may have provided inspiration for 
Halbwachs’s conception of the spatial framework of memory as a means for 
remembering other things as well as a notion formed accumulatively over 
time. Different from singular memories of events, Halbwachs contends, the 
spatial framework is more stable and we need to keep it in mind at all times 
in order to bring to mind other memories. We need it to localise things in 
memory: experiences, social relations, or history. It acts as an organisational 
tool for our recollection and can be employed repeatedly to reconstruct 
memories. Such an emphasis on its stability echoes Yates’s description of the 
art of memory: 
The formation of the loci is of the greatest importance, for the same set of loci 
can be used again and again for remembering different material. The images 	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which we have placed on them for remembering one set of things fade and are 
effaced when we make no further use of them. But the loci remain in the 
memory and can be used again by placing another set of images for another 
set of material.40 
I will not suggest that the spatial framework of memory is a remodelling of 
the principles of loci in the art of memory. There is no evidence for that. I am 
not even sure if Halbwachs at any time was aware of the similarities between 
his conception and the mnemotechnic. It is likely, for a critical scholar like 
him, in the early decades of the twentieth century, that the art of memory may 
have been too obscure a reference to speak out loud.41 What, nevertheless, 
can be suggested is that amongst the theories that shaped Leibniz’s ideas and, 
consequently, amid those that formed the intellectual realm in which 
Halbwachs’s thought emerged, the art of memory arguably has its place, if 
also in the margin. 
Durkheimian influence 
Durkheim counts as the founder of the academic discipline of sociology in 
France and Halbwachs is said to have regarded Durkheim as probably the 
greatest of all.42 After his stay in Hanover Halbwachs returned to Paris to 
study at Paris University, and it was his friend and mentor François Simiand 
who introduced him to Durkheim.43 Halbwachs moved from philosophy to 
sociology and soon he belonged to the circle around Durkheim. His law 
thesis from 1909 on land values and expropriation gave French reform 
socialists a sociological basis for analysing and fighting social injustice in the 
cities.44 During the studies and the writing of his doctoral dissertations, 
completed in 1913, he made a living by teaching at secondary schools. From 
1905 he became involved in the publication of the sociological journal 
L’Année Sociologique, founded by Durkheim in 1898, and among its 
important collaborators were also Célestin Bouglé, Marcel Mauss, Henri 
Hubert, Robert Hertz, and Simiand.45 
Douglas says of Durkheim’s thinking that ‘the prospect of individual 
thought is impossible to contemplate, almost an absurdity, since language and 	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categorization arise together in social intercourse … To understand the social 
factors [of morality and religion] sustaining individual consciousness was his 
central program of research’.46 The social and societal interaction of the 
individual is paramount to Durkheim’s conception of consciousness, almost 
to the level of giving collective thought an existence of its own. The various 
groups that may direct the thought of the individual are the result of the self-
organisation of society. This dividing into classes and groups, Schroer 
summarises Durkheim, is the basic workings of any society, enabling the 
sectioning of the land it inhabits.47 Without such classifications society would 
not function; thus, every society impresses its own organisation on space. 
There are two inherent perspectives of space in Durkheim’s thinking. One 
regards space epistemologically – what space means and how it can be 
conceived; the other looks at space from the perspective of social theory – 
how the spatial organisation of society changes in complex societies. In both 
perspectives it can be recognised how the social order is mirrored in its 
material deposits in space.48 This perspective becomes a central point in 
Halbwachs’s later study of the social morphology, a term proposed by 
Durkheim in a new section of L’année Sociologique in 1898.49 According to 
Stephan Egger, it is a field of study, and a reading of societal facts, in which 
‘the collective life, the collective work of people in the world, takes on 
visible, tangible form’.50 He asserts that Halbwachs extends and deepens 
Durkheim’s concept and so invents it anew, making it a more coherent 
theory.51 Stéphane Jonas goes further to argue that Halbwachs is the real and 
important founder of social morphology, improving Durkheim’s concept.52 I 
will return to social morphology in the next chapter. 
In Durkheim’s last work, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, a 
passage on religious ceremonies of the Warramunga people can be seen to 
foreshadow Halbwachs’s conceptualisation of a socially conditioned 
memory:  
the mythology of a group is the system of beliefs common to this group. The 
traditions whose memory it perpetuates express the way in which society 	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represents man and the world; it is a moral system and a cosmology as well as 
a history. So the rite serves and can serve only to sustain the vitality of these 
beliefs, to keep them from being effaced from memory and, in sum, to 
revivify the most essential elements of the collective consciousness. Through 
it, the group periodically renews the sentiment which it has of itself and of its 
unity; at the same time, individuals are strengthened in their social natures.53 
Later in the text Durkheim concludes, ‘So we have here a whole group of 
ceremonies whose sole purpose is to awaken certain ideas and sentiments, to 
attach the present to the past or the individual to the group’.54 The conclusion 
points to a central point in later studies of social memory; for collective 
remembering, and as opposed to history, the past is brought into the life of 
the present, without expressing a clear division between the past and present. 
According to Douglas, when Halbwachs leaves Bergson for Durkheim, and 
not any other sociologist, he leaves for the enemy.55 With Durkheim he does 
not only shift from an individualistic to a collectivistic perspective, she 
argues, but is given an especially good position for attacks on Bergson’s 
philosophy. Such an antagonistic view of his relation to his two masters may 
be somewhat schematic and simplified. Bergson remains a central reference 
for Halbwachs in his development of the theory of memory, not only in Les 
Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, but also in La Mémoire collective. Halbwachs 
often employs Bergson’s formulations in order to identify problems, reach 
his own conclusions and clarify his positions. In several places Halbwachs 
makes use of Bergson as an opponent of his own rhetoric. 
Jean-Christophe Marcel and Laurent Mucchielli argue that Halbwachs has 
followed up all the important aspects of Durkheim’s thinking, keeping with 
the intentions of the original project and applying and developing them 
further.56 His engagement with collective psychology, they suggest, is one of 
the answers provided by Halbwachs to defend Durkheim’s theses. In his 
search for the collective influences on the individual mind, especially on 
memory, he takes a different path than Durkheim did in his theory of 
collective representations and develops a sociology oriented more towards 
the individual. Marcel and Mucchielli point to three main axes of these 
sociological reflections: ‘first the social construction of the individual 	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memory, second the formation of the collective memory in different societal 
groups, and third the collective memory on the level of societies and 
cultures’.57 Along similar lines, Douglas has also suggested that 
Halbwachs’ gift to Durkheim was to unpack and separate clearly the elements 
of social life that contribute to the collective memory … To have worked this 
out within the strong constraints evidently imposed by Durkheim on his 
colleagues was a signal service to Durkheim himself and a contribution to 
Durkheim studies.58 
The emphasis on the individual in social processes, however, puts him in a 
position that is easier to defend than Durkheim’s. Halbwachs states explicitly 
that no remembering goes on outside the individual minds.59 It is rather the 
frameworks of memory that constitute the collective aspect of memory, but 
these are also part of the individual memory, refined and revised, again and 
again, in interaction with society.60 Alexandre Dessingué demonstrates how 
Durkheim insists that collective memory is external to and ‘cannot be 
dependent on the individual consciousness; it has a life of its own’.61 It places 
Durkheim in a very different position than Halbwachs’s and suggests a 
fundamental disagreement between his and Durkheim’s understanding of 
sociology and collective thought. 
Halbwachs’s intellectual position owes much to Durkheim. To consider 
him a full-fledged Durkheimian, however, and his thought only an extension 
of Durkheim’s shrouds the intricate amalgamation of his own as well as of 
Leibnizian and Bergsonian intuitions. The consistency of Halbwachs’s theory 
of a collective memory and his conception of space, in my opinion, relies on 
his careful appraisal and balance of the influence of the three precursors. 
What in the eyes of many appears as a fixed, disciplinary position of 
sociology may rather take the form of a three-part and interdisciplinary 
attribution. It becomes clear, for instance, to what extent Leibniz contributed 
to the conception of space as a mental entity and maybe also to a 
predisposition for a socially conditioned self, before Halbwachs even turned 
to Durkheim. Also, if my own intuition holds true, Leibniz may have given 
him a glimpse of the use of mental places in the art of memory, suggesting 	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that the conceptualisation of the spatial framework of memory may be 
considered as a recent contribution to the mnemonic tradition. It may also be 
relevant to ask to what degree the strong emphasis on individual experience 
in Halbwachs’s theory stems from a Bergsonian philosophy – phenomenal 
and personal experiences, the explorations of childhood, family, and home 
give colour to his theory. 
The professorial years 1919–1944 
In 1919 Halbwachs received a professorship in sociology and pedagogy in 
Strasbourg previously held by the German sociologist Georg Simmel (1858–
1918).62 When the Alsatian city was reattributed to France after the war, the 
chair continued to exist. From 1922 it became a professorship only in 
sociology, the first of its kind in France. 
Already with his arrival in Strasbourg Halbwachs got interested in societal 
memory, partly due to the rapid forgetting of WWI and its prehistory in 
political life.63 In 1925 he published the first book on memory. Les Cadres 
sociaux de la mémoire springs out of his critical involvement with Bergson’s 
theory of consciousness within the framework of Durkheim’s collectivistic 
social theory. Already the same year he started writing the manuscript of La 
Mémoire collective, which, despite being reworked several times in the 
following two decades, remained unfinished and unpublished at his death.64 
In the same period he started to prepare La Topographie légendaire.  
In the 1930s Halbwachs counted as one of the important successors of the 
Durkheim school and as one of a few notable sociologists in France, next to 
Mauss.65 He joined the interdisciplinary board of Annales d'histoire 
économique et sociale, a journal founded in 1929 by Marc Bloch and Lucien 
Febvre to promote new conceptions of historiography.66 Halbwachs was a 
loyal and valued member and published three articles and a number of 
notices and reviews in the first ten years of its existence.67 
In 1930 Halbwachs accepted an invitation to take on a guest professorship 
at the University of Chicago.68 The hosting department of sociology, founded 
in 1892 and the first of its kind in the United States, had become a leading 
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intellectual milieu for sociology in the post-war period.69 In Chicago 
Halbwachs entered into a fruitful collaboration with scholars like Robert E. 
Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Louis Wirth. It resulted in an appreciating 
article of their work, which he published in Annales d’histoire économique et 
sociale in 1932.70 In 1938 he published an article on collective psychology in 
the American Sociological Review, and in the following year an article on the 
collective aspects of the mind appeared in the American Journal of 
Sociology, at the time of the publication under the editorship of Burgess.71 
The same volume saw contributions by Chicagoans like Wirth and Park, but 
also by figures like Kurt Lewin, Bronislaw Malinowski, and Bertrand 
Russell. 
In 1937 Halbwachs was appointed a chair in methodology and philosophy 
of science at Sorbonne.72 From 1939 he held the chair in sociology at the 
same institution. In addition to books on various topics published in the 
1920s and 1930s, his study Morphologie sociale appeared in 1938 and La 
Topographie légendaire in 1941. The latter has been considered a crossroads 
in Halbwachs’s thinking on memory, placed in between Les Cadres sociaux 
de la mémoire and La Mémoire collective and going deeper into the 
sociological areas of collective psychology and social morphology.73 With 
the study Halbwachs gave the term ‘topographie’ a new meaning. In memory 
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Books, 1978), 311–12. 
70 Halbwachs writes, ‘If an original school of sociology exists at the University of Chicago it is not unrelated to 
the fact that the observers do not have to look far for a subject of study. Before their eyes new phases of urban 
development without precedent unroll from decade to decade, almost from year to year’. M Halbwachs, 
‘Chicago, expérience ethnique’, Annales d’histoire économique et sociale, 4/13 (1932), 17. 
71 M Halbwachs, ‘Individual Psychology and Collective Psychology’, American Sociological Review, 3/5 (Oct. 
1938); M Halbwachs, ‘Individual Consciousness and Collective Mind’, The American Journal of Sociology, 
44/6 (1939). Until 1935, the American Journal of Sociology, a journal controlled by the sociology department 
at Chicago University, had been the official journal of the American Sociological Society. The American 
Sociological Review was founded to replace it as the official journal. For a history of the dispute involving the 
two journals, see P M Lengermann, ‘The Founding of the American Sociological Review: The Anatomy of a 
Rebellion’, American Sociological Review, 44/2 (1979), 185–98. 
72 Becker, Maurice Halbwachs, 456. 
73 S Egger, ‘Editorische Vorbemerkung’, in M Halbwachs, Stätten der Verkündigung im Heiligen Land: Eine 
Studie zum kollektiven Gedächtnis (Konstanz, UVK, 2003), 7–8. 
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studies it subsequently came to denote ‘space that makes the contents of 
collective memory experienceable’.74 
With the German occupation of France Halbwachs’s private life cannot be 
separated from his political and intellectual life, since his Jewish wife, 
children, and family-in-law came under threat of persecution and 
extermination.75 His mother, to whom he had been strongly devoted, died in 
1940. His brother-in-law committed suicide in 1941, and in 1944, at the age 
of eighty, his parents-in-law were murdered by the Vichy militia, according 
to rumours in collaboration with the Gestapo. In March 1944 he was 
appointed the new chair in social psychology at Collège de France, but only 
after the Jewish professors had been forced to leave their posts, among them 
his friend Mauss.76 In addition, he was appointed honorary professor at the 
Faculté des Lettres de Paris in September the same year, but was arrested by 
the Gestapo before he could take up the post.77 Because of the resistance 
activities of his son Pierre he was deported to Buchenwald on 15 August 
1944. He died in March 1945, exhausted by forced labour in a quarry.78 
Collective memory and its frameworks 
In the early years of the 1920s Halbwachs started to engage with the theme 
that would preoccupy him for the rest of his life: the social conditioning of 
individual memory and the postulation of a collective memory.79 It would 
result in three books, the last of which would be published posthumously.80 
Collective memory in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire 
The first book, Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, has two parts. The first 
four chapters establish a general theory of a socially constructed memory.81 
The last three exemplify the collective memory in different societal groups: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 G Wolf, ‘Topographie’, in N Pethes & J Ruchatz (eds), Gedächtnis und Erinnerung: Ein interdisziplinäres 
Lexikon (Reinbek, Rowohlt, 2001), 582–84, 582. My transl. Cf. Existing Scholarship in the Introduction and 
The spatial framework of memory in La Topographie légendaire in ch. 2. 
75 Wetzel, Maurice Halbwachs, 34–35. 
76 Becker, Maurice Halbwachs, 456; Wetzel, Maurice Halbwachs, 35. 
77 Wetzel, Maurice Halbwachs, 36. 
78 P Bourdieu, ‘L’assassinat de Maurice Halbwachs’, La Liberté de l’Esprit, /16 (Autumn 1987). For a 
comprehensive account of the conditions in Buchenwald, see Becker, Maurice Halbwachs, 413–53. 
79 He already uses the term ‘mémoire collective’ in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, for example in two of 
the chapter titles. The emphasis in that book, however, is primarily on the cadres collectifs de la mémoire, the 
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81 Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 1–145. 
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the family, religions, classes and professions. With the book, Halbwachs 
claims to offer a foundation for a sociological theory of memory.82 He 
introduces the central aspects of the collective memory by referring to a story 
of a nine- or ten-year-old girl who was found in the woods in Châlot. Her 
background could not be established, since she was unable to bring back the 
memory of her childhood. Halbwachs asks rhetorically what part of her 
memory this girl would retain, when she is separated from her family and the 
place where she used to live and forced to live in a place where the language, 
customs, and people do not resemble what she knew from before. For 
Halbwachs the girl lacks external factors of the environment and the milieu to 
enable her to reconstruct her own past. Because when we remember, he says, 
‘we will certainly recognise that the greatest number of our memories come 
back to us when our parents, our friends, or other people remind us of 
them’.83 
Halbwachs presents his theory as a response to psychological treatises on 
memory, which consider people as isolated beings.84 Instead, one should 
regard the mental operations of the individual in relation to the society he is 
part of, as this is where he acquires memories as well as recalls, recognises, 
and localises them. In everyday life we do not only remember ourselves; 
others help us to remember, or we remember when people ask us things or 
when we believe they could have asked us. The memory of people around us 
comes to our aid, and the groups that we belong to give us the means to 
reconstruct the past ‘on the condition that I turn towards them and adopt, at 
least temporarily, their way of thinking’.85 
It is in this respect that Halbwachs wants us to see that something exists, 
which can be referred to as a collective memory, a faculty about which there 
is nothing mysterious. The individual thought places itself in relation to 
society, and by means of society’s frameworks it is capable of acts of 
recollection. The frameworks are also memories, he posits, but stable 
constructs, not simply constructed from accumulated individual recollections, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 ibid., VIII. 
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84 He explicates the critique in a later article: ‘There is a serious fault in classical, as well as in associationist 
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have failed to recognize the many factors which stimulate him from the outside, such as the institutions, 
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but shaped from a position in the social group. They are in accord with the 
predominant thought of society: ‘One could also say, indeed, that the 
individual remembers by placing himself in the standpoint of the group, and 
that the memory of the group realises and manifests itself in the individual 
memories’.86 
Also individual recollections are collective, according to Halbwachs, in the 
sense that they are stored, structured, and retrieved according to social 
frameworks. We make meaningful the memory of having walked alone or 
having seen or thought things without company by localising it in space, by 
analysing its form, and categorising it by giving it a name. We employ these 
frameworks to make it understandable and to inscribe it in a social setting.87 
The reconstructive act of remembrance, he argues, needs to place itself in 
connection with the total system of general ideas in society ‘that many others 
than us possess, with people, groups, places, dates, the words and forms of 
language, with thoughts and ideas, that is with all the material and moral life 
of society, to which we belong or used to belong’.88 To understand disparate 
individual memories we need to internalise and overlay them with external 
structures, for instance of important events in society: 
to recall a series of events, for example those that kept us occupied during the 
first month of the war, we have to ask questions like these: where was I before 
the mobilisation, at the moment when we learnt of the outcome of the battle of 
Charleroi, when Paris was threatened, etc.?89 
It is essential that we position our recollections in relation to such societal 
events and to the overall spatial distribution. Only then is it possible to 
retrieve and fix the memories. The influence that collective frameworks have 
on individual thought not only affects processes of the reconstruction of the 
past, but equally the perception of the material world. Halbwachs argues that, 
as little as there is any purely individual memory that is not inscribed in 
frameworks, there is also no act of perception that does not, at the same time, 
define and categorise what is seen according to the conventions of the 
group.90 
Some of the individual memories, Halbwachs asserts, we reconstruct over 
and again, and in so doing we keep them attached to our emotions and 
identity. This has redefined them by positioning them in relation to different 	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88 ibid., 38. 
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systems of notions. They have lost their original form and cannot allow the 
reconstruction out of their parts. Instead, 
we should compare them to the stones we find embedded in certain Roman 
houses, which have been used as materials in the buildings of ancient times, 
and which certify to their age only because they still show in the erased 
features the vestiges of old characters, which neither their form nor their 
appearance would betray.91 
For Halbwachs, our recollections, especially those we return to the most, bear 
little resemblance to any original event or situation; instead, they are coloured 
by repeated use and only acquire their meaning in every period through the 
societal framework of that present. 
When, like we believe, the collective memory essentially is a reconstruction 
of the past, when it adapts the image of the ancient events to the beliefs and to 
the spiritual needs of the present, the knowledge of what was originally is 
secondary, if not quite useless, since the reality of the past, as a perceptual 
model to which it has to conform, no longer exists.92 
With Halbwachs, the collective memory does not implicate the study of the 
past, but of mechanisms of the collective psychology that shapes every 
group’s engagement with the past in the present. 
Collective memory in La Mémoire collective 
The posthumously published La Mémoire collective appears as a collection of 
essays, each of them bearing on the same overall theme, but treating different 
facets.93 It has been considered as a complement to the theory of memory 
outlined in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, addressing a memory of 
culture and values rather than a memory of phenomena.94 Some themes 
reoccur throughout the book, like, for example, that of childhood memories. 
In the chapter ‘Mémoire individuelle et mémoire collective’ (‘Individual 
memory and collective memory’), Halbwachs expands on the collective 
character of memory outlined in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire. He 
reminds us that memories of events we experienced alone may also be 
recalled by others, like when friends whom we meet after a long time tell us 
of things we experienced on our own, but which we had forgotten about. In 	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93 Note that the chapter structure and the contents of the 1950 edition and of the 1997 critical edition differ. 
This thesis uses the latter for reference. Cf. Editions, translations, languages in the Introduction. 
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the group we can reconstruct the past more fully than by ourselves. In reality, 
we are never alone. We carry with us at all times friends, relatives, and 
famous people, through whose opinions we perceive and remember what we 
experience. The often quoted passage from London, in which the author takes 
a walk with Dickens, exemplifies this clearly: 
I arrive for the first time in London and I take a walk on several occasions, 
sometimes with one companion, sometimes with another. Now an architect 
directs my attention to the proportions and dispositions of the buildings. Now 
it is a historian: I understand how this street has been planned in such-and-
such époque, how this house has witnessed the birth of a famous person, how 
noteworthy incidents took place here or there. With a painter, I am sensitive to 
the tonality of the parks, and the lines of the palaces, of the churches, the play 
of light and shadow on the walls and façades of Westminster, on Temple, on 
Thames. A merchant, a businessman drags me along in the popular routes of 
the City and stops in front of the shops, the bookshops, the department stores. 
But even if I have been walking unaccompanied, it is enough to have read the 
descriptions of the city to take in all the different points of view, the different 
aspects that I have been advised to look at, simply because I studied the plan. 
Suppose I took a walk on my own. Could one say that this walk, which I am 
not able to consider as individual memory, does not only belong to me? 
However, only in appearance did I walk alone. Passing before Westminster, I 
thought about what my historian friend told me (or, what counts as the same, 
what I have read in a history book). Crossing a bridge, I considered the effect 
of perspective that my painter friend pointed out (or that struck me in a 
painting, in an engraving). I let myself be directed by the aid of a map. The 
first time I went to London, the impressions I had in front of St. Paul’s or 
Mansion House, on the Strand, or in the vicinity of the law courts, reminded 
me of Dickens’s novels that I read in my childhood: I thus went walking with 
Dickens. In such moments, under such circumstances, I have not said that I 
was alone, that I reflected alone, because while thinking I placed myself in 
this or that group, the one I formed with the architect, or beyond him, with 
those for whom he was merely the interpreter, or with the painter (and his 
group), with the surveyor that has designed the plan, or with a novelist. Other 
people have had these recollections in common with me. Moreover, they help 
me to recall them: to improve my memory, I turn towards them, I adopt their 
viewpoint, I re-enter their group, and I continue to be part of it.95 
The groups Halbwachs refers to do not necessarily and not only constitute 
living people whom we interact with in person, but also remote fellows like 	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deceased relatives, colleagues we have never met, authors and thinkers, 
coreligionists, compatriots etc. Their influence stays with us whatever we do 
or recall. Thus, ‘A social “current of thought” is normally as invisible as the 
atmosphere that we breathe. We do not recognise its existence in everyday 
life except for when we resist it’.96 A person’s individual remembering, 
consequently, stands at the intersection of a number of groups, whose 
currents of thought his thinking becomes impregnated with. We cannot 
always identify the source of the opinions or memories we express; they may 
stem from persons of this or that group, from newspapers or from books. 
Halbwachs also points out that the collective memory can be viewed as the 
shared denominator of the memories of a group of individuals. 
While the collective memory draws its strength and duration from its base in 
the body of people, it is nevertheless the individuals who remember, as 
members of the group. In this pool of shared memories, mutually supportive, 
some will appear with more intensity than others. We would readily 
acknowledge that each individual memory is a view on the collective 
memory, that this perspective changes according to the position I occupy, and 
that this place itself changes according to my relationships with other milieus. 
It is not surprising therefore that not everyone draws on the same parts of the 
common instrument.97 
The collective memory is not a supraindividual entity, but an abstracted 
notion that refers to the commonality of the pool of individual memories, all 
of which belong to the same group. It would not exist without the individuals 
who remember in detail; at the same time, it is more general and 
encompasses many more aspects than individual thought. 
Memory and history 
When the individual places himself in the position of the group, he can 
differentiate between the remembrances that agree with the current group’s 
collective memory and the remembrances that distinguish him from it. The 
latter, according to Halbwachs, forms an individual memory, which also lets 
itself be influenced by society. It uses words, ideas, and events that have 
taken place in society during or before the lifetime of the person. The 
borrowed remembrances are conceptions and symbols that the individual can 
call to mind, but not remember as if he had experienced it himself. In order to 
remember such an event in its entirety he would need to bring together 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 ibid., 70. 
97 ibid., 94. 
1   Collective memory 	  
 71 
disparate fragments dispersed among all group members. Halbwachs 
distinguishes between two kinds of memory, 
one inner or internal, and one external, or a personal memory and a social 
memory. We could express it more precisely …: autobiographical memory 
and historical memory. The first would make use of the second, because the 
stories of our life belong, after all, to general history. Naturally, the latter 
covers much more than the first. On the other hand, it represents the past only 
in a condensed and schematic form, while the memory of our own life would 
present a richer and more continuous picture.98 
The historical memory (mémoire historique) draws from an external base of a 
general history (l’histoire en general); the former is the individual’s memory 
of the latter, his perspective on it. The historical notations of names, dates, 
and anecdotes of the general history, Halbwachs suggests, are like the 
epitaphs of bygone events. ‘This history is in fact like a cemetery, where the 
space is limited, and where it is necessary, at all times, to find space for new 
graves’.99 Halbwachs argues that the relation of general history to the 
collective and the historical memory of the group is like the relation of death 
to life, the remains or traces of life that has been: ‘General history does not 
begin until tradition has ended, at the moment when the social memory fades 
or breaks down’.100 As long as the group remembers, history does not have to 
be written down; it is only under the threat of the dissolution of the group, 
when the individuals lose the social support to maintain the memory of 
sequences of events, that the need to record history appears, the point from 
which the memories of events transmute into history. 
Paul Ricœur has pointed to what he deems an unexpected turn in 
Halbwachs’s introduction to the distinction between history and memory. 
Did not the principal dividing line for which the author fought above pass 
between individual memory and collective memory …? And yet the 
difference is strongly marked: between individual memory and collective 
memory the connection is intimate, immanent, the two types of memory 
interpenetrate one another. This is the major thesis of the work. The same 
thing is not true of history inasmuch as it is not assigned to what is going to 
become ‘historical’ memory.101 
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Halbwachs identifies this rupture in the situation of school children who as 
coming members of the nation need to assimilate its history. The dates, facts, 
and events they learn can be thought of as nothing but external to their own 
previous experience. ‘The discovery of what is called historical memory’, as 
opposed to a general history, Ricœur continues, ‘consists in a genuine 
acculturation to externality. This acculturation is that of a gradual 
familiarization with the unfamiliar, with the uncanniness of the historical 
past’.102 Halbwachs’s postulations of, on the one hand, the rupture between 
memory and history and, on the other, the double fundament of historical 
facts, one in the historical memory of individual minds and one in external 
history writing, have affected the conception of memory in the works of 
subsequent memory scholars, including Pierre Nora and Aleida and Jan 
Assmann. In chapter five the first of the postulations will be reformulated in 
Aleida and Jan Assmann’s model of the communicative and cultural memory 
in order to avoid the dichotomy between history and memory. The second 
postulation offers a useful distinction for the spatial framework of memory 
between written history as a product of historians and the internalised history 
that is known by laypersons. When addressing imaginative remembering at 
historic sites the distinction is crucial, since it can enable us to distinguish 
between historic knowledge that may be documented in a certain building or 
site by archaeologists or historians and the imaginative experience of any 
person visiting a site where he is told a historic event played out or where a 
famous person lived.103 The former makes critical use of general history, the 
latter of individual historical memory. 
Critique of the collective memory 
Halbwachs’s theory has not been without critique. Colleagues and other 
contemporaries stood for the first assessments. In his review of Les Cadres 
sociaux de la mémoire, from the year of its publication, Marc Bloch raises 
the question of transmission in the collective memory: 
How are memories passed down from generation to generation within a 
group? The answer obviously varies according to the group, but the question 
is too important to leave unanswered. Halbwachs, it seems to me, scarcely 
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addresses this question, most often limiting himself to explanations of a 
certain finality.104 
Halbwachs’s analysis of memory transmission from grandparents to 
grandchildren misses important aspects, Bloch argues, and he points to the 
different principles for the transmission of traditions in rural societies and in 
the towns. Halbwachs later incorporated this aspect in his reflections on 
childhood in La Mémoire collective.105 
However, Halbwachs had already included a study of transmission in Les 
Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, although in the context of collective memory 
in Christianity.106 He identifies how priests take on the role of specialists who 
monopolise the transmission of the religious collective memory on behalf of 
the laity. Through rites and ceremonies they repeat the central aspects and 
ensure stability in the faith. Halbwachs argues that when the meaning of 
forms and formulas increasingly lost their meaning for subsequent 
generations, a need for interpretation arose and this gave birth to dogma. 
Bloch relates the neglect of the study of transmission to Halbwachs’s use 
of language. As one of the first in the discourse on social memory after Les 
Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, Bloch accuses Halbwachs of a ‘slightly vague 
anthropomorphism’. Sentences like ‘“The group tends to erase from its 
memory everything that could divide individuals;” the group is, at certain 
times, “obligated to adopt new values, to emphasize new traditions that are 
more in accordance with its present-day needs”’, Bloch does not read as 
literal statements. 
Such an omission [in Halbwachs’s formulations], from an author so well-
informed about social life, is surprising enough to tempt one to fix the blame 
on something external to him, [like on] Durkheimian language … It is not that 
I have any objection to speaking of ‘collective memory,’ just as we speak of 
collective representations or collective consciousness. These terms are 
important and expressive, and their use is entirely legitimate, but on one 
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any other way and which do not really form one body’. It is the persistence of external distinctions like places, 
names, and the general character of the group that gives the appearance of continuation of the group. 
Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 132. 
106 Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 178–221, esp. 17–19. I will return to the spatial framework of religious 
collective memory in the next chapter. 
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condition: that we do not automatically subsume all of the realities that we 
label ‘individual memory’ under the name of ‘collective memory.’107 
The critique offered by Bloch, I should note, is inscribed in a general 
appreciation for Halbwachs’s ‘extremely rich and suggestive work’, a person 
he argues has formulated ‘some of the great metaphysical doctrines of our 
time’, and who ‘pushes us to reflect on the conditions of the historical 
development of humanity’.108 
Like Bloch, psychologist and philosopher Charles Blondel, a Durkheimian 
and colleague from the University of Strasbourg, does call for the distinction 
between individual remembering and collective remembering and is critical 
of Halbwachs’s avoidance of the role of sensory intuition and perception for 
memory. Not to confuse our own experience with that of the neighbour, the 
reconstruction of ‘this empirically, logically, socially possible past to appear 
to correspond to our real past, it is necessary that this reconstruction 
consist[s], at least partly, of something more than commonly shared 
materials’.109 Some of this commonly shared material could consist of 
sensory impressions we keep in memory. 
Halbwachs responds to Blondel’s critique, arguing that any memory image 
would need to be situated within the framework that the person was 
immersed in when it happened, and any recall of the event would necessarily 
need to address the framework in relation to which the memory image has 
been kept.110 In fact, only as social beings do we have the ability to keep any 
impressions, he posits.111 
Like Bloch, Bartlett offers a critique of Halbwachs’s tendency towards 
anthropomorphism in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, which consists in 
treating the group or the collective as a subject capable of remembering: 
Certainly most of [Halbwachs’s] remarks, in so far as it is possible to give 
them clear significance, seem to be both true and important. Certainly also 
Halbwachs is justified in going on to speak in a similar manner of memory in 
the religious group and in the social class. Yet he is still treating only of 
memory in the group, and not of memory of the group. As to the former, there 
need be no dispute whatever.112 	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Bartlett argues that there cannot be a memory of the group, and therefore no 
theories of social memory can exist, only of the social determination of 
remembering. It is my belief that Halbwachs intended to clear his 
postulations of any such associations, and, in proposing terms such as ‘the 
collective memory’, or ‘collective frameworks of memory’, he offers 
convenient abstractions of a theory based on the idea of a socially determined 
individual memory.113 I believe that, in order to speak of socially conditioned 
individual memory from the perspective of groups or society, there is a need 
for a set of abstractions that refer to common denominators of a greater 
number of memories. The term ‘collective memory’, my reading of 
Halbwachs tells me, does not, by any means, designate any supraindividual 
or metaphysical subject with its own faculty of memory. It is but an 
abstraction for processes and entities of thought that are outside of the control 
of any single individual. 
A second period of criticism of Halbwachs’s theory can be said to begin in 
the formative years of humanistic memory studies in the late 1980s and 
1990s.114 Amos Funkenstein, like his predecessors Bloch, Blondel, and 
Bartlett, emphasises the individual base of remembering. He accepts 
Halbwachs’s term ‘collective memory’ as a description of certain aspects of 
remembering, as long as one accepts the condition that individual 
recollection can never be removed from the social context. And while he 
praises Halbwachs’s work on the collective memory for its merits in 
understanding historical consciousness, he also makes an objection: 
‘Halbwachs does not refrain in his analysis from hypostatization of collective 
memory, even though he is aware that only the individual remembers sensu 	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stricto’.115 When Halbwachs describes collective mentalities as if they had an 
existence by themselves, like the ‘spirit of the nation’, it is, according to 
Funkenstein, a romantic inclination of his. We shall return to accusations of 
hypostatisation later in the thesis, especially in relation to the critique of 
Rossi’s and Halbwachs’s theories of memory in architectural theory. 
 More recently, Ricœur sets out to denounce ‘the illusory attribution of 
memories to ourselves, when we claim to be their original owners’, 
essentially putting up a defence for Halbwachs’s fundamental postulate of the 
social conditioning of remembering.116 His argument, however, evolves into 
what he considers a ‘rapprochement’ of the ‘sociology of collective memory’ 
with the ‘phenomenology of individual memory’. He suggests staying with 
the two models, though complementing them: 
Does there not exist an intermediate level of reference between the poles of 
individual memory and collective memory, where concrete exchanges operate 
between the living memory of individual persons and the public memory of 
the communities to which we belong? This is the level of our close relations, 
to whom we have a right to attribute a memory of a distinct kind. [Ricœur 
concludes his argument] not with the single hypothesis of the polarity between 
individual memory and collective memory … but with the hypothesis of the 
threefold attribution of memory: to oneself, to one’s close relations, and to 
others.117  
Astrid Erll twists the perspective and offers an altogether different model for 
understanding collective memory. With the support of Jeffrey K. Olick, and 
with reference to the conceptualisations of memory by Nora and by Aleida 
and Jan Assmann, she distinguishes between two levels of memory. The first 
is biologically based and shaped in social contexts; the second refers to a 
symbolic order, administered by media, cultural and political institutions, and 
through the practices of social groups.118 She points out that societies do not 
remember, but their reconstruction of the past bears resemblance to processes 
of biological memory. For the proposal of the spatial framework of memory 
as a cultural theory, I will adhere to Erll’s distinction. For our concern with 	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architecture, with respect to its material forms and its conceptual 
representations in the mind, such a model provides certain advantages. With 
the communicative memory and the cultural memory (Aleida and Jan 
Assmann) we may distinguish between an informal and everyday form of 
remembering and a formal and institutionalised form. Chapter five will 
discuss this model in depth. 
I will also lay as a premise of this thesis the construal of Halbwachs’s 
theory that ‘individual memory’ should be considered as a socially 
constructed form of remembering that cannot be separated from the social 
context it is immersed in, and which does not stand in opposition to a 
‘collective memory’, but is its basis. As a consequence, I see the group 
members’ memories as specific viewpoints of the collective memory of the 
group and the collective memory as an abstraction for the shared 
denominator of these socially conditioned individual memories. 
Frameworks of memory 
To remember, Halbwachs posits, is fundamentally a constructive act that 
attempts to turn fragments of impressions into understandable representations 
by borrowing from the social situation of the present. Only by placing 
remembrance in the frameworks of time, space, and the social milieu, as they 
exist at the time of remembering, we can get meaning out of meaningless 
fragments. The frameworks of memory are not only for memory but also of 
memory; they are constructs in memory ‘made up entirely of psychological 
states’.119 But there is a difference between singular images of memory and 
the frameworks, Halbwachs explains.  
Let us pause for a moment to explain in what sense the disappearance or 
transformation of frameworks of memory leads to the disappearance or 
transformation of our memories. There can be two hypotheses. Either there 
exists between the framework and the [memories of] events that take place a 
relationship, even though the two are not made of the same substance, like the 
frame of a painting and the canvas that sits in it. We could think of the bed of 
a river, whose banks see the water pass by without projecting anything other 
than a superficial reflection. Or the framework and the events [in memory] are 
identical by nature: the events are memories, but the framework is also made 
up of memories. The difference between the former and the latter is that the 
latter is more stable so we need to observe them at every moment and use 
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them to recover and reconstruct the former. It is the second hypothesis we 
rally to the support of.120 
Bergson had formulated the first hypothesis. Halbwachs clarifies his own 
position through his rejection of Bergson’s. The latter distinguished between 
two kinds of memory: one that records in unique memory images the events 
of our life with their original temporal and spatial contexts, and a second, 
habitual memory, ‘always bent upon action’ and created on the basis of many 
successive experiences.121 Halbwachs argues explicitly against Bergson that 
in the act of remembering we start from the present,  
from the system of general ideas that are always at hand, from language and 
the points of reference given by society, that is to say, all means of expression 
it makes available to us, which we combine to recall either a detail or a 
nuance of past figures or events, and, generally, our state of consciousness in 
the past.122 
The means we have at hand include language and notions, but also social 
relations, places and dates. Memories, emotions, and thoughts become 
inscribed in the total framework of the material and moral life of the groups 
we belong to; they are connected to our understanding of history, geography, 
biography, politics, and other familiar frames of reference.123 In discussions 
with others or in personal recollection we connect our intimate remembrances 
with a social body of thought.124 In this way, he argues, what happens to us, 
and what we remember, is coloured with meaning and significance by the 
collective frameworks of memory.  
It has been noted earlier in this chapter that the collective memory can be 
understood as the common denominator of the individual memory of the 
group members, as an abstract concept. The collective frameworks of 
memory, differently, should be seen as ‘the result, the sum, the combination 
of individual recollections of many members of the same society’.125 The 
collective frameworks of memory do not refer to an abstract denominator, but 
simply to the totality of possible thought in society or in the group. Each 	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individual holds his part of the totality, and these parts are characterised by 
their commonality, not by their idiosyncrasy. Involvement in the different 
groups provides the individual with sets of social constraints within which he 
reconstructs the past.126 It is in relation to the collective framework of the 
present that we remember; remembrance is the reconstruction of the past 
attained through the use of elements borrowed from the present. As society 
changes, the collective frameworks of memory are redefined, and 
consequently each period in the history of a society will provide different 
frameworks for the reconstruction of the past. Their slow change, however, 
gives the appearance of a stable frame of reference, and they can easily be 
taken to stand outside of the passage of time.127 The same notions of the 
frameworks may be constant over time; their understanding in each period, 
however, will differ. We can get access to the frameworks of earlier times by 
starting from the present, by means of reasoning or analogical thinking.128 
The further back in time we go, the coarser the framework, and the less 
events we will be able to identify through the framework. 
The adaptation of the spatial framework to changes in the physical 
environment is a continuous process of the mind, leaving older versions of 
the framework behind. 
Every time we place one of our impressions in the framework of our current 
ideas, the framework transforms the impression, but the impression, in its 
turn, modifies the framework. It is a new moment, a new place that we add to 
our time, to our space; it is a new aspect of our group that makes us see it in a 
new light.129 
The continuous adaptation makes us go from one framework to the next, but 
each framework differs slightly from the previous. A new person changes the 
configuration of the social framework; a new place or a new moment is 
added to the frameworks of space and time. Since every individual belongs to 
several groups, for instance the family, a professional group, and a 
community, he comes to sustain several collective frameworks into which he 
can insert memories and impressions.130 A single event in memory may thus 
come to acquire different meanings in relation to different frameworks. Any 
changes that take place will not only alter the specific elements of the 
framework, but all of its relations to other elements and frameworks. 	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In the Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire Halbwachs spends some time 
discussing the dynamic relation between memory images and the frameworks 
in the reconstructive process of memory. The frameworks can either help 
reconstruct images or series of images by positioning them socially, 
temporally, or spatially. Or singular memory images can contribute to 
localising and establishing the surrounding framework – the milieu, the time, 
or the place.131 There always exists, so Halbwachs argues, a general aspect of 
unique memory images that can be linked to the current frameworks of 
memory.132 This is explained by the fact that both the individual images and 
the framework of memory are constructs of the mind. 
The historical framework of memory, outlined in La Mémoire collective, 
Halbwachs describes as somewhat different from other frameworks. When a 
person learns history in school or through history books, as it were, elements 
from general history are internalised into that person’s historical memory.133 
What appears to the individual to be an external framework is appropriated, 
and personal memories from early life are reinterpreted in relation to this 
framework.134 The external, and often national, history manifests itself in 
specific memories like names, dates, and events, which are internalised into 
the individual’s historical framework of memory.135 The internalised 
historical framework of memory shows a different character than the social 
framework in which the child was immersed during childhood, but it is also 
employed to localise memories. The social framework, however, is more 
living and natural than the former, and it is better suited to provide a 
framework in which the individual can base his thought and reconstruct the 
past.136 ‘Ordinarily, the nation is too remote from the individual for him to 
consider the history of his country as anything else but a very large 
framework, with which his own history makes contact only at a few 
points’.137 Halbwachs establishes a concept pair that I will develop further in 
relation to Aleida and Jan Assmann’s theory. The general history, written 
down by historians, exists as a mind-external framework that the individual 
can consult by means of reading; the historical memory exists for him as a 
mind-internal framework that can be consulted by means of reflection. Both 
assist acts of memory. Concerning architecture I will similarly distinguish 
between the physical building, as an external spatial framework that supports 	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the reconstructions of the past, and the mental representation of it, as an 
internal spatial framework. 
The postulation that frameworks are structural underpinnings of 
remembering is not an idiosyncrasy of Halbwachs’s. Other theories of the 
first part of the twentieth century saw similar conceptualisations. In 1904 
biologist Richard Semon suggested that complexes of memory traces, or 
engram-complexes, could be activated in their whole, when memory received 
sensory stimuli.138 In 1932 Bartlett used schema to refer to ‘an active 
organisation of past reactions [to stimuli], or of past experiences, which must 
always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organic response’.139 
Schemata do not refer to mental storehouses of percepts or memory images, 
but living notions, constantly developing with an effect on all sensational 
experience, he argues. 
More recently, memory scholar John Sutton has included Halbwachs as 
one of the forerunners of the study of situated cognition and social 
scaffolding of thought.140 Social psychologist Gerald Echterhoff has reviewed 
the collective frameworks of memory in the light of similar developments in 
psychology. He argues that Halbwachs’s conception of frameworks ‘in an 
exemplary fashion connects to the contemporary stronger empirically 
founded state of research … Thereby the productive potential in Halbwachs’s 
work manifests itself, also in light of current psychological attempts’.141 Jan 
Assmann has pointed to the similarity between the frameworks in 
Halbwachs’s theory and frame analysis proposed by Erving Goffman, a 
theory that ‘delves into the social prestructure or organization of everyday 
experience’.142 
For this thesis’ attempt to better understand the role of architecture for 
social remembering Halbwachs’s postulation of the frameworks of memory 
enables us to draw a crucial distinction between architecture that is perceived 
and architecture that is conceived, remembered. While Halbwachs argued 
that the understanding of the spatial framework of memory is that of 
architecture conceived in the mind, the discussion in chapter five will 
propose the physical environment as a mind-external framework of memory, 	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thus expanding on some discussions inherent in Halbwachs’s thinking as well 
as on the development of his theory through Aleida and Jan Assmann. 
Remembering and forgetting 
In Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire Halbwachs makes it clear that 
remembering, as an activity, is entirely dependent on the frameworks of 
memory. Only when memory fragments are placed in relation to the 
frameworks of one or several groups is the individual able to reconstruct and 
make meaning of the past. Forgetting, he postulates, is explained by the 
disappearance of the frameworks, or parts of them.143 Singular memories may 
relate themselves to several frameworks (temporal, spatial, social), and the 
more often they appear in the frameworks, or at the points of their 
intersections, the less the risk of forgetting. From time to time society or the 
group changes – the social organisation of the group may be remodelled 
because of births, deaths, and marriages, a family may move to a new city, 
and buildings may be demolished or new ones erected. Such changes cause 
the group to alter its corresponding frameworks and the cues for certain 
memories may disappear. 
The person who resists changes to the group memory and to the 
frameworks, and who clings to things that the group has stopped talking 
about, for example the name of dead ancestors, is like a person who sees 
what others do not see. He behaves as if he was suffering from 
hallucinations, Halbwachs explains.144 Under the social pressure of the group 
he will keep quiet, and soon also he forgets what no one around him talks 
about. 
Halbwachs introduces additional aspects of forgetting in La Mémoire 
collective that support and expand the formulations of Les Cadres sociaux de 
la mémoire. An important reason for forgetting he attributes to the separation 
from a group. He takes as an example the teacher who meets one of his 
former pupils again.145 It is likely that the pupil will recall the teacher, but not 
the teacher the pupil. The teacher has seen many classes over the years and at 
the end of each year they all scattered. This is true for the pupils as well, 
Halbwachs explains, but for them the class is less ephemeral and lives on for 
some time. They belong to the same age and maybe the same social circle. 
The teacher does not belong to the group in the same manner. The teacher 
performed the same function in all the classes, but the teacher left a unique 	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imprint on all the pupils through his person and his teaching, a memory that 
the pupils share and remember with the help of one another. 
Halbwachs gives another example. Suppose we lose contact with a group 
of people that we have previously spent time with on a trip. The other 
members, meanwhile, have continued to socialise. Upon meeting a person 
from that group again, we may realise that we have forgotten all about it, but 
he can tell us of things that he remembers from the journey. We could also 
have remembered, Halbwachs argues, if we had stayed in contact with the 
group, sharing the subsequent discussions. ‘For if that first recollection [of 
our individual memory] is obliterated’, he explains, ’it can no longer be 
retrieved, because we have, for a long time, not belonged to the group in 
whose memory it is retained’.146 However, the loss of the first recollection 
can never be total. There always exist certain fragments, which, given the 
right context, could be used for reconstruction: 
there is no such thing as an absolute void [vide absolu] in memory, that is to 
say, regions of our past that are so emptied from our memory that any image 
projected onto them cannot associate itself with a memory element, where the 
imagination remains pure and simple, or the historical representation remains 
external to us.147 
Bergson had argued that we forget nothing, because our past is retained in its 
entirety in memory through complete images of events, with intrinsic 
references to time and place. Forgetting, he explains, can be explained by 
obstacles in the behaviour of the brain. Remembering is in part due to the 
removal of these obstacles. Explicitly against Bergson’s thesis of internal 
obstacles that cause forgetting, Halbwachs proposes that 
what remains are not ready-made images in some subterranean gallery of our 
thought. Rather, we find in society all the indications necessary to reconstruct 
those parts of our past that are represented in incomplete or indistinct manner 
or which we even believe have been completely removed from our 
memory.148 
An incomplete memory makes use of frameworks that pertain to the society 
outside in order to reconstruct the past. The actualisation of earlier 
experiences by returning to an environment or seeing a friend may give 
access to the framework we need in order to reconstruct the past out of the 	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148 ibid. Douglas sees Halbwachs’s explanation of forgetting as a critical dissociation from his former teacher 
Bergson. Douglas, ‘Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs’, 5. 
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fragments. Forgetting, so Halbwachs’s hypothesis can be summarised, should 
be attributed to changing definitions, unavailability, or loss of the 
frameworks of memory, the disappearance of outer stimuli that previously 
had actualised the frameworks of memory: dispersal of the group itself, 
displacement from, or destruction of the environment of the group. Due to the 
limitation of how long collective memories can persist, Jan Assmann reasons, 
Halbwachs’s theory of memory has the priceless advantage of also being a 
theory of forgetting.149 Moreover, the theory could address collective 
forgetting, because if the frameworks that are shared by a group disappear, 
forgetting affects all its members. Yerushalmi argues that the latter does not 
refer to past events in the group members’ lives, like individual forgetting 
does, but rather to the present. 
When we say that a people ‘remembers’ we are really saying that a past has 
been actively transmitted to the present generation and that this past has been 
accepted as meaningful. Conversely, a people ‘forgets’ when the generation 
that now possesses the past does not convey it to the next, or when the latter 
rejects what it receives and does not pass it onward, which is to say the same 
thing. The break in transmission can occur abruptly or by a process of erosion. 
But the principle remains. A people can never ‘forget’ what it never received 
in the first place.150 
Collective forgetting becomes an issue of transmission, sustenance, and 
alteration; the collective frameworks of the group define what should be 
remembered in active or passive acts of recall in the present. In chapter five I 
shall return to the question of forgetting and discuss the merits of its re-
evaluation in the model of Aleida and Jan Assmann. 
A basis for the spatial framework of memory 
This chapter has addressed how the theory of collective memory is the result 
of a delicate work of synthesis. Through Halbwachs’s three books a complex 
conceptualisation of memory is drawn up, which builds on the postulates of 
his intellectual forefathers, Bergson, Leibniz, and Durkheim. He develops 
ideas, refines them, and positions himself against them. The construal of the 
collective memory in this thesis, on the one hand, is based on the careful 
appreciation of the origin of Halbwachs’s thought. On the other, it is 
determined by the use I will make of it as a theoretical premise for the spatial 
framework of memory. 	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A central claim of the collective memory is that all individual memory is 
conditioned by the social groups the individual is inscribed in – the family, a 
profession, a religious community etc. Only by the means of frameworks, 
collectively shared notions of time, of space, of social relations, and of 
language, is the individual able to reconstruct the past. Halbwachs opposes 
Bergson’s suggestion that memory images remain in memory as vivid and 
complete units, including spatial and temporal specifications. Instead, he 
argues that fragmentary images need to be localised in the collective 
frameworks to acquire meaning. The frameworks can be seen as common 
denominators of separate memories that are stored in memory independently 
from the images – they took place at the same time of the day, in the same 
house, or with the same people. They change with time to comply with the 
views of current society and of the group. The group can only remember 
what the frameworks enable them to reconstruct; with the alterations or loss 
of frameworks comes forgetting. In this way, Halbwachs’s theory is a theory 
of memory as well as forgetting. 
The frameworks are essentially mind-internal constructs that enable 
remembering. They are in part conceptualisations of external things. For 
instance, the historical frameworks of memory Halbwachs regards as a 
scheme of dates, names, and places internalised from an external framework 
of general history, written down in books. Similarly, the material framework 
refers to the physical environment that presents itself to the senses and lends 
itself to various practical uses. It makes up a counterpart to the internal 
spatial framework of memory. In a similar way, it is possible to think of the 
social framework of memory, for example in the family, as the conception 
that we have of our relatives, their personalities, and our relationships with 
them. It is the internal and notional construct that has its counterpart in the 
physical and social bodies that the group consists of. 
Some of the critics of the collective memory have accused it of 
anthropomorphising the group, of treating it as a subject on a par with 
individuals, and of hypostatising the abstract notion of collective memory. 
Halbwachs maintains that there is nothing mystical about collective memory 
and it does not exist as a supraindividual entity. Instead, it should be 
understood as the influence that the group psychology has on individual 
thought. To refer to collective memory, or to collective frameworks, is to 
refer to the common aspects of a great number of memories spread out over 
the group members’ individual memory faculties.                   
These are some of the fundamental aspects of the collective memory. To 
comprehend the concept of the spatial framework of memory presupposes the 
general characteristics of frameworks of memory, of which the spatial is but 
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one. To agree with the postulation of the spatial framework means to agree 
with the argument that the basic workings of memory depend on frameworks. 
It is with such recognition in mind that we turn to the next chapter and to 
Halbwachs’s conception of the role of space for memory. 
 
2 
The spatial framework of memory 
and collective landmarks 
 
But it happens whenever a collective memory has a double object, 
on the one hand, a material reality, a person, a monument, a place 
in space, and, on the other hand, a symbol, that is to say the 
spiritual significance which, in the mind of the group, attaches 
itself and superposes the reality. Suppose the group breaks up. 
Some of the members stay in the place, in the presence of the 
material object, in contact with it. The others leave, carrying with 
them the image of the object. At the same time the object changes. 
The very place it occupies no longer remains the same, because all 
that surrounds it transforms. It no longer bears the same relations 
to the different parts of the material world that surrounds it.   
— Maurice Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire, 19411 
In the previous chapter we arrived at a rudimentary understanding of the 
collective memory and the workings of its frameworks. I shall now turn to 
the specific concept of the spatial framework of memory to see how it ends 
up as a crystallisation point in the interface between theories concerned with 
architecture, memory, social life, and cultural forms. The concept, so I 
suggest, has been veiled by its position as one of the pillars of the collective 
memory, and this chapter aims at highlighting this particular aspect of the 
theory. 
The linguistic similarity between the spatial, the social, and the temporal 
framework of memory betrays the fundamental aspects that they share. They 
are, in essence, mental constructs that each individual sustains in his mind. 	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Jaisson, Quadrige (1941; 1971; rev. 2nd edn, Paris, PUF, 2008), 128–29. 
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What makes the spatial framework dissimilar from the others is that it is 
commonly interwoven in an interdependent relationship with a physical 
dimension. Time and social relations outside of the human mind are not 
tangible in the same sense as furniture, buildings, or cities. This does not 
mean, however, that the spatial framework is less conceptual than the others. 
In this chapter I will demonstrate the richness, complexity, and consistency 
of the concept that Halbwachs developed in the three books on memory, 
arguing for its recognition as a fundamental contribution to a theoretical 
framework for addressing the intersection of architecture and societal 
memory. 
As will become clear in the next two chapters, architectural thinkers 
embraced Halbwachs’s thinking on space already in the 1960s, making him 
one of the most important references for highly influential books that shaped 
a generation of architects. In this chapter I will reassess the spatial framework 
in its original context and put it forward as a concept that could, once more, 
and differently than in Kevin Lynch’s and Aldo Rossi’s studies, benefit 
studies in architecture and memory. In a similar fashion as their works, 
however, this study is motivated by a concern for deficient attention to 
humanistic values in architecture and urban planning. 
Because of my emphasis on the concept of the spatial framework of 
memory as a free-standing theoretical framework, and because of its intended 
application in concerns of contemporary society, I will make a selection of 
those elements that contribute to the ambitions. Consequently, other elements 
will not be treated, for instance some of the phenomenal reflections and some 
matters primarily of historical interest. Since I deal with only certain aspects 
of a larger theory, I will, from time to time, jump from one place in a book to 
another in order to keep the focus on the same aspects, thus reading it in a 
different order than most readers would. I will discuss each book separately, 
but occasionally I will let the thinking of another source complement the 
discussion. 
Before we continue, let me emphasise that for Halbwachs the spatial 
framework of memory refers to the mental conceptualisation that the 
individual holds of an environment. It is individually based in the cognitive 
faculty of the brain, but at the same time it represents a unique point of view 
on the collective spatial framework. It could, but does not need to, 
correspond to a physical environment. The mental conception could be 
imagined or acquired from fictive places in books or films. The spatial 
framework of memory, thus, does not denote material buildings or 
landscapes, but refers to a notion that may stand in a relation to them. 
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Selected parts of the physical environment of a group play important roles 
for their spatial framework of memory, entering into a dependence of 
reciprocal influence. Halbwachs’s use of language, like when he refers to 
‘spatial framework’ but leaves out ‘memory’, may sometimes give the 
impression that it equals the built environment that the individual moves in or 
perceives. In my understanding, he does not use ‘spatial framework (of 
memory)’ to refer to the built environment; it is when he uses terms like 
‘material frameworks’ (‘cadres matériels’) that he explicitly refers to the 
organisation or the perception of the physical environment.2 In Halbwachs’s 
theory the material environment can be considered the physical counterpart to 
the spatial framework of memory in the same way that the living members 
are the counterparts to the concept the individual has of social relations in the 
social framework of memory. In chapter five, as an extension of Halbwachs’s 
reasoning, and with the support of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s theories, I will 
propose to regard the material framework as a spatial framework of memory, 
but of a different kind. Existing as a mind-external rather than a mind-
internal framework, it enables the distinction between architecture as material 
and as mental aid for the memory, both with direct influence on processes of 
memory. 
The spatial framework of memory in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire 
Formation of the spatial framework of memory 
The formation of the frameworks of memory takes place in childhood. In a 
passage about the social life and memory of the child in Les Cadres sociaux 
de la mémoire, Halbwachs presents the first considerations of the spatial 
framework of memory.3 The social frame of reference of the child of ten or 
twelve years is somewhat limited, he explains, and it sustains only a vague 
idea of society as a whole. It belongs to a smaller social circle of the family 
and friends, whose daily life takes place around the home, in certain rooms, 
gardens, or streets. Sensational and everyday events take place within this 
limited environment: ‘Thus, because of the habitual contact that we have with 
certain objects and people and the repeated impressions of our surroundings, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 E.g. M Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, ed. G Namer (1950; crit. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997) [orig., 
‘Mémoire et société’ (1947)], 205. Cf. terms like ‘milieu extérieur’, ‘milieu matériel’, and ‘l’espace physique’. 
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the dominant images eventually engrave themselves more deeply than others 
in our mind’.4 Halbwachs continues the line of reasoning with a quote from 
Goethe’s autobiography: 
When we desire to recall what befell us in the earliest period of youth, it often 
happens that we confound what we have heard from others with that which we 
really possess from our own direct experience … [Therefore] I am conscious 
that we lived in an old house, which in fact consisted of two adjoining houses, 
that had been opened into each other.5 
Halbwachs explains that for Goethe the spaces he subsequently describes in 
detail constitute the framework in which a whole period of his life took place. 
Rhetorically, he asks to what extent Goethe’s methodical arrangement of the 
text and clarity in the pictures agrees with the author’s clear and graphic 
conception and with what the child really saw. 
What is often kept in memory of a house where we used to live is less the 
layout of the rooms, as they would be shown on an architectural plan, than 
impressions, which, if we wanted to place them in relation to each other, 
would maybe not make sense and sometimes contradict each other.6 
While the child is limited to only some environments, the adult possesses a 
larger frame of reference. ‘Certainly’, Halbwachs points out, 
for the adult, the house he lives in and the places in the city he frequently 
visits most often constitute something like a framework, but he knows that it 
is only a part of a larger defined totality, and he has an idea of the proportions 
of the parts in relation to the totality: the spatial framework that encloses the 
thought of the adult is therefore much larger.7 
In this way, we should understand the relative importance of the home 
environment for the child’s thought compared to that of the adult, for whom 
it only makes up a smaller part of the total spatial framework of memory. 
Besides, when we speak about a spatial framework, we do not mean 
something that resembles a geometrical figure. Sociologists have shown that 
in many primitive tribes space is not thought of as a homogeneous 
environment, but its parts are differentiated by the mystical qualities attributed 
to them: a specific region, a specific direction that is under command of a 	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spirit or is identified with a specific clan of the tribe. Similarly, the different 
rooms of a house, specific nooks, specific pieces of furniture, or in the vicinity 
of the house, a specific garden, a specific street corner, because they usually 
evoke vivid impressions in the child’s mind and are associated with specific 
family members, with its games, with specific events, unique or recurring, 
because its imagination has animated and transfigured them, in some way they 
acquire an emotional value [for the child].8 
The spatial framework is fully immersed in the social life of the child, and 
thus the different places and the associations act like a system of notions set 
in a spatial structure. This associative spatiality of the child Halbwachs sees 
as a physical environment that has been internalised and memorised. If 
architectural principles, material properties, and physical laws define the 
external world, then social and emotional connotations determine the spatial 
framework. The internal representation of space sustains a relationship with 
the physical environment, but does not share the same logic. 
The spatial framework of memory and the material framework 
For the adult, the home takes a similar role as for the child. If he was to leave 
a house in which he has spent a part of his life, it could appear as if he was 
leaving that part of his life behind. And in fact, Halbwachs explains, when 
the environment is not there anymore, and it stops to evoke the spatial 
framework in the person’s memory through its presence, there is a danger 
that the memories associated with all the places in that part of the framework 
may be forgotten. However, many of the memories from that period will 
cling to other objects, places, or reflections outside the realm of the home, or 
a meeting with people who have a relation to that place may evoke the 
period. For the adult, that environment forms only a minor part of the total 
framework of space and can more easily be considered dispensable. For the 
child, differently, a larger share of its framework may have been lost and 
with it its whole life and all the memories attached to its places and objects.  
If a household is dispersed, the family scattered or extinguished, [the child] 
can count only on itself to preserve the image of his home and everything 
associated with it. The image, moreover, is suspended in emptiness, since his 
mind was confined to the delimiting framework, and since he only has an ever 
so imprecise idea of its place in the totality of other images, a totality that he 
only encountered after it had already ceased to exist.9 	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For the adult, the spatial framework of memory is not equally dependent on 
input from the environment that corresponds to it, to the material framework. 
Halbwachs makes clear the intimate relationship that exists between the two. 
We should not confuse them. The spatial framework of memory is formed by 
repeated interaction with the environment, but the resulting construction is 
not the representation of a geometrical reality, rather a notion created out of 
it, a conceptualisation. 
When the individual is present in a part of the environment, the framework 
conceived in the mind amalgamates with the perception and produces a total 
image in his conscious mind. The space of the framework complements and 
contextualises the perceptive input. It expands the spatial awareness to 
encompass areas outside of the immediate perception, so that the person 
knows which room, garden, or street he can expect to find if he was to move 
out through the door. The framework also lends meanings and associations to 
space. For instance, a bed that a person observes in a room may be associated 
with the idea of the child that normally sleeps there and the person’s 
emotional affiliations to that child. The environment, through its presence to 
the senses, evokes the spatial framework of memory and the memories and 
emotions associated with it, and it gives it a sense of reality. Two persons, or 
two social groups, may assign different meaning to the same environment 
and, consequently, the spatial framework of the place comes to carry 
different associative arrangements. Whereas the bed for one of them is 
associated with his child, for the other it may give associations to his own 
childhood. The materiality in front of both of them is appreciated and 
conceived differently. 
In the fourth chapter of Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire Halbwachs 
addresses localisation processes of remembrance, the searches in mind that 
one performs in order to become ‘conscious of the moment in which one has 
established [acquis] a memory’.10 If we recognise a person, or an image 
crosses our mind, we cannot localise the memory until we have become 
conscious of who or what or what place or situation the person or image 
relates to etc. It is an intellectual and reflective activity of the mind, he says, 
that establishes the memories, contextualises, and enriches them. 
Localisation does not go through the images, but through the continuity or 
similarity of frameworks, he argues. He exemplifies this with a self-lived 
experience of watching the Vallula Massif in Vorarlberg, with its jagged 
summits standing out against a peculiar blue sky, with two or three pink 
clouds, and suddenly being reminded of a similar landscape he had thought 	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of another evening. At first unable to locate it, it was not until he could place 
it in relation to a spatial, temporal, and social framework that he could fully 
remember the similar experience at Saint-Gervais: 
I had the impression of an image, for a moment suspended in the void, and 
which coincided almost exactly with the picture [of the landscape] that 
unfolded in front of me. It all happened as if a memory arose, without any 
help from the contexts of time, place, and environment, and it took me almost 
a minute to explore in my thought the time and place in which it could be 
placed and to recover its framework.11 
Halbwachs brings in Bergson to assert his own standpoint. Bergson would 
argue that it is the similarity between the current impression and the memory 
image that causes the latter to occur in our mind. This helps us to localise the 
impression. Halbwachs proposes instead that we should understand it as if the 
frame of mind (cadre psychique) that is caused by current impressions of the 
environment can be localised with the help of the spatial framework of 
memory. The latter consists of fairly stable notions that we can actualise in 
mind at any moment to render the current percept complete or meaningful. 
Halbwachs’s postulation offers a radical twist to the idea of Bergson (and 
other thinkers) that association in memory goes from one singular percept or 
memory image to another. Instead, Halbwachs asks us to recognise that it 
happens as a result of similarities in more stable concepts of space: the one 
created in mind upon seeing the environment, the other conjured up from 
memory. Spaces and spatial conceptualisations, rather than perceptual 
images, connote other spaces and conceptualisations. We should consider 
that the ability to remember in spatial situations might depend more on 
spatial understanding than on vivid impressions and memories. 
Remember other things 
By defining space in memory as a framework and not as inherent properties 
of memory images, like Bergson had done, Halbwachs gives it an essentially 
different character, emphasising its notional, dynamic, and schematic nature 
rather than its mathematical and geometrical. What the framework loses in 
terms of detail and accuracy, it gains in familiarity, flexibility, and 
operability. Its function in the reconstruction of other memories becomes 
more important than its status as a signifier of spatial properties and spatial 
relations. While it certainly may be employed to enable orientation and way-
finding, which we will see in the theory of Kevin Lynch in the next chapter, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 ibid., 117. 
Edifices 	  
 94 
its use for social remembering remains one of the central tasks of the spatial 
framework of memory. It is the actualisation of space in memory that enables 
the reconstruction of other memories. We do not remember space as such; we 
remember it in order to bring to mind events, people, or other places. Its 
mnemonic function differentiates the spatial framework from space in 
memory images: ‘when we recall a city – its neighbourhoods, its streets, its 
houses – so many memories crop up, many of which seem to have been lost 
forever and which, in turn, help us to discover others’.12 The spatial 
framework is the means by which other things can be organised, retrieved, 
and disseminated, and in order to recollect the memories of events we need to 
bring it to mind and to be aware of it at all times.13 
On the one hand, we can bring to mind the spatial framework to search for 
other memories. On the other hand, we may also stumble, literally and 
figuratively speaking, upon memories we thought we had forgotten, like 
when ‘we come back to places where we have spent a part of our life to relive 
and rediscover details that had vanished’.14 Halbwachs explained in the 
account from Vorarlberg how he localised the concept of what he perceived 
through its similarity with a spatial framework conjured up in memory. In a 
passage on the illusions of memory, which Halbwachs wrote sometime 
between 1925 and 1932, and which only came to be included in the critical 
edition of La Mémoire collective, he addresses memories that seem 
impossible to localise without stimuli from outside.15 For such mémoires 
involontaires (Proust) we have to wait for the right circumstances, but when, 
for instance, a place comes into the field of our perception, we may 
spontaneously conjure up memories of events that we have not thought about 
since they occurred: 
we recognise this place and we remember at the same time the state of mind 
we have seen it in. It seems that the memory remained there, clinging to the 
façades of these houses, waiting along this path, on the edges of this cove, on 
this bench-shaped rock. We return there to hold on to the moment and to 
recapture in our memory a place that otherwise would never have been 
occupied.16 
Such situations seem to suggest that the precondition for reactualising these 
memories lies in the bodily return to the place. The series of perceptions of 	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edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997), 15. 
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the houses or of the rock result in a unique combination of sensory 
impressions that directs the mind in the process of remembering exactly those 
things. 
Halbwachs demonstrates a similar concern in Les Cadres sociaux de la 
mémoire. In situations where we return to a place we have not been to for a 
long time, he reasons, it is not only the case of a one-way process of 
localising the current frame of mind in relation to an existing spatial 
framework of memory. In the localities where previous events or periods of 
our lives played out we may find that the people and the environment have 
aged and changed, just like ourselves.17 The expectation to find again the 
social and spatial context of our earlier life, as if it had been preserved in the 
place, is contrasted with the reality of the current life we see there. We 
become aware of the gap between the physicality of the place and the spatial 
framework of its earlier state, including associations, and we perceive the 
new social orders that now involve the physical structure. At the same time as 
the impressions cue memories, the mind receives impressions that revise the 
spatial framework according to the physical and social changes. 
The processes of remembering in places are part of a continuous revision 
work executed by the mind upon the framework. The memories associated 
with the place, which we before the return to the place may have considered 
as lost, can simply not by reconstructed without certain cues. We get the 
illusion, though, of rediscovering these memories when we find ourselves in 
spatial conditions similar to those in which we experienced the original 
events. 
But from where does this kind of sap come that makes certain memories swell 
up and gives them an appearance of real life? Is it the former life conserved in 
them, or is it not rather a new life, which we communicate to them, a 
borrowed life, drawn from the present, and which lasts only so long as the 
passing overexcitement or our immediate affective disposition? … when one 
returns to localities where [events] took place, that is to say, where one 
believes to find the traces on the façades of the houses, which once saw us 
passing by … how little remains of the old appearance that is familiar to us … 
Well, through a mutual exchange, our reconstructed images borrow present 
emotions of this feeling of reality, which it, in our eyes, makes into existent 
objects, while the sense of presence, through these connections to the images, 
comes to identify itself with the feelings that once accompanied the objects.18 
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Halbwachs challenges the illusion we get of ‘finding’ again memories 
through the mémoire involontaire. The life-like quality of the remembrance 
rather results from the amalgamation of the experience of the situation with 
our memories, than from the pristine condition of these memory images, 
unattended for a long time somewhere in our memory. In this way, we can 
understand the importance of sensory impressions from the environment for 
recollection. The localisation and animation of certain memories can only be 
enabled through the overlay of the material framework over the spatial 
framework in memory. I will bring Halbwachs’s argument with me to chapter 
five and see how this way of thinking could inform the discussion of the acts 
of remembering and imagination that take place in historic sites, the 
phenomenon of antëische Magie. 
Common denominator 
More than to individual properties, the frameworks of memory refer to 
features that are shared between different memories. Halbwachs takes as an 
example the recollection of things we may have learnt at a reading. We 
normally cannot remember the exact date or situation when we learnt it, but 
all the readings display several similarities: ‘they took place in the same 
room, on the same day, with the same classmates, or in the same room with 
the parents, brothers, and sisters’.19 With Bergson, Halbwachs explains, we 
should understand every reading to correspond to a distinct memory (un 
souvenir définit). Who does not see, Halbwachs asks, that by placing all these 
memories of the readings next to each other, what we construct is the 
framework in which these readings took place. The framework enables us, if 
not to revive the original states of experience, so at least to imagine how they 
could have been according to these shared circumstances. They enable us to 
reconstruct the past rather than to recover traces of it. Halbwachs formulates 
his critique explicitly against Bergson’s thesis: 
It is therefore not surprising that even in a recollection, where images (in the 
sense of unique images) occupy the greatest place, there are also general 
notions that habit and repetition have fixed in our minds. [We could not 
prevent such notions from being part of the individual images, unless] we 
would try to represent images where all the contents is in fact new and unique, 
in a place unrelated to those we know from other experiences, and in a time 
that we would not situate within general time or in a defined period of our life. 
This is how far we would need to go. Besides, notions that precede and follow 
our impression, and which remain in a more stable form in our consciousness, 	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could not be involved in it: a notion from a book, from printed characters, 
from a table, a teacher, parents, a lesson, etc.20 
Space, like time and social relations, offers constants in memory, stored in a 
different fashion than vivid memory images. It is not possible, therefore, to 
derive a general framework of space, time, or the milieu from a series of 
singular memories. The frameworks of memory, differently, are qualitative 
views established separately from our impressions, Halbwachs posits. They 
constitute notions of relative stability and lend continuity to fragmentary 
memory images. They are common denominators of the individual’s 
memory, but are also shared in the social collective and offer it a common 
frame of reference. 
Collective landmarks 
With reference to his own professional and family life, Halbwachs addresses 
how memories can be localised with the help of collective landmarks or 
collective points of reference (points de repère collectifs) in the spatial, 
social, or temporal framework.21 The frameworks should be understood as 
systems of landmarks and points of references that serve as referential and 
conditional notions for recollection. The landmarks and points of reference 
are the connection points between, and shared denominators of, the various 
frameworks of memory. Singular memory images can be localised by our 
mental movement from landmark to landmark or from a landmark in the 
spatial framework to a point of reference in the social or temporal 
framework. 
I am in Strasbourg and I am soon to depart to Paris to take part in an 
examination jury. I try to recall the place where I stayed at the same time last 
year, in the period of the same exams. Did I get off on my own in the 
Gobelins district, where my mother lives, or with my wife and my children at 
my parents-in-law, who live close to Rue de Rennes? A memory comes to 
mind: I see myself having breakfast one morning in this period, at a café in 
the neighbourhoods of the Montparnasse station.22 
Halbwachs describes how he recalls vivid details of the breakfast and is led 
to conclude that he must have stayed at his parents-in-law, near the Rue de 
Rennes. The affective character of the memory, the feeling of being refreshed 
in a time of overwork, so Halbwachs reasons, becomes one such point of 	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Edifices 	  
 98 
reference in his personal and family life. He continues by asking where he 
had stayed before the departure. 
Another memory, also emotional, a new individual point of reference comes 
to my mind. One evening, I arrived at my in-laws after dinner. I was tired and 
mostly concerned about the health of A. … I tried to offer him some 
distraction, when I lean out from the balcony. Large modern homes that were 
erected in our district loomed with their dark shapes and gave me the feeling 
of suffocation. From the fifth floor, I looked down on the narrow street, as if it 
was a chasm of silence and boredom. Opposite, an open window allowed me 
to look into a brightly lit dining room, where an old man with a sullen 
countenance was reading a newspaper alone in front of a half-emptied table. 
All that I saw was consistent with my feeling of sadness. In any case, I 
remember now that in this period I took my meals in the company of my 
mother, who had not yet departed, and I came back every night to my in-laws 
where I stayed until morning.23 
In these two related accounts, Halbwachs localises his memories by relating 
them to the homes of his family members in Paris (collective landmarks in 
the spatial framework of the family), to the period of the exams and A.’s 
illness (collective points of reference in the temporal framework of the 
profession and of the family) and to his mother, wife, children, A. and his 
parents-in-law (collective points of reference in the social framework of the 
family). The actualisation of elements in the spatial framework – the flat, the 
dining room, the balcony – enabled him to reconstruct the emotional state he 
was in. It was at the connection points of these different frameworks that he 
could finally localise the memories that he had set out to find. Without the 
spatial, temporal, and social frameworks, which secured the localisation of 
memories, Halbwachs concludes, he would not have been able to remember. 
In the conclusion of the book he returns to the subject.24 In the acts of 
recollection, he says, we move between collective landmarks and points of 
reference that we carry in mind and that we share with other members of the 
groups we are part of. We jump from one to the other in the series of 
reflections we need to perform in order to localise memory images or 
recognise impressions: from people, periods, and houses to objects, facts, and 
emotions. In the Paris example, for Halbwachs, it is essentially the homes 
and people with relevance to the family that constitute his collective 
landmarks and social points of reference, and each point is a crossroads for 
several frameworks of memory. 	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A stage for memory 
Recent memories of places, Halbwachs explains, can be picture-like in their 
character. This marks their difference from the spatial framework, 
accumulated over time: 
The first time we visit a city we examine the houses, monuments, etc. with a 
curiosity of sharpened attention. We keep a more vivid recollection than if we 
had stayed there for a long time, without having looked closer at our 
surroundings.25 
The places we see often, on the other hand, turn into abstractions that contain 
all the particularities that interest us, but which may differ from the original 
sensory impression. 
I live at a specific point in the city. Every day I walk through different areas, 
more or less distant: in this way I walk through all parts of the city and can 
now head wherever I wish. Why can I not, in a coherent manner, represent to 
myself the view of the streets, houses, all the particularities of the shops, the 
façades etc., but only to a certain limit, which besides is not fixed? When I 
orient myself according to successive images, up to this limit, why must I 
direct myself at rather discontinuous landmarks, which, for one or the other 
reason, are not contained in the indistinctive mass of unnoticed images? It 
happens because I have very often crossed, in all directions, the 
neighbourhood of my house; it is because I have connected these familiar 
images with each other in multiple ways, in a series of reflections, and which I 
can reconstruct in mind in many ways, starting from many other images.26 
The vivacity of the first memories of the environment gives way to familiar 
schemata, lifeless constructs. They have become intersections for multiple 
impressions, associations, and information, spread out over the spatial, the 
social, and the temporal framework. In this manner, Halbwachs suggests, 
when we first draw the memories to mind, they are filled in and completed by 
their association to various points of reference; linking the empty schema to 
the landmarks in our frameworks, it is fleshed out and turns into a rich 
experience of recollection. 
In the chapter on family memory, Halbwachs illustrates how we can make 
use of such schematised and abstract notions of space. In addition to working 
like a set of landmarks that allow the localisation of memories, the spatial 
framework may also serve as a stage or backdrop for events and people, 
especially when the latter have transfigured into equally stable notions in the 	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frameworks of memory. The stability of the spatial framework is coupled 
with the ability to entertain associations with memories over time. Places in 
the framework serve as common denominators for a multitude of scenes of 
the past. 
When Chateaubriand in a well-known page tells how evenings were spent at 
the manor of Combourg, is this an account of an event that took place only 
once? Was he particularly impressed, on one evening more than any other, by 
the silent comings and goings of his father, by the appearance of the hall, and 
by the details that he throws into relief in his depiction? No: he undoubtedly 
assembled in one single scene memories of many evenings that had been 
engraved in his memory and in that of the family. It is the summation of an 
entire period, the idea of a type of life.27 
Chateaubriand’s account, so Halbwachs tells us, is a reconstructed picture, 
full of details, collected and inserted to evoke different aspects of the 
characters of the parents or their life. It is a narration and a translation of the 
past, summarising reflections and feelings in a new composition. With 
Halbwachs we could regard the spatial framework of memory as a mental 
stage, a mise en scène, against which we can let the people, objects, or 
feelings play the roles we assign them in the re-enactment of the past. Every 
scenery and prop has the capacity to express an entire character or period. 
Zone de l’activité technique et zone des relations personnelles 
In the second part of chapter VII in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire 
Halbwachs goes at length to address the workings of collective memory in 
professional and social environments in the contemporary city. In the 
following I will select some aspects of that discussion to see what the 
implications are for the spatial framework of memory. 
Two zones dominate the modern city. The first, the zone de l’activité 
technique, the zone of technical activity, is where professionals – professors, 
bankers, workers, or soldiers – perform the activities required of them by 
their profession. The techniques ‘consist in knowing and in applying the rules 
and precepts that in every epoch prescribe for the functionary in general 
terms the actions, the language, and the gestures of the function’.28 Every 
profession has accumulated a collective memory of written and unwritten 
rules that directs the techniques of the profession and specifies what should 
be done and what not: 	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If a professor does not follow the curriculum, if a judge does not pronounce 
his verdict in its forms, if a banker applies an illegal rate, in all these cases 
their activity does not reach its goal.29 
The spirit of the profession attaches itself to the specific spaces in the zone de 
l’activité technique and appears as a naturally occurring phenomenon. It is 
‘this kind of spirit that we breathe in with the air, so to speak, when we enter 
a law court or walk into a bank’, and which can be recognised as ‘the certain 
collective features of soldiers of all times, which can be explained by the 
soldier’s life in the trenches and camps’.30 
Like the zone de l’activité technique, the zone des relations personnelles 
organises itself through a material framework and a corresponding spatial 
framework of memory. I have earlier discussed how, in the accounts of 
Chateaubriand’s family home and the homes of Halbwachs’s mother and in-
laws in Paris, the collective landmarks of the spatial framework consist of the 
homes and related places of the family. In the social zone individuals, social 
relations, and family history stand at the centre: ‘It is not concerned with 
accomplishing a function, but only with fortifying in each of its members the 
awareness of his social rank or intensifying collective life’.31 
For some professions the zone de l’activité technique is clearly separated 
from the second zone, la zone des relations personnelles, the zone of 
personal relations. The technical activity is identified with the profession. 
The factory worker, for instance, leaves his world of personal relations when 
he enters the door to the factory, and he does not bring the profession with 
him into his private life after work.32 For the judge or lawyer, entering the 
court building is not to leave the life outside behind. He needs its judgements, 
values, and facts to be able to perform the function: ‘invisibly, the function, 
envisaged as a context of technical activities and thought, is immersed in a 
milieu of activities and thought, which are not technical but purely social’.33 
However, not to confuse the function with the social sphere, and to resist 
external influence, the zone de l’activité technique of the judiciary group 
visually marks the idiosyncrasy of the function and its distance from other 
groups by the use of costumes, the apparatus of the tribunal, and the modes of 
communication.34 The connotations of the name and title of the judge, of the 
court official, or of the president of the court of appeals differ when we hear 	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them in the technical sphere of the courtroom and when we hear them in the 
social sphere of the salon, according to Halbwachs. 
For the parties of a trial and for the public, [the title] certainly represents a 
social authority that is contemporary and impersonal. It is the question of an 
agent who performs a function. More attention is given to his dress than to his 
person, and they do not ask whether he has a past or whether he has occupied 
his position for a long time. He is defined in relation to the other members of 
the court, to subordinates such as the clerks, the defendants, the lawyers, the 
public. He is the centre of purely technical relations, part of an apparatus that 
might have been constructed on that day or the day before. All this 
overshadows the man, his person, and the environment from which he came 
and in which he still lives. In society, on the other hand, he is imbued with a 
social prestige that dates from long ago, or that reflects memories of all kinds, 
some of which are very old. Here it is a matter of the sentiments of the 
environments from which most magistrates have come, of the people with 
whom they associate.35 
Halbwachs makes clear in this chapter that each group, in its corresponding 
zone of modern society, not only constructs a spatial framework with 
different memories or ethics. The rules for remembering also, and the ways in 
which remembering takes place, radically differ between the social memory 
of the family and the memory within highly codified and institutionalised 
professions. The latter may have been passed down, its precepts for 
behaviour developed over several generations. The focus of memory shifts 
with the kind of memory. A zone, thus, could be understood to refer to sets of 
practices of remembrance that are bound to the physical frame of the 
profession and to the collectively shared spatial framework of memory of the 
group. For the professor, the collective memory of the profession dwells in 
the buildings of universities and libraries; for the judge it attaches itself to the 
court buildings, for the family the homes and other significant environments. 
Areas of one zone could overlap areas of other zones – especially where they 
include public space or where professions interact with one another or with 
the public – projecting on to them two or more sets of technical precepts and 
memories. Other spaces are reserved for that zone only, allowing no other 
profession to lay claim to it. The Government Quarter in Oslo, which will be 
the topic of chapter six, has, on the one hand, acted as the spatial setting for 
the professional milieu of the government administration. At the same time, 
the government buildings, especially with regard to their exterior, make up 	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collective landmarks in the spatial frameworks of several other groups – 
architectural historians, citizens of Oslo, or Norwegian nationals. 
A relative stability of such an environment over generations, one could 
speculate, could contribute to optimising the transmission of professional 
collective memory. The rooms in which the organisation of social 
hierarchies, precepts, and ceremonies is embedded are repeatedly actualised 
by performing the duties of the profession. The physical space becomes a 
constant, perceptual reminder. An environment that remains the same 
arguably eases the sustenance of memories that the professional has acquired 
through education or from colleagues. Thus, professional surroundings that 
continue to serve as the material frame slow down the erosion of collective 
memory. 
The spatial framework of memory in La Topographie légendaire 
Topographie 
In Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, Halbwachs devoted a chapter to 
religious collective memory. Some of these arguments can, in hindsight, be 
regarded as sketches for issues that he would return to in La Topographie 
légendaire, the book he already began to prepare in 1925, the same year as 
the first book appeared, but which was not published until 1941. Halbwachs 
develops the line of reasoning in the historically specific study of the 
legendary topography of the Holy Land parallel to the subject matter of the 
more general analysis of memory in La Mémoire collective, the preparations 
for which he also had begun in 1925.36 Subtitled Étude de mémoire 
collective, study of collective memory, La Topographie légendaire transfers 
the theories that he outlines in the other two books to bring to bear on the 
empirical material. 
Halbwachs addresses how the topography of the life of Jesus came to be 
established in the Gospels. What was the role of the landscape in the 
formation of the collective memory of early Christianity, and what can the 
testimonies of pilgrims and travellers from the early fourth century tell us of 
how space is employed in collective remembrance? He further points to how 
anchoring of stories in locales becomes an important device for the 
dissemination of the religious legend. In the introduction he makes a 
disclaimer of his objectives. It is not a historical study of the places 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 G Namer, ‘Postface’, in M Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective (crit. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997), 241. 
Edifices 	  
 104 
themselves, but a study of the role of the places in the formation of collective 
memory: 
We shall not examine whether the traditions of the holy places are exact or 
conform to old facts. We take them as they are formed, in the moment they 
appear to us, and we study them over the centuries that follow. If, as we 
believe, the collective memory is essentially a reconstruction of the past, and 
it adapts the image of the old facts to the beliefs and spiritual needs of the 
present, the knowledge of what was originally is secondary, if not 
unnecessary, since the reality of the past is no longer there as an immutable 
model to comply with. The experience we study … is nothing but an 
experience of a collective psychology, and the laws that we can learn from it 
could be confirmed by studies of the same kind of other facts.37 
A selection process took place in the first or during the second century. The 
disciples made a collection of places that related to the events that had been 
selected to become part of the Christian dogma. Originating in testimonies of 
the disciples who had gathered around Christ and knew of the places of his 
everyday life, they selected ‘among all the other, the places where Jesus had 
been tried, crucified, buried, and resurrected, and where he appeared to his 
disciples’.38 
Halbwachs suggests that for the disciples, contact with the places could 
refresh and revitalise the collective legend at the time, ‘just like we come 
back to places where we have spent a part of our life to relive and rediscover 
details that had vanished’.39 He argues that not only are the places selected 
out of a larger body of locations in which a large amount of stories took 
place, but because of the presence of direct witnesses and their presumably 
heated discussions to establish what had happened, ‘we should expect not 
only a minimum of deformations, errors, and omissions’.40 Since abstract 
thought is not a recollection and, therefore, cannot be held alive by a group, 
Halbwachs explains, it is through the selection and arrangement of locales, 
the rooting of stories in specific places, that the abstract idea survives of a 
God who dies as atonement for the sins of the believers.41 Places make 
abstract thought cognisable and memorable through their tangibility. They 
are as real in the present as they were in the past, and they can at any time 
restage for the believer the mythic drama of Christ. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire, 7. 
38 ibid., 123–24. 
39 ibid., 124. Halbwachs also writes about such mechanisms in the other two books. Cf. Remember other things 
in this chapter. 
40 ibid., 118. 
41 ibid., 124. 
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For the disciples in the Holy Land the physical environment corresponded 
to, but was not identical with, the collective spatial framework that was 
disseminated through the Gospels. Despite the comprehensive destruction of 
Jerusalem in AD 70, which rendered the environment completely different 
from how it had been, it could be recognised and passed down by means of 
persisting place names.42 For the Christian communities in Europe, far 
removed from the Holy Land, the topography of the Gospels was a reality 
because of the spatial framework that they constructed as part of their 
religious training. The remembered city of Jerusalem could be venerated as 
an ideal symbolic space, the theatre of the passion, without having to 
confront it with a radically altered city and concrete reality. During the 
crusades it was this ideal spatial framework of European Christianity that was 
brought back to Palestine to root it in the soil.43 It helped to rediscover in the 
physical environment the imaginary places which would fill in for 
insufficient remains, Halbwachs argues. The erection of churches, altars, and 
monasteries at the places in the Gospels marked the collective spatial 
framework of the Christian doctrine in the physical landscape. It manifested 
it as a physical mnemonic system. In Patrick Hutton’s words, ‘the biblical 
Holy Land was an imaginary holy landscape conjured up during the Middle 
Ages in Europe and superimposed on the actual terrain of Palestine’.44 The 
pilgrims did not discover it when they travelled to Palestine, but carried it 
with them to establish it there. 
Halbwachs’s book points to intriguing aspects of space. The construction 
of a spatial framework of memory for a larger cultural group, like the 
Christians, predominantly takes on a fictive and symbolic character, despite 
its relation to a concrete material environment. It exists, in the first place and 
for most of the believers, as an imagined topography absorbed from the 
Bible. The physical landscape comes in the second place. In Christianity, it is 
constructed in the image of the spatial framework of the creed, not the other 
way around. 
The topographie of other cultural fellowships, like that of a nation or of a 
citizenry, could be considered along similar lines. Because of the scale and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 ibid., 127. Halbwachs explains that there are no known physical traces, which could be remains from the 
environments in which Jesus served. Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire, 113, 16. 
43 He also touches on this topic in the other two books. In Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire Halbwachs 
argues that the crusaders set out for the Holy Land to find the symbolic image of a place suspended between 
Heaven and Earth rather than a picturesque setting for Jesus’s life. Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 203. In La 
Mémoire collective he suggests that the crusaders did not seek out the places of the Gospel, but arbitrarily 
localised the events of the life of Jesus and the early Christian Church in the topography. The spatial 
framework of Christian collective memory was laid over the physical environment, serving as a master 
spatiality. Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 230. 
44 P H Hutton, History as an Art of Memory (Hanover, University Press of New England, 1993), 80. 
Edifices 	  
 106 
complexity of the physical space, it may be considered first as a spatial 
framework for the members of these fellowships. Only in portions can the 
material framework become a reality for any group member; the national or 
the citizen only moves in or has access to a limited part of the total 
topographie. This makes it different from a zone de l’activité technique of 
which a larger share may be available for all fellows. Removing the 
topographie from its context of early Christianity, in the theory of the spatial 
framework of memory we could let it denote the totality of the spatial 
framework of memory and the material framework of a larger cultural group. 
Gregariousness and the distribution of collective memory 
In the first centuries the newly formed Christian doctrine introduced localities 
from the existing Jewish traditions into the topography. Halbwachs 
hypothesises that this was probably done to make them more believable or to 
lend them credibility by situating them in consecrated places.45 Nothing, for 
instance, indicates that Jesus was born in Bethlehem, but the story needs him 
to have been born in the city of David, close to the tombs of the prophets and 
patriarchs, as the scripture suggests, in order to be taken to be the Messiah of 
the Jews.46 
Also, some locations in the Gospels were localised in two physical places 
at the same time. In the early centuries the Cenacle was located on the Mount 
of Olives for some and at Gethsemane for others.47 Throughout the Middle 
Ages two Courts of Justice, two houses of Caiaphas, and two sites of the Via 
Dolorosa existed at the same time. Halbwachs explains this with the 
competition between different traditions. As long as they remain vivid in the 
collective memory, there is an unwillingness to sacrifice one of the two. 
Halbwachs believes to have identified two rudimentary laws that govern 
the memory of groups. First, he sees a kind of gregarious instinct of 
memories’ attachment to places, resulting in the tendency for several events 
in the memory of the group to concentrate in the same place. Through the 
spatial proximity the memories mutually support each other. Second, he 
observes that a localisation of a memory can split up to associate itself with 
several sites in different places, as a tool to repeat, reinforce, and rejuvenate 
memory by spreading its traces. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire, 138. 
46 ibid., 139. The Grotto and Nativity scene, therefore, have been located in Bethlehem to remind of David, not 
of Jesus. Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire, 63. 
47 Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire, 147. 
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Concentration in one single place as well as the distribution over a duality of 
locations in contrasting regions: these are familiar means used by groups of 
people, not only churches, but also other communities, families, nations, etc., 
with the aim of fixing and organising their memories of places, but also of 
times, events, and persons.48 
Just as Halbwachs pointed out in relation to the family in Les Cadres sociaux 
de la mémoire, specific places turn into collective landmarks, acting as 
crossroads of association in the group memory. The sites where memories 
flock may be described as the spatial intersection points of different 
frameworks. Correspondingly, the distribution of one memory in several 
places points to the interconnection of several localities in one point of 
reference in the framework of dogma. Distant spaces enter into a relation 
because of their relation to the other framework. 
Social morphology 
What Halbwachs demonstrates in the study of the legendary topography is 
the formation of a spatial framework of memory and its consolidation within 
the collective memory of a specific cultural group. From being a local group 
of disciples, it grows to encompass the whole cultural sphere of Europe and 
other regions of the world. The group constructs the spatial framework of 
memory from memories set in the locations of a physical landscape, already 
connoting Jewish traditions. Much later, the framework, developed and 
passed down through generations of Christians, is projected onto the same 
landscape, erecting new landmarks in the form of chapels and churches to 
mark the places of the Gospels. The materiality comes to mirror a symbolic 
order. 
The idea that ‘all societies, family, church, state, industrial companies, etc. 
have material forms’ Halbwachs took over from Durkheim.49 In 1938 he 
offered his own perspective in the book Morphologie sociale. There he 
argues that the forms of the physical environment can be studied to reveal 
social structures of a population that, by nature, will always be bound to a 
specific and limited geography. The social life and traditions of the extended 
family, for instance, have their basis in the houses of its members, but every 
collective also needs a material framework: 
The institutions are not merely ideas: they must be grounded on earth,  
charged with matter, human matter and inert matter, bodies of flesh and 
bones, buildings, houses, places, aspects of space. All these affect the senses. 	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49 M Halbwachs, Morphologie sociale (Paris, Armand Colin, 1938), 6. 
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They are patterns in space that can be described, drawn, measured, their 
elements and parts counted, their locations and movements identified, their 
expansion and diminution ascertained. It is in this sense that all vehicles of the 
social life have material forms.50 
Social morphology is the study of institutional patterns deposited in space. It 
is a method that can be used to interpret, from physical environments, the 
social structures that create and administer them and to detect the spatial 
framework that the group employs for its collective memory. Marcel and 
Mucchielli argue that social morphology sees behind the material forms a 
totality of factors at work related to the collective psychology of the group.51 
The group’s spatial framework becomes the key to understanding the 
material reality as a manifestation of society. The topographie would be the 
object of study of social morphology on the level of a religious community. 
The spatial framework of memory in La Mémoire collective 
Reproduction of spatial frameworks of memory 
A different aspect of Christian memory systems that remains unanalysed in 
La Topographie légendaire, but which is alluded to by Halbwachs several 
times, pertains to how Christianity in regions outside of the Holy Land in 
various ways created spatial systems for the dissemination and memorisation 
of the Dogma, notably through the architectural design of churches and 
abbeys. 
In the chapter on space and the collective memory in La Mémoire 
collective Halbwachs complements his writings on religious collective 
memory in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire and La Topographie 
légendaire with reflections on the role of ecclesiastic architecture.52 Not 
primarily used for supporting the memory of social relations, he posits, 
churches and cemeteries are sacred places, where the believers know they 
will enter into a mental state that they have experienced many times before. 
Their physical form provides equilibrium for the group over time, when 
thought and feeling fail to give stable support. The architectural arrangement 
of churches reflects devotional needs, recalls traditions and thoughts, and 
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Halbwachs’, tr. J Ohnacker [Fr. orig. (1999)], in S Egger (ed), Maurice Halbwachs – Aspekte des Werks 
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distributes collective reminders around the building of the most important 
religious remembrances. 
for the priest, better informed of the traditions, all the details of [the church’s] 
interior layout have a meaning and correspond to a particular direction of 
religious thought, whereas in the mind of the masses of believers an 
impression of mystery dominates when in the presence of these material 
images. … A church is like a book whose characters can be spelled out and 
deciphered only by a small number [of people].53 
In this way, Halbwachs explains, the devotional spaces with funeral stones, 
altars, statues, pictures of saints, etc. arrange remembrance spatially.54 The 
material layout of any church in any part of the Christian world brings to 
mind the same religious memory, based on the topography of the Holy Land. 
Thus, with every cross we recall the crucifixion that took place on Golgotha, 
and in every service Jesus again shares his communion like he did in the 
cenacle.55 The devotion of the Stations of the Cross re-enact the episodes of 
the Passion along Via Dolorosa. 
The description offered by Halbwachs foreshadows the separation of 
collective memory into communicative memory and cultural memory (Aleida 
and Jan Assmann), the topic of chapter five. Different from employing the 
homes and surroundings of an extended family to support an informal and 	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54  Other scholarship has complemented Halbwachs’s argument. In the age of scholasticism, Frances Yates has 
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parts and parts of parts’. E Panofsky, Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism (Latrobe, Archabbey Press, 1951), 
45. For a study on how the pictures of a Biblia pauperum were transferred onto the walls of a late fifteenth-
century church in Sweden to support the priest in his preaching, see S Tengström, ‘Albertus Pictor och Biblia 
pauperum i Härkeberga kyrka’, Religion och bibel: Nathan Söderblom-sällskapets årsbok, lviii–lix (Lund, 
Nathan Söderblom-sällskapet, 1999–2000). 
55 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 231. 
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dynamic family memory, the churches are highly specific as to what aspect 
of the religious past they are supposed to recall. The specialists of the clergy 
and the institutionalisation of Christian faith through the Church secure 
relative stability over time as well as in space and provide the laity with a 
careful construal of the creed arranged as a spatial mnemonic in the church 
building. For the family, the individual houses take on unique connotations 
linked to family memory; for the Christians, all churches contain a repertoire 
of the same mnemonic references to aspects of religious thought, across 
individual architectural differences. The former kind of memory is social and 
communicative; the latter predominantly institutionalised and cultural. It is 
possible to recognise in the ceremonial use of ecclesiastic architecture a shift 
from an emphasis on the spatial framework of memory to the material 
framework of the church interior and objects. These physical artefacts come 
to materialise the religious memory. The internal framework of memory 
becomes an external framework, employed actively in processes of 
remembrance. 
Notables of memory 
In legal memory Halbwachs recognises further aspects of how space sustains 
collective memory. Legal groups, like religious and economic groups, do not 
have a relation to material space based on their proximity to it. This makes 
them different from families or the inhabitants of a city. They are defined by 
the distribution of rights and obligations among their members and by images 
of space rather than material space. In the countryside, Halbwachs explains, 
the features of the environment, like meadows, fields, woods, farms, and 
homes, make up a spatial framework of memory with which a notary public 
or mayor may recall property rights, contracts, leases, etc.56 The landscape 
provides a mnemonic system for those initiated or affected. For the group 
remembrance, the different parts of the environment connote memories of 
ownership and transactions. The physical framework of the land reinforces 
the spatial framework and reminds of the contents of that legal memory. In 
the city, Halbwachs continues, the material frameworks of immovable real 
estate or mobile material objects, like art or furniture, similarly evoke for the 
notary public or for the auctioneer the transactions of rights in sales. 
The labour provided by workers and the services offered by clerks, doctors, 
or lawyers do not, to the same degree, form stable relationships to locations, 
but they nonetheless depend on an infrastructure of factories and offices in 
which they are carried out. He continues to elaborate on what he referred to 	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as the zone de l’activité technique in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire. The 
spatial framework of the professional memory of a member of an 
employment tribunal or a union secretary covers all the factories, whose 
workers concern him, and which recall contracts, laws, and conflicts. Similar 
frameworks, corresponding to the topography of important buildings and 
places, can be identified for each professional zone. 
By means of the spatial framework, the notary public, the mayor, and the 
union secretary come to be responsible for the transmission of the memory of 
the group they act on behalf of. They guarantee the stability of the group by 
keeping alive the memory of previous legal transactions and agreements. 
Namer considers the identification of such notables of memory (des notables 
de mémoire) to be the ultimate renewal in Halbwachs’s thought.57 The 
notables are given a mandate to care for the remembrance of the rights and 
obligations bound to certain locations by the groups that are concerned with 
that particular legal matter and that part of space. Furthermore, the notables 
establish a permanent relationship between humans and physical space, 
which has been agreed upon by society.58 
As I have stressed earlier, Halbwachs is less concerned with the 
remembrance of the spatial image, as such, than with what the image can 
help to effectuate in memory. The spatial framework becomes a mnemonic 
for the notable to localise and reconstruct, at any time, the memory of 
property ownership and transfer in order to ensure stable behaviour in 
relation to the physical landscape and buildings. 
Dual nature of space 
In the introduction of the chapter on space in La Mémoire collective 
Halbwachs refers to Auguste Comte, who claims that mental equilibrium 
relates to the permanence of the objects that surround us. Halbwachs adds 
that the material framework and the spatial framework that corresponds to it 
intrinsically are connected to our idea of ourselves. The entourage matériel 
(approx. material surroundings), the furniture, and the interior of the home 
come to symbolise for us family and friends, who we normally see in the 
environment, as well as ideas the family may have of fashion and taste, of 
customs and social distinctions.59 The environment stands for stability and is 
a guarantor of access to the associative links embedded in it. 	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Thinking of the environment as stable does not mean that the significance 
that we ascribe to the environment in the family or in the circle of friends 
does not change with altering social preferences and habits. The meaning that 
is bound to the spatial framework may be affected, but as long as the physical 
space remains more or less the same, the group will not experience change, 
but be comforted in their idea of the continuity of the environment. After 
some time in the environment the group learns to act according to it; ‘not 
only its movements, but also its thoughts become determined by the 
succession of the material images that represent the external objects’.60 The 
surroundings come to reflect the group:  
When a group is inserted into a part of space, it transforms it to its image, but 
at the same time, it yields and adapts to the material things that resist it. It 
retreats into the framework it has constructed. The image of the external 
environment and the stable connections it maintains to it pass to the 
foreground of the idea it has of itself.61 
Halbwachs’s concern is what Namer has referred to as the dual nature of 
space as framework for the memory: the interior representation (spatial 
framework of memory) and the material space of immobile places (material 
framework).62 It is not as simple as distinguishing between an environment 
that we perceive and one that we summon up in memory. 
As it were, there is no part of collective memory that does not unfold in a 
spatial framework. … One could say that there is, in fact, no group, nor any 
kind of collective activity, that does not have any relation to a place or with a 
part of space, but this is insufficient to explain how it represents the image of 
the place when it conjures up thoughts about an activity of the group that is 
associated with the place.63 
If space is only considered as a physical entity, Halbwachs reasons, it is not 
possible to understand how the perception of it can trigger any associations in 
memory. But space is not simply the totality of forms and colours we see. He 
argues that it is virtually impossible to perceive physical and sensory 
qualities of things without being influenced by the thought of society and the 
groups that constantly form frames of reference for our thought. We would 
need to step outside of any group that has a relation to the built environment, 
which, according to Halbwachs, is not possible. When a physical place is 	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perceived, it, at the same time, amalgamates with our spatial framework of 
memory and becomes part of it. The associations of the latter appear to rise 
from the former.64 It is in this way that we can understand his postulate, 
‘there is no part of collective memory that does not unfold in a spatial 
framework’, since the latter always overlays the physical space in the act of 
perception. Already in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire Halbwachs had 
stressed that there is no perception that is not, at the same time, a 
recollection, conditioned as it is by frameworks of memory to interpret and 
understand what we see.65 
In the conclusion of the chapter on space and collective memory, in the 
four-page passage that was omitted in the 1950 edition of La Mémoire 
collective, but reintroduced in the critical edition, Halbwachs makes an effort 
to clarify the relationship between the material disposition of space and its 
representations in the spatial framework of the group.66 He argues that a place 
becomes a precondition for the memory of the group only as long as the 
group has its attention fixed on it and assimilates this part of space into its 
thought. Therefore, a section of space does not evoke memories by its very 
material substance or by its existence as a place in which the group moves. 
Only in an active relationship with the group, when it exists as a stable 
materiality as well as a mental entity in its dual nature of space, can it come 
to play the part of a spatial aide-memoire.67 
Altering the spatial framework of memory 
When a group alters the physical environment, it may impose unwanted 
changes to other collective spatial frameworks of memory, redefining social 
orders and practical use or eliminating parts that enable those groups to 
reconstruct certain parts of their past. As I noted in the previous chapter, 
Halbwachs argues that it is the loss of frameworks or parts of them that is the 
reason for forgetting. And even if the spatial frameworks of memory are 
mental constructs, perceptual support from the physical place may strengthen 
the mnemonic capacity and nourish the mental structure of space. It may also 
guarantee the shared features of a collective framework that is spread out 
over many group members. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The account of the author taking a walk with Dickens in London exemplifies his point. See Collective 
memory in La Mémoire collective in ch. 1. 
65 Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 275. 
66 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 233–36. For the editor’s comments on the passage, referred to as text 21, 
cf. Namer, ‘Avertissement [La Mémoire collective]’, 17–18. 
67 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 235. 
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However, long after the material framework of the group has been altered 
or ceased to have importance in its life, an existing spatial framework can 
remain the ordering principle of memory: 
when the group members are dispersed and do not find anything in their new 
material surroundings [entourage matériel] that reminds them of home and 
the rooms they left behind, they remain united across space because they think 
of the home and its rooms. Even after the priests and nuns of Port-Royal were 
expelled, nothing was affected as long as the buildings of the abbey were not 
razed, and those who retained it in memory had not disappeared.68 
The collective spatial framework of memory was still cared for, and it 
allowed them to preserve some of the social order and memories that had 
been embedded in the previous spatial order. A Canadian woman told me a 
similar story a few years ago. Her German grandparents had been deported, 
along with all Germans, from their village in Croatia in the aftermath of 
WWII. They immigrated to different parts of North America, but kept contact 
over the years. All their life the social organisation of the diasporic 
community was structured according to the families they had originally 
belonged to, the houses they had occupied in certain streets in the village, and 
the professional position they had occupied. Their social organisation was 
structured according to the collective spatial framework of memory of the 
former village, which they had brought with them to the new existences. 
With Halbwachs we should understand that such behaviour is explained by 
the fact that 
all the processes of the group can be translated into spatial terms, and the 
place it occupies is but the juncture of all these terms. Each aspect, each detail 
of this place has a meaning that is intelligible only to members of the group, 
for each part of the space it occupies corresponds to the many different 
aspects of the structure and life of their society, at least of what is most stable 
in it.69 
What he proposes in La Mémoire collective is a place-centred order of 
society. The stability of social groups relies on the stability of the 
surrounding environments. It may be regarded as a conservative stance, as it 
was written in a period dominated by architecture and urban planning 
principles defined by the Modern Movement and which saw traditional ways 
of living change dramatically. In a study on social classes he noted that 	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We are in fact living in a period characterized by constant, rapid and 
fundamental change in all the circumstances of life; change that is affecting 
our modes of thinking and our ideas and beliefs powerfully. Social groups 
break up, lose their traditions and with them the possibility of surviving amid 
surroundings no longer favourable to them; they know they are on the wane; 
sometimes we actually watch them disappear. At the same time others start 
and develop, bit by bit taking over many elements of those that are on their 
way out, creating a new environment for men and imposing new ideas and 
sensibilities on them.70 
Earlier, in Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, Halbwachs had expressed his 
feelings about contemporary architecture: 
I lean out from the balcony. Large modern homes that were erected in our 
district loomed with their dark shapes and gave me the feeling of 
suffocation.71 
Such a view, arguably, could be taken as a critique of the functionalist 
agenda, and, consequently, Halbwachs’s argument in La Mémoire collective 
could be read as a premonition of the social repercussions of the 
comprehensive remodelling of the cities in the twentieth century. 
However, even if his statements may be interpreted in this way, seen to his 
whole oeuvre it becomes clear that Halbwachs recognises such processes of 
change in many societies and in different historic periods. And while the 
individual may mourn the changes of the surroundings in any kind of urban 
transformation, resistance and resilience, he writes, can only spring forth 
from the group. ‘Certainly, it is inevitable that transformations of a city and 
the simple destruction of a house trouble some individuals, disturbing and 
disconcerting them in their habits’.72 The individuals may regret the loss of 
trees, walls, or buildings, because of the memories they have attached to the 
environment, he suggests. The group, however, ‘does not only immediately 
express its suffering, indignation, and protest. It resists with the full force of 
its traditions, and this resistance is not without effect. It searches and 
succeeds partially in re-establishing its old equilibrium in the new 
conditions’.73 The group splits its spatial framework up into several 
frameworks, each corresponding to the period of one specific architectural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 He observed that the vestiges of traditional social ways of living could still be found in the rural areas. M 
Halbwachs, The Psychology of Social Class, tr. C Delavenay (London, Heinemann, 1958) [Fr. orig., Esquisse 
d’une psychologie des classes sociales (1955)], 22. 
71 Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 127. For the context, see Collective landmarks in this chapter. 
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setting, associating a set of memories. The collective spatial framework of 
memory that corresponds to a part of space may outlive its physical 
counterpart. 
Thus, when a society has been subjected to fundamental change, it seems that 
memory reaches back to the memories corresponding to these two successive 
periods by two different paths. It does not move from one to the other 
continuously. In reality, there are two times that preserve two frameworks of 
thought, and it needs to place itself in one or the other to be able to recover the 
memories localised in the two frameworks.74 
Halbwachs’s reasoning is crucial. To a certain degree it undermines critique 
that has accused him of promoting stability and permanence of the built 
environment.75 It supports the case that I make in the thesis, namely to argue 
for the dynamic and pluralistic character of architecture in the spatial 
framework of memory over time as well as between groups. 
Time and the spatial framework of memory 
The discussions in this chapter have pointed to the fact that spatial 
frameworks of memory necessarily exist in plural: one collective framework 
for each group that has a relation to the environment and one perspective of 
this collective framework for every individual in the group. In the quote 
above, Halbwachs also suggests that the frameworks can come to exist in 
plural for the same group and the same individuals, one for each spatial 
setting that the group has sustained a relation to. In continuation of the quote, 
Halbwachs elaborates the idea of two times in the spatial framework: 
In order to recognise an old city in the maze of new streets that have gradually 
encircled and altered it, in the houses and monuments that have replaced or 
engulfed the buildings of now vanished neighbourhoods, and sometimes 
found their place as extensions to, and in the space between, the constructions 
of the past, we do not go back from the present to the past in an inverse 
movement along a continuous series of constructions, demolitions, street 
routes, etc., which gradually changed the aspect of the city. To rediscover the 
old streets and monuments, which are preserved elsewhere or have 
disappeared, we are guided by the general plan of the old city and brought 
there in our thoughts.76 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 ibid., 188. 
75 See e.g. A Erll, ‘Travelling Memory’, Parallax, 17/4 (2011), 10. Cf. the discussion of Erll’s article in 
Objectives in the Introduction. 
76 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 188. 
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To go back we employ a different spatial framework than the one that 
corresponds to the city in its contemporary state. For the group, these 
successive time periods coexist, but they are not necessarily permeable with 
regard to the memories. Each of the periods binds to its unique spatial 
configuration a specific set of landmarks and memories. The group can 
access these separately and simultaneously. 
In her search for a way to point to how a place like Dachau is experienced 
essentially different as a memorial site and as a concentration camp, 
Germanist and Holocaust survivor Ruth Klüger has suggested finding a term 
that distinguishes between the place in different periods and under specific 
social conditions. 
I once visited Dachau with some Americans who had asked me to come 
along. It was a clean and proper place, and it would have taken more 
imagination than your average John or Jane Doe possesses to visualize the 
camp as it was forty years earlier. Today a fresh wind blows across the central 
square where the infamous roll calls took place, and the simple barracks of 
stone and wood suggest a youth hostel more easily than a setting for tortured 
lives … The missing ingredients are the odour of fear emanating from human 
bodies, the concentrated aggression, the reduced minds. … Landscape, 
seascape – there should be a word like timescape to indicate the nature of a 
place in time, that is, at a certain time, neither before nor after.77 
In this context a term like timescape is helpful, because it suggests the 
division of social experience in space into temporal sections, referring to the 
dynamics of life experience rather than to unchanging Cartesian properties. 
Consequently, a city or a camp can find its equivalent in several spatial 
frameworks of memory, one for each epoch of the group. I have previously, 
and in another context, proposed to refer to them as epochal-spatial 
frameworks of memory as a distinction to the Halbwachsian spatial 
framework of memory.78 In the history of the camp at Dachau, and for each 
group that had a relation to it, the period in which it functioned as a 
concentration camp provided a different epochal-spatial framework than the 
periods in which it has functioned as a memorial site.79 As I shall argue in 
chapter six, in relation to the groups who dispute the future of the 
Government Quarter in Oslo, arguably, the buildings involved could be said 	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to make up one unique epochal-spatial framework for the period that 
preceded the explosion, one for the period of clearance and construction, and 
one for the period that will follow the opening of a reconstructed or newly 
designed Government Quarter, only in the span of ten or twenty years.80 A 
distinction between several epochal-spatial frameworks of memory, shared 
within the group or between different groups, helps to conceive of the spatial 
frameworks as the dynamic mental construction of space that I suggested in 
the discussion of travelling memory and travelling architecture in the 
Introduction.81 While the differentiation of a spatial framework into epochs 
calls for more elaborate analyses of the division of time periods, its 
postulation could be useful for challenging ideas of permanence in 
architecture and landscape. 
A theoretical framework 
The assessment of the spatial framework of memory in this chapter has 
pointed to its usefulness and versatility. To propose the concept as a 
theoretical framework for assessing architecture in processes of societal 
memory does not mean that I am unwilling to consider the inherent 
limitations. Before continuing I will sum up some of its merits and indicate 
areas that need further consideration. 
I started this chapter by pointing to the essential character of the spatial 
framework of memory as a mental construct. For Halbwachs, the term 
denotes the abstracted conceptualisations of space that the individual 
employs in recollection processes. These are conjured up in mind as stable, 
but dynamic and constantly changing entities. Only certain parts of the 
environment are selected to be included in the group’s framework, lending 
them symbolic and reminding functions for the collective memory. The 
framework can be seen to reflect group thought as much as it mirrors a 
geometrical space, thereby taking on the character of something in between a 
construct and a construction. Different from the social and temporal 
frameworks, the spatial framework often bears a strong and interdependent 
relation to the built environment, to the material framework. It consists of 
accumulated notions of space and spatial interrelations and is not a collection 
of separate memory images of the environment. It can rather be thought of as 	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the common denominator of many memory images, the spatial setting that 
repeats in them. 
Different from studies of spatial representations in so-called cognitive maps 
in psychology, ethnography, and geography, the relevance of the spatial 
framework of memory lies rather in the associative and social functions of 
collective landmarks in space than in the use of memory constructions of 
space, catering for orientation and way-finding. The collective landmarks are 
intersections between several frameworks in the group and display a kind of 
gregariousness; they come to accumulate diverse associations in the 
collective memory, as they seem to strengthen and support each other’s 
presence by offering more mental routes to access the place’s memories. For 
each person, the spatial framework stands as a system of collective points of 
reference that supports the localisation of other memories – things we 
experienced or learnt, colleagues’ opinions, or social relations. The flipside 
of the associative function is that we can hardly draw to mind a place in the 
spatial framework of memory, or be reminded of it by seeing it in the 
material framework, without thinking of what we have experienced there, 
what we have learnt happened there in history, what our colleague thinks of 
it, or the people we associate with it. Halbwachs points out that the 
localisation and contextualisation of memories depend on the correspondence 
of the perceived material framework with the actualised spatial framework in 
memory and not on the correlation between the percept and memory images.  
 Because of its role in ascribing significance to places, for each individual 
there can be said to exist different systems of collective landmarks in the 
same spatial framework, one for each group the individual is a member of. 
Some of these landmarks pertain to the family, some to the profession, some 
to legal relationships, etc. They change over time, adjusting to constructions, 
demolitions, and alterations in the physical environment, and to 
modifications of ideologies, emotions, and norms in the group thought. With 
Halbwachs we should understand how the group develops and sustains 
different spatial frameworks in order to correspond to its view of the 
environment in different times in its history. Through each of these spatial 
configurations the group members can access the collective memory of that 
period. I have suggested referring to them as epochal-spatial frameworks. 
These make up basic, temporal distinctions of space in memory. 
I have emphasised the dual nature of space by its division into a spatial 
framework of memory and a material framework of the physical 
environment, and I have pointed to some of the many ways in which they 
may enter into relationships. By reference to the term social morphology, 
Halbwachs has investigated how the material forms of the environment may 
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be regarded as deposits of social orders of groups, which, in their turn, are 
internalised by the same or by other groups to form the basis for new or 
revised spatial frameworks of memory. 
In the analyses of Christian churches and the topography of the Holy Land 
and zones of professional activities, there is a tendency, to a larger degree 
than in informal remembering, to employ the material framework as aid to 
the memory. Via Dolorosa in the spatial framework of the story of Jesus in 
the Bible, known by all believers, gets its material counterpart in the Stations 
of the Cross, reproduced in churches all over the world. The division of legal 
functions and positions according to the profession’s prescriptions is 
materialised in every courtroom and in the apparatus of a tribunal. 
Halbwachs’s observations point towards recognising the material framework 
as a framework of memory on a par with the spatial framework of memory. 
In chapter five I will suggest referring to the first as an external spatial 
framework of memory and the latter as an internal, both with the purpose of 
supporting remembrance. With a profession’s zone de l’activité technique we 
could understand a concept of space in its dual nature, as a spatial framework 
of memory and as a material framework, to be employed in its practices of 
remembrance. With topographie we could similarly refer to the totality of the 
spatial framework of memory and the material framework of a larger cultural 
group, such as a religion or a nation. Because of the scale and complexity of 
physical space it may, with regard to its totality, be considered as a spatial 
framework of memory. Only in parts can it be accessed and traversed by the 
group’s members. 
In his references to the special function of the clergy in Christianity and to 
the notables of memory in legal and professional collective memory, 
Halbwachs has pointed to the distinct character of institutionalised forms of 
collective memory in relation to informal and everyday forms of, for 
instance, the family. Authorised functionaries take on the responsibility to 
define remembrance; the laity has little to say. Through dogma, laws, or 
contracts, and by means of the spatial framework of memory as well as the 
material framework, the specialists of the group construe the past for them. 
While Halbwachs went at length to describe the difference in use of the 
internal and external frameworks in different societal contexts, he did not 
clearly distinguish between informal and formal kinds of collective 
remembrance. With Aleida and Jan Assmann’s model of communicative 
memory and cultural memory, the topic of chapter five, it will be possible to 
draw such a distinction theoretically. While it may be true that 
institutionalised remembrance employs the material environment as 
mnemonics to a larger degree than informal, it cannot be said that only the 
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former, which Aleida and Jan Assmann referred to as cultural memory, 
makes use of material frameworks for remembering. Instead of seeing the 
concrete environment of the library, the museum, or the city as cultural 
memory by metonym, like Aleida and Jan Assmann’s theory implies, I will 
argue that they make up a mind-external framework that is employed by the 
communicative and the cultural memory alike, but in different ways and for 
different purposes. 
Before elaborating and reconsidering Halbwachs’s concept with Aleida and 
Jan Assmann’s theories, I will address its remodelling, which took place in 
architectural theory in the 1960s. The analysis contextualises the spatial 
framework of memory in relation to the currents of thought in the 
architectural discourse and identifies some specifications that are valuable for 
it role as a theoretical framework. 
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3 
Landmarks of orientation 
The named environment, familiar to all, furnishes material for 
common memories and symbols which bind the group together 
and allow them to communicate with one another. The landscape 
serves as a vast mnemonic system for the retention of group 
history and ideals.   
— Kevin Lynch, The Image of the City, 19601  
In the last three decades, Maurice Halbwachs has benefited from a growing 
reputation as the founding father of studies of remembrance in social 
fellowships. Endeavours such as Yosef Yerushalmi’s study of Jewish history 
and memory (1982), Pierre Nora’s localisation of French national memory in 
lieux de mémoire (1984–1992), Gérard Namer’s study of social and 
institutional memory (1987), the postulation of kommunikatives and 
kulturelles Gedächtnis by Aleida and Jan Assmann (1988), and the study of 
the practices of social memory by Paul Connerton (1989) stand as milestones 
in the transport of Halbwachs’s legacy into the humanistic memory studies 
around the turn of the millennium.2 
Yet, already in the 1960s, Halbwachs began to acquire a reputation in 
architecture and the planning professions for his thinking on memory and the 
physical environment. Through the writings of Kevin Lynch and, more 
forcefully, through Aldo Rossi the notion of a ‘collective memory’ was 	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established in the architectural vocabulary. This term possibly found fertile 
soil in disciplines and professions that, as a rule, need to address masses of 
people rather than individuals in their quests for new architectural solutions 
for transport, industry, and social services, and for housing, leisure, and 
culture. Despite the two architects’ focus on spatial matters in their readings 
of the theory of collective memory, the term ‘cadre spatial de la mémoire’, 
spatial framework of memory, never occurs in their writings. Denoted by 
other words, the concept, nonetheless, came to have a profound influence on 
their theories and, subsequently, on a generation or two of architects and 
planners in Europe and the Americas. 
This chapter introduces the architectural discourse in the post-war period 
with its reformulations of history and the new advocacy of binding 
architectural planning in the present to issues of the past by means of notions 
such as ‘tradition’ and ‘memory’. I will argue that the introduction of 
Halbwachs’s theories to the architectural discourse is accompanied by a more 
general shift in conceptions of architecture’s relation to the past during this 
period. It takes place at a crucial moment in the development of the writing 
of architectural history, and the timing seems to have contributed to the 
success of Lynch’s redefinition of city architecture as an intersubjective 
construction of perception and memory, and of Rossi’s conception of the city 
as a collective and cultural product produced in the course of history. 
Through The Image of the City (1960), possibly the first reference to 
Halbwachs in architectural theory, Lynch’s theories come to play a pivotal 
role in the reformulation of architecture in postmodernism. His postulations 
of how buildings and other features of the physical environment come to 
make up landmarks for orientation and way-finding have become an essential 
reference in architectural theory. For this thesis’s formulation of the spatial 
framework of memory as a theoretical framework his theories equally mark 
out a basic level. 
The Modern Movement and history 
Unlike the term ‘memory’, ‘history’ had a central position in the Modern 
Movement’s formulation of a new architecture in the 1930s and the 1940s. 
Art historians like Sigfried Giedion (1888–1968), Emil Kaufmann (1891–
1953), and Nikolaus Pevsner (1902–1983), dedicated to the history of 
architecture, contributed with the idea that functionalist architecture was the 
logical and inevitable consequence in the historical evolution of architecture. 
Rather than a break with the past, they saw modern architecture as the result 
of a break with established authorities of architectural style, responsible for 
an unjustified turn to historicism in the otherwise modern nineteenth century. 
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The break in contemporary architecture had led to the realisation on the 
aesthetic level of the technical and cultural advancements of the Western 
civilisation in the preceding two centuries. The past was employed by the art 
historians to legitimise the present. 
Following in the footsteps of his teacher, art historian Heinrich Wölfflin 
(1864–1945), and Wölfflin’s predecessor Jakob Burckhardt (1818–1897), 
Giedion saw as his task ‘to uncover for his own age its vital interrelationships 
with the past’.3 He turns against what he sees as an indifference to the recent 
history among his contemporaries. The new conception of space that Giedion 
identifies in the architecture of the Modern Movement, characterised by 
planar surfaces and cultural volumes, he traces back to technological 
advances of the preceding centuries. It replaces earlier conceptions of space, 
merely as the consequence of the rediscovery of concrete as a building 
material and of the development of techniques of mass production of cast and 
wrought iron, steel, and ferroconcrete. Thus, the eighteenth century had 
already seen the preliminary stages of what Giedion understands as the 
growth of a new tradition. The tradition takes form in the nineteenth century, 
throughout which ‘the masses, poor and rich under the domination of the 
press, academy, and governments, were always wrong in their taste and 
judgement’, and flourishes in the first part of the twentieth.4 
Like Giedion, Pevsner had studied art history under Wölfflin, among 
others. Pevsner traces the abstraction of form and the reduction of 
ornamentation in modernism to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
notably in his book The Pioneers of Modern Design: From William Morris to 
Walter Gropius (1936).5 Different from Giedion, in his history of modern 
architecture Pevsner does not argue that technological advances or changing 
social conditions paved the way for the new architectural style: ‘The Modern 
Movement did not come into being because steel frame and reinforced 
concrete construction had been worked out – but they were worked out 
because a new spirit required them’.6 He finds early evidence of the spirit of 
the modern style in the architecture of Sir John Soane (1753–1837) and 
Friedrich Gilly (1772–1800) and later in the works of William Morris (1834–
1896) and the Arts and Crafts Movement. Their attempts stand out against 
prevailing ideas of a nineteenth century that ‘remained smugly satisfied with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 S Giedion, Space, Time and Architecture. The Growth of a New Tradition (1941; 2nd edn, Cambridge, HUP, 
1949), 6. 
4 S Giedion, ‘The Need for a New Monumentality’, in P Zucker (ed), New Architeture and City Planning. A 
Symposium (New York, Philosophical Library, 1944), 558. 
5 N Pevsner, Pioneers of Modern Design: from William Morris to Walter Gropius (London, Faber, 1936). 
6 N Pevsner, An Outline of European Architecture (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1942), 12. 
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the imitation of the past’.7 Not only does Pevsner inscribe the Modern 
Movement into a historic phase that began with Morris and should be seen as 
one historical unit, but he also suggests it as the successor of changes in spirit 
that had already taken place in the late eighteenth century and that rejected 
the uncritical reproduction of historic styles. He traces the intellectual legacy 
of functionalism as far back as French rationalism in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, thus legitimising modern architecture as the high phase 
of a century-long tradition.8 
Kaufmann, like Pevsner, finds the source of twentieth-century architecture 
in late eighteenth-century attempts by the likes of Boullée and Ledoux. In his 
study Vom Ledoux bis Le Corbusier, published in 1933, he investigates the 
early era of architectural autonomy, the continuation of which he recognises 
in the architecture of Berlage, Loos, and Le Corbusier. The period around 
1800, he suggests, bears similarity with that of the early twentieth century, 
not only because of formal and thematic resemblances, but also especially 
because of the new idealism.9 He will later argue that the architecture of the 
period of the French Revolution initiates a development that will continue 
into the twentieth century. 
the most advanced of the designs resemble in plainness and monumentality 
those of the twentieth century. In architecture, just like in politics, the 
reactionaries were to triumph over the inspired, though not sufficiently 
realistic, modernists. But the temporary victory of the conservatives should 
not lead us to believe that the achievements of the progressives lacked 
significance. On the contrary, great events took place in eighteenth-century 
architecture – events which were as significant as the processes of transition 
from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, as momentous as the 
contemporaneous changes in philosophical thinking, in literature, and in social 
life. A glorious artistic tradition [of the Baroque] was abandoned, and the 
foundations of a new tradition were laid.10 
In three different ways, Giedion, Pevsner, and Kaufmann work towards 
establishing a historical lineage for contemporary architecture. It is with 
reference to its continuation of a tradition rooted in the eighteenth century 
that they recognise the break with the past signalled by the Modern 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Pevsner mentions Soane briefly in the first edition (ibid., 136.). The argument is extended in later editions 
with discussions of the architecture of Soane and Gilly. N Pevsner, An Outline of European Architecture (6th 
Jubilee edn, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1960), 612–14, here at 14. 
8 N Pevsner, The Sources of Modern Architecture and Design (London, Thames & Hudson, 1968), 9. 
9 E Kaufmann, Vom Ledoux bis Le Corbusier. Ursprung und Entwicklung der Autonomen Architektur (Vienna, 
Passer, 1933), 62. 
10 E Kaufmann, Three Revolutionary Architects, Boullée, Ledoux, and Lequeu, Transactions. New ser., xlii:3 
(Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society, 1952), 434. 
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Movement. The break with historicism in the twentieth century again takes 
up the break with the past that had been initiated a century before, but which 
was interrupted by ‘reactionaries’. 
New conceptions of the past 
In the post-war period a discourse emerges that comes to broaden 
understandings of how architectural practice and theory ought to relate to the 
past. It came as a response to the dogmatic teachings of CIAM (Congrès 
Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne) and the environmental consequences 
of a period dominated by the doctrines of functionalist design and planning. 
The city architecture of modern society seemed not to offer what it had 
promised. At the core of the American metropolis contemporaries saw 
‘massive structures blot out open space; industrial areas beyond are dumped 
with factory buildings and the dingy barracks where we house our poor; the 
residential fringes are dotted with characterless cottages repeated 
endlessly’.11 Countries like Italy saw large-scale migration into the suburbs of 
fast-growing industrialised cities, the social consequences of which would be 
epitomised in films like Luchino Visconti’s Rocco e i suoi fratelli (Rocco and 
His Brothers), released in 1960. 
The critique of existing conceptualisations of history and the past comes to 
its fruition in the 1960s. Terms like ‘history’ and ‘historian’ become 
redefined. Others, which had been in limited use in the inter-war period, are 
brought back with new connotations; ‘culture’, ‘tradition’, and ‘memory’ are 
positioned against prevailing notions of ‘function’, ‘technology’, and 
‘international style’. The linguistic and conceptual siblings of ‘memory’ – 
‘collective memory’, ‘recollection’, ‘remembrance’, ‘reminiscence’, ‘recall’, 
etc. – come to circulate in an architectural discourse dynamically positioned 
between the Modern Movement and a new paradigm to be defined, each term 
having different meanings depending on the user. 
It is my impression that the critique of the 1950s and 1960s establishes at 
least three new ways of conceiving architecture’s relation to the past as 
alternatives to the dominant art-historical writing of history in the Modern 
Movement. The first critically reformulates the writing of architectural 
history; the second provides a conceptualisation of history as a living 
tradition in the architectural profession rather than as an academic act, and 
the third pictures architecture as a cultural mnemonic, defined by man’s 
faculties of perception and memory and society’s relationship with the past, 
rather than by aesthetic systems. I will briefly touch upon these developments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 G Kepes, The New Landscape in Art and Science (Chicago, Paul Theobald, 1956), 69. 
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before I return to the collective memory and the spatial framework of 
memory and trace their entry into this discourse. 
Critical history 
The first of these new conceptions of the past is concerned with the integrity 
and academic rigour of the architectural historian. The historians of 
modernism, Pevsner argued in 1961, had taken a step in this direction. He 
argued that from the nineteenth century, when architects performed the role 
of historians uncovering principles that could be brought into the design 
processes, the architectural historian had evolved into a separate profession in 
the twentieth century: ‘The historian now did his job and the architect did his, 
and while the personal relations might remain warm, their relation was bound 
to be no longer the same’.12 Giedion’s relation with contemporary architects 
was indeed warm. He collaborated with architects around Europe ‘to 
determine as clearly as possible what directions housing, town planning, or 
regional planning had to take’ and remained the secretary for CIAM during 
its entire existence.13 The historian, he explains in Space, Time and 
Architecture, ‘the historian of architecture especially, must be in close 
contact with contemporary conceptions. Only when he is permeated by the 
spirit of his own time is he prepared to detect those tracts of the past which 
previous generations have overlooked’.14 The historian of the Modern 
Movement was not a practising architect, but neither acted at a distance from 
the trade. 
In Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture 1750–1950 (1965), architect 
and historian Peter Collins (1920–1981) criticises architectural historians’ 
close relationships with practising architects, arguing that the two tasks 
should not be confounded: 
there is a grave danger that modern architecture may be maimed and 
devitalized if we allow historians to breathe too heavily down practicing 
architects’ necks. Such eagerness overlooks the crucial difference between the 
theory and the history of architecture; between the way buildings are built and 
the way they were built.15 
The history, Collins writes, covers a similar historic period as the one 
outlined by Pevsner and Giedion, but he explains that his intention is to write 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 N Pevsner, ‘Modern Architecture and the Historian or the Return of Historicism’, RIBA Journal, 68/6 
(1961), 230. 
13 Giedion, Space, Time and Architecture, 4. 
14 ibid., 5. 
15 P Collins, Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture 1750–1950 (1965; repr. edn, Montreal, McGill 
University Press, 1967), 295–96. His emphasis. 
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the history of the architects’ and critics’ ideas of modern architectural form, 
not the history of modern architectural form itself.16 Philosophical and ethical 
problems underlying the creation of architecture, he argues, are what should 
be studied by history. With Collins the history of architecture comes to take 
on the form of a history of ideas rather than a history of art, bringing with it a 
critical integrity that he thought had been missing. 
In Teorie e storia dell’architettura, first published in 1968 (Engl. as 
Theories and History of Architecture, 1980), Manfredo Tafuri (1935–1994) 
deals with contemporary criticism of the Modern Movement and its decision 
to present itself as a ‘radically anti-historical phenomenon’.17 Tafuri traces 
the true origin of modern art and architecture in the revolution of the Tuscan 
humanists of the Quattrocento. In Brunelleschi’s establishment of a linguistic 
code and symbolic system based on a ‘superhistorical’ comparison with 
examples of antiquity, and in Alberti’s rational exploration of the structure of 
the code, Tafuri recognises ‘the first great attempt of modern history to 
actualise historical values as a translation of mythical time into present time, 
of archaic meanings into revolutionary messages’.18 These attempts, 
however, do not so much achieve a rooting in history of contemporary 
practice as a ‘dehistoricisation’. Brunelleschi’s arbitrary selection of positive 
and negative elements from history, Tafuri reasons, marks the break in the 
conception of history as a continuous line in favour of ‘a broken line defined 
by an arbitrary yardstick that decides, each time, its values and goals’.19 
According to Tafuri, the quest for building a new history makes Brunelleschi 
the leading figure of what he sees as the first avant-garde in the modern 
sense. The Modern Movement, his argument continues, behaves according to 
existing norms in European culture, established five centuries earlier: ‘the 
neat cut with preceding traditions becomes, paradoxically, the symbol of an 
authentic historical continuity. In founding anti-history and presenting their 
work not so much as anti-historical, but rather as above the very concept of 
historicity, the avant-gardes perform the only historically legitimate act of the 
time’.20 Gently, Tafuri undermines the history as it was written by the 
historians of the Modern Movement and distances himself from the activities 
of the architects, analysing them in a wider cultural perspective. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 ibid., 16. 
17 M Tafuri, Theories and History of Architecture (London, Granada, 1980) [It. orig. (4th edn, 1976)], 11. 
18 ibid., 14. 
19 ibid., 16. 
20 ibid., 30. 
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History as tradition 
The second way, in which the discourse of the 1950s and 1960s offers 
alternative conceptions of the past, also addresses the idea of a break with 
history. For the leading exponents of this way of conceiving history, 
practising architects and critics rather than historians, history should not be 
isolated from the present, but be seen as an asset, a living tradition with 
relevance to the production and administration of architecture and urban 
environments. 
In Italy, architect and critic Ernesto Nathan Rogers (1909–1969) 
polemicised against contemporary architecture with an appeal for the 
appreciation of a national culture, while explicitly demonstrating distance to 
reactionary nationalists and demagogues.21 In order for the architecture of a 
complex and multifarious reality to develop and flourish, he called for re-
establishing its roots in a tradition full of the treasures of lived experience. To 
be modern, he argued, meant to know contemporary history in relation to the 
whole history and to take responsibility for one’s actions as spiritual 
contributions to culture. In an article on European architecture that appeared 
in 1964, Rogers insinuates that modernism’s indifference to the architecture 
of the past is anti-European, potentially even American: 
If there is anything inherent in the European spirit (God keep me from making 
racial distinctions!) it is a feeling for history, for the simple reason that Europe 
is the laboratory for history. Indeed, the most sensitive and, actually, the most 
modern Americans do not come to Europe to improve their technological 
knowledge, which only in exceptional cases is less advanced than our own, 
but to admire our public squares, the relationships of our urban organisms, 
and to become one with their essence. An old square may very well seem odd 
if it is considered only in the light of ‘practical’ parameters, as it most 
assuredly would be it if were taken out of its natural context. But this is 
something beyond the mere forms that they take, for to this day the old square 
is still the essence of a way of life, and it is only the ultimate truth of this way 
of life that can be exported, for the purpose of giving substantially new 
appearances to those forms, appearances inherent in places greatly different 
from our own.22 
Along similar lines, architects Reinhard Gieselmann (1925–2013) and 
Oswald Mathias Ungers (1926–2007) in their 1960 manifesto for the renewal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 E N Rogers, ‘Die Präexistenzen der Umgebung und die zeitgenössischen praktischen Themen (Le 
preesistenze ambientali e i temi pratici contemporanei)’ [It. orig. (1955)], in F Neumeyer & J Cepl (eds), 
Quellentexte zur Architekturtheorie (Munich, Prestel, 2002), 476. 
22 E N Rogers, ‘The Phenomenology of European Architecture’, in S R Graubard (ed), A New Europe? 
(Boston, Houghton Miflin, 1964), 433–34. 
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of European architecture cried out that ‘Creative art is unthinkable without a 
spiritual clash with tradition’.23 Dutch architect Aldo van Eyck called for a 
universally valid approach to solve the environmental problems of his time 
and to stop the mechanical imitation of modern masters like Picasso, 
Mondrian, Le Corbusier, and Schönberg. By searching in history, architects 
could identify the similarities between historical periods, and not, like 
architects of the Modern Movement, emphasise the differences. ‘The time 
has come to gather the old into the new; to rediscover the archaic principles 
of human nature’.24 
With Robert Venturi’s Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture 
(1966), approaches such as those called for by Rogers, Gieselmann, Ungers, 
and van Eyck find their response as a manual for architectural practice. 
Venturi declares that he writes criticism of architecture as an architect and 
not as a critic; history, with him, is internalised into the professional’s work 
in the present.25 Historic precedents are assessed. Renaissance, Mannerist, 
Baroque, Rococo, as well as nineteenth- and twentieth-century examples 
serve to discuss solutions to form issues that have repeatedly resurfaced in 
history. In this way, Venturi’s select history of architecture does not aim to 
reconstruct chronological history or a development of schools, but analyses 
specific issues like ambiguity, contradiction, contrast between inside and 
outside, etc.26 Venturi’s book has been characterised as a superficial 
reduction of history in the present and as an attempt to ‘edit history in the 
likeness of the present’.27 I would suggest that his approach, alternatively, 
could be said to offer a different stance towards the past and a restoration of 
an engagement with past professional practice. Thus, it represents an attempt 
by Venturi to write himself into a tradition of an essentially European history 
of architectural practice and constitutes an analysis of issues of form seen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 R Gieselmann & O M Ungers, ‘Towards a New Architecture’ [Ger. orig. (1960)], in U Conrads (ed), 
Programs and Manifestoes on 20th-century Architecture (Cambridge, MIT, 1971), 165–66. 
24 A van Eyck, ‘Is Architecture Going to Reconcile Basic Values?’ [orig. (1961)], in H F Mallgrave & C 
Contandriopoulos (eds), Architectural Theory. An Anthology from 1871–2005, ii (Oxford, Blackwell, 2008), 
374. 
25 R Venturi, Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture, The Museum of Modern Art Papers on 
Architecture (New York, Museum of Modern Art, 1966), 18. 
26 Venturi’s appreciation of contrasts between the inside and outside of buildings, which he exemplifies with 
e.g. Frank Lloyd Wright’s Johnson Wax administration building and Sir John Soane’s Bank of England, is the 
polemic reversal of Giedion’s argument of the urge of interpenetration of inner and outer space, as it had been 
developed by Borromini in Sant’ Ivo and continued in the Eiffel Tower and Tatlin’s project for a monument in 
Moscow in 1920. ibid., 71–89; Giedion, Space, Time and Architecture, 49–53. 
27 S-O Wallenstein, Den moderna arkitekturens filosofier (Stockholm, Alfabeta, 2004), 240; J Otero-Pailos, 
Architecture’s Historical Turn. Phenomenology and the Rise of the Postmodern (Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 2012), xvi. 
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from the perspective of the practising architect.28 It is the return of tradition, a 
re-establishment of a sense of historical continuity within the profession. 
A different claim for architectural continuity can be seen in the influential 
The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961), written by journalist 
and activist Jane Jacobs (1916–2006). In the introduction she explains that 
the book is an attack on ‘the principles and aims that have shaped modern, 
orthodox city planning and rebuilding’ in American cities, propagated by the 
likes of Ebenezer Howard, Lewis Mumford, Sir Patrick Geddes, Catherine 
Bauer, Clarence Stein, Sir Raymond Unwin, and Le Corbusier.29 She directs 
the attention to the existing inner city districts and their socioeconomic 
variety, addressing issues such as pavement security, child upbringing, and 
qualities of neighbourhoods that have developed over time. 
The reason for bringing Jacobs’s book into this discussion of new 
conceptions of the past can be found in chapter ten of the book, named ‘The 
need for aged buildings’. Jacobs writes: 
Cities need old buildings so badly that it is probably impossible for vigorous 
streets and districts to grow without them. By old buildings I mean not 
museum-piece old buildings, not old buildings in an excellent and expensive 
state of rehabilitation – although these make fine ingredients – but also a good 
lot of plain, ordinary, low-value old buildings, including some rundown old 
buildings.30 
Her argument is that flourishing diversity in a city district only arises when 
there is a mix of high-yield, middle-yield, low-yield, and no-yield enterprises. 
Such a mix can only exist in the same neighbourhood if there are old 
buildings next to new ones, where the costs for construction since long have 
been amortised. Expensive construction costs of newer buildings require a 
high overhead of the enterprise occupying them, which means that they have 
to be high profit or well subsidised. Old buildings in a not so good state, 
Jacobs explains, promote diversity in the primary uses of the building stock. 
With Jacobs the economics of time, the changing economic premises of 
buildings over decades and generations enter into the architectural discourse 
as a key factor for the success of city architecture. Buildings that represented 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Architect Steen Eiler Rasmussen has provided a similar study that, like Venturi’s, flattens hierarchies 
established by historians. In Experiencing Architecture he studies spatial experience through themes such as 
colour, scale, and rhythm and turns to architectural exemplars of disparate historic periods to create a reference 
manual for the benefit of contemporary architectural design. S E Rasmussen, Experiencing Architecture 
(London, Chapman & Hall, 1959) [Da. orig., Om at opleve arkitektur (1957)]. 
29 J Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961; Pelican edn, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1964), 
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large investments in an earlier period become the bargains of the present. To 
promote a good socioeconomic development in a city district, too many older 
buildings ought not to be demolished. Her line of reasoning is profoundly 
different compared to the conception of historic architecture we find in the 
histories of architecture of the Modern Movement. The architecture of the 
past is seen as an economic factor rather than a cultural or aesthetic one. Age 
as such and the building’s poor condition become the value, not its period or 
style. Jacobs shifts the focus entirely from singular, representative buildings 
as aesthetic expressions to the average and trivial architecture that does not 
stand out for its high quality or uniqueness. The issue of tradition and 
continuity is given a quite different form from that of Rogers, van Eyck, or 
Venturi. It represents an extraprofessional continuity of architecture based on 
real estate value and social ethics. The tradition that should be passed on to 
new generations consists of an administration of urban districts to, at all 
times, and for socioeconomic reasons, uphold a diversity of architectural age 
in the stock of buildings. 
Architecture as mnemonic 
A third conception of the past that develops from the 1950s introduces an 
appreciation for how the built environment makes up a stability-providing 
construction, which, through perception and memory, come to support 
cognitive functions. Leaning on theories from philosophy, psychology, and 
sociology, its advocators argue for the importance of architecture for reasons 
of individuals’ sense of orientation, well-being, and recollection, as well as of 
social and cultural collectives’ historical awareness and identity. 
A strand of such appreciations comes to pursue phenomenological studies 
in architecture. These are concerned with man’s intimate and emotional 
relationship with the built environment, especially that of the home and of 
childhood environments, accessed through dreams, reveries, and memory. 
The architectural writers take as their point of departure the writings of 
phenomenologists like Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), Gaston Bachelard 
(1884–1962), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
(1908–1961), but indirectly Halbwachs seems also to have asserted influence 
on the development. Bachelard’s La poétique de l’espace appeared in French 
in 1958 and an English translation was published in 1964. His application of 
phenomenology to architecture, notably to the dwelling, becomes a major 
source of influence for architects. The emphasis on the role of the home, 
especially that of the childhood home, as a support for personal remembering 
reminds strongly of passages in Halbwachs’s Les Cadres sociaux de la 
mémoire: 
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Of course, thanks to the house, great many of our memories are housed, and if 
the house is a bit elaborate, if it has a cellar and a garret, nooks and corridors, 
our memories have refuges that are all the more clearly delineated. All our 
lives we come back to them in our daydreams. A psychoanalyst should, 
therefore, turn his attention to this simple localization of our memories. I 
should like to give the name of topoanalysis to this auxiliary of 
psychoanalysis. Topoanalysis, then, would be the systematic psychological 
study of the sites of our intimate lives. In the theater of the past that is 
constituted by memory, the stage setting maintains the characters in their 
dominant roles. At times we think we know ourselves in time, when all we 
know is a sequence of fixations in the spaces of the being’s stability … 
Memories are motionless, and the more securely they are fixed in space, the 
sounder they are … For a knowledge of intimacy, localization in the spaces of 
our intimacy is more urgent than determination of dates.31 
Bachelard knew Halbwachs’s Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire well, and 
with the idea that the house in memory enables the adult to move in the 
spaces of his life in order to reconstruct past experiences, he introduces a 
conceptualisation that is similar to Halbwachs’s concept of the spatial 
framework of memory for private remembrance.32 As I will discuss later in 
this chapter and in the next chapter, when the latter’s theories are introduced 
by Lynch and Rossi, such intimate and emotional aspects of remembering in 
the built environment are left out in favour of collective and societal aspects. 
They come to be associated with the phenomenologists rather than with 
Halbwachs and the urbanists Lynch and Rossi. 
Later attempts further the legacy of Bachelard’s ruminations for a 
generation of architects.33 In Body, Memory, and Architecture, published in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 G Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, tr. M Jolas (Boston, Beacon Press, 1994) [Fr. orig. (1958)], 8, 9. Cf. 
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furniture, or in the vicinity of the house, a specific garden, a specific street corner, because they usually evoke 
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edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1994), 97. Cf. Formation of the spatial framework of memory in ch. 2.  
32 Bachelard talks of Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire as ‘le beau livre’, the great book. G Bachelard, 
L’intuition de l’instant. Suivi de: Introduction à la poétique de Bachelard, ed. J Lescure ([Paris], Gonthier, 
1932), 34. This passage was brought to my attention in A Vydra, ‘Solitude as a Philosophical Stance in the 
Later Bachelard’, in P Šajda (ed), Affectivity, Agency, and Intersubjectivity (Paris, L’Harmattan, 2012), 196. 
33 English titles by architects on phenomenology in architecture include C Norberg-Schulz, Intentions in 
Architecture (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1963); K C Bloomer & C W Moore, Body, Memory, and Architecture 
(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977); C Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of 
Architecture (London, Academy Editions, 1980). For secondary literature on early phenomenology in 
architecture, see e.g. K Nesbitt (ed), Theorizing a New Agenda for Architecture. An Anthology of Architectural 
Theory 1965–1995 (Princeton, PUP, 1996), 48–49, 411–53; H F Mallgrave, Modern Architectural Theory. A 
Historical Survey, 1763–1968 (Cambridge, CUP, 2005), 369–73; J Dehs, ‘Arkitektur och fenomenologi’, in C 
Caldenby & E Nygaard (eds), Arkitekturteoriernas historia (Stockholm, Formas, 2011); Otero-Pailos, 
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1977, Kent C. Bloomer and Charles W. Moore elaborate on Bachelard’s 
thoughts to take on an operative character for architectural design, in which 
memory becomes linked to the centre place of the hearth or the patio of the 
traditional house: 
Although we cannot see the inside of our body, we do develop memories of an 
inside world that include a panorama of experiences taken from the 
environment and etched into the ‘feelings’ of our identity over a lifetime of 
personal encounters with the world. We populate our inside world with the 
people, places, and events that we ‘felt’ at one time in the outside world, and 
we associate those events with the feelings themselves. The centerplace of the 
house, like the body, accumulates memories that may have the characteristics 
of ‘feelings’ rather than data. Rituals over time leave their impression on the 
walls and forms of the interior and endow the rooms with artifacts which give 
us access to previous experiences. These centerplaces in the house are the 
regions where the memories of the self can be ritualized and new memories 
belonging to the family can be accumulated and re-experienced away from the 
distractions which must occur along the outer boundaries of the house.34 
According to the authors, modern architecture with large picture windows 
and no centre place could suppress or empty the architecture of meaning and 
memory. For them, ‘memory’ becomes a key concept in the normative 
assessment of architectural style.35 
In the remaining part of this chapter and in the next chapter I shall address 
two studies in which ‘memory’ predominantly comes to refer to functions of 
orientation in the built environment. They avoid an individualistic and 
philosophical approach to architecture and memory, like that of Bloomer and 
Moore, but recognise individual remembering primarily as a socially 
conditioned activity. It is the social and cultural aspects of Halbwachs’s 
theories, rather than the personal and phenomenal, which stand at the centre, 
next to those of other sociologists and anthropologists, geographers, and 
psychologists. The focus is on how the physical environment is perceived and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Architecture’s Historical Turn; J Otero-Pailos, ‘Architectural Phenomenology and the Rise of the 
Postmodern’, in C C Crysler et al. (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Architectural Theory (Los Angeles, Sage, 
2012). 
34 Bloomer & Moore, Body, Memory, and Architecture, 49–50. 
35 A later book by Moore and Donlyn Lyndon gives a similar, normative approach to architecture and memory. 
The authors refer to the mnemonic feats that Cicero performed in the Roman Senate by means of memorised 
places, as of the art of memory, and observe how the environment should be formed to make it easier to 
remember, because ‘Places that are memorable are necessary to the good conduct of our lives; we need to 
think about where we are and what is unique and special about our surroundings so that we can better 
understand ourselves and how we relate to others. This mental intermingling of people, places, and ideas is 
what makes architecture interesting’. D Lyndon & C W Moore, Chambers for a Memory Palace (Cambridge, 
MIT Press, 1994), xii. 
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conceived intersubjectively. The function of architecture as a mnemonic, in 
Lynch’s case in relation to perception and formal legibility, and for Rossi as a 
means for historical continuity and collective identity, offers distinctly 
different conceptions of the relation to the architectural past than did the 
historians of the Modern Movement. Like Jacobs did in The Death and Life 
of Great American Cities, they step outside of the architectural profession to 
find other theoretical approaches to the past and the built environment. In 
chapter four I will discuss Rossi’s contribution to the study of architecture 
and memory. For the remainder of this chapter I will turn to the American 
context, where Halbwachs’s theories first had an impact on architectural 
theory. 
An image of architecture 
Halbwachs was by no means the only one to direct attention to people’s 
mental representations of space in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Significant contributions had been made in psychology, ethnography, and 
geography, often in attempts to decipher mechanisms of orientation and 
navigation or to map general definitions of spatial cognition. In this section I 
shall try to convey how, and in what way, Halbwachs’s concept ends up in 
the theory of Lynch. My account, however, should be read with the 
awareness that Halbwachs’s contribution is but one of several influences on 
the intellectual environment that Lynch surrounded himself with. It is not 
with the idea of a mental image of the physical environment that Halbwachs 
comes to contribute, but with a concept of the kind that implied its 
embedment in social configurations. I will argue that what attracted Lynch 
was the symbolic and cultural performance that Halbwachs shows is related 
to the sustenance of mental images of space. However, to understand from 
where Lynch’s engagement with such images came I shall first introduce his 
twelve years older colleague and collaborator. 
Gyorgy Kepes and the mental image 
One of the strongest influences on Lynch and his conception of the 
environmental image can be found in his collaboration with the Hungarian 
painter, designer, and art and architecture theorist, Gyorgy Kepes (in 
Hungarian György; 1906–2001), who had moved to Chicago in 1937.36 
Kepes first taught at the New Bauhaus in Chicago, later renamed the Institute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 H F Mallgrave & C Contandriopoulos, ‘Introduction to György Kepes’, in H F Mallgrave & C 
Contandriopoulos (eds), Architectural Theory. An Anthology from 1871–2005, ii (Oxford, Blackwell, 2008), 
267. 
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of Design and founded by his compatriot and collaborator since 1930 Laszlo 
Moholy-Nagy, before he was offered a position at the department of 
architecture at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1945.37 In 
1967 he founded the Center for Advanced Visual Studies at MIT. 
With Language of Vision, published in 1944, Kepes, who was strongly 
influenced by gestalt psychology in the work of Rudolf Arnheim and the 
members of the Berlin school, advances a critique of the contemporary living 
environment.38 In the study he posits that formlessness characterises 
contemporary human existence, but with the advance of sciences of the social 
and psychological realm, a new visual language can be developed to become 
one of the means to ‘re-unite man and his knowledge and to re-form man into 
an integrated being’.39 In his introduction Kepes goes on to argue that the 
physical environment had been extended and reshaped, partly by new 
architecture and partly by new visual tools that enable us to discern what 
previously had been outside the realm of comprehension. ‘Vision’, he 
maintains, 
is primarily a device of orientation; a means to measure and organize spatial 
events … To orient oneself in walking requires a different spatial 
measurement than is required in riding a motor-car or in an aeroplane. To 
grasp spatial relationships an orient oneself in a metropolis of today, among 
the intricate dimensions of streets, subways, [elevators], and skyscrapers, 
requires a new way of seeing [and] necessitate[s] new idioms of spatial 
measurement and communication of space.40 
The reorientation of the language of vision would benefit not only the 
orientation in a physical realm, but, equally important, in ‘human spheres’. 
The latter would constitute a new, symbolical order of psychological and 
intellectual experiences that responded to the ‘dynamics of social events, and 
the new vistas of a mobile, physical world’.41 Kepes’s book is seated in a 
contemporary visual language and shows an appreciation of the recent 
generations of artists and architects. Positively, it offers itself as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 K Wagner, ‘Die visuelle Ordnung der Stadt. Das Bild der Stadt bei Kevin Lynch’, in C Jöchner (ed), Räume 
der Stadt. Von der Antike bis heute (Berlin, Reimer, 2008), 324. 
38 Kirsten Wagner points out that Kepes, next to Arnheim, likely was one of those who had introduced the 
Gestalt-theoretical approaches to the American art practice and theory. The Berlin school included members 
like Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Koffka, and Kurt Lewin, all of which emigrated from Germany 
to the US in the 1930s. ibid., 324–25. Kepes’s as well as Arnheim’s gestalt studies would become sources of 
inspiration for Norberg-Schulz’s Intentions in Architecture. For a study on psychology’s role at the 
intersections of history, art, and architecture in the twentieth century, see M Jarzombek, The Psychologizing of 
Modernity (Cambridge, CUP, 2000). 
39 G Kepes, Language of Vision (Chicago, Paul Theobald, 1944), 13. 
40 ibid., 13–14. 
41 ibid., 14. 
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contribution to addressing existing problems, not as a critique of society.42 
But if Language of Vision promises a continuation and consolidation of a 
tradition of modernist aesthetics, in my opinion, Kepes’s 1956 book, The 
New Landscape in Art and Science, contains a fierce critique of modernity in 
the middle of a treatise that continues to address issues of perception, as if it 
was a sequel to the previous book: 
A century and a half of industrial civilization has transformed the face of our 
environment. The virgin forests and lakes, the orchards and fields of early 
cultivation, are woven into a common landscape by ribbons of concrete and 
steel which bear traffic roaring by at relentless speeds … buildings of steel 
and glass outstrip the energy and strength of nature’s structures … The 
Modern metropolis, a giant focus of our unsettled world, spreads our upon the 
land in widening rings of visual disorder.43 
The lavishly illustrated and multifaceted volume, which includes his own 
writing as well as seventeen texts by artists like Naum Gabo and Fernand 
Léger and architects like Walter Gropius and Richard J. Neutra, as well as 
numerous quotations from thinkers of all times, had been prepared and 
written between 1947 and 1952, but was not published until 1956.44 A way to 
address the problems of modernity’s visual disorder, Kepes explains, goes 
through our mental images of the external environment. His concept is linked 
to a revival of the term ‘image’ in the 1950s and 1960s in cognitive 
psychology, taking the meaning of a mental representation, and in economy, 
with the understanding of a collective idea or principle that carries the views 
of the group on an object, person, or other group.45 In the same year as Kepes 
published The New Landscape in Art and Science K. E. Boulding published 
The Image, a study of mental imagery that claimed that ‘Behavior depends on 
the image – the sum of what we think we know and what makes us act the 
way we do’.46 According to Lynch, Boulding’s book would serve as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 In one of the introductory essays Sigfried Giedion suggests that Kepes’s endeavour ‘bears witness that a 
third generation is on the march, willing to continue and to make secure the modern tradition which has 
developed in the course of this century’. S Giedion, ‘Art Means Reality’, in G Kepes, Language of Vision 
(Chicago, Paul Theobald, 1944), 6. 
43 Kepes, The New Landscape, 69. 
44 ibid., 9. 
45 Wagner, ‘Die visuelle Ordnung der Stadt’, 319. 
46 K E Boulding, The Image. Knowledge in Life and Society (1956; pb edn, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 
Press, 1961). Quoted from blurb. Boulding’s image displays certain similarities to the frameworks of memory 
in Halbwachs’s theory. Boulding writes: ‘I am not only located in space and time, I am located in a field of 
personal relations. I not only know where and when I am, I know to some extent who I am’. And further: 
‘What I have been talking about is knowledge. Knowledge, perhaps, is not a good word for this. Perhaps one 
would rather say my Image of the world. Knowledge has an implication of validity, of truth … It is this Image 
that largely governs my behavior’. He continues: ‘The image is built up as a result of all past experience of the 
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theoretical underpinning of his and Kepes’s work, although he claims that 
they were unaware of it at the time of writing The Image of the City.47 As 
conceptualisations of the world, Kepes suggests, the images mediate between 
man and the external world: 
Sensed forms, images and symbols are as essential to us as palpable reality in 
exploring nature for human ends … We make a map of our experience 
patterns, an inner model of the outer world, and we use this to organize our 
lives. Our natural ‘environment’ – whatever impinges on us from outside – 
becomes our human ‘landscape’ – a segment of nature fathomed by us and 
made our home.48 
It is possible to recognise in the poetic descriptions distinctions also present 
in Halbwachs’s thinking. ‘Our natural “environment”’ could be seen to 
correspond to the material framework in Halbwachs’s thinking, and the 
‘inner model of the outer world’ or ‘our human “landscape”’ to the mind-
internal spatial framework of memory. We can use the latter to make 
meaning of ‘our surroundings and the world at large, individually in our 
personal images, socially in images we share with men of our time and 
condition’.49 Yet, the objective of the miniature theory offered in Kepes’s 
introduction differs from that of Halbwachs; as a painter and teacher Kepes is 
more concerned with the role of the visual than with the role of the social 
and, consequently, with the development of a new visual sensibility, acquired 
through intellectual analysis and the emotional delight of perception.50  
In modern life, Kepes suggests, the inner model is in disharmony with the 
outer world. New form patterns must be learnt in order to find a position in 
which we can cope with the world of forms: ‘Like the forest and mountains 
of medieval times, our new environment harbors strange menacing beasts; 
invisible viruses, atoms, mesons, protons, cosmic rays, supersonic waves’.51 
He calls for a sensuous mapping of the forms and configurations of the new 
world. It is the ‘dimensions of light, color, space, forms, textures, rhythms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
possessor of the image. Part of the image is the history of the image itself’. The images, Boulding explains, are 
also defined by the social setting: ‘Part of our image of the world is the belief that this image is shared by other 
people like ourselves who also are part of our image of the world. In common daily intercourse we all behave 
as if we possess roughly the same image of the world … It is this shared image which is “public” knowledge 
as opposed to “private” knowledge’. Boulding, The Image, 4, 5, 6, 14. 
47 K Lynch, ‘Reconsidering The Image of the City’, in L Rodwin & R M Hollister (eds), Cities of the Mind. 
Images and Themes of the City in Social Sciences (New York, Plenum Press, 1984), 152. Boulding’s The 
Image is listed in the bibliography of The Image of the City. Lynch, The Image of the City, 182. 
48 Kepes, The New Landscape, 18. 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid., 17. 
51 ibid., 19. 
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sound and movement’ of this different environment that we need to grasp in 
order to discover the ‘potentialities for a richer, more orderly and secure 
human life’.52 Kepes embraces the environment of modernity, seeing the 
‘kaleidoscopic pattern which shocks and numbs our sensibilities’ as a 
potential good.53 He suggests that this outer world should be brought into 
harmony with the inner mental model, learning new sensibilities from artists, 
architects, and designers, who can ‘present us with the new wonders and 
riches of our contemporary world in their affirmative, optimistic statements, 
showing us how use can be made of them. By these means’, he argues, ‘we 
can savor the tastes and experience the pleasures of our modern birthright’.54 
The mental image offers itself as the spatial framework of memory that 
Kepes suggests needs to be adjusted to the visual expressions of the physical 
framework of the society of the modern. Kepes presumes that the character of 
the image needs to change in the course of history to follow aesthetic 
configurations of the physical environment, and he implies that coming to a 
new equilibrium is a question of adaption. I believe we can use his thinking 
to raise questions of an architectural nature concerning Halbwachs’s theory. 
To what degree, for instance, do new aesthetic or architectural paradigms 
influence the processes of acquiring new mental images – spatial frameworks 
of memory – and the adjustment of the old? Do paradigm shifts in 
architecture and urban planning as well as major reconstructions resulting 
from war or redevelopment cause the need for stabilising periods, in which a 
new cultural equilibrium of mind can be found? Acting as representatives for 
the dominant groups of society in their work with shaping the physical 
environment – what is the role of architects and planners for the politics of 
the collective mental images of society? Questions like these were the 
concern of Kepes in his teaching and research, but they also came to stand at 
the centre of the work of his colleague. 
Kevin Lynch and Gyorgy Kepes 
Kevin Lynch (1918–1984) worked together with Kepes at MIT. He had 
begun to train as an architect in the mid-1930s at Yale, the last school of 
architecture in the United States to continue in the Beaux Arts tradition.55 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 ibid. 
53 ibid., 69. 
54 ibid., 74. 
55 T Banerjee & M Southworth, ‘Kevin Lynch: His Life and Work’, in T Banerjee et al. (eds), City Sense and 
City Design. Writings and Projects of Kevin Lynch (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1990), 12. For a comprehensive 
introduction to Lynch’s intellectual development in high school and university, see H Ellis, ‘Revisiting The 
Image of the City: The Intellectual History and Legacy of Kevin Lynch’s Urban Vision’, BA thesis, Wesleyan 
University, Middletown, 2010. 
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Dissatisfied with the studies he enquired about studying with Frank Lloyd 
Wright at his school at Taliesin. In 1937 he joined Wright for a year and a 
half, but left because he did not want to ‘get swallowed up’ by the milieu.56 
Lynch went on to study engineering, got bored, and started studying biology. 
After having served in the army during the war, he pursued a Bachelor’s 
degree in city planning at MIT, fulfilling a dream he had nurtured since the 
time at Yale.57 He graduated in 1947, and in 1948, after a brief position at the 
Greensboro Planning Commission in North Carolina, he was offered a 
teaching position at MIT, which he accepted. 
Lynch’s book The Image of the City was published in 1960 at the Joint 
Center for Urban Studies, a cooperative venture of MIT and Harvard 
University.58 It remains Lynch’s most influential writing and is one of the 
bestselling books of all time with over 200,000 copies printed of the first 
edition and about 5,000 still printed every year.59 The study was based on the 
findings of the research project at the Center for Urban and Regional Studies 
at MIT that Lynch worked on together with Kepes. Lynch had worked out 
some of the underlying ideas for the project during a study trip to Italy in 
1952–1953.60 Lynch later recalls that in discussions with Kepes, walking 
down the Boston streets in 1954, the ideas matured into the theme of the 
mental image of the city.61 In a working paper, written as a part of the 
research project, they propose a definition of ‘the image’, or, to be more 
precise, they say, ‘the schema’ of the city. With reference to visual 
perception, they assume four levels of organisation of the mental image: 
1.) the visual field, the immediate image as recorded by the eye: bound and 
finite, in perspective, shifting, instantaneous, etc. 
2.) the visual world, the visual field reinterpreted in terms of everyday 
experience, stable, without perspective, of constant color and size, panoramic, 
and extended present. 
3.) the schematic world, a generalized picture or image of a specific physical 
reality; abstract, independent of time and of the actual presence of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56  Lynch quoted in Banerjee & Southworth, ‘Kevin Lynch: His Life and Work’, 18. 
57 ibid., 19. 
58 Lynch, The Image of the City, v. 
59 Ellis, ‘Revisiting The Image of the City’, 6. 
60 The travel journals and an early text based on the experience bear witness to their early development. K 
Lynch, ‘The Travel Journals (1952–53)’, in T Banerjee et al. (eds), City Sense and City Design. Writings and 
Projects of Kevin Lynch (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1990), 107; K Lynch, ‘Notes on City Satisfactions (1953)’, in 
T Banerjee et al. (eds), City Sense and City Design. Writings and Projects of Kevin Lynch (Cambridge, MIT 
Press, 1990).  
61 Lynch, ‘Reconsidering The Image of the City’, 152. The research group, Lynch maintains, neither had any 
training in the methods they used nor literature to guide them. 
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particular reality (although this must have been present to the eye at least 
once). 
4.) the realm of stereotypes, also an abstract timeless image; now no longer 
referring to any specific reality, but rather to a class of them.62 
The authors explain that the study will only concern the visual world (2) and 
the schematic world (3). The paper is interesting in that it suggests 
differentiations that remind of Halbwachs’s more detailed distinctions.63 
Lynch and Kepes speak of perception, Halbwachs of memory, but they both 
address the images of space in mind. Although the social aspects are only 
implied in the fourth level, the realm of stereotypes, the others have their 
counterparts in Halbwachs’s theory; the visual field can be compared to 
vivid, fragmentary, memory images of a singular exposure to an 
environment. These are the first-time impressions. The visual world for 
Halbwachs is the form in which the impressions of the visual field reach the 
conscious mind. Pre-existing notions of the frameworks of memory colour 
the incoming stimuli, making them into schematised and dynamic constructs 
from vivid, static images. Therefore, according to Halbwachs, there is no 
perception that is not informed by earlier experience. The schematic world is 
the counterpart of the spatial framework of memory. It comprises the 
abstracted notions of our mind. The realm of stereotypes may be compared to 
certain aspects of the group images of space, as collectively shaped notions 
of space that influence the perception or memory of an environment. 
In the brief note Lynch and Kepes do not refer to any social aspects, not 
even on the level of stereotypes. For Halbwachs, differently, the social is the 
essential reason and precondition for the frameworks of memory. Yet, the 
distinctions they propose suggest a theoretical complexity of their research 
project. Kepes has a profound influence on Lynch’s work. In the preface of 
The Image of the City Lynch writes, ‘The detailed development and concrete 
studies are my own, but the underlying concepts were generated in many 
exchanges with Professor Kepes. I would be at a loss to disentangle my ideas 
from his’.64 The model of different levels of perception, however, which they 
conceived together, does not find its way into The Image of the City. It is the 
image, or the schema, that becomes the central issue of the book. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 K Lynch, ‘Discussion in Progress: The Image of the Urban Environment’, in Research project: The 
Perceptual Form of the City, doc no. 125773, MC 208, Box 1, General Statements 1 (Boston, MIT, Institute 
Archives and Special Collections, pub. online) <http://hdl.handle.net/1721.3/35693> accessed 24 Nov. 2012 
63 Cf. e.g. Frameworks of memory in ch. 1 and Remember other things, A stage for memory, and Collective 
landmarks in ch. 2. 
64 Lynch, The Image of the City, vi. 
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Lynch had tested some of the methods used in the book in a small study on 
childhood memories of cities made in collaboration with Alvin K. Lukashok 
and published in 1956. Although the physical and visual features of space are 
at the centre of the analysis, the results prompt the authors to reflect on the 
role of social and cultural associations of the memories of certain spaces, like 
the differences in perceived beauty or social status of different 
neighbourhoods. They summarise by stating that ‘Knowledge of how people 
react to their physical environment, and how they invest it with emotional 
qualities, is quite as important as knowing the technical or economic or 
sociological resultants of a given form’.65 
The image of the city 
The Image of the City sets out to ‘consider the visual quality of the American 
city by studying the mental image of that city which is held by its citizens’ 
and focuses on the clarity and legibility of the forms of the cityscape and how 
they contribute to the orientation in the city.66 The insight from the study, 
Lynch argues, could inform planning professionals in remodelling the 
external environment to improve the mental image people have of it.67 The 
‘strategic link’ in the process of way-finding – a term he has been credited 
with coining in the book – is the environmental image.68 Lynch outlines its 
main theoretical features in the first chapter, The Image of the Environment, 
and elaborates on its many features and his theoretical references in appendix 
A, Some References to Orientation.69 It is ‘the generalized mental picture of 
the exterior physical world that is held by an individual. This image is the 
product both of the immediate sensation and of the memory of past 
experience’.70 It is used to interpret information and to guide action, and the 
ordered environment, internalised into this environmental image, enables one 
‘to find a friend’s house or a policeman or a button store’.71 The original 
function of the environmental image, so he argues, is to permit purposeful 
mobility and the basis for emotional and social associations. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 A K Lukashok & K Lynch, ‘Some Childhood Memories of the City’, Journal of the American Institute of 
Planners, 22/3 (Summer 1956), 152. 
66 Lynch, The Image of the City, 2. 
67 ibid., 12–13. What was unforeseen, Lynch later writes, was that the study, ‘whose principal aim was to urge 
on designers the necessity of consulting those who live in a place, had at first a diametrically opposite result. It 
seemed to many planners that here was a new technique … that allowed a designer to predict the public image 
of any existing city or new proposal’. Lynch, ‘Reconsidering The Image of the City’, 156. 
68 The term ‘way-finding’ has inspired further work on how to cater for finding the way in architectural and 
urban planning. See e.g. R Passini, Wayfinding in Architecture (New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1984); P 
Arthur & R Passini, Wayfinding. People, Signs, and Architecture (Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1992).  
69 Lynch, The Image of the City, 1–13, 123–39. 
70 ibid., 4. 
71 ibid. 
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A two-way process forms the image. The observer takes in the environment 
and structures it, and, in turn, the image shapes the way in which the observer 
directs his attention and sees the external environment: 
The environment suggests distinctions and relations, and the observer – with 
great adaptability and in the light of his own purposes – selects, organizes, and 
endows with meaning what he sees.  The image so developed now limits and 
emphasizes what is seen while the image itself is being tested against the 
filtered perceptual input in constant interacting process.72  
Lynch portrays the environmental image as an accumulated but fairly static 
construct. He would later revise this view, arguing that the image is 
essentially dynamic and changes over time, for example with the maturation 
of the person and changes to the city.73 
Kirsten Wagner has written a concise study of the structural and gestalt-
theoretical premises for Lynch’s study.74 She points to the sources of 
influence for Lynch’s concept of the environmental image. One of these 
sources is his close collaboration with Kepes at MIT and the distinction 
between a mental image of the environment and its corresponding external 
landscape, outlined in The New Landscape in Art and Science. The 
theoretical side of Kepes’s concept is not, however, systematically elaborated 
in the text, but remains a personally shaped concept. Wagner argues that 
Lynch takes over not only the concept of the environmental image from 
Kepes, but also the gestalt-theoretical perspective of the legibility of form in 
the city, as well as the idea that the modern metropolis, in opposition to the 
historical city, does not offer a totality of form, a gestalt, but instead the 
formlessness of the urban sprawl.75 
A second sphere of influence for Lynch’s concept is the scholarship in 
psychology and anthropology that considers man’s conceptualisations of 
space. According to Wagner, the literature takes up about two thirds of 
Lynch’s bibliography and gives him and his readers a broad understanding of 
the function of the mental image of the environment, particularly with respect 
to orientation and way-finding.76 In my opinion, Lynch’s study is an 
inventive synthesis of various sources, complemented with his own research. 
The field he related to was also concerned with the psychological functions 
of human navigation, and Lynch would lean on several inventive studies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 ibid., 6. 
73 Lynch, ‘Reconsidering The Image of the City’, 157. 
74 Wagner, ‘Die visuelle Ordnung der Stadt’. 
75 ibid., 327–28. 
76 ibid., 332 n. 33. Geographic literature also plays an important role. 
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from other disciplines, such as C. C. Trowbridge’s ‘On Fundamental 
Methods of Orientation and Imaginary Maps’ from 1913.77 And while his 
book today is considered a groundbreaking study in architectural and urban 
theory, which, among other things, ‘challenged modernism’s visual leveling 
of the urban environment’,78 it also enjoys the status of a seminal book in the 
field that is concerned with what is now generally referred to as the study of 
cognitive mapping.79  
Kevin Lynch and Maurice Halbwachs 
A third area of influence, which Wagner only mentions in passing, comes 
from social and sociological studies of the city. Halbwachs stands as the most 
evident authority, but inspiration also came from the urban historian Lewis 
Mumford (1895–1990) and from the intellectual milieu of the Chicago 
School of Sociology.80 Lynch appreciated the postulates of La Mémoire 
collective enough for him to return to them a decade later in What Time is 
This Place?, published in 1972. Halbwachs’s book had been published 
posthumously in 1950 and Lynch must have read it in French.81 Lynch 
recounts several of the social and cultural aspects of the spatial framework of 
memory – although never referred to by that name – in the two chapters that 
outline the theory of the environmental image. The Image of the City displays 
one of the early examples of the use of terms like ‘memory’, ‘collective 
memories’, and ‘common memory’ in architectural theory in the second half 
of the twentieth century and what may be the first reference to the writings of 
Halbwachs. Lynch’s book appears around the same time as the publications 
of English translations of Halbwachs’s Morphologie sociale, Esquisse d’une 
psychologie des classes sociales, and Les origins du sentiment religieux, 
thereby contributing to the early post-war focus on Halbwachs in the social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Trowbridge referred to imaginary maps, which approximately can be said to correspond to Lynch’s 
environmental image. C C Trowbridge, ‘On Fundamental Methods of Orientation and “Imaginary Maps”’, 
Science, 38/990 (19 Dec. 1913). 
78 H F Mallgrave & D Goodman, An Introduction to Architectural Theory. 1968 to the Present (Chichester, 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 7. 
79 B Tversky, ‘Remembering Spaces’, in F I M Craik & E Tulving (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Memory 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 2000), 363. The term cognitive map was first used by Edward Tolman 
and referred to the mental construct of external space in the brain of rats and men, employed for navigation. E 
C Tolman, ‘Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men’, Psychological Review, 55/4 (1948). For introductions to the 
field, see e.g. R M Kitchin, ‘Cognitive Maps: What are They and Why Study Them?’, Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 14/1 (1994); J Portugali (ed), The Construction of Cognitive Maps (Helmstedt, 
Kluwer, 1996). 
80 Wagner, ‘Die visuelle Ordnung der Stadt’, 323. 
81 M Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, ed. J Alexandre & G Gurvitch (Paris, PUF, 1950) [orig., ‘Mémoire et 
société’ (1947)]. An English translation would not appear until 1980. Cf. Editions of the works by Maurice 
Halbwachs in the Introduction. 
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sciences in the English-speaking world (only later, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
will the humanities develop an interest in his writings).82 
In addition to the pragmatic functions of enabling purposeful mobility 
Lynch sees in the environmental image a frame of reference for the 
organisation of activities, beliefs, or knowledge. The image takes on social 
functions: 
It can furnish the raw material for the symbols and collective memories of 
group communication. A striking landscape is the skeleton upon which many 
primitive races erect their socially important myths. Common memories of the 
‘home town’ were often the first and easiest point of contact between lonely 
soldiers during the war.83 
In this way, the environmental image takes on an emotional quality among 
the people who share associations to a part of the city; their images become 
‘soaked in memories and meanings’.84 Lynch transposes the idea of the social 
and cultural functionality of the environmental image from Halbwachs; it is 
used as a framework to which the memories of events, knowledge, and social 
relations are attached. ‘The landscape serves as a vast mnemonic system for 
the retention of group history and ideals … Maurice Halbwachs makes the 
same point in reference to modern Paris, when he remarks that the stable 
physical scene, the common memory of Parisians, is a potent force in binding 
them together and allowing them to communicate with each other’.85 
Mumford’s books, in particular The Culture of Cities, published in 1938, 
made their presence felt on Lynch.86 The Culture of Cities inspired him to 
pursue an urban-focused architectural education.87 In the book Mumford lays 	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‘Maurice Halbwachs, 1877–1945’, American Journal of Sociology, 51/6 (May 1946); G Friedmann, ‘Maurice 
Halbwachs’, Europe, 24/1 (Jan. 1946). Furthermore, Leo F. Schnore points out Halbwachs’s importance for 
carrying on Durkheim’s study of social morphology. L F Schnore, ‘Social Morphology and Human Ecology’, 
American Journal of Sociology, 63/6 (1958), 631 n. 40. The English translations, along with the re-editions of 
several of Halbwachs’s French titles in the late 1940s and in the 1950s, demonstrate the relatively widespread 
interest in Halbwachs’s thinking in the post-war period and nuances Michael Hebbert’s claim of the lack of 
influence of Halbwachs on sociology and social psychology. M Hebbert, ‘The Street as Locus of Collective 
Memory’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 23/4 (2005), 585.  
83 Lynch, The Image of the City, 4. 
84 ibid., 1. 
85 ibid., 126. 
86 Wagner, ‘Die visuelle Ordnung der Stadt’, 328. 
87 Ellis, ‘Revisiting The Image of the City’, 49. Ellis writes that ‘This book was the first contact Lynch had 
with Mumford’s work, and his incredibly passionate reaction was the first sign of their eventual friendship. … 
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out a ‘social concept of the city’ that he forms on the basis of a ‘sociological 
concept of the city’. He distinguishes between two sides of the city: one that 
acts as a physical frame for domestic and economic activities, and one that 
takes the role of a special framework for common life and collective drama, a 
consciously dramatic setting for the more significant actions and the more 
sublimated urges of human culture … It is in the city, the city as theater, that 
man’s more purposive activities are formulated and worked out, through 
conflicting and cooperating personalities, events, groups, into more significant 
culminations.88 
Furthermore, Mumford stresses the importance of socially structured 
environments for our sense of balance and well-being: 
[Men’s] unified plans and buildings become a symbol of their social 
relatedness; and when the physical environment itself becomes disordered and 
incoherent, the social functions that it harbors become more difficult to 
express.89 
Along similar lines, Lynch emphasises the importance of the environment for 
emotional security and ‘harmonious relationship between himself and the 
outside world’.90 Such ideas can, however, also be found in the reasoning in 
Kepes’s The New Landscape in Art and Science91 as well as in the opening 
passage in the chapter on space in La Mémoire collective, where Halbwachs, 
with reference to Auguste Comte, suggests that mental equilibrium is 
dependent on the relative stability of surrounding objects and physical 
space.92 Much mental illness, he writes, comes with the breakdown of the 
relationship between inner and outer environments. Our image of the external 
world is so attached to the self that it can feel like leaving our own 
personality, if we were to move to new surroundings. 
The research that Lynch undertook at MIT should also be seen against the 
background of the social discourse on urbanity in the first decades of the 
twentieth century in the United States.93 With regard to sociological studies 
of the city, it was the Chicago School that dominated that discourse – the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
when Mumford would come to Cambridge, while Lynch was a professor at MIT, he would sometimes stay at 
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88 L Mumford, The Culture of Cities (London, Martin Secker & Warburg, 1938), 480. 
89 ibid., 481. 
90 Lynch, The Image of the City, 4. 
91 Kepes, The New Landscape, 18–19.  
92 M Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, ed. G Namer (1950; crit. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997) [orig., 
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same academic environment that had seen Halbwachs as guest professor in 
the 1930s.94 Malcolm Miles argues that Lynch, by linking the planning 
profession with studies of urban experience, situates ‘himself in a broad and 
holistic approach beyond the conventional boundaries of planning and 
architecture [that] follows the Chicago School’s ethos in as much as that 
ethos was derived from Georg Simmel’s construction of a specifically 
metropolitan viewpoint’.95 Drawing on principles of interdisciplinarity 
practised by the Chicago School, the Joint Center for Urban Studies, under 
the auspices of which Lynch’s study was published, had been founded to 
bring together scholars from several disciplines and professions in the study 
of the city.96 Furthermore, the Chicago School provided a role model for its 
approach of direct contact with the communities under study, for instance 
through interviews, as it had been advocated in the teaching by Park and 
Burgess or demonstrated by Frederick M. Thrasher.97 The latter spent eight 
years tracking down more than a thousand youth gangs in Chicago for his 
study The Gang (1927). Lynch employs similar principles in his method of 
direct contact with people in the city through surveys and interviews. 
Because differences in ‘social class and habitual use cause people to see a 
city with very different eyes’, Lynch later notes, he did not regard his study 
as a predictive theory that could assist the planner in identifying a general 
public image by studying form, but instead believed that its ‘principal aim 
was to urge on designers the necessity of consulting those who live in a 
place’.98 
The Chicagoan Park had studied with Georg Simmel in 1899–1900 and his 
thought came to influence Park’s conceptualisation of modern urban 
civilisation.99 Through the study of human ecology, a concept introduced by 
Park in 1915, which regards the city as a human habitat and natural product 
of the social life led by civilised man, the scholars of the Chicago School of 	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one. 
95 M Miles, ‘Legibility and Liveability: a Critique’, Perspectivas urbanas/Urban Perspectives, /5 (2004), 8. 
96 The Center for Advanced Visual Studies, founded by Kepes at MIT, similarly fused art and science in an 
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98 Lynch, ‘Reconsidering The Image of the City’, 156. 
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the 1920s and 1930s came to further a European legacy of social thought, 
especially that of Simmel, but also of the likes of Durkheim and Marx.100 
However, according to Jens Tonboe, linked as their thinking was to the study 
object of Chicago, which at the time grew with 50,000 inhabitants per year, it 
developed in its own direction and came to form a ‘relatively loose system of 
sociological concepts and perspectives that express some common, 
historically and objectively existing phenomena. It is ideally described as 
forms and processes’.101 Mirroring neither the structural societal level of 
Durkheimian thinking nor the social-psychological level of Simmel, it 
pragmatically focused on the level of communities. Others have claimed that 
the adaption of biological ideas to the study of the city in human ecology 
illustrates that the Chicago School in fact lacked a viable theoretical 
orientation.102 
In ‘Urbanism as a Way of Life’ Wirth refers to Simmel’s well-known 
argument that social distance arises in the metropolis due to the physical 
proximity of the citizens. The consequence, he argues, is that the ‘urban 
world puts a premium on visual recognition’, and the urban dweller becomes 
sensitised to seeing the role of things denoted by their surface appearance, 
such as the uniform of the functionary, instead of recognising the personality 
behind it: ‘We are exposed to glaring contrasts between splendor and squalor, 
between riches and poverty, intelligence and ignorance, order and chaos’.103 
Miles claims that the emphasis on visual recognition is crucial to the legacy 
of the Chicago School and that Lynch translates it ‘into a structural approach 
to urban design, breaking with a privileging of architectural elements over 
their settings and the spaces between them, but not breaking with the distance 
of the eye’.104 The moving elements of people and their activities, Lynch 
explains in the opening section of The Image of the City, are just as important 
as stationary objects.105 The image of the city that each inhabitant holds is a 
composite of the different senses involved in the perception, but also of other 
concerns. Following Wirth’s argument, Lynch posits that in order to 
understand the city we need to consider how it is perceived and identified, 
not only what it is by itself. 	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Group images 
The developed mental image will limit and emphasise our perception, but it 
will also be tested and altered according to new perceptual input or 
information, Lynch argues.106 Because of the continuous formation and 
remodelling of the environmental image in sensory and motor interaction 
with the outer landscape, the mental construct comes to differ slightly from 
person to person. And yet, even though each individual possesses a singular 
image, Lynch continues, ‘there seems to be a substantial agreement among 
members of the same group. It is these group images, exhibiting consensus 
among significant numbers, which interest city planners who aspire to model 
an environment that will be used by many people’.107 With group images, or 
public images, Lynch distinguishes between the ‘common mental pictures 
carried by large numbers of a city’s inhabitants: areas of agreement which 
might be expected to appear in the interaction of a single physical reality, a 
common culture, and a basic physiological nature’, and idiosyncratic images 
held by the individual.108 The former can thus be regarded as the abstracted 
common denominator of the individual images of a given group. This brings 
Lynch close to Halbwachs’s argument that the spatial framework of memory 
is formed on the basis of accumulated experiences in the same place, and it is 
the reactualisation of the framework that enables the reconstruction of 
memories of events. Halbwachs illustrates this with a group of pupils, who 
may have studied in the same rooms during the same days of the week for a 
period of time. The shared denominators of the remembered activities form 
the social, spatial, and temporal frameworks that each of them needs to 
reconstruct what they have learnt.109 Lynch’s empirical findings suggest the 
validity of such a generalised, commonly shared idea of space, not as an 
exclusive concept that all should have, but as a central aspect of most 
people’s individual image. 
Even if Halbwachs, like Lynch, attributes both an individual quality and 
shared features to the spatial framework of memory, with the distinction 
between the individual and public image Lynch contributes with a distinct 
terminology; it is then possible to refer to the shared features of the 
environmental image or the spatial framework of memory by group image or 	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public image and not lose the understanding of their basis in the individual 
minds. Halbwachs seldom refers to something like a collective spatial 
framework of memory, even though it is implicated in several contexts with 
reference to the social or cultural associations of the framework, not, like 
Lynch, with reference to the perceivable spatial or architectural features. 
Caution should be exercised when using such terms, so that it is not mistaken 
for an entity external to the memories and minds of individuals, but is 
understood as a part of the individual images within the group, the shared 
denominator. Neither Lynch nor Halbwachs ascribes the mental image of 
space to a supraindividual subject; they merely argue that it is conditioned by 
the individual’s engagement with the social life of the group. Thus, it may be 
preferable to refer to it as group environmental image or group spatial 
framework of memory. 
A further aspect of the group images in Lynch’s argument echoes a central 
hypothesis of the theory of the collective memory: such shared spatial 
notions differ from group to group, also when they refer to the same physical 
space. Not only are they associated with a whole realm of group-specific 
memories and values, they may also, because of cultural differences in the 
general understanding of space and social orders, exhibit fundamental 
differences in their configuration.110 
In the section Structure and Identity in the introductory chapter Lynch 
proposes to analyse the environmental image into three components. The 
identity of the object makes it distinct from other things; it comprises the 
individuality and the recognition as a separable entity. Its structure is ‘the 
spatial or pattern relation of the object to the observer and to other objects’.111 
Finally, the meaning of the object refers to its practical or emotional 
significance. He gives an example of the three components:  
Thus an image useful for making an exit requires the recognition of a door as 
a distinct entity, of its spatial relation to the observer, and its meaning as a 
hole for getting out. These are not truly separable. The visual recognition of a 
door is matted together with its meaning as a door.112 
The problem with the meaning of environmental images, Lynch asserts, is 
that it is not easily manipulated by altering the physical environment. ‘The 
image of the Manhattan skyline may stand for vitality, power, decadence, 
mystery, congestion, greatness, or what you will’.113 Therefore, he continues, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Lynch, The Image of the City, 131–33. 
111 ibid., 8. 
112 ibid. 
113 ibid., 8–9. 
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it is wise, if the purpose is to build cities that can be enjoyed by people from 
any background, to exclude issues of meaning and concentrate on the clarity 
of form. Lynch concludes by pointing out that for the remainder of the book 
he will focus on the identity and structure of the images of the city. This 
means to exclude issues of meaning. From this point on, the study deviates 
from Halbwachs and his social theory of the spatial framework of memory.114 
Landmarks of orientation 
The findings of the environmental image of American cities include few, if 
any, references to meaning on a social and cultural level. Still, some of the 
distinctions of the imageability of urban form that Lynch proposes, such as 
the node and the landmark, relate to aspects in Halbwachs’s theory. It is 
unlikely, I believe, that they originated from Halbwachs’s theory; they 
probably reached him from scholarship in geography, psychology, and 
ethnography, of which he was knowledgeable, and from gestalt theory and 
his collaboration with Kepes. Lynch draws attention to the legibility of the 
environment and how formal elements of the urban landscape and 
architecture are organised in patterns to allow for orientation and way-
finding. These belong to spatial and conceptual categories that the individual 
mind uses to cognise the perceived environment, inherent in each 
environmental image: 
1. Paths. Paths are the channels along which the observer customarily, 
occasionally, or potentially moves. They may be streets, walkways, transit 
lines, canals, railroads. … 2. Edges. Edges are the linear elements not used or 
considered as paths by the observer. They are the boundaries between two 
phases, linear breaks in continuity: shores, railroad cuts, edges of 
development, walls. … 3. Districts. Districts are the medium-to-large sections 
of the city, conceived of as having two-dimensional extent … and which are 
recognizable as having some common, identifying character. … 4. Nodes. 
Nodes are points, the strategic spots in a city into which an observer can enter, 
and which are the intensive foci to and from which he is traveling. They may 
be primarily junctions, places of a break in transportation, a crossing or 
convergence of points, moments of shift from one structure to another. … 5. 
Landmarks. Landmarks are another type of point-reference, but in this case 
the observer does not enter within them, they are external. They are usually a 
rather simply defined physical object: building, sign, store, or mountain.115 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 For a summary of the subsequent critique of Lynch’s study, some of which refers to the failure to include 
social aspects in the study, cf. Wagner, ‘Die visuelle Ordnung der Stadt’, 328–30. 
115 Lynch, The Image of the City, 47. My abbrev. 
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Landmarks and nodes in Lynch’s study are elements with objectively 
describable features of space, singled out by the mind because of their 
salience or centrality as crossroads in patterns of movement. They are 
perceptual entities that guide, enable, or restrict movement, and they are 
collective in the sense that they will stand out visually for all people and, 
therefore, as Lynch pointed out, be describable as general or universal 
features of the environment. The visual elements, such as the nodes and 
landmarks, have lent him fame in subsequent scientific studies of spatial 
memory.116 As I have described in the previous chapter, Halbwachs refers to 
points de repère collectifs, translatable into collective landmarks in space and 
points of reference in time or figuratively. For him, collective landmarks are 
intersubjective and group-related points in space. They are not universal, but 
relate to a specific social milieu in a certain period of time. For every group, 
the landmarks act as crossroads for different frameworks of the collective 
memory. In the account referred to in the previous chapter, where Halbwachs 
tries to recall where he stayed last time he travelled to Paris to take part in an 
examination jury, such points of reference are exemplified with the house of 
Halbwachs’s mother and the flat of his parents-in-law.117 The salience of the 
homes as landmarks in his spatial framework is caused by their social 
significance for him and his family, not their physical features. The points of 
reference may take the form of Lynchian landmarks of orientation, but only 
as long as they are also social indexes or nodes in one or another group the 
individual is a member of. 
With Lynch’s landmarks we arrive at a distinction between two levels of 
spatial entities that stand out in the spatial framework of memory of the 
individual: one, the landmark of orientation that is visual and universal and 
devoid of any connotations to meaning other than those enabling a sense of 
orientation and way-finding, and, two, a collective landmark that connotes 
social meaning, in the sense that it is an intersection point where it overlaps 
collective points of reference, which stand out in the social and temporal 
frameworks of memory, like the places that are important for the family in 
certain periods of one’s life. 
Social aspects of the image 
In 1972 Lynch publishes What Time is This Place?. The introduction declares 
that the book ‘deals with the evidence of time which is embodied in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 In scholarship on cognitive maps in the fields of geography, cognitive psychology, and neuropsychology, 
Lynch’s term landmark has evolved to more generally designate known places in the mental images of space. 
R G Golledge, ‘Place Recognition and Wayfinding: Making Sense of Space’, Geoforum, 23/2 (1992), 200. 
117 Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 126. Cf. Collective landmarks in ch. 2. 
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physical world, how those external signals fit (or fail to fit) our internal 
experience, and how that inside-to-outside relationship might become a life-
enhancing one … [It discusses] place as an emblem of past, present, and 
future time’.118 The book takes the form of a patchwork of evocative ideas, 
theoretical considerations, and anecdotes rather than a clearly structured 
argument and analysis. Thus, it exhibits a distinctly different stylistic quality 
than The Image of the City. Halbwachs is also an important reference in this 
book; La Mémoire collective is listed as one of the twenty-three selected 
readings, alongside Remembering, the book written by another pioneer of 
socially conditioned memory, the psychologist Frederic C. Bartlett.119 The 
book outlines a landscape of considerations of time for the analysis and 
planning of the urban environment. Lynch also introduces thoughts on a 
social understanding of the environmental images of space, which could have 
become valuable for architects and urban planners, but with the lack of 
elaboration these attempts come to a halt. 
As an example, Lynch suggests that the reason why people keep physical 
things is their familiar connections; they can act as family mementoes. This 
reflection leads him to acknowledge that the problem in large new suburban 
communities is to maintain ‘some continuity of image and association despite 
the physical and social upheaval to which their inhabitants have been 
exposed. Since images and associations must be useful for both original and 
new inhabitants, the histories of the immigrants should be interwoven with 
the history of the new setting’.120 The argument could have become a useful 
reflection on the environmental image for the planning professions, but after 
two brief examples of immigrants looking for recognisable features in space, 
in an attempt to illustrate the claim, he continues to another reflection. 
A short section in the book is called Group Time. It summarises 
Halbwachs’s postulation that social interaction in the group conditions 
individual memory and creates a ‘group past’ and a ‘group future’, which 
help to select, explain, retain, and modify memories. Lynch develops the 
argument in relation to space: ‘Group memories are supported by the stable 
features of the environment, which becomes “a spatial emblem of time.”’121 
He illustrates and develops the argument further with a passage from Isak 
Dinesen (pseud. for Karen Blixen): 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 K Lynch, What Time is This Place? (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1972), 1. 
119 ibid., 248–49. For Bartlett’s criticism of Halbwachs, see Critique of the collective memory in ch. 1. 
120 ibid., 39. 
121 ibid., 125. 
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[She] was forced to sell her African estate, and the Kikuyu living there were 
driven off. They pleaded to be relocated together, and she comments: ‘It is 
more than their land you take away … It is their past as well, their roots and 
their identity. If they were to go away from their land, they must have people 
round them who had known it … Then they could still, for some years, talk of 
the geography and history of the farm, and what one had forgotten the other 
would remember. As it was, they were feeling the shame of extinction falling 
on them.’122 
Again Lynch touches on an intriguing aspect of the environmental image, an 
aspect that Halbwachs also testifies to in La Mémoire collective: the ability to 
remember together with the social group and with the help of the mental 
image of an environment the group has left.123 However, Lynch does not 
elaborate, but continues on to another reflection. Is it tempting to think of 
what an analytical elaboration of this reflection could have contributed with 
in the context of urban planning policies of the early 1970s, especially with 
regard to relocation of citizens in redevelopment areas in existing urban 
environments or the migratory flows into new urban suburbs. 
Architecture, perception, and memory 
Against the background of the changes in the conceptualisation of the past in 
the architectural discourse of the 1950s and 1960s, I have tried to give a 
picture of the theoretical landscape that Halbwachs’s spatial framework of 
memory entered into. Touching on Kepes’s attempts to identify modernity’s 
new images of the environment through studies of art and architecture, I 
continued to address the synthesis of theory from many sources, which forms 
the underpinning of Lynch’s The Image of the City. While drawing on some 
of the social aspects of the spatial framework in the collective memory, 
Lynch does not follow Halbwachs in the social and cultural direction, but 
turns to understand how the legibility of form in the physical landscape 
affects people’s ability to form mental images of it, and its effect on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 I Dinesen, Out of Africa (New York, Modern Library, 1952). Quoted in Lynch, What Time is This Place? , 
126. His abbrev. 
123 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 195–96. Cf. Altering the spatial framework of memory in ch. 2. For 
more elaborate attempts to employ Halbwachs’s theories in relation to displacement and diaspora, see e.g. S 
Horstkotte, ‘Recollective Processes and the “Topography of Forgetting” in W. G. Sebald’s Austerlitz ’, in M-A 
Baronian et al. (eds), Diaspora and Memory. Figures of Displacement in Contemporary Literature, Arts and 
Politics (Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2007), 193–202; G Lagoumitzi, ‘The Uses of Nostalgia in the ‘Imagination’ of 
Diaspora: The Case of the New Pontic Greek Refugees’, in M David & J Muñoz-Basols (eds), Defining and 
Re-Defining Diaspora (Oxford, Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2011), 25–40; M Ekman, ‘Remembering Home. 
Displacement, Return, and Spatial Frameworks of Memory’, in J Muñoz-Basols & M David (eds), Defining 
and Re-Defining Diaspora: From Theory to Reality (Oxford, Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2011), 3–24. 
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orientation and way-finding. His theory enters into another realm than that of 
Halbwachs’s collective memory. With the focus on perception and spatial 
cognition, his thinking establishes a subsocial level of the spatial framework 
of memory. It relates itself more to geography and psychology than to the 
humanities. In the context of this thesis, the analytical framework outlined in 
The Image of the City could rather be seen as the beginning of subsequent 
theories of architecture and perception as well as of spatial cognition.124 It 
stands as a reference to the theoretical framework of this thesis with regard to 
perception and spatial memory; the study of landmarks demonstrate how 
important the salient features of space are for our orientation, pointing to the 
social status of tall and imposing buildings throughout history and to the fact 
that many cultural landmarks – buildings or sites of cultural importance (cf. 
ch. 4 and 5) – often also are landmarks according to the definition of Lynch.  
In the next chapter, social and cultural connotations stand at the centre of 
the conception of architecture and the city. With the proposal to widen the 
definition of architecture to include aspects of its history, of collective 
memory, and of processes of change, the importance of the physical form 
object is marginalised, compared to the period of functionalism. For Rossi, 
the ideas of Halbwachs play an important role, and Rossi could be seen to 
import their social and cultural complexity to his thinking. He does not write 
theory with the aim of it being used as a handbook, in the same way as Lynch 
does. There are no methods outlined in L’architettura della città. This has not 
prevented the book from becoming exceptionally influential for architects 
and urban planners in the 1970s and 1980s, contributing to important changes 
in the understanding of architecture, and establishing the idea that the built 
and imagined environments are crucial for collective remembrance in society. 
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Cultural landmarks 
Expanding the thesis of Halbwachs I would say that the city itself 
is the collective memory of the people, and as memory it is linked 
to the facts and to places, the city is the locus of collective 
memory. This relationship between the locus and the citizens 
therefore becomes the predominant image, the architecture, the 
landscape, and as the facts retreat into memory, new facts emerge 
in the city. In this altogether positive sense, the great ideas move 
through the history of the city and give shape to it.   
— Aldo Rossi, L’architettura della città, 19661  
In the mid-1950s the Italian journal Casabella Continuità had become one of 
the important sites of architectural critique under the editorship of Ernest 
Nathan Rogers. Italy was a place in Europe of lively discussions on 
architectural theory, ‘where almost all theoretical statements have been 
characterised by a keen awareness of history’.2 The contributions came from 
architects as well as historians of art and architecture. The Modern 
Movement was re-evaluated, as was the relation to a more distant past, partly 
in the comments written by the editor and partly in the presentation of 
contemporary or historical projects and in the reviews of books. Issue number 
215 of 1957, notably, includes an editorial entitled ‘Continuità o crisi? 
(Continuity or Crisis?)’, written by Rogers, a review by Aldo Rossi of the 
recent study by art historian Stephan Tschudi-Madsen on the neglected Art 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A Rossi, L’architettura della città (1966; repub. 1st edn, Macerata, Quodlibet, 2011), 149. Transl. by Alice 
Labadini. Rossi’s emphasis. 
2 H-W Kruft, A History of Architectural Theory: from Vitruvius to the Present, tr. R Taylor et al. (London, 
Zwemmer, 1994) [Ger. orig. (1985)], 444. For a contextualisation of the Italian debate in the architectural 
discourse of the 1950s and the 1960s and its re-evaluations of the relation to the past, see the first part of 
chapter three. 
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Nouveau style, and a joint article by Rossi, Gau Aulenti, Vittorio Gregotti, 
and others on the problems of contemporary architecture.3 Rogers 
deliberately directed his critique against the vision of modernism by CIAM 
and offered a summary of his arguments for positioning architecture in 
relation to tradition, while, at the same time, making clear that it did not 
mean submitting to historicism.4 Words like ‘history’, ‘tradition’, ‘culture’, 
‘heritage’, and ‘the past’ flourished in the articles of the journal in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. 
Aldo Rossi 
In this chapter I will turn the attention to Aldo Rossi, one of the architects 
who operated in the Italian context just described, and look at the use of 
Halbwachsian thought in his influential formulation of a theory of the city. I 
will argue that Rossi’s elaboration has been misconstrued and point to how 
his theory offers valuable distinctions to Halbwachs’s spatial framework of 
memory. With fatto urbano, culturally pregnant architecture can be 
conceptualised as the totality of its material form, available as an external 
artefact that can be trawled archaeologically for traces, and its representation 
in the collective imagination, unfolding over time. The distinction of vital 
and pathological permanences point to the fatto urbano’s double support of 
the citizens’ remembrance: for informal and social as well as for official and 
institutional memory. It is because of the multilayered complexity that I will 
suggest referring to the fatto urbano as a cultural landmark. 
Already before he finished his studies in architecture, Rossi had begun to 
publish articles on the history of architecture and societal issues in journals 
like Voce comunista, Il contemporaneo, Comunità, and Società.5 In 1956, on 
an invitation from Rogers, he joined the editorial staff, and in the years of 
Roger’s editorship, until 1964, Rossi would write 31 articles, including book 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Tschudi-Madsen expressed discontent with the limited view of the contemporary history of art and 
architecture: ‘Interest has so far been concentrated mainly on that part of the development which has 
contributed directly to the Modern Movement and the style of our own age. All the varied forms of expression 
within the architecture and applied art of the nineteenth century based on previous styles and the historical 
Einleben – to use a neutral term, Historicism – have, however, so far been neglected. Nevertheless this 
development too deserves to be dealt with. The objects that have come down to us from this period are 
expressions of a mode of thinking and feeling basically different from ours. Whether they evoke revulsion or 
enthusiasm, it is impossible to remain indifferent to the philosophy and artistic ideals of this age, now receding 
into history’. S Tschudi-Madsen, The Art Nouveau Style: a Comprehensive Guide with 264 Illustrations, tr. R 
Christophersen (1956; republ. edn, Mineola, Dover, 2002), 11. 
4 H F Mallgrave, Modern Architectural Theory. A Historical Survey, 1763–1968 (Cambridge, CUP, 2005), 
362. 
5 H Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossis Auseinandersetzung mit Geschichte, Erinnerung und Identität am Beispiel des 
Projekts des Deutschen Historischen Museums’, DTech thesis, ETH, Zürich, 2005, 132. 
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reviews and essays.6 Already with the article on the concept of tradition in 
Milanese neoclassical architecture, published in Società in 1956, Rossi began 
to formulate new ideas of how to relate to the architectural past.7 Identifying 
the acute situation of the expanding cities, he did not, however, call for the 
preservation of historical city centres threatened by demolition. In an article 
on English town planning published in 1961, Rossi talks of planning 
processes that need to balance between commercial developers and ‘the 
useless lovers of antiquity’: 
The destruction of old centres, in London as in Milan, in Rome as in Paris, is 
inevitable and is serious only insofar as it leaves us unprepared for what is 
happening. If, however, new ideas succeed in interpreting the course of 
history, we may really look forward to a new and positive era.8  
Instead, as described in his article ‘Nuovi problemi’ (‘New Problems’) from 
1962, Rossi’s concern was the contemporary Italian city, radically 
transformed by rapid urban growth in the post-war period, to such an extent 
that the contrast between the city fabric and the countryside no longer 
existed.9 The bond between man and his surroundings, Rossi argued, should 
be strengthened. To do this, the architect needed to address the great civic 
tasks of commercial centres, universities, cultural centres, and public 
buildings.10 In her article on Rossi and the cultural context of the debate over 
urbanism in Italy in the 1960s, Mary Louise Lobsinger argues that ‘Rossi 
sought to identify the specific nature of the forces acting upon the city, and 
this goal stood in contrast to architects preoccupied with describing the 
effects of population growth and the unravelling of the city’s periphery’.11 
Addressing this new task for architects of understanding the growing cities, 
Rossi turned to scholarship on urban conditions. In 1964 Aldo Rossi 
published a study that investigates the morphology and typology of the city, 
including a classification of building types, analyses of areas, and the forces 
that change the city and the buildings, the most important of which he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 H F Mallgrave & D Goodman, An Introduction to Architectural Theory. 1968 to the Present (Chichester, 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 23. 
7 Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossi’, 132. 
8 A Rossi, ‘L’esperienza inglese e i nuovi problemi urbanistici’, Casabella Continuità, 25/250 (Apr. 1961), 14. 
Quote from Engl. summary on p. VI. 
9 A Rossi, ‘Nuovi problemi’, in R Bonicalzi (ed), Scritti scelti sull’architettura e la città 1956–1972 (1962; 
2nd edn, Milan, Clup, 1978). Abridged Engl. transl. as A Rossi, ‘Directional Centers in Italy. New Problems’, 
Ekistics, 15/87 (1963). 
10 Rossi, ‘Directional Centers in Italy’, 103. 
11 M L Lobsinger, ‘The New Urban Scale in Italy. On Aldo Rossi’s L’architettura della città’, Journal of 
Architectural Education, 59/3 (Feb. 2006), 30. 
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considers to be economy.12 He based his thesis on the argumentation in 
Halbwachs’s 1928 La population et les tracés de voies à Paris depuis un 
siècle, a revised edition of two chapters from a study on the expropriations in 
Paris, originally published in 1909.13 In the article, Rossi did not refer to 
Halbwachs’s notion of the collective memory, but indicated that a similar but 
more complex study of psychological, aesthetic, and cultural perspectives 
should follow.14 
The architecture of the city 
In 1966 Rossi published the book L’architettura della città as a part of a 
series of international texts on urban planning at the publisher Marsilio.15 It 
was based on earlier articles, lectures, and notes, and Rossi claims to have 
written it around 1960.16 Rossi addressed the contemporary discourse on the 
city in urban planning, drawing on architects, urban planners, and urban 
historians like Francesco Milizia, Reinhard Baumeister, Camillo Sitte, 
Marcel Poëte, Fritz Schumacher, Hans Benno Bernoulli, Werner Hegemann, 
Pierre Lavedan, Lewis Mumford, Steen Eiler Rasmussen, André Chastel, and 
Kevin Lynch. Rossi further emphasised the importance of studies of 
collective psychology and sociology and especially praised the French 
scholars for their contribution to conceiving the city as a collective man-
made artefact – sociologists and anthropologists like Marcel Mauss, Maurice 
Halbwachs, and Claude Lévi-Strauss and geographers like Paul Vidal de la 
Blache, Albert Demangeon, Maximilien Sorre, Jean Gottman, and Jean 
Tricart. 
Central to the thesis is the critique of what Rossi calls naïve functionalism. 
He uses the concept fatto urbano to refer to architectural objects as 
manifestations of cultural and historical processes and as functional and 
material objects. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 A Rossi, ‘Considerazioni sulla morfologia urbana e la tipologia edilizia’, in IUAV (ed), Aspetti e problemi 
della tipologia edilizia., Documenti del corso di caratteri distributivi degli edifici. Anno accademico 1964–
1964 (Venice, CLUVA, 1964). A summary can be found in Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossi’, 245 n. 61. 
13 M Halbwachs, La population et les tracés de voies à Paris depuis un siècle (Paris, Cornély & PUF, 1928) 
[rev. edn of Les expropriations et le prix des terrains à Paris (1909)]. 
14 Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossi’, 151, 245 n. 61. 
15 In the following I will refer to the English translation and revision of the fourth Italian edition, unless it is 
misleading with regard to the first Italian edition. A Rossi, The Architecture of the City, ed. P Eisenman, tr. D 
Ghirardo & J Ockman (1st Amer. edn, Cambridge, Opposition books/MIT Press, 1982) [It. orig. (4th edn, 
1978)]. Cf. The works and translations of Kevin Lynch and Aldo Rossi in the Introduction. 
16 P Eisenman, ‘Editor’s Preface’, in A Rossi, The Architecture of the City (1st Amer. edn, Cambridge, 
Opposition books/MIT Press, 1982), 0; A Rossi, A Scientific Autobiography (Cambridge, Oppositions 
books/MIT Press, 1981), 15. One of the studies that were reworked to become a part of the book was the 
article addressing residential typologies in Berlin. A Rossi, ‘Aspetti della tipologia residenziale a Berlino’, 
Casabella Continuità, 28/288 (June 1964). 
4   Cultural landmarks 	  
 	   161 
I believe that any explanation of urban artifacts in terms of function must be 
rejected if the issue is to elucidate their structure and formation … we reject 
that conception of functionalism dictated by an ingenuous empiricism which 
holds that functions bring form together and in themselves constitute urban 
artifacts and architecture.17 
His argument is formulated as a polemic against the doctrine of 
functionalism, especially in the formulations by sociologist Max Weber, 
anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, and geographer Georges Chabot. ‘The 
question “for what purpose?”’, Rossi explains, ‘ends up as a simple 
justification that prevents an analysis of what is real … In the studies of the 
classifications of cities, [the concept of function] overwhelms and takes 
priority over the urban landscape and form’.18 Different functions need to be 
attributed with different values, Rossi claims, for example, those of economy 
and production. Form, the capacity of architecture to ‘embrace many 
different values, meanings, and uses’, but also other aspects of the fatto 
urbano, need to be taken into account to understand the significance of the 
permanence of buildings and the transmission of culture through the built 
environment.19 To only look at function ‘oversimplifies reality and humiliates 
fantasy and liberty’, he argues.20 Function in architecture should thus only be 
considered as a component of a larger analysis: 
Even if a classification of buildings and cities according to their function is 
permissible as a generalization of certain kinds of data, it is inconceivable to 
reduce the structure of urban artifacts to a problem of organizing some more 
of less important function. Precisely this serious distortion has impeded and in 
large measure continues to impede any real progress in studies of the city.21 
In L’architettura della città Rossi formulates a definition of architecture that 
takes into account other meanings of architectural production and 
administration than practical functions. Such a definition of architecture 
points to the conceptualisations of Halbwachs in his three books on memory. 
For Halbwachs, architecture is not only the pragmatic framing of activities, 
but often part of complex societal or cultural functions. For example, in La 
Topographie légendaire, he describes how Christians established a 
topography of sites, altars, and chapels in the Holy Land with the main 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 46. In my discussion of the different concepts of Rossi I will allow 
myself to move back and forth between different parts of the book. Rossi often elaborates a theme in several 
places, and so the individual passage may not offer the full picture. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid., 118. 
20 ibid., 167. 
21 ibid., 47. 
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objective of establishing a landscape of mnemonic markers to structure and 
disseminate the religious dogma to the community, not in the first place as an 
answer to the practical needs of establishing sites for assembly and worship. 
Halbwachs was not, however, the only reference of Rossi. One of the merits 
of Rossi’s L’architettura della città is the interdisciplinary rigour with which 
he brought together a vast range of disciplinary scholarship on the city as 
well as study cases from classical cities, medieval, and modern 
developments.22 The resulting conceptualisation of the city as a collective 
construction over time and an open-ended process offers a radical break with 
town planning conceptions of the twentieth century, like those of Le 
Corbusier and Ludwig Hilberseimer, which assumed the possibility of 
constructing an ideal city, once and for all. This break corresponded to a shift 
in the academic architectural debate of the time, which has been described as 
a ‘turn from investigating the continuity and tradition of architectural 
modernism and the critique of modernism as a style toward the problems of 
the city and town planning’.23 Rossi’s text thus positions itself as one of the 
cardinal texts to define a superseding paradigm in architecture. 
Lynch’s The Image of the city had been published in Italian in 1964 in the 
same book series as L’architettura della città, and an article based on his 
study had appeared in Casabella Continuità in 1965.24 Rossi praises Lynch’s 
work, explaining the importance of his study as regards the orientation in the 
city as well as the formation and evolution of the sense of space (senso dello 
spazio) and conceptualisation of space (concezione dello spazio).25 Lynch 
also inspires Rossi to conceive of the city as constituting differentiated parts, 
defined by their structure and intersubjective perceptual order rather than by 
their function.26 This leads Rossi to recognise a distinction between the city 
centre and the residential districts, each with their own monuments and ways 
of life, each with a different character, shaped by the place, and to turn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This has also been asserted by G Lupfer, ‘Aldo Rossi (1931–1997). L’architettura della città’, in T Nebois et 
al. (eds), Architectural Theory From the Renaissance to the Present. 89 Essays on 117 Treatises (Cologne, 
Taschen, 2003), 784. 
23 Lobsinger, ‘The New Urban Scale in Italy’, 29. 
24 K Lynch, L’immagine della città (Padova, Marsilio, 1964) [Engl. orig. (1960)]; K Lynch, ‘La città come 
ambiente’, Casabella Continuità, 29/299 (Nov. 1965). An illustration made by Lynch appeared on the cover of 
Casabella Continuità already in 1964, issue no. 292. In 1966 Gyorgy Kepes publishes two articles in the 
journal, now renamed Casabella. G Kepes, ‘Il nuovo paesaggio’, Casabella, 30/306 (June 1966); G Kepes, 
‘Modularità in natura e in arte’, Casabella, 30/307 (July 1966). 
25 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 34. The reference to Lynch’s book, the English original as well as the 
Italian translation, was already present in the first Italian edition. Rossi, L’architettura della città, 198 n. 5. 
26 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 65–66, 69. 
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against the theory of zoning, as it had been proposed by Ernest Burgess and 
Robert Park of the Chicago School of Sociology in their studies of Chicago.27 
Maurice Halbwachs and L’architettura della città  
Of greater influence to L’architettura della città are the works of Halbwachs. 
In the first Italian edition Rossi refers to four of Halbwachs’s studies, 
including two works on collective memory, and in the American edition from 
1982 he refers to seven.28 A subsection of chapter three – The Collective 
Memory – and the first three sections of chapter four – The City as Field of 
Application for Various Forces; Economics, The Thesis of Maurice 
Halbwachs, and Further Considerations on the Nature of Expropriations – 
directly address Halbwachs’s theories.29 References to him can also be found 
in other places in the book. Rossi praises his studies of the city, arguing that 
‘Halbwachs maintains that economic factors by nature predominate in the 
evolution of the city up to a point when they give way to more general rules 
… the sum total of economic factors fails to explain fully the structure of 
urban artifacts [fatti urbani]’. Instead, he reasons, it should be explained by 
the development of social groups and ‘the complexly structured system of the 
collective memory … Few works on the city based on these premises have 
been conceived with such a rigour’.30 Rossi also expresses his appreciation 
for the authors who, like Halbwachs, ‘base their studies on collective 
psychology, which in turn is linked to sociology’, arguing that ‘Collective 
psychology has bearing upon all the sciences where the city as an object of 
study is of primary importance’.31 Certainly, as Rossi knew, Halbwachs was 
concerned to see collective psychology as the foundation upon which 
sociology could be based.32  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Burgess proposed that cities organise themselves in concentric residential districts around city centres. Rossi 
challenged this idea by claiming that smaller parts of larger cities constitute autonomous units, much like cities 
in themselves. 
28 Rossi, L’architettura della città, 202 n. 1, 06 n. 27, 07 n. 1. The works referred to in the first Italian edition 
are: Halbwachs, La population et les tracés de voies; M Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire des évangiles 
en Terre sainte. Étude de mémoire collective (Paris, PUF, 1941); M Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, ed. J 
Alexandre & G Gurvitch (Paris, PUF, 1950) [orig., ‘Mémoire et société’ (1947)]; M Halbwachs, Esquisse 
d’une psychologie des classes sociales (Paris, Marcel Rivière, 1955) [orig., ‘Analyses des mobiles qui 
orientent l’activité des individus dans la vie sociale’ (1938)]. In the first American edition another three of 
Halbwachs’s works have been added to the references, including Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, Rossi, 
The Architecture of the City, 181 n. 3, 93 n. 1. 
29 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 130–31, 39–52. 
30 ibid., 140. 
31 ibid., 112. 
32 Jean-Christophe Marcel and Laurent Mucchielli point out that Halbwachs as early as 1905, in his first two 
articles, had formulated a clear opposition between individual and collective psychology and would become an 
‘impassionate labourer on a collective Psychology’, as the only sociologist of the Durkheim school to follow 
up on the intentions of Durkheim. J-C Marcel & L Mucchielli, ‘Eine Grundlage des lien social: das kollektive 
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In the following I will attempt to trace Halbwachs’s conceptualisation of 
space, outlined in his three books on the collective memory, in the writings of 
Rossi.33 Although Rossi nowhere explicitly refers to the term ‘cadre spatial 
de la mémoire’, spatial framework of memory, it is my impression that it is 
precisely what he refers to in sentences like: ‘Maurice Halbwachs advanced 
[the study of the city as an object of nature and a subject of culture] further 
when he postulated that imagination and collective memory are the typical 
characteristics of urban artifacts [fatti urbani]’.34 The environment cannot be 
reduced only to its physical manifestation, but also exists in the collective 
memory; it is both a material framework and a spatial framework of memory. 
Rossi uses formulations like ‘image of space’ (‘immàgine dello spazio’), 
‘idea of space’ (‘nozione dello spazio’), ‘idea of place’ (‘nozione dello 
luogo’), and ‘concept of space’ (‘concetto dello spazio’). In my reading I will 
generally take them to be analogous to the spatial framework of memory. 
Rossi sometimes refers to the individual and sometimes sees it in relation to a 
collective or the citizenry, for example in reference to the city’s image.35 
Halbwachs, similarly, had used other general words to refer to his notion of 
the spatial framework of memory, especially the French ‘image’ or ‘image 
spatiale’. If one reads Rossi’s book with the spatial framework of memory in 
mind when he uses these terms, the proximity to Halbwachs’s theories stands 
out more clearly.36 It may sometimes be easier to see the ideas of Halbwachs 
protrude from Rossi’s argumentation, when he does not explicitly refer to 
him. Rossi’s references, as others have also pointed out, can sometimes 
obscure the stringency of Halbwachs’s original ideas.37 With Halbwachs’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Gedächtnis nach Maurice Halbwachs’, tr. J Ohnacker [Fr. orig. (1999)], in S Egger (ed), Maurice Halbwachs – 
Aspekte des Werks (Konstanz, UVK, 2003), 224–25. For a study of the development of a collective 
psychology among the disciples of Durkheim, see L Mucchielli, ‘Für eine kollektive Psychologie: Das 
durkheimsche Erbe bei Maurice Halbwachs und seine Auseinandersetzung mit Charles Blondel’, tr. J 
Ohnacker [Fr. orig. (1999)], in S Egger (ed), Maurice Halbwachs – Aspekte des Werks (Konstanz, UVK, 
2003). Halbwachs later explained his standpoints on collective psychology in M Halbwachs, ‘Individual 
Psychology and Collective Psychology’, American Sociological Review, 3/5 (Oct. 1938); M Halbwachs, 
‘Individual Consciousness and Collective Mind’, The American Journal of Sociology, 44/6 (1939). Cf. 
Durkheimian influence in ch. 1. 
33 For a general review of the book, see e.g. R J Lawrence, ‘Architecture of the City Reinterpreted: a Critical 
Review’, Design Studies, 6/3 (July 1985). For a detailed review, cf. Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossi’, 151–81. 
34 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 33. 
35 The Lynchian concept environmental image, arguably, contributed to Rossi’s conceptualisation. For Rossi’s 
recognition of Lynch, see The architecture of the city in this chapter. 
36 This specific reading of Rossi’s image is only possible by subscribing to a certain simplification of the term. 
The complexity inherent in the concept image in Rossi’s writings, as well as in those of Halbwachs, Kepes, 
and Lynch, draws the attention to the need for more in-depth studies. I will not pursue that in this context, but 
limit myself to the definitions offered here and elsewhere in the thesis. Cf. other discussions of image in Use of 
terms in the Introduction and Gyorgy Kepes and the mental image in ch. 3. 
37 Tieben, e.g., argues that Rossi lacks scholarly precision in his use of the term collective memory. Tieben, 
‘Aldo Rossi’, 155. 
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conceptualisations of space clear to us after chapters one and two, I will 
allow myself to read Rossi’s text as references to entire notions in 
Halbwachs’s thinking, not only as free-floating statements and quotations. 
Locus 
In the introduction to the book, Rossi presents an understanding of the city as 
architecture: 
By architecture I mean not only the visible image of the city and the sum of its 
different architectures, but architecture as construction, the construction of the 
city over time … [this point of view] addresses the ultimate and definitive fact 
in the life of the collective, the creation of the environment in which it lives.38 
With some themes persisting over time and getting stronger, he argues, and 
some disappearing, history builds the city as constructs of memory images 
and forms that exist in the minds of the citizens side by side with the 
contemporary physical city. Neither the former nor the latter can alone 
explain the city conceived as complex man-made (arte-) fact. The individual 
place in the city, the locus solus (same in Italian; luogo is sometimes 
translated as locus in the English translation), makes up distinct parts of the 
urban totality, in which urban and architectural interventions engage with the 
singularity of the place. It is determined by factors of space and time, 
topography, form, acting as ‘the seat of a succession of ancient and recent 
events, by its memory’.39 Rossi relates locus to context (ambiente), but he 
sees the latter as a form of illusionism, used in urban preservation to make a 
scene for architecture that ‘serves to preserve forms as they are and to 
immobilize life, saddening us like would-be tourists of a vanished world’.40 
The context, he posits, can be regarded as a permanent feature in the city that 
keeps itself isolated from social and technological evolution, ‘so-called 
contextual preservation’. He suggests that it ‘is related to the city in time like 
the embalmed corpse of a saint to the image of his historical personality’.41 
Locus, differently, should make visible the whole history of its architecture, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 21. In a text published the same year as L’architettura della città Rossi 
writes, ‘One has to distinguish between the city and the architecture of the city as a collectively made object, 
and architecture for its own sake, architecture as a technique, as an art form that is ordered and passed on in a 
traditional way. In the first instance it is a collective process, slow and traceable over a length of time, in which 
the whole of the city, society and humanity with all its different forms play a part. In this way the urban 
evolution, the changing face of the city, is a slow and indirect process which needs to be studied by following 
its laws and peculiarities’. A Rossi, ‘Architecture for Museums’ [It. orig. (1966)], in J O'Regan (ed), Aldo 
Rossi. Selected Writings and Projects (London, Architectural Design, 1983), 18. 
39 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 107. 
40 ibid., 123. 
41 ibid., 60. 
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taking into account ‘the apparently unresolvable conflict between design as a 
rational element and an imposition, and the local and specific nature of 
place’, what makes it unique.42 
Fatto urbano 
The architecture in the locus can be referred to as fatto urbano, the Italian 
translation of the French fait urbain, approximately urban phenomenon or 
urban condition.43 ‘Architecture’, Rossi says, ‘attesting to the tastes and 
attitudes of generations, to public events and private tragedies, to new and old 
facts [fatti (urbani)], is the fixed stage for human events’.44 It cannot be 
isolated from the history of the city and only understood in light of the 
present times. The tendency to do so, Rossi maintains, has led to ‘one of the 
greatest fallacies of urban science’.45 In the fatto urbano, he argues, the built 
architecture amalgamates with the history of their creation; ‘such elements 
which originally start out as means tend to become ends; ultimately they are 
the city. Thus the city has as its end itself alone, and there is nothing to 
explain beyond the fact of its own presence in its own artifacts [che la città è 
presente in queste opere]’.46 
According to the English translators of Rossi’s text, Diane Ghirardo and 
Joan Ockman, the fatto urbano implies ‘not just a physical thing in the city, 
but all of its history, geography, structure, and connection with the general 
life of the city’.47 Lobsinger adds to their comment that the meaning of the 
term is ‘diametrically opposed to ideas such as plan as process, user 
participation, or the emphasis on transitory perceptual experiences as 
producing meaning and structuring experience of the city’.48 These 
statements are helpful. To fully appreciate the nuances of the fatto urbano, it 
is also useful to look at Rossi’s dissection of the term. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 ibid., 126. 
43 The term is also indebted to Durkheim’s ‘fait social’. Social facts, Durkheim explains, are clearly defined 
phenomena that are distinct from organic or physical phenomena. Duties performed as husband or citizen, as 
believer, or in the profession belong to ‘a category of facts which present very special characteristics: they 
consist of manners of acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive 
power by virtue of which they exercise control over him’. É Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, tr. 
W D Halls (New York, The Free Press, 1982) [Fr. orig. (1895)], 52. Belgin Turan has suggested translating 
fatto urbano to ‘urban fact’ instead of ‘urban artefact’ to retain some of the connotations of Italian and French 
to the activities and processes that have produced the urban object. B Turan, ‘Is ‘Rational’ Knowledge of 
Architecture Possible? Science and Poiêsis in L'Architettura della Città’, Journal of Architectural Education, 
51/3 (Feb. 1998), 165 n. 28. I have opted for retaining the original term, as I have with a number of specific 
terms in the thesis. Cf. Editions, translations, languages in the Introduction. 
44 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 22. 
45 ibid., 61. 
46 ibid., 162. His emphasis. 
47 ibid., 22 n. *. 
48 Lobsinger, ‘The New Urban Scale in Italy’, 35, 37 n. 37. 
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One of Rossi’s examples of the fatti urbani is the Palazzo della Ragione in 
Padua, a building that has existed since the fourteenth century, and which has 
sustained a great number of functions through its history, currently being 
used commercially.49 He points to the dual composition of such places. On 
the one hand, it is an architectural and material construction; on the other, it 
is the idea of the building, ‘our most general memory of it as a product of the 
collective’.50 The latter gives the built environment its value. Their 
amalgamation is the fatto urbano. 
Different from Halbwachs, for whom it is the spatial framework of 
memory that comes to organise memories of events, history, emotions, etc., 
for Rossi, through the fatto urbano, this organisation is positioned in relation 
to both the spatial framework of memory and to the material framework. The 
city and its fatti urbani could be regarded as a repository of history, again 
emphasising the dual nature of space. First, it is a physical artefact, built over 
time, the materiality of which can be studied and trawled for historical 
information by archaeologists and architectural historians. Second, it is the 
city seen as ‘not only the real structure of the city but also of the idea that the 
city is a synthesis of a series of values. Thus it concerns the collective 
imagination’.51 These two perspectives may at times overlap, and cities like 
‘Athens, Rome, Constantinople, and Paris represent ideas of the city that 
extend beyond their physical form, beyond their permanence; thus we can 
also speak in this way of cities like Babylon which have all but physically 
disappeared’.52 In the section on Athens, in which Rossi exemplifies his 
previous discussion of Halbwachs’s collective memory, he goes even further 
in the distinction of architecture into material space and space of memory, 
describing the city that was a political and administrative centre in antiquity: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 29–32. 
50 ibid., 29. 
51 ibid., 128. In a later text Rossi elaborates on the mnemonic relationship that people enter into with 
architecture and objects. ‘The question of things themselves, whether as compositions or components – 
drawings, buildings, models, or descriptions – appears to me increasingly more suggestive and more 
convincing. But this is not to be interpreted in the sense of “vers une architecture” nor as a new architecture. I 
am referring rather to familiar objects, whose form and position are already fixed, but whose meanings may be 
changed. Barns, stables, sheds, workshops, etc. Archetypal objects whose common emotional appeal reveals 
timeless concerns. Such objects are situated between inventory and memory. Regarding the question of 
memory, architecture is also transformed into autobiographical experience; places and things change with the 
superimposition of new meanings’. A Rossi, ‘An Analogical Architecture’, tr. D Stewart [orig. (1976)], in K 
Nesbitt (ed), Theorizing a New Agenda for Architecture. An Anthology of Architectural Theory 1965–1995 
(Princeton, PUP, 1996), 349. 
52 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 128. This point parallels that of Jean-Pierre Cléro in his comment on 
Halbwachs and the fictional character of all cities, existing as well as mythological. J-P Cléro, ‘Halbwachs et 
l’espace fictionnel de la ville’, in M Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire des évangiles en Terre sainte: 
Étude de mémoire collective, Quadrige (1941; 1971; rev. 2nd edn, Paris, PUF, 2008), 45*. Cf. Existing 
scholarship in the Introduction and Leibnizian influence in ch. 1. 
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‘In this ancient organization [of the city state] it seems that the physical 
aspect of the city was secondary, almost as if the city were a purely mental 
place. Perhaps the architecture of Greek cities owes its extraordinary beauty 
to this intellectual character’.53 
Collectivity 
The mental conception of space, one part of the dualism of the fatto urbano, 
Halbwachs calls spatial framework of memory. Lynch refers to it as 
environmental image. But where Halbwachs and Lynch hesitate to see 
anything but individual conceptions or images of space,54 even if they are 
ever so much conditioned by the social milieu, Rossi tends to emphasise the 
totality of individual spatial frameworks of memory as an abstracted and 
unified collective image or construct of thought. Despite his somewhat 
unclear wording, which has contributed to getting him accused of making a 
subject of the abstract notion of the city,55 it is my impression that Rossi, 
nonetheless, is aware of the distinction between specific individual 
conceptions of space and, in an abstracted sense, collective or shared spatial 
constructs, of which the individual may have his own perspective. His focus, 
however, is not on the individuals, but on the collectives of the city. Each 
individual, Rossi says, may have good or negative memories associated with 
an urban artefact, but it is the totality of such experiences that constitute the 
city.56 He follows up on this a few pages later, distinguishing between those 
who form an idea of a place without having walked through the building, 
street, or district: ‘the concept that one person has of an urban artifact [fatto 
urbano] will always differ from that of someone who “lives” the same 
artifact [fatto]’.57 Rossi is less interested in the individuals, who sustain 
differing spatial concepts of the urban artefact, than in the collective citizenry 
that shapes the architecture of the city. He is less clear than Halbwachs with 
respect to defining what groups this collective is constituted of, but explains 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 137. 
54 ‘The environmental image [is] the generalized mental picture of the exterior physical world that is held by 
an individual. This image is the product both of immediate sensation and of the memory of past experience’. K 
Lynch, The Image of the City (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1960), 4. Rossi has certainly picked up Lynch’s point: 
‘Naturally we must also take into account how people orient themselves in the city, the evolution and 
formation of their sense of space. This aspect constitutes, in my opinion, the most important feature of some 
recent American work, notably that of Kevin Lynch. It relates to the conceptualization of space’. Rossi, The 
Architecture of the City, 34. 
55 Tieben writes, ‘Halbwachs had already made a subject out of the “collective memory”. Rossi went further 
and referred to the city as the place of this collective memory and made it into a subject with its own 
consciousness’. Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossi’, 159. My transl. I believe it is incorrect to accuse Halbwachs of 
subjectivisation of memory. Cf. the discussion in Critique of the collective memory in chapter one. 
56 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 29. 
57 ibid., 33. 
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that ‘in an art or a science the principles and means of action are elaborated 
collectively or transmitted through a tradition in which all the sciences and 
arts are operating as collective phenomena’.58 In the context of Rossi’s book, 
such arts and sciences may be understood as the professions and disciplines 
dealing with the study and planning of architecture and the city, including 
political bodies. It is only in relation to such groups that individuals may be 
of interest to the study of the city; inscribed in professional traditions it is the 
individuals who propose and effectuate changes to the fatti urbani and to the 
city. Tieben has articulated this aspect: 
For Rossi, society defined the framework in which the artist and architect, 
respectively, moved, acting on behalf of society, although this may surely not 
always have been the case. Thus, this argumentation followed Halbwachs’s 
conceptualisations; according to his view the memory contents of the 
individual were characterised by the social milieu.59 
Rossi introduces an aspect of the social collectives that has not been 
extensively treated in Halbwachs’s writings on memory: separate 
professionals as exponents of collective thought. Rossi asks rhetorically, ‘But 
what can psychology tell us if not that a certain individual sees the city in one 
way and that other individuals see it in another? And how can this private and 
uncultivated vision be related to the laws and principles from which the city 
first emerged and through which its images were formed?’60 Certainly, 
though, some people become especially influential in the conceptualisation of 
space as agents of a social group or cultural sphere: 
When Bernini speaks disdainfully of Paris because he finds its Gothic 
landscape barbarous, we are hardly interested in Bernini’s psychology; instead 
we are interested in the judgement of an architect who on the basis of the total 
and specific culture of one city judges the structure of another city. Similarly, 
that Mies van der Rohe had a certain vision of architecture is important not for 
ascertaining the ‘taste’ or the ‘attitude’ of the German middle class relative to 
the city, but for allowing us to appreciate the theoretical basis, the cultural 
patrimony of Schinkelesque classicism, and other ideas with which this is 
connected in the German city.61 
In the idea of the city itself, Rossi asserts, we find the actions and thought of 
individuals which pertain to the collective, and, as such, not all things in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 ibid., 113. Tieben stresses that Rossi primarily defines groups of a meta-level, like ‘nation’ and ‘society’. 
Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossi’, 160. 
59 Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossi’, 162. My transl. 
60 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 114. 
61 ibid. 
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fatti urbani are collective; ‘yet, the collective and the individual nature of 
urban artifacts [fatti urbani] in the end constitutes the same urban structure. 
Memory, within this structure, is the consciousness of the city’.62 And despite 
the individuals and the particular local traditions that may characterise a city, 
it is ultimately dependent on the general laws of urban dynamics in the 
development of the city. Urban growth is not spontaneous, Rossi explains, 
but should be searched for in spatial images of the collectives. ‘Rather, it is 
through the natural tendencies of the many groups dispersed throughout the 
different parts of the city that we must explain the modifications of the city’s 
structure’.63 
With Rossi’s emphasis on individuals we are reminded of Halbwachs’s 
analysis of the notables of memory in La Mémoire collective. The notary 
public, the mayor, and the union secretary act on behalf of groups in the 
collective memory of legal matters. They are authorised to maintain the 
memory of property ownership and transactions, contracts, etc. to ensure the 
stability of relationships between man and the physical environment.64 
Similarly, the individual exponents in the city’s collective memory, 
according to Rossi’s argumentation, a Bernini or a Mies van der Rohe, could 
be seen as notables of the city’s memory in matters of architecture. They are 
believed to make appropriate judgements on the basis of their specific 
professional memory. In this sense, the group appoints notables for its 
collective memory, professionals who, by means of the architectural 
organisation of the city, administer the memories attached to it as well as 
offer their interpretations and legitimise the practice of architecture. 
Permanences 
From urban historians Marcel Poëte (1866–1950) and Pierre Lavedan (1885–
1982) Rossi takes the theory of permanences (la teoria della permanenza). 
The concept helps him to distinguish between the different roles the fatto 
urbano can take for remembrance. Certain forms persist in the city 
architecture, Rossi explains, partly as physical monuments (monuménto, from 
Latin monumentum, meaning memory, memorial, or token of remembrance), 
which refer to streets, zones, and areas as well as to buildings, some of which 
are visible as forms in city plans. He refers to Poëte’s observation of how 
cities tend to develop along existing urban elements; sometimes the fatti 
urbani persist virtually unchanged, sometimes only the locus persists after 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 ibid., 131. 
63 ibid., 162. 
64 M Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, ed. G Namer (1950; crit. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997) [orig., 
‘Mémoire et société’ (1947)], 213. Cf. Notables of memory in ch. 2. 
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continuous modification.65 Representing the continuity of certain aspects of a 
fatto urbano, such permanences in the city, Rossi suggests, can be regarded 
either as vital and propelling elements (elementi in modo vitale, elementi 
propulsori) or as pathological elements (elementi patologici). The latter he 
exemplifies with Alhambra. Its earlier role was as the seat of Moorish and 
Castilian kings, a function that once dominated Granada. Now it is emptied 
of function and stands isolated in the city, he says. The Palazzo della Ragione 
in Padua, on the other hand, he takes to represent a propelling element of 
permanence; the building’s functions have changed over time and it functions 
today as a retail market. While Alhambra, considered as a fatto urbano, a 
spatial framework of memory, only supports historical narratives that are 
distanced from the private life and memories of the citizens, the Palazzo della 
Ragione gives access to the past by living it in the present; the memory of 
history is entered through a realm of personal experience. 
In La Mémoire collective, Halbwachs offers a distinction between historical 
memory – the individual’s knowledge of history, events that can be learnt of 
and imagined, but not remembered as personal experiences – and 
autobiographical memory – belonging entirely to the individual as references 
to an informal, self-experienced past.66 While pathological permanences like 
Alhambra could be said to act as a spatial framework of the historical 
memory only, propelling permanences could be seen to support 
autobiographical memory as well as historical memory. The personal 
memory gives access to the imagination of the history, to an external realm of 
experience. While the two kinds of memories may relate to the same fatti 
urbani, it is clear, not least by their names, that Rossi advocates the 
propelling and vital permanences to the pathological, where both personal 
and historical remembering takes place.67 Rossi offers a useful distinction 
between two kinds of fatti urbani, which both pertain to the individual’s 
engagement with general history. Both open up for historical imagination, the 
personal appropriation of an external history, which is supported by historic 
sites. In vital permanences the imagination goes through the informal 
collective memory of everyday life, in pathological permanences 
remembrance is channelled through memory institutions’ official construal of 
the past. For our purpose, the usefulness of such categories may not be to 
point to the one as preferable to the other, but to see how fatti urbani can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 59. 
66 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 99. 
67 Yet, in some cases, like in German Quedlinburg, the preservation of a whole district is justifiable to Rossi, 
even with its city life of ‘obsessive quality’, because of its character as a museum of Gothic and German 
history. Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 123. 
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operate on two different levels with regard to historical memory. In the next 
chapter I shall return to see how the permanences may help to differentiate 
the concept of the imaginative places of the antëische Magie. 
A framework of communicative and cultural memory 
The duality of Rossi’s definition of the fatto urbano and of the architecture of 
the city and his frequent return to the notion of collective memory in relation 
to these terms have provided his readers with the challenge of how to 
understand the concept of memory in Rossi’s theory. According to Tieben, 
Halbwachs had already made the collective memory a subject,68 and, with 
reference to formulations like ‘Expanding the thesis of Halbwachs I would 
say that the city itself is the collective memory of the people, and as memory 
it is linked to the facts [fatti] and to places’, he argues that Rossi follows 
Halbwachs on this point and makes the city a subject, if one is to take them 
literally.69 Equating the city with memory, Tieben continues, covers the fact 
that there exist parallel forms of collective memory, like spoken and written 
transmission, film, photo, rites, and artefacts, and that the city thus only 
forms a part of the collective memory. In his analysis, Tieben seems to 
subscribe to an understanding of the notion of the city as a material entity, 
and, consequently, to regard it as memory means to consider materiality a 
memory, which is the same as hypostatising memory. With reference to Jan 
Assmann, Tieben distinguishes between the communicative memory and the 
cultural memory.70 The realm of the former refers to the individual memory 
faculties, distributed over the minds of the citizens. It is constantly revised 
and actualised in interplay with other members of the same social groups. 
The latter includes the mnemonic aids society creates outside of the mind in 
order to transport memory to different places and future times. It includes 
rites, texts, art, buildings, and cities. These artefacts are memory not by 
metaphor, but by metonym; the thing comes to stand for the cognitive act that 
engages with it, that reads or interprets its signs, thus drawing on the memory 
in a process similar to that of recollection. It is by assigning Rossi’s notion of 
the city as the citizens’ collective memory to the latter, to the cultural 
memory, that Tieben clarifies the issue of subjectivisation. Rossi’s 
architecture of the city is collective memory, insofar as the physical artefacts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossi’, 159. He uses Jan Assmann to reject Halbwachs on this point. Cf. n. 55. 
69 Rossi, L’architettura della città, 149. Transl. by Alice Labadini. The translation of the American edition is 
different: ‘One can say that the city itself is the collective memory of its people, and like memory it is 
associated with objects and places’. Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 130. 
70 For a more comprehensive introduction to communicative memory and cultural memory, see Two realms of 
the past in ch. 5. 
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recall to the citizens, in interpretable forms and signs of the materiality, the 
processes of its coming into being, of having been altered, and of having 
been part of history.71 
The sentence quoted above, though, could also be read differently: ‘The 
city’ should not be defined as the materiality of the buildings, but as a 
construct in the collective memory of the citizens. If one, in this way, regards 
it as a spatial framework of the collective memory, one could see that it, by 
character, connects itself to architecture and places. Thus, the city is the 
totality of individual memories, which relate themselves to the buildings and 
spaces of the city. With such a reading one arrives at a notion of the city that 
is devoid of materiality. Rossi states several times in the book that his notion 
of the city as a man-made fact [fatto], just like its components the fatti 
urbani, cannot solely be considered as its material deposit. Sure, as material 
artefacts ‘Cities become historical texts’, Rossi says, possible to study with 
the help of archaeologists and architectural historians (cultural memory), but 
equally important, he asserts, is its image in the memory of the citizens, 
connoting the understanding of history and tradition and individual and 
group-related remembering (communicative memory). In addition to 
ascribing the memory of the city to the realm of the cultural memory, in my 
opinion, with Rossi it is crucial to consider its role as a framework of the 
communicative memory or, in Rossi’s words, ‘the collective imagination’. 
He is clear on the fact that the two views complement each other and overlap. 
In one, the city is seen as a material artefact, in the other it is seen as the 
study of the formation and a synthesis of values: ‘The first and second 
approaches are intimately linked, so much that the facts they uncover may at 
times be confounded with each other’.72 In fact, the distinction Rossi sketches 
out resembles the distinction that will become paramount to Aleida and Jan 
Assmann’s model of memory. So while Tieben may be correct in describing 
Rossi’s concept of the city and the fatto urbano as cultural memory by 
metonym, to my understanding, Rossi also includes in his concept the role of 
architecture as spatial framework of the communicative memory, the 
informal memory of individuals and social groups. The architecture of the 
city and the fatto urbano cannot be restricted to only one of the two modes of 
memory. 
To distinguish between the material manifestation of architecture and its 
conception in collective memory, it is not necessary to refer to Aleida and Jan 
Assmann’s model of communicative and cultural memory. Halbwachs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Tieben, ‘Aldo Rossi’, 160.  
72 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 128. 
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distinguished between internal and external frameworks of memory, referring 
specifically to the built environment as ‘material framework’ as opposed to 
the ‘spatial framework of memory’.73 As I will demonstrate in chapter five, 
the advantage of doing so is that Aleida and Jan Assmann associate the 
communicative memory with informal, unspecialised, and everyday 
remembrance and cultural memory with formalised, specialised, and 
institutionalised memory. The material framework, I posit, is used also in the 
processes of the communicative memory and the spatial framework of 
memory in processes of cultural memory. The fatto urbano can, according to 
my view, be seen as an internal as well as an external framework of 
remembering, made use of in processes of communicative as well as of 
cultural memory. 
The fatto urbano and social morphology 
A central position in Rossi’s thesis is occupied by his summary of 
Halbwachs’s study of expropriations in Paris and a discussion on related 
cases.74 With Halbwachs, Rossi comes to the conclusion that acts of 
expropriation normally occur because of larger tendencies in the 
development of cities, expressing the collective needs of the city. They do not 
focus on this or that street or building, but on a larger system of the city; they 
are not extraordinary phenomena, but most typical and normal in the city’s 
evolution. Individuals like Georges-Eugène Haussmann, and Napoléon III 
who commissioned him, come to stand for the needs and politics of the city 
administration. 
To avail ourselves to Halbwachs’s point of view, one may or may not approve 
of Haussmann’s plan for Paris when judged solely on the basis of its design 
… but it is equally important to be able to see that the nature of Haussmann’s 
plan is linked up with the urban evolution of Paris in those years; and from 
this standpoint the plan is one of the greatest successes ever, not only because 
of a series of coincidences but above all because of its precise reflection of the 
urban evolution at that moment in history.75 
This study of changes in the city brings Rossi closer to what Halbwachs 
subsumes under the concept social morphology.76 As social groups exist and 
move in space, Halbwachs postulates, they shape the physical environment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Cf. esp. The spatial framework of memory and the material framework, Social morphology, and Dual nature 
of space in ch. 2. 
74 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 139–52. 
75 ibid., 146. 
76 Halbwachs took over the term from Durkheim. See Durkheimian influence in ch. 1. 
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according to their image of space. Buildings, roads, and divisions of land are 
external manifestations of social groups of the present and of the past.77 
Social morphology is the study of the physical forms in order to decipher 
social reality. 
The consequence of this way of thinking, Halbwachs demonstrates in his 
books on collective memory, is that physical structures can be considered as 
the externalisations of pre-existing spatial frameworks of the group memory, 
shared images of space.78 Also, societies or groups take over existing 
structures – a house or a city – by inheriting, conquering, or buying, and bear 
upon them to alter them according to their own image. The spatial 
frameworks of memory give shape to the built environment, which, in turn, 
forms the spatial frameworks of memory of its inhabitants. In his section on 
the collective memory, Rossi quotes Halbwachs’s description of this process 
in La Mémoire collective: 
When a group is inserted into a part of space, it transforms it to its image, but 
at the same time, it yields and adapts to the material things that resist it. It 
retreats into the framework it has constructed. The image of the external 
environment and the stable connections it maintains to it move to the 
foreground of the idea it has of itself.79 
Rossi continues by stating his position as an expansion of Halbwachs’s 
thesis. After having suggested that the city may be considered as the 
collective memory of its citizens, he continues: ‘the city is the locus of 
collective memory. This relationship between the locus and the citizens 
therefore becomes the predominant image, the architecture, the landscape, 
and as the facts [fatti] retreat into memory, new facts emerge in the city’.80 
Since the city, as Rossi declared in his introduction, should be understood as 
a conceptual as much as a material entity, the statement can be freely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 M Halbwachs, Morphologie sociale (Paris, Armand Colin, 1938), 11–12. 
78 What are the drawings and models of the architect if not the communication of his mental image of the 
building that is to be built, shared with his collaborators in order to evaluate or construct the edifice? 
Consequently, Rossi refers to ‘the constant polemical urge of architects to design systems in which the spatial 
order becomes the order of society and attempts to transform society’. Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 113. 
79 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 195. The translation is mine. In the Italian original Rossi quotes from the 
French 1950 edition. The American edition translates his quote thus: ‘“When a group is introduced into a part 
of space, it transforms it to its image, but at the same time, it yields and adapts itself to certain material things 
which resist it. It encloses itself in the framework it has constructed. The image of the exterior environment 
and the stable relationships that it maintains with it pass into the realm of the idea that it has of itself.”’ Rossi, 
The Architecture of the City, 130. 
80 Rossi, L’architettura della città, 149. Transl. by Alice Labadini. Rossi’s emphasis. The translation of the 
American edition is slightly different: ‘the city is the locus of the collective memory. This relationship between 
the locus and the citizenry then becomes the city’s predominant image, both of architecture and of landscape, 
and as certain artifacts become part of its memory, new ones emerge’. Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 130. 
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reformulated as follows: it is the city as a man-made artefact – understood to 
refer to the spatial framework of memory as well as to the material 
framework – that is the place for the citizens to attach their memories. Their 
relation to the physical city forms their spatial framework of memory, but the 
citizenry forms the physical environment according to their spatial 
framework of memory. Rossi further argues that ‘The collective memory 
participates in the actual transformation of space in the works of the 
collective, a transformation that is always conditioned by whatever material 
realities oppose it’.81 A socio-spatial order, conceived by a dominant group, 
is externalised from its collective imagination into built architecture in the 
city, and the built architecture, in return, impacts the group’s image of space. 
Rossi offers a lucid illustration of such mechanisms earlier in the same 
chapter.82 With reference to Halbwachs’s La Topographie légendaire, Rossi 
exemplifies the principle of reciprocal influence of the spatial framework of 
memory and physical space. The spatial image of the Catholic Church, he 
posits, maintains a universal spatial framework, characterised by the 
topography of the Holy Land as defined through the Gospel, in which each 
place connotes acts or events of the Christian doctrine. While this heavenly 
space is transcendental and invisible, it may manifest itself in material places 
of sanctuaries. Thus, the shared image of religious space has been 
externalised into a physical topography to visually signify immaterial 
qualities; from the spatial framework of memory a material framework has 
been created in the landscape, a reproduction that includes both a memory 
image, relating to a known religious concept, and the materials of the built 
artefact, relating to the senses.  
Rossi mentions another reference to the mechanisms of social morphology 
in passing: 
When one goes to a charitable institution, the sadness is almost something 
concrete. It is in the walls, the courtyards, the rooms. When the Parisians 
destroyed the Bastille, they were erasing the centuries of abuse and sadness of 
which the Bastille was the physical form.83 
According to Belgin Turan, ‘It is evident that Rossi discerns various 
immaterial and temporal phenomena such as collective history, memory, 
individual experience, or individual suffering within the form of architecture; 
within the physical, spatial object’.84 With reference to the passage just 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 130. 
82 ibid., 103. 
83 ibid., 101. 
84 Turan, ‘Is ‘Rational’ Knowledge of Architecture Possible?’, 163. 
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quoted, Turan reads Rossi’s assertion as a claim that the perceptual 
engagement with architecture, with the walls of the charitable institution and 
the Bastille, may provide the observer with knowledge of what has happened 
there, that past events somehow are recorded in the materiality of the walls. 
Turan continues: 
Even if the space (or the architectural object) is the location of such 
experiences and somehow embodies temporal phenomena as well, is there any 
way of reading this from its form, from its material? Is there a door opening to 
such a moment of transcendental knowledge? Would it be really possible to 
read the sufferings of thousands imprisoned within the walls of the Bastille, 
even if those walls did survive today?85 
Turan responds to some of his own questions in a footnote: 
This is not to say that the Bastille if it had survived would not convey 
anything today, but … whatever meaning it would have, would have been 
contingent upon a prior knowledge of the Bastille’s history. That message 
would not have emerged directly from the walls themselves.86 
Turan’s critique is perhaps a fair critique, if we are to read the words of Rossi 
literally. I would suggest another reading. First, with the workings of the 
social morphology fresh in mind, the Bastille and the charitable institutions 
could be considered as architectural solutions to, and deposits of, the societal 
organisation of punishment and charity at the time. The physical forms can, 
in their turn, be interpreted by the likes of archaeologists, historians, or 
sociologists, yielding information about the society that shaped the 
architecture. Rossi suggests this as one of the ways in which the city can be 
regarded as a repository of history.87 Such a reading is maybe often, like 
Turan suggests, but not always, contingent upon prior knowledge of the 
building typology or other historical information. Also the apprehension of 
architecture about which nothing is known may enable the observer to 
conjecture the reason for its creation. This explanation corresponds to 
Tieben’s analysis of architecture in Rossi’s L’architettura della città as 
cultural memory by metonym or, as I will refer to it in the next chapter, as an 
external spatial framework of memory. 
The second aspect of interpretation may lie closer to Rossi’s immediate 
intention, bearing in mind that he refers to the Parisians tearing down the 
Bastille. The architectural object of the Bastille, in Rossi’s vocabulary, was a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 ibid. 
86 ibid., 165 n. 53. 
87 Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 128. 
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fatto urbano, a physical object and, at the same time, a conceptualisation in 
the minds of contemporary Parisians, a collective landmark in their spatial 
framework of the city. Memories of repressive acts – self-experienced or 
heard about – were associated with the fatto urbano; the citizens would likely 
recognise their spatial framework of memory in the physical building, 
instinctively cueing unpleasant memories and associations. The razing of the 
material part of the fatto urbano, the physical building of the Bastille, would 
remove it as a perceptual reminder in the city. This interpretation supports 
my suggestion to consider the fatto urbano partly a physical object and partly 
a component of the spatial framework of memory of the citizens. 
Cultural landmarks 
The extensive elaborations of Halbwachs’s ideas in L’architettura della città 
contribute to making it a pioneering theory of architecture and the city. 
Addressing the complex interrelation between society and the materiality that 
it surrounds itself with, Rossi does not, however, elaborate on how to identify 
and define the groups that produce the changing images of the architecture or 
to describe the processes with which these groups assign, reassign, and erase 
meaning associated with the fatto urbano. Regardless of this, the book offers 
a radical new conception of the city and has proved highly successful. 
Rossi distinguishes himself from Halbwachs in the sense that he places an 
emphasis on fatti urbani, which stand out because of architectural qualities of 
size, form, history, or permanence: palaces, amphitheatres, churches, etc. A 
similar focus on noteworthy architecture is virtually absent in Halbwachs’s 
works on memory.88 Unlike Halbwachs, Rossi does not specifically point to 
architectural features as a determinant for the formation and support of the 
spatial framework of memory, but he points out that the form of architecture 
may express and sustain cultural ideas. The landmarks in the city, the fatti 
urbani, do not primarily refer to salient, perceptual landmarks of orientation, 
like those of Lynch, or to collective landmarks of social groups, as defined by 
Halbwachs. More importantly, they are architectural objects that stand out to 
the citizens because of their architectural features and the references to the 
history of the city. They may cue the memory and imagination of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 In La Topographie légendaire Halbwachs devotes himself to how a collectively held spatial framework of 
memory is manifested as built architecture. He refers to the Christians of the fourth and fifth centuries and to 
the crusaders half a millennium later, who erected chapels and churches in the Holy Land to mark out the 
places deemed important in the religious collective memory. See e.g. M Halbwachs, La Topographie 
légendaire des évangiles en Terre sainte. Étude de mémoire collective, ed. M Jaisson, Quadrige (1941; 1971; 
rev. 2nd edn, Paris, PUF, 2008), 148–51, 56–57. La Mémoire collective further includes an analysis of the role 
of church architecture for religious remembrance. Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 208–09, 27–32. Cf. 
Topographie and Reproduction of spatial frameworks of memory in ch. 2. 
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individual, like the collective landmarks, but they also support history writing 
and official commemoration as shared points of reference for the citizens. If, 
as we have seen, pathological permanences only support institutionalised 
remembering and history, vital permanences also cue the informal collective 
memory. The former excludes the informal groups’ experience in the act of 
historical and cultural remembrance. It is clear from the names given to them 
by Rossi that he is critical of the pathological permanences. I shall not, 
however, like him, argue that one is favourable, but acknowledge the two as 
different kinds of fatti urbani and, thereby, as two distinctions of the spatial 
framework of memory. The common denominator of the permanences is 
their status as cultural landmarks. 
With such a definition of the fatto urbano, it is possible to draw up three 
levels of landmarks: the Lynchian landmark of orientation, universally 
recognisable in visual salient buildings or places, and which assists way-
finding; the Halbwachsian collective landmark, which offers an intersection 
of the social, temporal, and spatial frameworks of memory for the group and 
supports social relations and remembering; and the Rossian cultural landmark 
of the fatto urbano, which connotes formal history and cultural memory, in 
addition to informal memory, and which acts as a reference point in the 
culture of the city or the country. 
We could take the cultural landmark to refer to architecture that supports 
memory on several levels. For the citizenry, it has double status as a concrete 
and material object (external spatial framework) and as an image in the 
collective memory (internal spatial framework). It can be employed for 
localising memories either as mental representations or by perceiving them in 
situ. Furthermore, if it is a vital permanence, it can be employed for informal 
and everyday remembering among families and friends and in professions, 
like those of the sellers and buyers in Rossi’s example from the market in the 
Palazzo della Ragione in Padua (communicative memory), but also for 
institutionalised and formal remembering by notables like historians, 
politicians, architects, etc. Rossi’s distinctions foreshadow the next chapter’s 
distinction between internal and external frameworks and between 
communicative and cultural memory. Both are inherent in the fatto urbano. 
The complexity of the term has not, as far as I am aware, been appreciated 
thoroughly in other readings of Rossi. As we shall see later in this chapter, 
these various aspects and their amalgamation in the fatto urbano have often 
been overlooked in criticisms primarily directed against his figurative use of 
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language in a postulate like ‘the city itself is the collective memory of the 
people [la città stessa è la memoria collettiva dei popoli]’.89 
To refer to the fatto urbano as well as, on the larger scale, to ‘the 
architecture of the city’ as an external as well as internal spatial framework of 
memory is useful. In the context of the collective memory of a larger group, 
like communities, citizens, or nationals, the term offers itself as a 
combinatory concept that, at the same time, refers to the artefact of the 
physical building and its representation through drawings and photographs, 
and to its conception in the mind of the citizenry. 
Critique of the Rossian theory of memory 
When L’architettura della città reached the English-speaking audience with 
the American publication The Architecture of the City in 1982, it had already 
been published in five languages and several editions.90 In the introduction to 
the American edition Rossi wrote that the book had already ‘influenced a 
generation of young European architects’.91 Peter Eisenman and Rossi edited 
the book on the basis of the Italian revised fourth edition from 1978, 
including illustrations and forewords from the different editions as well as 
additional references and many illustrations that had not been included in 
previous editions.92 Diane Ghirardo had translated it under the supervision of 
Ellen R. Shapiro, the first editor of Oppositions Books; later it was corrected 
and refined by the new editor Joan Ockman as well as by Eisenman and 
Rossi.93 
Eisenman has provided a reading of Rossi’s book that has had a strong 
influence on subsequent readers. In the preface he presents the book’s 
publishing history as a cultural artefact itself, recognising the context of its 
initial publication and the development in the years until the American 
publication. He stresses that the text ‘is not so much a literal transcription of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89  Rossi, L’architettura della città, 149. Transl. by Alice Labadini. In the American edition it translates as ‘the 
city itself is the collective memory of its people’. My emphasis. Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 130. 
90 It had appeared in four editions in Italian (1966, 1970, 1973, and 1978), five in Spanish (1971, 1976, 1977, 
1979, and 1981), in German in 1973, in Portuguese in 1977, and in French in 1981. Rossi, The Architecture of 
the City, 197. 
91 A Rossi, ‘Introduction to the First American Edition’, in A Rossi, The Architecture of the City (1st Amer. 
edn, Cambridge, Opposition books/MIT Press, 1982), 13. 
92 P Eisenman, ‘Editor’s Preface’, ibid., 0; S Frank, IAUS The Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies: An 
Insider’s Memoir (Bloomington, AuthorHouse, 2011), 117. 
93 Frank, IAUS: An Insider’s Memoir, 117. Rossi’s introduction to the American edition is dated already 1978. 
Rossi, ‘Introduction to the First American Edition’, 19. In 1979, in a catalogue for an exhibition in New York 
on Rossi’s work, Eisenman promises that the translation of L’architettura della città will appear soon. P 
Eisenman, ‘Preface’, in K Frampton (ed), Aldo Rossi in America: 1976 to 1979 (New York, IAUS/MIT Press, 
1979), 1. 
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the original as a carefully revised edition – revised so as to provide the style 
and flavour of the original without encumbering it with some of the rhetorical 
and repetitive passages which are part of the original text’.94 The English 
audience, he implies, receives a different book than the Italian readers did 
sixteen years earlier. Likewise, in his own introduction, Eisenman declares 
that the edition not only introduces the book but also the figure of Rossi, 
which the book anticipates. Eisenman attempts to ‘collapse and dislocate the 
time and place of the evolution of Rossi’s ideas’ into the artefact that is the 
book.95 According to himself, this includes introducing the text also with 
references to his personal discussions with Rossi, to Rossi’s recent book A 
Scientific Autobiography, and to his term analogous city, which was 
introduced in the foreword to the second Italian edition.96 
Eisenman’s emphasis on Rossi’s preoccupation with memory shines 
through already in the title of the introduction: The Houses of Memory: The 
Texts of Analogy. In his reading of Rossi and the argument on permanences, 
however, Eisenman establishes a relation between the notions of history and 
memory in an attempt at simplification: 
History exists so long as an object is in use; that is, so long as a form relates to 
its original function. However, when form and function are severed, and only 
form remains vital, history shifts into the realm of memory. When history 
ends, memory begins.97 
His formulation is the reversal of the hypothesis provided by Halbwachs and 
which provides the point of departure for Rossi: ‘General history does not 
begin until tradition has ended, at the moment when the social memory fades 
or breaks down’.98 It has implications for the consideration of the fatti urbani. 
The continued use of a fatto urbano over generations means that it remains 
active in the unfolding of the collective memory of the present. It retains its 
role in relation to an ongoing tradition and not a general history that exists 
only outside of the social group. By breaking with the continuous use, the 
past is separated from the memory of the living group that has been using it 
and has to be written down as history in order to survive.99 In Halbwachs’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Eisenman, ‘Editor’s Preface’, 0.  
95 ibid., 1. 
96 Rossi, A Scientific Autobiography; Rossi, ‘Introduction to the First American Edition’, 13. 
97 P Eisenman, ‘Editor’s Introduction. The Houses of Memory: The Texts of Analogy’, in A Rossi, The 
Architecture of the City (1st Amer. edn, Cambridge, Opposition books/MIT Press, 1982), 7. 
98 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 130. Neither in the preface of the book nor in the introduction does 
Eisenman relate the concept of collective memory to Halbwachs. 
99 Aleida and Jan Assmann define this as a transfer from the realm of the communicative memory to the 
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terms, memory breaks down and is replaced by history. For Rossi, it is an 
unavoidable fact that all fatti urbani, at some point in history, must change 
their function according to social and technological changes in society. 
Unlike Rossi and Halbwachs, for Eisenman it is the form that remains vital, 
when the function and the users disappear, associating memory with the form 
and materiality itself, not with the group that makes use of it.  
Eisenman prepares the reader for an interpretation of Rossi’s concept of 
memory of the city as something tangible and concrete, without suggesting 
its framework-like function for collective memory, like Halbwachs does, or 
by pointing to the objects’ metonymic relation to the processes of cultural 
remembrance, like Aleida and Jan Assmann do.100 In Eisenman’s 
interpretation, Rossi hypostatises memory into material form and turns the 
architecture of the city into a remembering subject. The city is ‘a theater of 
human events. This theater is no longer just a representation; it is a reality. It 
absorbs events and feelings, and every new event contains within it a 
memory of the past and a potential memory of the future’.101 The imprint of 
architectural form on the city, in Eisenman’s reading, constitutes the urban 
history; the events that unfold around it accumulate into the memory of the 
fatto urbano: ‘With the introduction of memory in the object, the object 
comes to embody both an idea of itself and a memory of a former self’.102 
Such a reading opposes the theory of Halbwachs, the essence of which is 
what Rossi aims to convey with his text. Sven-Olov Wallenstein has argued 
that Eisenman, through his introduction, projects his own issues onto Rossi’s 
book, among them the idea of the analogous city in which elements of 
concrete cities become fiction, where ‘real history transforms into a 
collective memory’.103 Eisenman, I believe, may have contributed to 
promoting the widely held understanding, in the subsequent architectural 
discourse, of collective memory as a (metaphysical) property intrinsic to 
architectural form, not as a term denoting the socially conditioned faculty of 
remembering of the citizenry, in which architecture is implicated in the form 
of a mental image, a spatial framework of memory. 
The American edition was not the first introduction to Rossi’s thought in 
English. Previous to the translation of L’architettura della città, Eisenman, as 
one of the editors of the Oppositions journal, had given the English-speaking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
living group has discontinued to employ for their memory as Erinnerungsorte. Cf. Receptive places – 
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100 Cf. The spatial framework of memory and the material framework, Social morphology, and Dual nature of 
space in ch. 2 and External frameworks of memory in ch. 5. 
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102 ibid. 
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audience an introduction through an article by Rafael Moneo. ‘Aldo Rossi: 
The Idea of Architecture and the Modena Cemetary’ was originally published 
in Spanish in 1973 and was translated by Angela Giral for the Oppositions 
summer issue 1976.104 The same year, Moneo moved to New York to take up 
a teaching position at the Institute of Architecture and Urban Studies (IAUS), 
the institute that published the Oppositions journal and book series.105 The 
article situated Rossi in relation to Casabella Continuità and the Tendenza 
movement and gave an overview of central themes of L’architettura della 
città. It also offered an analysis of Rossi’s project on the Modena cemetery in 
an attempt to demonstrate the relationships of Rossi’s thinking with his built 
work. 
In his discussion of Rossi’s book, Moneo distinguishes between 
remembering as an act done by the collective of citizens who live in the city, 
and memory as a faculty of the architecture of the city, sometimes put in 
quotation marks to point to an understanding of it as a trope. Like Eisenman 
will do after him, Moneo conceives of the city as a subject with its own 
faculty of remembering: ‘The city is faithful to its own “memory,” a term that 
Maurice Halbwachs already applied to the city’.106 He continues by quoting 
Rossi, but lets the statement stand for itself, unexplained: 
‘The city is the locus of collective memory. Memory thus becomes … the 
conducting thread of the entire complex structure … the collective nature and 
the individuality of urban facts [fatti urbani] arrange themselves into the same 
urban structure. Within this structure memory becomes the conscience of the 
city.’107 
In the description of the Modena cemetery project, however, Moneo offers a 
brief description of the role of architecture for memory that more correctly 
points to Rossi’s as well as Halbwachs’s positions. For Moneo, the 
architecture of Modena cemetery situates the social milieu that makes use of 
the place for its rituals of death. It becomes the spatial framework for their 
remembering. He asserts that 
Architectural form must support such meaning: that is, its meaning in the 
collective memory through which one may then understand [the architectural] 	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105 R J Moneo, ‘José Rafael Moneo. April 7, 1999 (Appendix A. 27 Accounts)’, in S Frank (ed), IAUS The 
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107 Rossi quoted in ibid. The abridgement in the quote is Moneo’s. 
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work, assimilate it and situate it in the world of known objects; this support 
establishes a relationship with the deep and so often forgotten world of our 
experience.108 
In this passage, Moneo comes closer to the understanding of the fatto urbano 
as support for collective remembrance, both as a material framework and as a 
spatial framework of memory. 
One of the readers of Moneo’s article is Lynch. Seemingly unaware of his 
own importance for Rossi in L’architettura della città, not yet published in 
English, he dismisses Rossi’s thinking. Lynch argues that to separate 
architecture as an autonomous discipline, like Rossi does according to the 
article, is rooted in the false idea of separating man from his habitat and 
treating them as two separate entities. Collective memory in Rossi’s thinking, 
he states, becomes separated from social life. 
[For Rossi] The city is a permanent structure, which, through its monuments, 
‘remembers’ its past and ‘realizes itself’ as it develops. Architecture is 
divorced of function; it is collective memory, a pure, sophisticated formal 
game. Physical structure is abstracted from social structure, and becomes a 
thing of fascinating, independent possibilities. These attitudes unfold into 
monstrous, seductive flowers.109 
Lynch subscribes to Moneo’s interpretation and criticises Rossi for making 
the city architecture into a subject with its own faculty of memory, and he 
even suggests that Rossi separates architectural form from social life, 
implying that memory, for Rossi, only is memory in form and of form and 
not a product of a cultural collective. 
For an architect of the generation born around the time Rossi was 
introduced to American readers, and who started to study in the 1990s when  
L’architettura della città had lost some of its influence on the architectural 
discourse, the enormous influence that Rossi’s book exercised on architects 
of previous generations cannot easily be grasped. Ellin has pointed out that 
the Venice Triennale of 1973, organised by Rossi, the publication of 
Moneo’s article in Oppositions in 1976, as well as Rossi’s affiliation with the 
Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies (IAUS) in New York City from 
1976 to 1979 contributed to the expansion of Rossi’s influence and to the 
translation of his book into English.110 Suzanne Frank of the Oppositions 
editorial group refers to Ockman, translator of L’architettura della città and 	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associated editor of the journal, who has ‘credibly suggested that this book … 
as well as Venturi’s Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture … were 
trailblazing’.111 People like Kenneth Frampton should have been awestruck 
by the book.112 Other appraisals, like this one by Lupfer, suggest that with the 
attention focused on the history of the city, ‘its durable values and its 
potential for development, Rossi decisively stimulated the debate on town 
planning and heritage conservation’.113 
The afterlife of Halbwachsian and Rossian theories of memory 
In 1980, two years prior to the appearance of The Architecture of the City, 
Halbwachs’s La Mémoire collective had just appeared in an English 
translation by Francis J. Ditter and Vida Yazdi Ditter.114 It was the first of his 
books on memory to be translated into English. The availability of the book 
in English at the time when Rossi’s book became widely read likely 
contributed to the proliferation of Halbwachs’s ideas in the architectural 
discourse, especially those from La Mémoire collective. Les Cadres sociaux 
de la mémoire and La Topographie légendaire would not become available 
in English until 1992 and then only in part.115 It seems that these two books, 
neither in their original language nor in the translations by Lewis A. Coser, 
have come to the notice of the architectural discourse. They rarely appear in 
the bibliographies of architectural theory. 
In the 1995 December issue of the journal Daidalos, dedicated to the theme 
of memory in architecture, Wolfgang Sonne suggests that Rossi has taken 
over a conceptualisation of space and memory from Halbwachs that 
essentially is metaphorical: ‘Halbwachs sees space … as the true actor of 
memory: because the mind is too capricious, the space of the city preserves 
the recollection’.116 Sonne does not recognise in Halbwachs’s theory the 
differentiation between the material framework of physical space and the 
mental representation in the spatial framework of memory and thus reads 
Halbwachs as if the remembering individual only engages with physical 
space in acts of recall. But it is not Halbwachs or Rossi that Sonne is most 
critical of, but the followers who take Rossi’s metaphor for real: ‘The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Frank, IAUS: An Insider’s Memoir, 113. 
112 ibid., 117. 
113 Lupfer, ‘Architectural Theory From the Renaissance to the Present’, 784. 
114 M Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, ed. M Douglas, tr. F J Ditter Jr. & V Y Ditter (New York, Harper & 
Row, 1980) [Fr. orig. (1950)]. 
115 Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire would be abridged to about half of the original size, omitting most of the 
references to space, and only the concluding chapter of La Topographie légendaire would be translated. M 
Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. L A Coser (abridged edn, Chicago, UCP, 1992) [Fr. orig., Les Cadres 
sociaux de la mémoire (2nd edn, 1952), La Topographie légendaire des évangiles en Terre Sainte (1941)]. 
116 W Sonne, ‘The City and the Act of Remembering’, Daidalos, 58 (Dec. 1995), 99. 
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comparison between city and memory, whose metaphorical rhetoric was 
neglected by Rossi’s adepts, finally becomes part of the stock of common 
knowledge in the form of this cryptic apodictic’.117 Sonne incorrectly 
criticises Halbwachs for only remembering by means of the physical and not 
the remembered environment – ‘every reader can disprove in no time by 
simply recalling any place from his past’118 – and Rossi for considering 
architecture a memory in itself – ‘The city itself does not remember anything. 
It is pointless to imagine what Troy might have thought of itself beneath the 
heap of rubble; the city only became significant for those who excavated it. 
Human beings with a memory and recollections are required to make a city 
talk’. 
In the book on the vocabulary of modern architecture, Words and Buildings 
(2000), Adrian Forty addresses Halbwachs’s and Rossi’s contributions to the 
term ‘memory’, as one of the latest chapters in its history. Forty explains that 
Rossi reintroduced it to offer a new rationale to replace functionalism in 
architecture. By binding society’s memory to the built environment, the 
destruction of the latter would be understood as an assault on the collective 
memory. The understanding ‘that the inhabitants of a city shared a collective 
memory manifested in the buildings of the city’ Rossi had taken over from 
Halbwachs.119 According to Forty, in the theory of collective memory, ‘with 
its shortcomings’ and ‘weaknesses’, especially as it was outlined in La 
Mémoire collective, Halbwachs ‘went to some trouble to argue … that 
memory relates not to an actually existing physical space, but to the 
particular mental image of the space formed by that group’.120 Forty thus 
directs the attention to an aspect of Halbwachs’s thinking that stands at the 
centre of the argument of this thesis: the acknowledgement of the spatial 
framework as a stable construct of memory with which groups reconstruct 
the past.121 He points out, in relation to Rossi’s theory, that ‘it is not urban 
artefacts [fatti urbani] that are the agents of memory, but their mental 
images’. In this way Rossi cast Halbwachs’s ideas in an ‘idealist framework 
that was quite alien to Halbwachs’s own thought’ and formulated a poetic 	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118 Cf. here Frameworks of memory in ch. 1 and the introduction to ch. 2. 
119 A Forty, Words and Buildings: a Vocabulary of Modern Architecture (London, Thames & Hudson, 2000), 
217. 
120 ibid., 217–18. The perceived shortcomings of the book can in part be explained by the fact that La Mémoire 
collective was an uncompleted manuscript by the time of Halbwachs’s death in 1945. Changes imposed by the 
editors of the 1950 edition and renderings by the translators of the 1980 English edition may also have 
contributed to making it appear unfinished in its thought. On the editing, see Editions of the works by Maurice 
Halbwachs in the Introduction. On the translation, see Translations of the works by Maurice Halbwachs in the 
same chapter. 
121 Cf. esp. the introduction to ch. 2. 
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rather than a theoretical conception of memory that did not take into account 
important nuances of Halbwachs’s original theory.  
I have argued in this chapter that Rossi had a detailed knowledge of 
Halbwachs’s theory, but that he, arguably, was not as stringent in his own 
thinking and articulate in the formulation of his ideas. Rossi gave 
Halbwachs’s ideas new forms of quite different character, but I would 
suggest, that is possible to perceive Rossi’s conceptualisations as a 
supplements to the Halbwachsian concept. For instance, I have proposed to 
see the fatto urbano as, on the one hand, a physical object and, on the other, a 
mental image of it in the collective thought.122 To appreciate its dual nature 
implies to recognise the part of it that exists in people’s memory as an agent 
for remembering. The next chapter will see a reconsideration of this model, 
and I will propose to regard also the physical environment as a mind-external 
framework or agent of memory, complementing the mnemonic function of 
the inner frameworks. 
Other attempts to revitalise the theories of Halbwachs in the architectural 
discourse around the turn of the millennium include Christine Boyer’s The 
City of Collective Memory, published in 1994, and Sébastien Marot’s ‘L’Art 
de la mémoire, le territoire et l’architecture’ from 1999.123 An English 
translation of the latter appeared in 2003 as Sub-urbanism and the Art of 
Memory.124 Although thoroughly different in their character, the texts have in 
common that they try to free Halbwachs’s thinking from the readings by 
Rossi and by his interpreters Eisenman and Moneo. 
In his essay, Marot offers one of the rare summaries in architectural theory 
of Halbwachs’s conception of space and the spatial framework of memory.125 
Marot has identified that many of the references to space in Les Cadres 
sociaux de la mémoire have been omitted in Coser’s English translation and 
should be credited for having translated some of the omitted passages for the 
English translation of his essay.126 As I have pointed to in the Introduction, 
although there are several reviews of Halbwachs’s thinking on space and 
memory, Marot’s review may be one of the better introductions for readers in 
architectural theory. The book is also interesting because it draws a link 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 E.g. Rossi, The Architecture of the City, e.g. 21–22, 29, 32. Cf. The architecture of the city in this chapter. 
123 M C Boyer, The City of Collective Memory: Its Historical Imagery and Architectural Entertainments 
(Cambridge, MIT Press, 1994). S Marot, ‘L’Art de la mémoire, le territoire et l’architecture’, Le Visiteur, /4 
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125 ibid., 30–32. 
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between the mental places in Halbwachs’s theory and those in the art of 
memory, as Frances A. Yates described them.127 
Also Boyer’s comprehensive study links the theories of Halbwachs with 
those described by Yates, covering a vast range of cultural perspectives on 
the nineteenth- and twentieth-century city. What began as a critique of 
historical preservation, urban design, and postmodern architecture evolved 
into an exploration of ‘how images from the nineteenth century have been 
translated into contemporary views of the city, how the restoration of former 
architectural and neighbourhood traces forged a hybrid layering of 
architectural sites and a constant migration from one time period to 
another’.128 Boyer shows her preoccupation with Halbwachs already in the 
title of the book, but although notions of memory appear and reappear 
throughout the book, the consideration of Halbwachs’s thinking is limited to 
a handful of passages. In her quest for a reformation of urban planning, she 
rhetorically establishes a dichotomy of memory and history in the city.129 On 
the one side, Boyer posits the collective memory, based on the interaction of 
social groups and linked to their mental conceptions of space in the spatial 
framework of memory. On the other, she places the symbols of a constructed 
public history, displayed through representative civic architecture and 
through disciplinary and systematic arrangements of objects in museum 
spaces. 
Memory, Halbwachs argued, stands opposed to this narrative history, for 
memory always occurs behind our backs, where it can neither be appropriated 
nor controlled. Collective memory, moreover, is a current of continuous 
thought still moving in the present, still a part of a group’s active life, and 
these memories are multiple and dispersed, spectacular and ephemeral, nor 
recollected and written down in one unified story. Instead, collective 
memories are supported by a group framed in space and time. They are 
relative to that specific community, not a universal history shared by many 
disparate groups. History on the other hand gives the appearance that memory 
persists in a uniform manner, being handed down from one period of time to 
another and passing successively from place to place.130  
In the passage Boyer introduces Halbwachs’s distinction between collective 
memory and general history as a polarity in a political struggle, construing 	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129 Cf. History in memory in the Introduction. 
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his theory in a manner alien to Halbwachs as well as Rossi. The former exists 
in the minds of the (dominated) group members, she asserts, the latter is 
positioned outside of their minds, formalised in books, documents, and 
administered by (dominating) institutions. For Halbwachs, there are not 
necessarily any political implications in the distinction. He divides memory 
into autobiographical memory, which concerns personal and social 
experience, and historical memory, which makes meaning out of the general 
history for every individual.131 The general history, structured and 
schematised through historical writing, can only exist for the individual as a 
representation in the historical memory. The official memory of Boyer’s 
history, disseminated through architectural monuments or museum 
collections, is in Halbwachs’s understanding a part of the collective memory 
of groups, like the nation or the city. It corresponds to the historical memory 
and not to the externalised general history. Where Boyer sees a political 
dichotomy between memory and history, Halbwachs only sees the distinction 
between mind-internal and mind-external processes of group memory. 
Halbwachs postulates that all acts of remembrance, in all cultures and 
through history, are conditioned by the social thought of the present. Boyer 
reads Halbwachs differently and suggests that the collective memory, as 
mental faculty, is a cultural specific; collective memory exists only under 
certain societal conditions. Such conditions do not exist in the contemporary 
city: 
Remembering and recollection today have achieved new importance as the 
contemporary metropolis becomes a source of constant exchanges in and 
relays of information, and represents a physical site in which images and 
messages seem to swirl about, devoid of a sustaining context. Recall no longer 
refers exclusively to psychological memory – our ability to recollect forgotten 
experiences and retie them to conscious awareness. Nor is memory considered 
to be collective, in the sense that it is linked to the social and physical space of 
a people and related to the transmission of values and traditions. The presence 
of interpretative systems that translate memories and traditions into 
meaningful contemporary forms have vanished once and for all.132 
In Boyer’s study, the theoretical legacy of Halbwachs takes on a new guise in 
her agenda for urban planning, quite alien to Halbwachs (and to the growing 
field of interdisciplinary memory studies that builds on his legacy). She has, 
nonetheless, written Halbwachs into a complex and rich study of Western 
cities in modernity and given prominence to his legacy in the architectural 	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discourse through repeated references to the collective memory, among other 
places in the title and in central concepts. 
In a recent text (2012), Boyer brings the collective memory and Halbwachs 
back into the architectural discourse. By now she accepts the hypostatisation 
of memory into built architecture as a natural basis for her argument: ‘Since 
architectural collective memory is literally carved or erected in stone, and 
thus tangible, monolithic, recognizable and permanent, it has been called the 
archetypal collective memory’.133 What Halbwachs referred to as external 
frameworks of general history – history books and other documents – and of 
material frameworks – physical buildings, cities, and landscapes – Boyer 
refers to as a historical memory that has been petrified.134 The shift in 
definition from Halbwachs’s historical memory, which denotes what the 
individual recalls of general history, to Boyer’s historical memory as material 
artefact seems to have fixed the idea of architecture as concretisation of 
memory in architectural theory. It should, however, not be taken to indicate 
that Halbwachs ever intended any such interpretation. The collective 
memory, according to him, refers to the act of reconstructing the past by 
individuals, conditioned by its social milieus and employing the environment 
as one of the supporting frameworks. Memory does not exist independently 
from human subjects in the materiality of an artefact: ‘[The collective 
memory] does not preserve the past, but it reconstructs it, with the aid of 
material traces, rites, texts, and traditions left behind by that past, but also 
with the aid of recent psychological and social factors, that is to say, with the 
present’.135 Without the acts of reactualisation of the reminding traces no 
collective memory exists. 
A second phase of Halbwachsian theories of memory in architecture? 
I could ask myself why Boyer’s book, or Marot’s for that matter, has not 
exerted as much influence on the architectural discourse as Rossi’s book. 
Could it be that when The City of Collective Memory appeared in the mid-
1990s, architects were leaving postmodernism’s historical preoccupation and 
entered an era of supermodernism (Hans Ibelings)? Abstract form languages, 
in part revived from the Modern Movement’s developments, became new 
norms, and again, like during modernism, for practising architects, terms like 	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‘memory’, ‘history’, or ‘tradition’ would not connote favourable values. 
Curiously, in the decade when the humanities took on memory studies with 
full force, architecture seems to have left them. 
From the 1960s to the 1980s Halbwachs’s notions of the spatial framework 
and the collective memory had a prominent position in the remodelling of 
architectural theory and practice. Lynch’s environmental image, and, to some 
degree, also Kepes’s conception, was remarkably successful, but with regard 
to Halbwachs’s theory, it did little to promote its merits. Rossi went much 
further in his rewriting of the definition of the architecture of the city, some 
of the essential features of which he developed on the basis of Halbwachs’s 
theory. Halbwachs became a figure that architectural writers needed to 
position themselves in relation to, if they were to assess Rossi’s theory. 
Implicitly, through the notion of the spatial framework of memory, and 
explicitly, through the term ‘collective memory’, Halbwachs’s thought came 
to permeate a postmodern awareness in architecture. Although widely 
criticised for his way of referring to memory as inherent in the materiality, 
Rossi contributed to raising the concern among architects to see architecture 
not only as form, function, and material, but, to a larger degree, as a vehicle 
for social and cultural processes and values. He did not, however, succeed in 
providing the discourse with the distinction between architecture’s role as a 
material framework and as spatial framework of social memory. Neither did 
he provide the key to understanding material architecture as memory, namely 
by reference to it as metonym, as Jan and Aleida Assmann have successfully 
done in their subsequent theories. 
With the fatto urbano, Rossi has provided a useful concept that addresses 
culturally significant pieces of architecture in the city. These are as much 
material manifestations as they are constructs in the collective imagination. 
With reference to Lynch’s visually salient landmarks of orientation and 
Halbwachs’s socially significant collective landmarks, we may regard the 
fatti urbani as cultural landmarks. Important nodes in the culture and fabric 
of cities, such entities take the form of a mind-external material framework 
and a mind-internal spatial framework of memory. Furthermore, with vital 
permanences, a distinction of the fatto urbano, we may take them to support 
the informal and everyday memory of the citizenry as well as the formal and 
institutionalised memory of architects, historians, and politicians. With 
pathological permanences, on the other hand, only the official and 
institutionalised forms of remembrance are encouraged. 
In the first phase of Halbwachsian theories of memory in architecture Rossi 
was the main advocator of his thinking. With the theoretical framework of 
the spatial framework of memory, outlined in this thesis, I hope to contribute 
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to what could become a second phase of interest in his ideas. When this 
thesis advocates memory studies in architecture, it is not a gesture of 
conservatism or historicism. Studies of memory, here, are posited against 
memorylessness and against unawareness of cultural values attached to 
architecture. A concern for memory is not advanced as an alternative to 
preoccupations of form, but offered as a supplement to critical humanistic 
perspectives. It promotes an increased consciousness of societal processes 
that produce meaning in architecture and urban environments and recognises 
that no building or urban environment is neutral; it shapes, and is shaped by, 
group interests and it always connotes group values. Understanding such 
mechanisms could contribute to shifting the view from seeing architecture as 
singular, material, and permanent to appreciating it as a totality of mental 
images, images which only exist in plural and which differ between groups 
and change over time. Such a view lends more importance to architecture’s 
movements and orchestration in society than to its statics. In the next chapter 
I shall address a more recent model of memory, which, like Rossi’s, is an 
elaboration of Halbwachs’s theories. It will contribute to supplement the 
spatial framework of memory and to clarify some issues that were not 
explicated in the works of Halbwachs and Rossi. 
 
5 
Cultural memory and external frameworks 
Whereas chronologically ordered history books provide 
information for a nation’s historical consciousness, the nation’s 
memory finds its expression in the landscape of its places of 
remembrance. The strange bond between distance and proximity 
gives them their aura, and through them one seeks direct contact 
with the past. The ‘magic’ of the place of memory results from its 
status as ‘contact zone.’ Holy sites that establish a link with the 
gods have existed in all cultures, and places of memory may be 
regarded as their modern equivalent, because these too are 
expected to provide a connection with the spirits of the past.  
— Aleida Assmann, Erinnerungsräume, 19991 
In the German discourse on memory in the humanities Aleida and Jan 
Assmann occupy a prominent position next to people like Maurice 
Halbwachs and Pierre Nora.2 Through the communicative memory and 
cultural memory, a theoretical model that has received widespread 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization. Functions, Media, Archives, tr. D H Wilson 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2011) [Ger. orig., Erinnerungsräume (1999)], 322. 
2 On the differences between the discourses in Germany, the United States, and Britain, see A Erll, ‘Travelling 
Memory’, Parallax, 17/4 (2011), 5–6. For introductions to the German discourse, see: A Erll, Memory in 
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Edifices 	  
 	  194 
acknowledgment for its conceptual clarity, they uphold the legacy of 
Halbwachs’s memory theory by criticising and refining it.3  
Jan Assmann (b.1938) studied Egyptology, classical archaeology, and 
Hellenic studies in Munich, Heidelberg, Paris, and Göttingen.4 He worked as 
an independent scholar at the German Archaeological Institute in Cairo from 
1967 and held a chair in Egyptology in Heidelberg between 1976 and 2003. 
Since 2005 he has been honorary professor at the University of Konstanz. 
Aleida Assmann (b.1947) studied English literature and Egyptology in 
Heidelberg and Tübingen.5 In 1993 she was appointed a chair in English 
literature at the University of Konstanz, which she still holds. She has 
collaborated professionally and academically with her husband Jan Assmann 
since the 1960s. 
In the first part of this chapter I aim to demonstrate how their model of 
memory, with all its distinctions, offers a useful theory for developing and 
distinguishing not only the collective memory, but, more importantly for the 
study, Halbwachs’s conceptualisation of the spatial framework of memory. 
The terminology of Aleida and Jan Assmann, to my meaning, eases the 
application and enhances the specificity of the concept of spatial framework 
of memory. Aleida and Jan Assmann use the communicative memory to 
restate certain parts of Halbwachs’s theory and thus delineate it from the 
cultural realms referred to by the other part of the conceptual pair, the 
cultural memory. I will introduce the latter and with it the perspectival 
organisation of memory contents into functional memory and storage 
memory. It replaces the dichotomy of memory and history and inscribes the 
tension between remembering and forgetting in the concept of cultural 
memory.  
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In the second part of the chapter I will address definitions and distinctions 
of the spatial framework that can be derived from Aleida and Jan Assmann’s 
model of memory. Differently than in their model, I will insist on using the 
notion of the spatial framework also when referring to material artefacts. In 
this way, I use the distinction sketched by Halbwachs and elaborate on it with 
the help of the theory of Aleida and Jan Assmann. A number of general 
distinctions are added to the spatial framework of memory and, finally, I 
suggest including in the theorectical framework a selection of precise terms, 
suggested by Aleida Assmann to address the politics of European sites of 
memory in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as conceptual shortcuts to 
the general postulations and as complements to similar distinctions proposed 
by Halbwachs and described in chapter two. 
Dimensions of memory 
At the beginning of the book for which he is most known, Das kulturelle 
Gedächtnis (1992; Engl. as Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 2011), 
Jan Assmann outlines a model for the study of human memory that comprises 
four distinctive dimensions, shaped in social and cultural contexts outside of 
the brain. Three of them refer to pragmatic and functional everyday memory. 
Mimetic memory (das mimetische Gedächtnis) refers to stabilising procedures 
of actions: handling tools, cooking, playing sports, but also to manners and 
customs, which depend on mimetic traditions.6 It is acquired by imitating 
others or by reading codified instructions. The memory of things (das 
Gedächtnis der Dinge) describes the relations people form with objects they 
surround themselves with, from 
beds, chairs, crockery, clothes, and tools, to houses, streets, villages, towns, 
cars, and ships. They all represent our concepts of practicality, comfort, 
beauty, and, to a certain extent, our own identity. Objects reflect ourselves – 
they remind us of who we are, of our past, of our forebears, and so on.7 
Jan Assmann has later explained the world of objects that man surrounds 
himself with as a stabilising drive, representing a will towards form (Wille 
zur Form).8 The form world of objects is characterised by its regularity over 
longer time periods, and it is through the study of the morphology of the 
things that we can position them spatially and temporally. He sees the will 
towards form as an expression of mnemonic performance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization. Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination, tr. D 
H Wilson (Cambridge, CUP, 2011) [Ger. orig., Das kulturelle Gedächtnis (1992)], 5. 
7 ibid., 6. 
8 J Assmann, ‘Das kulturelle Gedächtnis’, Erwägen Wissen Ethik, 13/2 (2002), 239. 
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(Gedächtnisleistung) and of a formation of tradition (Traditionsbildung) in 
the group. The memory of things, formed outside of the body, corresponds to 
what Halbwachs refers to as entourage matériel, the material surrounds of the 
family and friends.9 It can be compared to the spatial framework of the home 
and its physical counterpart, as it comes to serve as a shared repository of 
familial and social values, attached to material objects.10 
The communicative memory (das kommunikative Gedächtnis) is the realm 
of language and everyday communication. Language and the ability to 
communicate are learnt from society and develop in social milieus. 
Remembering is thus inscribed in social and societal processes and cannot be 
explained only by the study of the individual mind and brain. Jan Assmann 
takes this dimension of memory to correspond to Halbwachs’s concept of the 
collective memory, with some exceptions. 
When these three dimensions go beyond the functional and take on 
meaning and significance, they transcend the limits of pragmatism and enter 
the dimension of semantics in the domain of the cultural memory. In an 
article on cultural memory that precedes the book, Jan Assmann describes the 
two dimensions as the distinction between informal and everyday situations 
and the cross-generational transmission of ‘all knowledge that directs 
behavior and experience in the interactive framework of a society and one 
that obtains through generations in repeated societal practice and initiation’.11 
I will take a closer look at the two main modes of memory that stand at the 
centre of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s theory, the conceptual pair 
communicative memory and cultural memory, and reflect upon how the 
spatial framework of memory comes to relate to the two. 
Communicative memory 
The concept of communicative memory, devised by Aleida and Jan Assmann 
in collaboration, is the development of Halbwachs’s collective memory and 
an attempt at clarifying his theory. In the introduction of the terms to an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 6. 
10 Halbwachs writes, ‘Let us leave aside the considerations of convenience and aesthetics. The material 
surroundings [entourage matériel] carry our mark and that of others. Our house, our furniture, and the way 
they are organised, the arrangement of the rooms in which we live, remind us of our family and the friends that 
we often see in this framework … Furniture, ornaments, paintings, utensils, and knickknacks circulate within 
the group, they are the topics of appreciation and comparison and provide, at all times, insights into the new 
directions of fashion and taste, as well as recall for us older social customs and distinctions’. M Halbwachs, La 
Mémoire collective, ed. G Namer (1950; crit. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997) [orig., ‘Mémoire et société’ 
(1947)], 194. 
11 J Assmann, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’, tr. J Czaplicka, New German Critique, /65 (1995) 
[Ger. orig. (1988)], 126. 
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English audience, Jan Assmann has described how they worked out the 
terminology: 
The term ‘communicative memory’ was introduced in order to delineate the 
difference between Halbwachs’s concept of ‘collective memory’ and our 
understanding of ‘cultural memory’ (A. Assmann). Cultural memory is a form 
of collective memory, in the sense that it is shared by a number of people and 
that it conveys to these people a collective, that is, cultural, identity. 
Halbwachs, however, the inventor of the term ‘collective memory,’ was 
careful to keep his concept of collective memory apart from the realm of 
traditions, transmissions, and transferences which we propose to subsume 
under the term ‘cultural memory.’ We preserve Halbwachs’s distinction by 
breaking up his concept of collective memory into ‘communicative’ and 
‘cultural memory,’ but we insist on including the cultural sphere, which he 
excluded, in the study of memory. We are, therefore, not arguing for replacing 
his idea of ‘collective memory’ with ‘cultural memory’; rather, we distinguish 
between both forms as two different modi memorandi, ways of 
remembering.12 
Following Halbwachs’s postulations of the parts of the collective memory 
that correspond to the communicative memory, Jan Assmann underlines the 
social conditioning of individual memory. It is the individual who 
remembers, but the group determines how and what he remembers. This is 
the reason why collective memory should not be considered as a metaphor (I 
will return to this aspect later in this chapter). The different frameworks of 
memory (social, spatial, temporal, linguistic, etc.) are needed for the 
individual to reconstruct his memories and supply them with meaning. The 
frameworks, in turn, are acquired in the social interaction in time and place: 
a person’s memory forms itself through his or her participation in 
communicative processes. It is a function of their involvement in a variety of 
social groups – ranging from family through religion to nation. Memory lives 
and survives through communication, and if this is broken off, or if the 
referential frames [frameworks]13 of the communicated reality disappear or 
change, then the consequence is forgetting. From the individual’s point of 
view, memory is a conglomeration that emerges from participation in different 
group memories. From the perspective of the group, memory is a matter of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 J Assmann, ‘Communicative and Cultural Memory’, tr. S B Young, in A Erll & A Nünning (eds), Cultural 
Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 110. 
13 Aleida and Jan Assmann use the German ‘Rahmen’ to correspond to Halbwachs’s use of the French ‘cadre’. 
‘Rahmen’ has sometimes been translated as ‘frame’ in Jan Assmann’s Cultural Memory and Early Civilization 
and in Aleida Assmann’s Cultural Memory and Western Civilization. This departs from established practice in 
English translations of Halbwachs, where ‘cadre’ is translated as ‘framework’. Cf. Translations of the works 
by Maurice Halbwachs in the Introduction. 
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knowledge that is distributed among and internalized by each member. All 
memories go to make up an independent system, whose elements both 
determine and support one another, whether in the individual or in the group. 
Memory is individual in the sense that it is a unique link between the 
collective memory (of the various group experiences) and the experiences 
specific to the person concerned.14 
Halbwachs had pointed out that in these processes the frameworks are 
constantly revised and positioned according to the present. The past of the 
communicative memory never exists as a pure fact, but always as a 
construction related to the social identity of the present. The remembering of 
the group thus does not aim at writing their own history, but at founding, at 
all times, present experience and projections on the future in conceptions of 
the shared past. Again, in the early preparatory article Jan Assmann 
summarises the communicative memory; it is a dynamic and non-institutional 
everyday process of communication that is ‘characterized by a high degree of 
non-specialization, reciprocity of roles, thematic instability, and 
disorganization’.15 
Jan Assmann’s review of the collective memory is also his support of the 
foundational conceptualisations of Halbwachs’s thesis. He shows that, for 
Halbwachs, the collective memory was not a metaphor, but a social 
phenomenon: ‘The fact that only individuals can have a memory because of 
their neurological equipment makes no difference to the dependence of their 
memories on the social frame [framework]’.16 He rejects any comparison 
with a Jungian collective unconscious, a memory that is biologically 
hereditary and expresses itself as a Proustian mémoire involontaire. 
Halbwachs, Jan Assmann contends, means nothing of the sort, but conceives 
of memory as communicable and non-hereditary mémoire volontaire. 
In my view, it is not the [Halbwachs’s] ‘socio-constructivist’ expansion but, 
on the contrary, the individual and psychological contraction of the memory 
concept [by the likes of Bergson] that obscures the ways in which the past is 
given communicative and cultural presence. Groups ‘inhabit’ their past just as 
individuals do, and from it they fashion their self-images. Trophies, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 23. 
15 J Assmann, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’, 126. 
16 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 33. On this point Jan Assmann has received strong 
support from social psychologist and sociologist Harald Welzer, who explains that the growth and maturation 
of the brain in children occurs in constant social interaction and that the development of a consciousness that 
could exist beyond a communicative situation is not possible. Consciousness and memory are founded in the 
dialogue between several brains. Since the information the brain handles is social by nature, it is doubtful, 
Welzer reasons, that there could exist something like an individual memory. On Aleida and Jan Assmann’s 
theory, see esp. Welzer, Das kommunikative Gedächtnis, 13–15. 
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certificates, and medals adorn the cabinets of clubhouses as well as the 
shelves of individual sportsmen, and there is not much point in calling one 
tradition and the other memory.17 
The difference between thought and memory, just like Halbwachs 
demonstrates in relation to the formation of the topography of places of 
Jesus’s life in the Gospel, lies in the fact that thought is abstract and memory 
concrete.18 ‘Images must take on a form that is imaginable’, Jan Assmann 
argues, ‘before they can find their way into memory, and so we have an 
indissoluble merging of idea and image’, into what he suggests calling 
memory figures (Erinnerungsfiguren).19 Three features characterise memory 
figures: a relation to time and place through the temporal and spatial 
frameworks of memory, to a group through the social framework of memory, 
and a capacity for reconstruction. 
To start with the latter, memory is not the preserved past or pure facts, but 
always reconstructed by means of societal frameworks in the present, 
and thus it is continually subject to processes of reorganization according to 
the changes taking place in the frame of reference of each successive present. 
Even that which is new can only appear in the form of the reconstructed past, 
in the sense that traditions can only be exchanged with traditions, the past 
with the past.20 
In order to reconstruct the past the group needs to actualise the frameworks 
of time, space, and the social milieu. Membership of a living group provides 
the member with a specific identity that comprises forms of communication, 
ideas, emotions, and values on the basis of which the individual can represent 
the group and adopt its attitude. 
Also the attachment of collective memory to space and time follows the 
thesis of Halbwachs. Jan Assmann stresses the connectivity of groups to 
points of crystallisation – in the events and festivals of the calendar or in the 
inhabited space: 
what cities are to town-dwellers, the countryside is to rural communities. 
These are all spatial frames [frameworks] for memories, and even – or 
especially – during absence they are what is remembered as home. Another 
spatial element is the world of objects that surround or belong to the 
individual – his entourage matériel [material surrounds] that both support and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 33. 
18 M Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire des évangiles en Terre sainte. Étude de mémoire collective, ed. 
M Jaisson, Quadrige (1941; 1971; rev. 2nd edn, Paris, PUF, 2008), 124. 
19 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 23–24. 
20 ibid., 27. 
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contributes to his identity … Any group that wants to consolidate itself will 
make an effort to find and establish a base for itself, not only to provide a 
setting for its interactions but also to symbolize its identity and to provide 
points of reference for its memories.21 
With Jan Assmann’s outline of the communicative memory and its 
frameworks, we are able to delineate the areas of Halbwachs’s collective 
memory that relate to the role of social remembering in everyday situations. 
Architecture, here, takes the form of a spatial framework for informal and 
non-specialised remembering, where anyone can take part and where the 
roles change. The communicative memory is disorganised and transient and 
is essentially bound to the minds of individuals. The brain is its biological 
basis, and, therefore, the contents of the communicative memory will not live 
longer than three or four generations before disappearing, unless they are 
formalised. There exist as many collective spatial frameworks of memory as 
there are groups and as many perspectives on the framework as there are 
members in the group. Over time the frameworks change according to 
changes in and of the group. 
Spatial frameworks of the communicative memory 
Before addressing the cultural memory and how architecture may act as its 
spatial framework, I will turn the attention to some of the basic roles of 
places for the communicative memory. These pertain to the most private of 
the social realms that the individual belongs to: that of the memory of the 
family and of close relations. 
Familial places – Generationenorte and Heimat 
In Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire and in La Mémoire collective, 
Halbwachs emphasises the surroundings of the family and close relations as 
especially important for remembering, the first environment that the child is 
inscribed in and remembers with the help of. For the child, the home and 
other places of the family are the first places to be mapped out in the spatial 
framework of memory, with which its initial conception of the world is 
structured. Like Halbwachs, Aleida Assmann introduces her discussion of 
places of memory with reference to Goethe and stresses that it is the places 
that associate personal relations and emotions that come to stand out in the 
spatial framework of memory rather than lend importance to architectural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 ibid., 24–25. 
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qualities. For Goethe, it is the square where he lives and his grandfather’s 
house. 
The symbolic power that Goethe attributes to these places seems to be 
connected with memory. Both places embody memories that he shares as an 
individual but that far transcend his own life. Here, the individual memory 
gives way to that of the family, and the context of an individual life is 
inextricably bound to that of people who were once within that context but are 
now no longer there. Thus in both places, individual memory merges with one 
that is more general.22 
From Halbwachs’s general observation of the relevance of the childhood 
environment for remembering – for any child, in any society – Aleida 
Assmann takes the step to establish the idea of Generationenorte. Rendered 
as ‘generational places’ in Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 
Generationenorte literally translates as ‘places of generations’, pointing to 
such places’ ‘firm and long-established ties with family histories [in] an 
unbroken generational chain’.23 At the centre of sedentary cultures, processes 
of modernity – migration to industrial centres, war, and displacement – have 
increasingly made the Generationenorte scarce. Aleida Assmann lets 
Nathaniel Hawthorne portray the phenomenon in the mid-nineteenth century: 
This long connection of a family with one spot, as its place of birth and burial, 
creates a kindred between the human being and the locality, quite independent 
of any charm in the scenery or moral circumstances that surround him. It is 
grounded less on love than on instinct. The new inhabitant – who comes from 
a foreign land, or whose father and grandfather came – has … no conception 
of the oysterlike tenacity with which an old settler, over whom his third 
century is creeping, clings to the spot where his successive generations have 
been imbedded. … The spell survives.24 
Being bound to a place over generations Hawthorne considers archaic and the 
opposite of ideals of the mobile modern man. For Aleida Assmann, 
Hawthorne represents the one side of a dichotomy of modernity. The upkeep 
and transmission of memory and the emotional attachment to the spatial 
framework of Generationenorte, she reasons, are an anti-ideal for a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 283. 
23 ibid., 284. Halbwachs has suggested a similar relationship between peasants and the land of their forefathers, 
although not in relation to his theory on memory. M Halbwachs, The Psychology of Social Class, tr. C 
Delavenay (London, Heinemann, 1958) [Fr. orig., Esquisse d’une psychologie des classes sociales (1955)], 
21–40. 
24 N Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter (New York, Norton, 1962), 22. Quoted in A Assmann, Cultural Memory 
and Western Civilization, 284. 
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‘functionalist perspective’. That perspective is what connects the 
Generationenorte with les milieux de mémoire, the ‘real environments of 
memory’ that Pierre Nora positions as the antithetical term to les lieux de 
mémoire.25 For Nora, it describes the milieus lost in modernity’s break with 
tradition, through industrial growth, the dissolution of the peasant culture, 
and the external and internal colonisation. He suggests that we 
have seen the end of societies that had long assured the transmission and 
conservation of collectively remembered values, whether through churches or 
schools, the family or the state … of ideologies that prepared a smooth 
passage from the past to the future or that had indicated what the future should 
keep from the past.26 
Aleida Assmann is critical of Nora’s postulation and points out that it is not 
sufficient to attribute the transition from milieux de mémoire to lieux de 
memoire only to modernity’s break with tradition and historicism.27 Seen 
from a German perspective, this dichotomy does not suffice to explain the 
sites of memory that exist today. The atrocities of the Nazi regime, she 
argues, emptied entire milieux de mémoire and replaced the Generationenorte 
of Jewish tradition with memorial sites and lieux de mémoire all over Europe. 
Repositories of collective memory are replaced by written history and 
commemoration. 
With Aleida Assmann it is possible to regard milieux de mémoire as related 
to the Generationenorte, and not only for describing what has been lost in 
modernity. The former are for communities and societies what the latter are 
for families. They are forms of informal memory practice that binds itself to 
an environment over generations and thus becomes threatened by any act of 
displacement or destruction of the community or alteration of the 
environment. 
In their introduction to the concept Heimat, approximately ‘home’ or 
‘homeland’, in Deutsche Erinnerungsorte (2001) – the German response to 
the French Les lieux de mémoire – Etienne François and Hagen Schulze 
explain how Heimat, far into the nineteenth century, was a legal term 
describing the place one belonged to by birth or marriage and in which one 
had the right to practice civic professions or to acquire land.28 Because of 
overpopulation in the mid-nineteenth century, large numbers of Europeans 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 323; P Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les 
Lieux de Mémoire’, Representations, 26/1 (Apr. 1989) [Fr. orig. (1984)], 7. 
26 Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, 7. 
27 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 323–24. 
28 E François & H Schulze, ‘Heimat’, in E François & H Schulze (eds), Deutsche Erinnerungsorte, iii 
(Munich, Beck, 2001), 361. 
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migrated into industrial cities or to the New World, affecting 85 per cent of 
the population in the span of the century. Around the turn of the century, two 
thirds of Germans lived in a different place than where they were born. 
Heimat had now come to emotionally denote the place where one was born 
and had spent one’s childhood. According to François and Schulze, the 
alienation of so many people living elsewhere caused a change in the relation 
to the place of origin; it fostered nostalgia, homesickness, and yearning for 
the Heimat. 
I would like to propose Heimat as a conceptual sibling to Aleida 
Assmann’s Generationenorte and consider them both as distinctions to the 
spatial framework of memory.29 Generationenorte could describe how 
individuals continue to live in the physical environment that corresponds to 
the spatial framework of one’s childhood (as well as that of the older 
members of the family), constantly updating the framework through 
interaction with the current physicality and the current social life playing out 
there. Heimat, differently, describes the distanced situation where the 
material framework of home is not available on the everyday basis, but can 
be called upon as a spatial framework of memory to remember social 
relations of the family and experiences from one’s life. Repeated returns 
serve to adjust the spatial framework of memory to the current situation, 
lessening the experience of temporal difference between the two.30 
Suzanne Vromen has written on nostalgia in Halbwachs’s work on 
memory. She argues that nostalgia for him has a liberating effect on the 
individual: 
it allows evasion from the coercion of social bonds … Nostalgia becomes for 
Halbwachs the exercise of individual freedom in the recall and ordering of 
experience, a freedom which permits the individual to emphasize positive 
experiences selectively. He was careful to point out that nostalgia does not 
represent escape from all social bonds; these remain, but their nature is altered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This distinction of two kinds of relation to the sites of family memory corresponds to the distinction that 
Halbwachs draws up with regard to religious memory and space in La Topographie légendaire between the 
Christians, who stayed in the landscape of the Gospel, and those who settled in foreign places: ‘But it happens 
whenever a collective memory has a double object, on the one hand, a material reality, a person, a monument, 
a place in space, and, on the other hand, a symbol, that is to say the spiritual significance which, in the mind of 
the group, attaches itself and superposes the reality. Suppose the group breaks up. Some of the members stay 
in the place, in the presence of the material object, in contact with it. The others leave, carrying with them the 
image of the object. At the same time the object changes. The very place it occupies no longer remains the 
same, because all that surrounds it transforms. It no longer bears the same relations to the different parts of the 
material world that surrounds it’. Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire, 128–29. 
30 Cf. my study of accounts of displacement and return, and how the individual shapes different spatial 
frameworks of memory of the same place in subsequent periods. M Ekman, ‘Remembering Home. 
Displacement, Return, and Spatial Frameworks of Memory’, in J Muñoz-Basols & M David (eds), Defining 
and Re-Defining Diaspora: From Theory to Reality (Oxford, Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2011). 
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because they have lost their coercive power. Because people in the past are 
fixed in a well-defined framework, evocation is done without arousing 
expectations, without fears of evil or hopes for good. Social bonds thus 
acquire a quality of equanimity which they did not have previously.31 
The spatial and social frameworks belong to the past and are pacified in their 
social influence on the present reconstruction of memories. The present 
vantage point offers the freedom to lay stress on new aspects and judgements. 
At the same time, the loss of continuity is felt. In the nostalgic condition of 
dislocation the ‘past furnishes an idealized image of old customs and thus 
provide[s] a sense of social continuity’.32 Such a productive construction of 
the past, with the help of a spatial framework of a previous era, is not only 
possible for people who left the Generationenorte, but also for subsequent 
generations of the migrants. Georgia Lagoumitzi has pointed out how such an 
idealised spatial framework of memory can be institutionalised and passed 
down for millennia in diaspora.33 For Pontic Greeks, living in or coming from 
Pontus (Eastern Turkey) and other regions around the Black Sea, Greece is 
the nostalgic homeland for the descendants of Greek colonies established 
hundreds or even thousands of years earlier. Lagoumitzi’s study indicates 
that for people of diaspora also seemingly transitory identities of Heimat can 
be stabilised in cultural forms and identities, up to such a level that a modern 
state like that of Greece offers ‘repatriation’ for Pontic Greeks. Thus, we 
could see Generationenorte and Heimat as two complementing categories; 
both are at work in different forms in the same societies. Generationenorte 
describes sedentary forms of spatial organisation of social memory in 
families, which modernity seems not to have managed to make entirely 
obsolete, for instance in rural regions. It may disappear in its traditional 
appearance for the majority of the people, but it can also take on new forms. 
Similarly, Heimat may not only be seen as a product of two centuries of 
industrialisation and mass migration, but a spatial organisation form of 
memory of those who have left or their descendants. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 S Vromen, ‘Maurice Halbwachs and the Concept of Nostalgia’, Knowledge and Society: Studies in the 
Sociology of Culture Past and Present, 6 (1986), 61. 
32 ibid., 62. 
33 G Lagoumitzi, ‘The Uses of Nostalgia in the ‘Imagination’ of Diaspora: The Case of the New Pontic Greek 
Refugees’, in M David & J Muñoz-Basols (eds), Defining and Re-Defining Diaspora (Oxford, Inter-
Disciplinary Press, 2011). 
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Cultural memory 
Halbwachs had analysed cultural contexts in which remembrance becomes 
organised and structured and the connotations of the spatial frameworks more 
regulated.34 In contemporary society the professionals in the zone de l’activité 
technique uphold the collective memory of the profession that is inherited 
from previous generations of the trade, the notables of memory are authorised 
to recall legal memory, and the clergy of the Church take on specialised 
forms of interpretation in the religious collective memory. Halbwachs also 
demonstrated how, in early Christianity, the Gospel structured the dogma 
around topographic places in the Holy Land as a consolidating mnemonic, 
and how the creed was passed down to subsequent generations by rites and 
ceremonies performed by specialists in the Church administration. What 
Halbwachs described are stabilising processes of group memory that make it 
different from informal memory. It enters into what Jan Assmann describes 
as ‘the realm of traditions, transmissions, and transferences’.35 These aspects 
of Halbwachs’s work, and other phenomena of institutionalised and 
specialised memory, Aleida and Jan Assmann have subsumed under the term 
cultural memory. But despite Halbwachs’s efforts to describe situations of 
institutionalisation and transmission of memory within such milieus, he did 
not separate them from other, more informal kinds of collective memory. 
So while Aleida and Jan Assmann credit Halbwachs for the communicative 
memory, they primarily attribute their theoretical conceptualisation of 
cultural memory to art historian Aby Warburg (1866–1929) and his concept 
of social memory.36 ‘To put their attempts into a concise formula’, Jan 
Assmann explains, ‘one could say that Warburg studied culture as a 
phenomenon of memory, and Halbwachs memory as a phenomenon of 
culture. Warburg is interested in the mnemonic formability 
[Gedächtnisförmigkeit] of culture, Halbwachs in the cultural shapability 
[Kulturgeprägtheit] of memory’.37 Inspired by the research on memory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See esp. Zone de l’activité technique et zone des relations personnelles, Topographie, Reproduction of 
spatial frameworks of memory, and Notables of memory in ch. 2. 
35 J Assmann, ‘Communicative and Cultural Memory [2008]’, 110. 
36 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 7; J Assmann, ‘Communicative and Cultural Memory 
[2008]’, 110; J Assmann, ‘Kollektives und kulturelles Gedächtnis. Zur Phänomenologie und Funktion von 
Gegen-Erinnerung’, in U Borsdorf & H T Grütter (eds), Orte der Erinnerung. Denkmal, Gedenkstätte, 
Museum (Frankfurt am Main, Campus, 1999), 14. Another early reference for their conception of the cultural 
memory Jan Assmann finds in Thomas Mann’s four Joseph novels (1933–1943), which, according to him, ‘are 
the most advanced attempt at reconstructing the cultural memory of persons living in Palestine and Egypt in 
the Late Bronze Age’. J Assmann, ‘Communicative and Cultural Memory’, in P Meusburger et al. (eds), 
Cultural Memories: The Geographical Point of View (Dordrecht, Springer, 2011), 16. Cf. J Assmann, Thomas 
Mann und Ägypten. Mythos und Monotheismus in den Josephsromanen (Munich, C.H. Beck, 2006). 
37 J Assmann, ‘Kollektives und kulturelles Gedächtnis’, 14. My transl. 
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conducted by biologist Richard Semon (1859–1918), Warburg would 
develop, although not in a rigorous and systematic manner, a 
conceptualisation of a cultural form of memory manifest in the art of 
different culture spheres. On the panels of the Mnemosyne project, named 
after the goddess of memory and mother of the nine muses in Greek 
antiquity, he mounted photographs of artwork from different periods, 
sometimes supplemented with contemporary illustrations and advertisements, 
to study the transmission of gestures of emotion from pagan antiquity to the 
Renaissance and into the present. For Warburg, the social memory addressed 
the issue of how that cultural inheritance was appropriated and 
administered.38 The artwork was loaded with ‘mnemische Energie’, 
mnemonic energy, which could be released at the sight or touch of it. In 
relation to baroque art, Warburg notes that ‘the task of social memory as a 
“mnemic function” emerges quite clearly: through renewed contact with the 
monuments of the past, the sap should be enabled to rise directly from the 
subsoil of the past’.39 Mental states were transported in the pathos formulae 
(Pathosformeln) of sculpture. For Warburg, art becomes a memory organ 
external to the body, in which engrams of experiences of suffering are stored. 
As exemplars, art transports the emotions as a form of gesture language, 
available for artists to access.40 
The engram was a term coined by Semon to refer to the biological changes 
in the brain caused by sensory stimuli. Thus, he believed the memory of an 
impression or an event was stored in hypothetical units of memory and could 
be retrieved from memory through processes of stimulus and response, which 
he called ecphorisation.41 Warburg transported this conceptualisation to art to 
suggest that the storage of emotional experience in visual symbols served the 
transmission of memory of cultural expression. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 M Rampley, The Remembrance of Things Past: On Aby M. Warburg and Walter Benjamin (Wiesbaden, 
Harrassowitz, 2000), 98. Roland Kany refers to the fact that Warburg had read Durkheim and that there may 
have existed a link between Warburg’s term social memory (soziales Gedächtnis) and the term social memory 
(mémoire sociale) that Halbwachs uses as a synonym of collective memory in Les Cadres sociaux de la 
mémoire. R Kany, Mnemosyne als Programm: Geschichte, Erinnerung und die Andacht zum Unbedeutenden 
im Werk von Usener, Warburg und Benjamin (Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1987), 176 n. 31. According to Jan 
Assmann Fritz Saxl should have referred Warburg to Halbwachs’s work. J Assmann, ‘Collective Memory and 
Cultural Identity’, 125 n. 1. 
39 Warburg quoted and translated in E H Gombrich, Aby Warburg: an Intellectual Biography (London, The 
Warburg Institute, 1970), 250. 
40 Warburg quoted and translated in ibid., 245. 
41 R Semon, The Mneme, tr. L Simon (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1921) [Ger. orig. (1904)]. R Semon, 
Mnemic Psychology (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1923) [Ger. orig. (1909)]. Cf. the scientific biography: 
D L Schacter, Forgotten Ideas, Neglected Pioneers: Richard Semon and the Story of Memory (Philadelphia, 
Psychology Press, 2001). 
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If Halbwachs provides Aleida and Jan Assmann with a comprehensive and 
systematic theory, Warburg’s conception of social memory is rather an 
intriguing collection of fragmentary thought, which they have turned into the 
systematic concept of cultural memory. Astrid Erll has suggested that 
Warburg’s ‘writings are more a quarry providing inspiration for subsequent 
scholars than the source of clear-cut theoretical concepts’, but that he 
managed to give ‘an example of how cultural memory can be approached via 
the level of material objects’.42 She also points out that, according to his 
dictum Der liebe gott steckt im Detail, God is in the detail, Warburg’s was 
interested in investigating artistic material in an inductive manner, not 
developing theory.43 
Two realms of the past 
Because of its basis in the brain, communicative memory is vulnerable. 
According to Jan Assmann, studies in oral history have asserted that the 
living memory in illiterate and literate societies does not reach further back 
than about eighty years, or three to four generations.44 After that time, there 
will be no more living witnesses to an event. Already forty years after an 
event or period seems to be a critical threshold for the transmission of the 
experiences of eyewitnesses, as ‘those who have witnessed an important 
event as an adult will leave their future-oriented professional career, and will 
enter the age group in which memory grows as does the desire to fix it and 
pass it on’.45 Jan Assmann exemplifies this with Tacitus, who in the year 22 
noted that the last person who had experienced the republic had died, and 
with the 1980s, forty years after Hitler’s persecution and annihilation of the 
Jews, which saw an increased activity to secure archive material and 
testimonies from survivors. 
Jan Assmann refers to the ethnologist Jan Vansina and the floating gap, a 
concept that describes the phenomenon of the time period that extends 
beyond the eighty or so years in the past, which can no longer be captured 
through living witnesses, and which has not yet been secured for transmission 
to new generations. A break occurs, and what had previously circulated in the 
communicative memory is in need of being fixed. The floating gap, Jan 
Assmann points out, ‘is followed by textbooks and monuments, for example, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Erll, ‘Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction’, 8–9.  
43 A Erll, Kollektives Gedächtnis und Erinnerungskulturen: eine Einführung (Stuttgart, Metzler, 2005), 21. 
44 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 34. 
45 ibid., 36. 
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the official version rather than myths of origin’.46 The relation to the past, 
beyond the floating gap, is essentially different from the self- and group-
experienced communicative memory. He suggests distinguishing between 
two modes of memory: the identity-securing and foundational 
communicative memory, on the one side of the floating gap, and the 
institutionalised cultural memory, on the other. The latter does not actualise 
the past in the present, like the former does, but focuses on temporal fixed 
points; the past ‘tends to be condensed into symbolic figures to which 
memory attaches itself – for example, tales of the patriarchs, the Exodus, 
wandering in the desert, conquest of the Promised Land, exile – and that are 
celebrated in festivals and are used to explain current situations’.47 History 
and myth blend into a remembered rather than recorded history: 
The Exodus, for instance, regardless of any historical accuracy, is the myth 
behind the foundation of Israel; thus it is celebrated at Pesach and thus it is 
part of the cultural memory of the Israelites. Through memory, history 
becomes myth. This does not make it unreal – on the contrary, this is what 
makes it real, in the sense that it becomes a lasting, normative, and formative 
power.48 
In this process, the character of the cultural memory becomes sacred and it is 
no longer upheld through everyday activities, but sustained by ceremonies 
keeping the foundational myth alive in the present. The transition from 
communicative to cultural memory is a removal of memory from the 
everyday life and routine and an insertion of it into ceremonies and festivals. 
Jan Assmann explains that the polarity of the two kinds of memory is clearly 
distinguishable in certain societies, for example in ancient Egypt. In other 
societies, like our contemporary Western, he continues, it is rather the case of 
a sliding scale in which the two forms can be considered the extremes, where 
practices of memory cannot necessarily be ascribed to either of the two. 
The latter point is crucial for the context of this study. For our purpose, in 
outlining a theory to address contemporary or recent historical cases, like that 
of the dispute over the Government Quarter in chapter six, the gradual scale 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 ibid., 37. There exist practices of memory that bridge the floating gap between the origin and the present, 
such as, for example, genealogies, which provide an unbroken link of succession. J Assmann, Cultural 
Memory and Early Civilization, 35. Halbwachs pointed to such a passage from an informal to an 
institutionalised form of collective memory in one of his analyses of religious memory in Christianity. Only 
after the last direct witnesses to Jesus’s acts were gone, and with them the possibility of verification, a body of 
doctrinal and legendary accounts was collected and constructed. M Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux de la 
mémoire, ed. G Namer (1925; facs. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1994), 202–03. Cf. also the increasing 
specialisation of the clergy from the third and fourth centuries. Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 198. 
47 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 37. 
48 ibid., 38. 
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between communicative and cultural memory needs to be recognised. They 
are not offered as two clear-cut categories, but as qualitative descriptions of 
informality and formality, in contact and sometimes overlapping. 
Unlike the communicative memory, the cultural memory is not everyone’s 
property. It is guarded, or carried, by specialists like shamans, bards, priests, 
teachers, artists, scholars, etc. Its distribution is controlled and 
institutionalised, participation in it restricted. 
In some cases, people must prove their competence (or their membership) by 
means of formal tests (as in classical China), or by mastering relevant forms 
of communication (e.g., from Greek in the Greco-Roman world, French in 
18th-century Europe, to Wagner operas to be played on the piano at home). 
Meanwhile, others are excluded from such knowledge. In Jewish and Ancient 
Greek culture these ‘others’ included women; in the golden age of the 
educated middle classes, it was the lower strata of society that were left out.49 
Jan Assmann refers to Halbwachs’s studies of early Christianity and how the 
clergy developed out of the laity to take on the role of interpreting the texts. 
By the fourth century the specialisation of memory transmission and 
dissemination had been embedded in tradition or the cultural memory.50 The 
specialists of the cultural memory become separated from everyday life and 
acquire a special status in society. 
In Aleida and Jan Assmann’s model the cultural memory relates itself to a 
fixed and absolute past. But no memory can preserve the past. Like the 
communicative memory, the cultural memory reconstructs it according to 
frameworks of each contemporary society, just like Halbwachs had pointed 
out in relation to the collective memory. Furthermore, the cultural memory 
needs to be formed culturally. 
As cultural memory is not biologically transmitted, it has to be kept alive 
through the sequence of generations. This is a matter of cultural 
mnemotechnics, that is, the storage, retrieval, and communication of meaning. 
These mnemotechnics guarantee continuity and identity, the latter clearly 
being a product of memory.51 
The neurological basis of the communicative memory is exchanged for 
culture, ‘a complex of identity-shaping aspects of knowledge objectified in 
the symbolic forms of myth, song, dance, sayings, laws, sacred texts, 
pictures, ornaments, paintings, processional routes, or – as in the case of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 ibid., 40.  
50 ibid., 48–49; Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 198, 201. 
51 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization, 72.  
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Australians – even whole landscapes’.52 Like Aleida and Jan Assmann have 
exemplified elsewhere, other symbolic manifestations include buildings, 
floor plans, monuments, or memory institutions like museums, libraries, and 
archives, in which linguistic and visual forms are embedded or organised 
according to set rules, to act as media for the cultural memory.53 
External frameworks of memory 
To use ‘cultural memory’ to refer to the reminding function of a material 
artefact calls to mind similar ways of speaking, using nouns like ‘souvenir’ – 
French for ‘remember’ or ‘memento’ – Latin for ‘remember!’. Kerwin Lee 
Klein suggests that contemporary scholars’ use of ‘memory’ to refer to 
artefacts is a revival of an older practice that has not been in general use since 
the eighteenth century.54 It may appear counter-intuitive to associate artefacts 
– material as well as immaterial – with memory, since things are not 
memories and they do not have a memory faculty.55  
Like the communicative memory, the cultural memory refers to acts of 
making meaning of the past. While the communicative memory refers to 
unstructured and everyday remembering, the cultural memory denotes 
remembering in formalised settings in institutions, organisations, or societies. 
To refer to the domain of artefacts as cultural memory does not entail 
suggesting that a book, a painting, or a museum makes up a memory faculty 
like the human brain. It is not a metaphor either, Jan Assmann asserts in a 
response to criticism directed at the concept. Instead, he argues, it is a 
metonym ‘based on material contact between a remembering mind and a 
reminding object’.56 In a similar manner as ‘the White House’ may be used to 
refer to the presidential administration of the United States, regarding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 ibid., 73. The separation of certain forms of social remembrance under the term ‘cultural memory’ answers 
to some of the critique that has been directed at Halbwachs and the collective memory: ‘The use of a metaphor 
of individuality [in ‘collective memory’] conceals (a) the novelty of structures of the public sphere in culture, 
of materialised tradition, of accumulating symbol systems (“intelligent tools”), (b) the temporalisation of the 
environment through buildings of different ages, monuments [Denkmäler], street names, (c) the peculiar form 
of communication in myth and ritual, of art and historiography as the factual use of the past by society’. H 
Cancik, et al., Handbuch religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe, ii (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1990), 311. 
My transl. Their critique is quite the opposite of the accusations of anthropomorphism and hypostatisation, 
rather a call to do so by differentiating the terminology. 
53 A Assmann & J Assmann, ‘Schrift, Tradition und Kultur’, in W Raible (ed), Zwischen Festtag und Alltag. 
Zehn Beiträge zum Thema ‘Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit’ (Tübingen, Narr, 1988), 30; J Assmann, 
‘Communicative and Cultural Memory [2008]’, 111. 
54 K L Klein, ‘On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse’, Representations, /69 (Winter 2000), 
132, 47 n. 12. 
55 Cf. the accusations of hypostatisation, anthropomorphism, and subjectivisation of memory in Halbwachs’s 
and Rossi’s work. See Critique of the collective memory in ch. 1 and Critique of the Rossian theory of memory 
and The afterlife of Halbwachsian and Rossian theories of memory in ch. 4. 
56 J Assmann, ‘Communicative and Cultural Memory [2008]’, 111. 
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material forms as ‘memory’ is a way of speaking that refers to the human 
cognitive acts engaged with the artefact. Reading, perceiving, or, in other 
ways, experiencing or comprehending artefacts semantically or symbolically 
is comparable to acts of remembrance. 
Things do not ‘have’ a memory of their own, but they may remind us, may 
trigger our memory, because they carry memories which we have invested 
into them … On the social level, with respect to groups and societies, the role 
of external symbols becomes even more important because groups which, of 
course, do not ‘have’ a memory tend to ‘make’ themselves one by means of 
things meant as reminders.57 
Erll has lent them her support, just like Aleida and Jan Assmann came to 
Halbwachs’s help: 
There is no such thing as a pre-cultural individual memory; but neither is there 
a Collective or Cultural Memory (with capital letters) which is detached from 
individuals and embodied only in media and institutions. Just as socio-cultural 
contexts shape individual memories, a ‘memory’ which is represented by 
media and institutions must be actualized by individuals, by members of a 
community of remembrance, who may be conceived of as points de vue 
(Maurice Halbwachs) on shared notions of the past. Without such 
actualizations, monuments, rituals, and books are nothing but dead material, 
failing to have any impact in societies.58 
We have learnt from Halbwachs that in the collective memory, the part of it 
that Aleida and Jan Assmann refer to as communicative memory, memory 
images as well as the frameworks are entities of memory. In the 
reconstructive act the individual needs to actualise frameworks in memory in 
order to localise and make meaning of memories. A building in the spatial 
framework, conjured up in memory, may in this way come to remind us of 
earlier visits, of those who live or work there, or it may remind us of our 
historical memory of the changes to the building over time or historic events 
that took place there. By activating the spatial framework of memory, we can 
reconstruct the past. The remembering activity employs only what exists in 
memory. 
We employ material artefacts in a similar way. Halbwachs refers to the 
material framework of the external environment as something essentially 
different from its representation in the spatial framework of memory. He 
suggests that in history and in religion both mind-internal and mind-external 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 ibid. 
58 A Erll, ‘Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction’ibid., 4. 
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frameworks exist, which aid remembrance – the latter in the form of history 
books, interior arrangements of churches, liturgical objects, etc. In relation to 
the environment, Gérard Namer refers to this distinction by Halbwachs as the 
dual nature: on the one hand mental, on the other physical.59 I suggest 
transposing this dualism to frameworks of memory in general. I want to 
suggest that texts, paintings, museums, and city plans can be considered as 
frameworks of memory, instead of (cultural) memory by metonym.60 This 
may avoid accusations of hypostatising memory by referring to it as objects 
and steer clear of giving the impression that the past lies embedded in the 
dead material, instead of it being reconstructed in the act of recollection. 
With my suggestion I do not wish to replace Aleida and Jan Assmann’s 
model of understanding, but to offer one that may prove intuitively more 
accessible as well as more consistent with the model of mind-internal 
frameworks of memory, as postulated by Halbwachs. It moves the focus from 
what is inherent in the object to its catalytic role in acts of remembrance. 
An advantage of the proposal is that it frees the material artefact from 
primarily being associated with cultural memory. In societies like the 
contemporary, material artefacts are, to a large degree, also employed in the 
realm of informal communicative memory. Internal spatial frameworks of 
memory may dominate the use in communicative memory; external 
frameworks are indispensable in cultural memory, but neither can be limited 
to only the one kind. In commemorative places and cultural heritage sites the 
material environment is employed for historical remembering and 
imagination by the laity as much as by the specialists, and the appointed 
notables of highly formalised remembering, like priests, lawyers, or scholars, 
need to employ internal spatial frameworks to at all be able to structure the 
learning and recall of canonical texts. 
Referring to artefacts as frameworks of memory is to suggest that the 
frameworks are not only internal to the mind, but also exist outside of it and 
can be actualised by reading, seeing, or, in other ways, experiencing the 
object. Processes of communicative and cultural memory may, in this way, 
draw on both internal and external frameworks. When I write this text, or you 
read it, we may both refer to our memories and frameworks of the mind – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 G Namer, Mémoire et société (Paris, Méridiens Klincksieck, 1987), 117–18. 
60 My proposal has a parallel in the term cultural frameworks proposed by Ann Rigney as an extension of 
Halbwachs’s social framework and to refer to group remembrance by means of lieux de mémoire, the ‘process 
whereby places, texts and artefacts become the focus of collective remembrance and historical meaning’. A 
Rigney, ‘Plenitude, Scarcity and the Circulation of Cultural Memory’, Journal of European Studies, 35/1 
(2005), 18. The development of the argument of this section has also benefitted from the critique and 
elaboration of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s concept cultural memory in J v Dijck, Mediated Memories in the 
Digital Age (Stanford, SUP, 2007), 1–14. 
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writing and reading skills, language proficiency, and academic knowledge 
that we have acquired previously in order to formulate the text or make 
meaning out of it. But we may also refer to external frameworks – other 
books, dictionaries, or websites – which we can consult when certain 
arguments or references prompt us to seek more knowledge, or when there 
are words that we do not understand. The signs from the external frameworks 
of the artefacts amalgamate with the internal frameworks of our memory in 
the cognitive act of reading, giving rise to an experience of understanding, 
insight, or emotion. The act can be referred to as cultural remembrance, since 
it employs memory in the process. It is on this level that the form and 
materiality of the book, artwork, or building metonymically comes to denote 
the act that plays out in our mind. The external as well as internal 
frameworks become cognitive catalysts. On the level of institutions and 
professions, which can only rely on individual minds for a certain period of 
time, stable external frameworks of archives and libraries are paramount to 
supplementing the oral transmission of precepts and codes from one 
generation of specialists to the next, or from one cohort to another. It is with 
the distinction of architecture as both internal and external framework, 
employed for communicative as well as for cultural memory, that I adopt the 
Halbwachsian and Assmannian model of memory. 
My suggestion to treat artefacts as frameworks of memory implies a 
different understanding of the role of specialists of the cultural memory than 
the one Jan Assmann has argued for. He follows Halbwachs in suggesting 
that the practice of cultural memory, like communicative memory, needs 
present frameworks of the group in order to interpret ‘the texts that no longer 
speak directly to that particular age, but have become to a degree alienated 
from the present’.61 Understanding has been given up in favour of 
interpretation, and the contemporary frameworks enable this interpretation. 
But Halbwachs also considered how material traces from the different pasts 
are employed in the processes of reconstruction on a similar level as the 
frameworks of the present. In relation to the rituals of collective religious 
memory in Christianity, he emphasises the duality between material and 
mental frameworks: 
 [The collective memory] does not preserve the past, but it reconstructs it, 
with the aid of material traces, rites, texts, and traditions left behind by that 
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past, but also with the aid of recent psychological and social factors, that is to 
say, with the present.62 
Similarly, I would argue that the interpretation, in every period, depends and 
falls back on the materiality of these external frameworks. It is not entirely 
free to invent, but needs to return to the material artefacts and incorporate 
them in its construal. The reconstruction of the past presented by the 
specialists thus presents itself as an act of combining the influence offered by 
the contemporary internal frameworks of memory (language, society’s 
values, group-specific codes, etc.) and presently existing external frameworks 
of memory (historic or contemporary texts, buildings, artwork, etc.). 
Like the cultural landmarks of Rossi’s fatti urbani, a building or other 
material environment may be seen as an external spatial framework that 
complements an internal framework. It comes to support informal and 
everyday remembrance in the family, the citizenry, or the national 
fellowship, but also the formal recollection by the notables of history, 
architectural history, religion, etc.63 They are salient points of the cultural 
fellowship – churches, museums, palaces, or places of commemoration. 
Recalling Halbwachs’s definition of the collective landmarks as points in the 
spatial framework that form associative intersections with other frameworks 
of memory, it is possible to regard the cultural landmarks as nodes in the 
internal and external spatial framework, where other frameworks of the 
communicative and cultural memory meet.64 Thus, the cultural landmarks are 
places where the informal and everyday memory of citizens becomes 
influenced by the authorised memory of the nation, of the religion, or of 
professions, through guided tours, brochures, and signs. In Halbwachs’s 
terms, it is where the general history permeates individual memory and 
becomes internalised into people’s historical memory. As I argued in chapter 
four, we ought to see the cultural landmark as the amalgamation of internal 
and external frameworks, the site of overlapping informal and formal 
remembering, and the spatial crossroads for other frameworks and gregarious 
collective memories. 
Functional memory and storage memory 
Whereas the separation of collective memory and written history is central to 
Halbwachs’s theory of memory, most explicitly formulated in La Mémoire 
collective, in their formulation of the cultural memory Aleida and Jan 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 221. 
63 Cf. Cultural landmarks in ch. 4. 
64 Cf. Collective landmarks in ch. 2. 
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Assmann replace the dichotomy with a different model.65 Abandoning the 
idea that writing history can be free from memory work – interpretation, 
partiality, and identification – they suggest that the pair memory–history 
should instead be referred to as inhabited memory–uninhabited memory. 
Thus, Aleida Assmann sees Halbwachs’s model as a distinction between 
memory that is connected to a group or an institution and memory that is free 
from a specific carrier; between one that bridges past, present, and future, and 
one that splits past from present and future.66 It is the difference between, on 
the one hand, one that determines what to remember and what to forget in 
order to provide values and to support identity and norms, and, on the other, 
one that is interested in everything, seeking to establish truth and suspending 
norms and values. Instead of a clear polarisation of two contradictory realms, 
Aleida Assmann proposes a perspectival model of two complementary modes 
of cultural memory: the inhabited functional memory (Funktionsgedächtnis) 
and the uninhabited storage memory (Speichergedächtnis). The former 
relates to the group; it is selective, normative, and future-oriented. In the 
foreground, the functional memory of a nation, a Church, or a profession 
actualises a small fraction of the total possible memory. The functional 
memory comprises canonised texts or works of art, ‘which are destined to be 
repeatedly reread, appreciated, staged, performed, and commented’.67 Space 
and attention are limited in the curricula of schools and universities, in the 
number of commemorative days in the calendar, and in the canons of 
religion, literature, or art.68 Carefully selected and administered by authorised 
institutions like universities, museums, or libraries, the forefront of the 
cultural memory serves to distinguish the group from others and to promote 
cultural fellowship. The latter, Aleida Assmann explains, includes 
that which has lost its living relevance to the present. This ‘memory of past 
memories’ is what I would like to call ‘storage memory.’ We are all familiar 
with the continuous process of disposal of forgetting, the irretrievable loss 
from generation to generation of valued knowledge and live experiences. But 
not all is lost forever; a small segment is assembled and preserved in cultural 
archives, and it is possible for historical knowledge to reclaim some of these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 97–142. Cf. History in memory in the Introduction and Memory and 
history in ch. 1. 
66 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 123. Assmann also refers to Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Pierre Nora as proponents of an oppositional model of memory–history.  
67 A Assmann, ‘Canon and Archive’, tr. S B Young, in A Erll & A Nünning (eds), Cultural Memory Studies: 
An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 99. 
68 Cf. Jan Assmann’s introduction to the notion of canon, its history and definitions: J Assmann, Cultural 
Memory and Early Civilization, 78–110. 
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disembodied relics and abandoned materials and perhaps even reconnect them 
with the functional dimension of cultural memory.69 
It is in the background that all bits and pieces, currently unused or 
meaningless, can be found, ‘de-contextualized and disconnected from their 
former frames which had authorized them or determined their meaning’.70 
Archives and stores hold this reservoir that could be used in historical 
scholarship and future alterations of the functional memory. Aleida Assmann 
points out that the two modes can be seen in relation to the structural role of 
frameworks, in the sense of Halbwachs. While the storage memory contains 
the unframed and unreconstructed, the functional memory places the bits and 
pieces in relation to the frameworks, thus establishing meaning and memory. 
She summarises: 
On the cultural level, storage memory contains what is unusable, obsolete, or 
dated; it has no vital ties to the present and no bearing on identity formation. 
We may also say that is holds in store a repertoire of missed opportunities, 
alternative options, and unused material. Functional memory, on the other 
hand, consists of vital recollections that emerge from a process of selection, 
connection, and meaningful configuration; they are – in Halbwachs’s terms – 
culturally framed. In functional memory, unstructured, unconnected fragments 
are invested with perspective and relevance; they enter into connections, 
configurations, compositions of meaning – a quality that is totally absent from 
storage memory.71 
The distinction between functional and storage memory is the distinction 
between active and passive. If the functional memory remembers, the storage 
memory forgets, but only for the time being. It is a suspended remembrance, 
not a total loss of memory. Irreversible forgetting, Aleida Assmann shows, is 
due to neglect or disregard or to more active destruction of memory, as was 
the case in regimes like those of Hitler and Stalin, which attempted to 
eradicate the traces of certain cultures, periods, or phenomena of the past. 
Hence, the storage memory is situated somewhere between forgetting and 
remembering.  
Elena Esposito suggests exchanging ‘functional memory’ and ‘storage 
memory’ with the terms ‘Erinnerung’ (approximately ‘recollection’) and 
‘Gedächtnis’ (approximately ‘memory’).72 While the former denotes active 
reconstruction, the latter, as a faculty, refers to the dynamics between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 124. 
70 A Assmann, ‘Canon and Archive’, 99. 
71 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 127. Assmann’s emphasis. 
72 E Esposito, ‘Eine Erinnerung an das Vergessen’, Erwägen Wissen Ethik, 13/2 (2002), 248. 
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remembering and forgetting. To do this, the conceptual pair can include the 
essential aspect of forgetting in memory. Literary societies, for example, 
Esposito argues, actively forget by transferring memory to texts, thereby 
increasing the possible amount of remembrance and making reconstruction of 
the past increasingly a question of localisation and retrieval.73 The advantage 
of referring to Erinnerung and Gedächtnis instead of functional and storage 
memory, Jan Assmann asserts, in acknowledgement of Esposito’s proposal, 
is that 
This dichotomy could be operative on an individual as well as on a collective 
level of the dynamics of memory. Memory [Gedächtnis] would then be a 
faculty, always also encompassing the unconscious and the implicit and the 
pluralistically and heterogeneously organised, which operates through acts of 
remembrance and forgetting [Akten des Erinnerns und Vergessens]; 
remembrance [Erinnerung], on the other hand, is their respective 
functionalisation.74 
In this study I will employ the terms functional memory and storage memory, 
while keeping in mind the considerations of Esposito and Jan Assmann. 
Referring to them as Erinnerung and Gedächtnis, or any appropriate English 
translation of the words, I believe, risks confusing the specific concepts of 
more general terms. Functional memory and storage memory, at least in the 
humanities, are idiosyncratic terms, easy to recognise in their specificity. 
Tasks of functional memory and storage memory 
Aleida Assmann points to three of the tasks the functional memory has to 
perform: legitimisation, delegitimisation, and distinction. Quite different 
from Halbwachs who, on the whole, avoided the topic, she asserts that power 
and memory are closely connected, and rulers aim to control the past and its 
commemoration in the present. The selection of traces of the past in the 
shaping of the functional memory creates a historical genealogy that 
legitimises current power structures. ‘The problem with this official 
memory’, Aleida Assmann contends, ’lies in the fact that it depends on 
censorship and coerced rites of commemoration. It lasts as long as the power 
that it supports. It drives out any unofficial remembrance that might present 
itself as a critically subversive functional memory’.75 The second task of the 
functional memory is delegitimisation. While regimes actively allow 
themselves to forget, thus withdrawing some parts of the past from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Cf. also Esposito in Explicit and implicit spatial frameworks in this chapter. 
74 J Assmann, ‘Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: eine Replik’, Erwägen Wissen Ethik, 13/2 (2002), 276. My transl. 
75 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 128. 
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circulation, the opposition attempts to revitalise that which has been forgotten 
in order to delegitimise the existing rule, to move the forgotten traces from 
the storage memory into the functional memory. 
A fairly recent example of delegitimizing memory is the commemoration in 
1989 of Imre Nagy, who was Prime Minister of Hungary in 1956 when the 
Soviet troops moved in to crush the uprising, and who was subsequently 
executed. His memory had been erased from the history books by the 
Communist regime and carefully kept out of the public eye. But it could not 
be extinguished, and indeed its exclusion only made it all the more solid. In 
1989 a group of dissidents staged a symbolic funeral, initially at a cemetery in 
Paris; but the same year they reburied their hero with full ceremonial honors 
and mass media coverage at the cemetery in Budapest. Imre Nagy now 
became the symbolic figure of counter-memory and a decisive influence on 
the process of de-Stalinization in Hungary.76 
The counter-memory thus anticipates a redefinition of functional memory 
that will come into play once those currently in power lose their influence. 
The third function is the creation and support of identities and the distinction 
of the group from other groups. It aims at constructing a collective identity 
for all members of the group with shared references. Aleida Assmann 
exemplifies this with the national movements that reconstructed or invented 
traditions in nineteenth-century Europe to provide ‘the people’ of the 
emerging nation states with identities.77 
These aspects of the functional memory and the storage memory will 
become important elements of the study in chapter six. Legitimisation and 
delegitimisation, and the struggle for influence over cultural interpretation, 
turn out to be some of the central mechanisms in the dispute over the memory 
connected to the Government Quarter in Oslo. Thus, I will emphasise the 
importance of Aleida Assmann’s analysis for the assessment of political and 
ideological forces acting out on society’s different spatial frameworks of 
memory. 
The task of the storage memory, Aleida Assmann continues, is to provide a 
reservoir for future functional memories. It is fundamental for all cultural 
renewal and change and remains the corrective for the functional memory of 
any society. ‘If the borders between functional memory and storage memory 
remain permeable, elements can be exchanged, patterns of meaning can be 
altered, and even the general framework can be restructured’.78 In totalitarian 	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regimes the border may be closed, preventing alternatives, criticism, and 
contradictions from surfacing. They miss the vital role of contextualisation 
and critique for the functional memory. Aleida Assmann emphasises that also 
the storage memory needs its supporters; it is 
no more natural or spontaneous than functional memory; it needs to be 
supported by institutions that preserve, conserve, organize, open up, and 
circulate cultural knowledge. Archives, museums, libraries, and memorial 
sites all play their part in this task, as do research institutes and universities, 
by resisting the automatic expulsion of the past from everyday memory just as 
they resist its deliberate exclusion from the functional memory. These 
institutions have a special license to relieve memory of its direct social 
usages.79 
The storage memory thus requires an institutional and architectural 
infrastructure. How this spatiality is organised, and which role it takes in 
relation to societal remembering, will be the focus of a later part of this 
chapter, The spatial frameworks of cultural memory. 
Spatial frameworks of the cultural memory 
Leaning on the principle of placement in the art of memory, as described by 
Frances Yates, in Halbwachs’s study of the topography of the Holy Land in 
the Gospel and in Nora’s conception of les lieux de mémoire, Jan Assmann 
asserts the importance of placement for the cultural memory.80 Only that 
which has a place in memory can be passed on. A-topos, placelessness, is the 
status of that which does not pass the censorship in the transcendence from 
the communicative to the cultural memory.81 As Nora has shown, places need 
not be physical, but can equally be places in a figurative sense: places for the 
mind. Just like Halbwachs before him, he makes clear that even when we 
speak of topographical places, we generally refer to our concept of them. As 
lieux de mémoire, Verdun or the Eiffel Tower are really not so different from 
the Marseillaise; they are predominantly cultural conceptualisations and 
memory intersections that can hardly be reduced only to their physical 
properties.82 Places are paramount to the cultural memory, both in their 	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82 Gérôme Truc has suggested translating lieux de mémoire as nodes of memory, suggesting their non-spatial 
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material form and in their mental form. In the following sections I will 
elaborate some of the ways in which I, with Aleida and Jan Assmann, see 
architecture and landscapes take the roles of frameworks of the cultural 
memory, as internal and/or external spatial frameworks.83 These are, in 
essence, elaborations and supplements to the ways in which Halbwachs 
regarded the use of the spatial framework of memory and, thereby, 
contributions to the expansion of the scope of the concept. 
Explicit and implicit spatial frameworks of memory 
When we enter into the realm of cultural memory, the specifics of form in 
architecture and in cities takes on an importance that Halbwachs has only 
briefly addressed in his study of the collective memory. The appearance of 
the materiality becomes key to some of the kinds of remembrance that make 
use of the surroundings as framework. In this respect, places and buildings 
are employed on at least two levels in the processes of cultural memory. On 
the first level, a building, for example a nineteenth-century museum, may 
have been intended by the architect as an architectural object displaying the 
style of its time or features characteristic of its typology, etc. Its plans, 
façades, and ornamentation prompt the visitor’s knowledge of the style and 
period in the history of architecture. As a framework of memory it displays 
intentional architectural form. In Jan Assmann’s words, it is ‘accentuated by 
signs’.84 
Moreover, the museum architecture may show signs of ageing that were 
not conceived in the original creation, for example in the form of weathering, 
alterations, or ruination. Like we shall see in chapter six, the splinters of the 
bomb that went off in the Government Quarter in Oslo caused damage to 
parts of the materiality and scarred otherwise intact building parts. The 
building displays markers of age, of events that have taken place, and of 
maintenance, and by the sight of it the visitor may recall events in history or 	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just reflect over time that has passed. These are also accentuations by signs, 
but signs that were not intended at the time of conception. Like the intended 
signs, however, they are explicit in the physical form. Both the intended and 
unintended signs are possible to survey and record in drawings, photographs, 
models, etc. These visible marks act as tokens of passed time and of the 
course of events. They are indexes pointing to historical or art historical 
memory of individuals and groups or to written history in books and 
archives. 
On the second level, places can also be assigned the role of a medium of 
memory without expressing it in their form. Jan Assmann says they are 
‘raised to the status of signs, that is, they are semioticized’. The materiality of 
the landscape of the Holy Land does not reveal to the disciples the life of 
Jesus through its materiality, but it acts as a cultural mnemonic for the 
community, structuring and cuing the dogma of Jesus’s life. The museum, 
similarly, may take on the role of a setting associated with events and periods 
in art history or in the history of the nation, without it being expressed 
architecturally.85 The cues for memory are not visible in the physical 
configuration and are not possible to record graphically in the same manner 
for the place that is ‘raised to the status of signs’ as for the place that is 
‘accentuated by signs’. Both levels, however, arguably point to memories that 
lie beyond the form of the materiality itself, which cannot be reconstructed 
without other interpretative frameworks, internal or external, actualised in the 
remembering mind. These may consist in pre-existing and internal 
frameworks of history, politics, or architectural history, or in external 
frameworks of photographs, history books, books on the history of 
architecture, professional experience, etc., in order to decipher and enlarge 
what one sees. 
On the two levels – the material or imagined architecture accentuated by 
signs as well as that raised to the status of signs – the building takes on the 
role of a spatial framework which, together with the temporal and social 
frameworks, enables the group to structure and reconstruct the past. I suggest 
calling the museum in the first example, ‘accentuated by signs’, an explicit 
spatial framework of memory. Correspondingly, the second example, the 
museum ‘raised to the status of signs’, can be referred to as an implicit spatial 
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framework of memory.86 As is the case for many sites of the cultural 
memory, the environment often acts as both an implicit and explicit 
framework, as an invisible as well as a visible index to the cultural memory. 
In such cases, it may be useful to speak of implicit and explicit aspects of the 
spatial framework. 
An art of cultural memory 
I have elsewhere suggested calling a metalevel of the spatial frameworks of 
cultural memory an art of cultural memory.87 The term alludes to the classical 
art of memory, which employed mental representations of buildings and 
streets to organise and help recall the contents of speeches or the details of a 
court case, and to Aleida and Jan Assmann’s concept cultural memory. By an 
art of cultural memory I understand the role architecture is assigned as a 
spatial mnemonic for scholars, librarians, and archivists in their work with 
organising, localising, and accessing external frameworks of the cultural 
memory – books, documents, artwork, specimen. As an external spatial 
framework, it primarily structures the search and maintenance of collections 
of material artefacts, but doubles as a memorisable spatiality that can help the 
specialist to remember the order of the collection, the order of the 
frameworks. It is a highly specific spatial framework that points to other 
external frameworks. Its spatial devices include the layout of floor plans and 
sectioning of museums, libraries, or archives, the division of rooms and 
systems of display and storage – vitrines, shelves, filing cabinets, and card 
indexes. 
The plan and ornamentation of the museum, as an explicit spatial 
framework, may help us to identify the building as of a particular period or 
style. For the art historian, additionally, each building, room, or wall may 
also point to the frameworks of other documentation; individual artefacts like 
paintings, photographs, drawings, texts, or classificatory aggregates like 
periods, oeuvre, discourses, etc. can be consulted in the act of cultural 
remembrance that involves the museum. Similarly, on the implicit level, the 
spatial order structures the other frameworks. In the museum, a particular hall 
may be assigned a certain artist or period, and the curator can structure his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Sébastien Marot has sketched a comparable distinction for architecture and urbanism of ‘literal memory’ 
(conservation, monuments) – approximately corresponding to the explicit spatial framework of memory and 
‘phenomenal memory’ (for places where there are few or no visible traces of the past) – analogous to the 
implicit framework. S Marot, Sub-urbanism and the Art of Memory (London, AA, 2003) [Fr. orig., ‘L’Art de 
la mémoire, le territoire et l’architecture’ (1999)], [85–86]. 
87 M Ekman, ‘Edifices of Memory. Topical Ordering in Cabinets and Museums’, in J Hegardt (ed), The 
Museum Beyond the Nation (Stockholm, The National Historical Museum, 2012). 
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knowledge of previous hangs and of the artist’s paintings, but he may also 
bring to mind collections, catalogues, and literature concerning the artist. 
The collective landmarks in the spatial framework of memory, as 
Halbwachs defined them, are points where different frameworks of the 
collective memory intersect. In chapter two I exemplified this by reference to 
his account of trying to recall whether he had stayed at his mother’s or at his 
in-laws’ when he went to Paris to take part in exams the previous year.88 His 
relatives’ homes took the role of topographical crossroads in his spatial 
framework of Paris, overlapping with notable points of reference in the social 
framework of his family (his mother and in-laws) and temporal framework of 
his familial and professional life (the annual exams, the period of illness of 
A.). I also suggested labelling cultural landmarks those salient points in the 
spatial framework of cultural memory that act as crossroads for internal and 
external frameworks and for communicative and cultural memory.89 The 
architectural spaces in the art of cultural memory can be referred to as 
second-degree cultural landmarks. They are effective systems of densely 
organised landmarks, each of which carry indexes pointing to other external 
frameworks of the cultural memory. In the museum, the halls are landmarks 
for artists, periods, or schools; in the library, the shelves structure the art 
history literature, a spatial logic based on the system of order in the library 
catalogue; and in the storages, the oeuvre of the artist is tightly packed, but 
easily retrievable. 
The architecture of the museum, the library, and the archive is positioned 
somewhere in between a concrete organisation of collections of material 
objects and a memory system of abstract knowledge orders, at the same time 
spatial and epistemological. The arrangement of the artefact or the specimen 
in the building could be seen as a pre-ordered system of memorisable loci, or 
places, to be internalised into the spatial framework employed in the art of 
cultural memory. Implicitly conveying ordering principles of knowledge, the 
spatial order organises a realm of cultural memory that stretches far beyond 
its specific collection. 
As the metalevel of the spatial framework of cultural memory, the second-
degree cultural landmark supports an advanced mnemotechnic, developed in 
specialist and scholarly practices to structure larger taxonomies. It is the 
technique of making classifications spatial. In Germany, such practices are 
studied under the term räumliche Wissensordnungen (spatial orders of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Cf. Collective landmarks in ch. 2. 
89 Cf. Cultural landmarks in ch. 4 and External frameworks of memory in this chapter. 
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knowledge).90 Such mnemotechnics, Esposito has argued, are the results of a 
historic development towards relegating memory to books and artefacts 
instead of memorising them. She refers to the use of documents to ‘archive’ 
memory as a parallel augmentation of the ability to remember and the ability 
to forget.91 The documents ‘archive’ the contents of memory and allow us to 
forget them as long as there exist techniques to find them again – through 
references, keywords, classifications, markers, or spatial orders. The mind is 
freed from memorising facts, Esposito points out, allowing the activation of 
other abilities and leading to a more effective and abstract approach to 
administering the past. In the art of cultural memory, ordered forgetting 
enables remembering more by means of the structured use of spatial 
frameworks. In this way, the art of cultural memory doubles as an art of 
cultural forgetting. 
Spatial frameworks of functional and storage memory 
The architectural infrastructure of the functional and storage memory 
provides additional distinctions to the spatial framework of cultural memory. 
On the one end of the perspectival gamut, the functional memory is 
performed in commemorative sites, in open-air museums, in exhibition halls 
of museums, on stages of theatres, in ceremonial spaces of the nation, and in 
TV and radio studios. On the other end, specialists cater to the upkeep of the 
storage memory in archives, storages, libraries, museums, and conservation 
studios. Also seemingly forgotten traces are administrated as a form of 
archive; the sites of not yet excavated remains from earlier societies are 
registered and regulated by law, so as not to be destroyed when new roads or 
buildings are planned. 
The nineteenth-century museum is a cultural memory institution that acts 
as a spatial framework both for the functional memory and for the storage 
memory.92 The halls of permanent or temporary exhibitions pass on and 
revise the functional memory. Pedagogical ordering into schools, artists, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 For an introduction, see e.g. R Felfe & K Wagner, Museum, Bibliothek, Stadtraum: Räumliche 
Wissensordnungen 1600–1900 (Berlin, LIT, 2010). In their contribution to the volume, Jeanne Pfeiffer and 
Raymond-Josué Seckel argue that for the arrangement of the library of aforementioned Aby Warburg (the 
attributed forefather of Aleida and Jan Assmann’s concept cultural memory), ‘The aim of Warburg was to 
design a spatial disposition (arrangement) that enables the free circulation from one department to another and 
unite them in a route denied by any disciplinary classification. For him, the objective was to fabricate an 
agreement between the series of thought within the arrangement of books and the physical route through the 
four floors of the building’. J Pfeiffer & R-J Seckel, ‘Der Grundriss der Bibliothek, oder wie der Raum die 
Konzeption des Kataloges bestimmt’, in R Felfe & K Wagner (eds), Museum, Bibliothek, Stadtraum: 
Räumliche Wissensordnungen 1600–1900 (Berlin, LIT, 2010), 84–85. My transl. 
91 Esposito, ‘Eine Erinnerung an das Vergessen’, 248. 
92 This argument is based on my study of the Norwegian national gallery. Ekman, ‘Architecture for the 
Nation’s Memory’, 152–54. 
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genres, or periods circulates and supports identity-promoting distinctions of 
regional, national, or Western art. In the basements or back rooms, or in other 
buildings, the specialists of the archives, libraries, storages, and conservation 
studios maintain, organise, and research the storage memory. In these 
activities elements repeatedly move from the spaces of the functional 
memory to those of the storage memory, and back again. 
Memorial, historical, or heritage sites can also be seen to furnish a 
community with a spatial framework both for the storage memory and for the 
functional memory. As a site of storage memory, the materiality can be 
trawled for informative traces, which can be used by archaeologists and 
historians to reconstruct an understanding of the past. As a site of functional 
memory, it may be assigned messages and symbols with the purpose of 
influencing a collective identity, for example architectural monuments or 
statues of prominent historic persons.93 The latter may be explicit frameworks 
that display memory cues in their material form, like the sites just mentioned, 
or form implicit frameworks, where memories have been linked to an 
existing materiality. 
Receptive places – Erinnerungsorte 
Discontinuation of the use of a site of the group’s spatial framework of 
communicative memory is a change from Generationenorte, or other 
environments employed actively as frameworks of the memory of 
communities or cultural groups, to Erinnerungsorte. The Erinnerungsort, so 
Aleida Assmann explains, corresponds to the end of engagement with the 
place by the groups that dominated it, due to abandonment or the destruction 
or dispersal of the group. The remains constitute a place open to the 
construction of meaning.94 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Meusburger, Heffernan, and Wunder have lucidly summarised the struggles of function memory in such 
places: ‘political regimes and elites seek to control the distribution of emblematic images in public space. 
Some places are more visible, prestigious, frequented, or symbolically significant than others. To be effective, 
mnemonic devices need to be specifically designed and deliberately located to channel public attention to 
certain events and interpretations and, crucially, to prevent future generations from ever even becoming aware 
of selected historical events. In this sense all memorials are simultaneously about remembering and forgetting 
… Like a well-conceived theater set, a successful commemorative landscape spotlights only certain parts of 
the scene, leaving some actors and events obscure. Jubilee celebrations and rituals of intimidation alike are 
staged at prominent public venues with the aim of impressing people, achieving a collective catharsis, 
demonstrating the superiority of a given political idea, revealing the powerlessness of individuals and groups, 
and eliciting emotions favourable to those in power’. P Meusburger, et al., ‘Cultural Memories: an 
Introduction’, in P Meusburger et al. (eds), Cultural Memories: The Geographical Point of View (Dordrecht, 
Springer, 2011), 9. 
94 With regard to the translation of the term Erinnerungsorte, see The works and translations of Aleida 
Assmann and Jan Assmann in the Introduction. Aleida Assmann has used the term with slightly different 
connotations throughout of the book. I will not use it as an open, general term, but with one specific meaning: 
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In order to survive and to be relevant, a story that replaces [supplementär 
ersetzt] the lost milieu must be told. Places of memory [Erinnerungsorte] are 
dispersed fragments of a lost or destroyed way of life [Lebenszusammenhang]. 
With the abandonment and destruction of a place, its history is not yet over; it 
holds on to material relics, which become the elements of narration and 
therefore again reference points of a new cultural memory. Such places, 
however, require explanation; their significance must be secured through 
linguistic transmission.95 
It is the material remains that characterise Erinnerungsorte. Different than 
intentional monuments, commemorative places, and commemorative rituals, 
they do not carry symbolic value, but only point to themselves as 
archaeological and historical evidence, ready to be construed.96 It has no 
living bond to collective memories; its only path to the past is via the 
materiality or through other historical sources. The Erinnerungsort is open 
for appropriation, to become a framework of a cultural memory. It exhibits 
architectural features or signs of time, but it has not yet been formed into an 
explicit spatial framework of cultural memory.97 In the vocabulary of this 
study, Erinnerungsorte stands out as the only term that specifically refers to 
the materiality. It is a materiality that is available to interpretation and 
meaning making. 
Aleida Assmann argues that when there is absolutely no connection to the 
past, such as in the cases of complete destruction of entire physical and social 
environments of Jewish culture by the Nazi regime, it is not the case of an 
Erinnerungsort, but of vergessen der Orte, forgetting of places.98A 
topographical point in a landscape or a city that carries no material traces, the 
place itself cannot remember. Only through remains can it remind or trigger 
curiosity. Plaques, photographs, or commemorative acts must compensate for 
the absence, if such sites should be able to serve as a framework of cultural 
memory. It needs other frameworks in the act of memory – books, recorded 
interviews, drawings, documents, etc. Only then can they be ‘raised to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
as a site with physical remains after a lost life context, receptive to new stories and appropriable by cultural 
memory. 
95 A Assmann, Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses (1999; special edn, 
Munich, C.H. Beck, 2003), 309. My transl. Wilson’s rendition is slightly freer in the interpretation. A 
Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 292. 
96 A Assmann, Erinnerungsräume, 337. In this example, Erinnerungsorte is translated as ‘sites of memory’: A 
Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 321. 
97 Nora has suggested a similar difference between lieux d’histoire and lieux de mémoire, places of history and 
places of memory: ‘To begin with, there must be a will to remember. If we were to abandon this criterion, we 
would quickly drift into admitting virtually everything as worthy of remembrance … Without the intention to 
remember, lieux de mémoire would be indistinguishable from lieux d’histoire’. Nora, ‘Between Memory and 
History’, 19. 
98 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 310. 
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status of signs’ and turned into an implicit spatial framework of cultural 
memory. 
Imaginative places – antëische Magie 
A phenomenon that reminds of the mémoire involontaire of places described 
in chapter two, Aleida Assmann has described as antëische Magie, antaeic 
magic.99 Just like the former spontaneously cues autobiographical memories 
at the return to places one has left behind, the latter supports the imagination 
of the past by visits to historic places, where we have learnt that important 
events took place or famous people lived. It is an act of cultural remembrance 
of the individual: ‘the longer the way through historical time, so it can be 
summarised, the more vivid the imaginative interest in shortcuts, immediate 
touch, and direct contact’.100 She refers to it as our expectation that the 
sensory involvement with the materiality of historic sites will intensify the 
experience of the past, provided we have already learnt about its history. 
Aleida Assmann speaks of Marcus Tullius Cicero, one of the theorists of 
the art of memory in Roman antiquity, who testified to the imaginative value 
of places for the structuring of memory. In On Moral Ends, Cicero tells of his 
visit to the academy in Athens, a few years after the city had been sacked and 
plundered: 
We arrived at the Academy’s justly famous grounds to find that we had the 
place to ourselves, as we had hoped. Piso then remarked: ‘I cannot say 
whether it is a natural instinct or a kind of illusion, but when we see the places 
where we are told that the notables of the past spent their time, it is far more 
moving than when we hear about their achievements or read their writings … 
Such is the evocative power that locations possess. This is how I am affected 
right now. I think of Plato, who they say was the first philosopher to have 
regularly held discussions here. Those little gardens just nearby not only bring 
Plato to mind, but actually seem to make him appear before my eyes. Here 
come Speusippus, Xenocrates and his pupil Polemo, who sat on that very seat 
we can see over there. Even when I look at our own Senate-house … I often 
think of Scipio, Cato, Laelius and above all my grandfather. Such is the 
evocative power that locations possess. No wonder the training of memory 
[the art of memory] is based on them.’101 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Cf. Remember other things in ch. 2. ibid., 163. I will draw on a few different texts in which Aleida Assmann 
has sketched out the term. Cf. n. 83. 
100 A Assmann, ‘Das Gedächtnis der Orte – Authentizität und Gedenken’, 201. My transl. 
101 M T Cicero, On Moral Ends (De finibus bonorum et malorum), tr. R Woolf, (ed), J Annas, Cambridge 
Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge, CUP, 2004) [L. orig. 45 ʙc], 117–18. Quoted in A Assmann, 
Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 296. 
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Similarly, Aleida Assmann relates to the experiences of visiting historic 
places in Italy recounted by Petrarch in the fourteenth century – ‘while we 
wandered not only in the city [Rome] itself but around it, at each step there 
was present something that would excite our tongue and mind: here was the 
palace of Evander, there the shrine of Carmentis, here the cave of Cacus 
…’102 – and by the sixteenth-century humanist Justus Lipsius: 
A special emphasis is on the eyes, which in this case are the only true guides 
to knowledge. [In Italy] you will set not set foot anywhere or turn your eye, 
without coming upon some monument or acquiring the memory of some 
ancient custom, some old story … When those great men enter not only into 
the mind but almost into the eye, while we step on the ground on which they 
themselves so often trod.103 
A temporal organisation of the past is made spatial; chronology is 
transformed into a topology of history, in a manner reminiscent of the art of 
memory. The written tradition, Aleida Assmann explains, ‘is brought to vivid 
life by … autopsy; the spiritual legacy of the past becomes accessible to the 
senses through the informed eye’.104 Aleida Assmann describes the 
distinction between the appropriation of a historical past by reading and by 
sensory experience, respectively, as the mediated and linguistic continuity of 
texts and the immediate and symbolic contiguity of images. She also 
recognises the distinction in the writings of nineteenth-century jurist and 
anthropologist Jakob Johann Bachofen, who distinguishes between two roads 
to knowledge, 
the longer, slower, more arduous road of rational combination and the shorter 
path of the imagination, traversed with the force and swiftness of electricity. 
Aroused by direct contact with the ancient remains, the imagination grasps the 
truth at one stroke, without intermediary links. The knowledge acquired in this 
second way is infinitely more living and colorful than the products of the 
understanding.105 
Aby Warburg similarly distinguishes between the two ways to knowledge, 
suggesting that engagement with antique sculptures facilitates a ‘visual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Letter of April 1341 from Francesco Petrarca to Giovanni Collonna. Quoted in A Assmann, Cultural 
Memory and Western Civilization, 294. My abbrev. 
103 Letter of 3 April, 1578 from Justus Lipsius to Philippe de Cannoy. Quoted in ibid., 293. My abbrev. 
104 ibid. 
105 J J Bachofen, Myth, Religion and Mother Right. Selected Writings of J. J. Bachofen, ed. R Marx, tr. R 
Manheim (Princeton, PUP, 1967) [Ger. orig., Mutterecht und Urreligion (1861)], 11–12. Quoted in A 
Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 163. 
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revival of the memory matter’.106 According to Aleida Assmann, it was 
Warburg who proposed the term antëische Magie in order to describe the 
‘discharge of latent memories released by direct contact’.107 It refers to the 
Greek myth in which Heracles wrestled the giant Antaeus, son of Poseidon 
and Mother Earth. As long as the giant would remain in physical contact with 
the Earth, his mother, he would gain new strength and be unbeatable. 
Heracles eventually defeated him by lifting him up in the air, separating him 
from his life-giving mother. The motif of Hercules lifting Antaeus has been 
frequently reproduced in art since antiquity and Warburg used the motif in 
his image panels, for example in the Mnemosyne Atlas.108 
Transferred to the built environment, Aleida Assmann understands 
antëische Magie as the way we ascribe historic sites the capacity to make the 
past tangible for us. We seek in historic places an intensification of 
experience different from the historical facts we learn in books or in school. 
Trips to buildings, towns, and landscapes of historical significance or 
curiosity, find their reward in the site-bound antëische Magie. Aleida 
Assmann describes it as the ancient, inner willingness of pilgrims and Grand 
tour tourists to strengthen historical knowledge through subjective 
experience. She argues that contemporary equivalents can be found in site-
bound museums, commemorative places, and documentation centres; through 
sensory tangibility, affective coloration and appropriation, we expect them to 
deepen our insight into the past and the remembering of historical facts. If the 
histories we have learnt lose the ground that testifies to them, if the site is 
cleared from traces, it would imply that the history of the site could lose its 
earth-bound potency and suffer a fate similar to that of the giant Antaeus, 
who lost his strength when lifted from the ground. In the eyes of the 
community that maintains history, the ground of the Erinnerungsort indeed 
possesses powers as an evocative structure for the imagination. 
Upon arriving at a site, the perceptual input from the materiality establishes 
a link to the historical memory we have brought with us or which we acquire 
at the site: in the mind, the spatial percept overlays the spatial framework of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 A Warburg, ‘Kommunale Pflichten und allgemeine Geistespolitik’ [orig. (1909)], in D Wuttke (ed), Aby M. 
Warburg. Ausgewählte Schriften und Würdigungen (Baden-Baden, Valentin Koerner, 1980), 305. My transl. 
Warburg argued that for students to study ‘The classical writers without the classical works of art remains a 
deceitful trap of failure. The antiquity is then dissected, not experienced.’  
107 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 163. In none of the texts where she discusses the 
concept does she give a reference to where Warburg used the term originally. I have not been able to identify 
the source. 
108 See e.g. A Warburg, Bilderreihen und Ausstellungen, (eds) U Fleckner et al., Aby Warburg Gesammelte 
Schriften. Studienausgabe, ii:2 (Berlin, Akademie, 2012), 318–21; A Warburg, Der Bilderatlas 
MNEMOSYNE, (eds) M Warnke et al., Aby Warburg Gesammelte Schriften. Studienausgabe, ii:1 (Berlin, 
Akademie, 2000), 64–65. 
Edifices 	  
 	  230 
memory. I am tempted to borrow Halbwachs’s thought on what happens 
when we experience the mémoire involontaire (Proust) upon returning to 
places where we have not been for a long time and read it in the context of 
historical memory, not autobiographical memory: 
But from where does this kind of sap come that makes certain memories swell 
up and gives them an appearance of real life? Is it the former life conserved in 
them, or is it not rather a new life, which we communicate to them, a 
borrowed life, drawn from the present, and which lasts only so long as the 
passing overexcitement or our immediate affective disposition? … Well, 
through a mutual exchange, our reconstructed images borrow present 
emotions of this feeling of reality, which it in our eyes makes into existent 
objects, while the sense of presence, through these connections to the images, 
comes to identify itself with the feelings that once accompanied the objects.109 
Does a similar phenomenon also take place if the events that took place were 
not our own, but events from history? Naturally, they are emotionally 
coloured, no matter whether they stem from exciting childhood adventures of 
medieval kings or from the disturbing learning of the Holocaust. Is there also, 
in such cases, a mutual exchange, where ‘the reconstructed images’ of the 
past ‘borrow present emotions of this feeling of reality’ of the historic 
environment before our eyes? The internal spatial framework is altered by the 
percept; at the same time, the spatial framework that we bring with us 
informs our perception and overlays it with our historical imagination. It is an 
external framework that we perceive, but the interpretation of the material 
signs is based on the existing frameworks of our minds – spatial, social, 
linguistic, and historical. The percept vivifies our historical knowledge and 
adds to memory our own experience of having been on the site. At the same 
time, the knowledge lends significance to the materiality. The amalgamation 
of external and internal spatial frameworks seems to trigger the imagination 
to stage in mind scenes of history against the architectural backdrop. 
We could compare this to the discussion of vital and pathological 
permanences in the last chapter.110 The historical imagination of the antëische 
Magie is present in both kinds of fatti urbani – in the vital, where history is 
imagined through present life activities that take place there, and the 
pathological, where the history of the site is approached at an emotional 
distance, for example in sites that have been turned into museums. The 
former site is characterised by its informal, unorganised character of memory. 
The visitor, or the person who sustains a relation to the site on a day-to-day 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux, 26. 
110 See Permanences in ch. 4. 
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basis, imagines freely. The latter, the pathological permanences, are 
institutionalised and controlled. Historical remembering may here only take 
place according to given rules; opening hours, guided tours, leaflets, 
postcards, or audio guides direct the attention of the visitor. The histories of 
place are selected; they belong to the functional memory of national history 
or of the society that maintains the sites. Understood as two distinctions of 
the antëische Magie, we may take them not only to refer to sites in cities that 
have existed for a long time, but to any site that the group ascribes historic 
events to or where relics indicate previous cultural activity. While vital sites 
of antëische Magie have their seat in the remembering of individuals and 
informal groups, the pathological are the places where the unstructured 
imagination meets the edifying cultural memory. 
Affirmative places – Gedenkorte 
In the study of French national remembering, Pierre Nora has investigated 
how national fellowships concretise in what he calls the lieu de mémoire, the 
site of memory, a ‘significant entity, whether material or non-material in 
nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a 
symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community’.111 As I have 
already mentioned, in the twentieth century, according to Nora, the lieux de 
mémoire replaced the milieux de mémoire; these real environments of 
memory are exchanged for an institutionalised culture of history and 
remembrance.112 Without the living memory bound to such places, what 
remains is the embodiment of a barely surviving memorial consciousness. 
The lieux de mémoire 
make their appearance by virtue of the deritualization of our world – 
producing, manifesting, establishing, constructing, decreeing, and maintaining 
by artifice and by will a society deeply absorbed in its own transformation and 
renewal … they mark the rituals of a society without ritual … Lieux de 
mémoire originate with the sense that there is no spontaneous memory, that 
we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organize 
celebrations, pronounce eulogies, and notarize bills because such activities no 
longer occur naturally.113 
The lieux de mémoire are collective places that crystallise values and secure 
the identity of the national fellowship. They should be understood as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 P Nora, ‘From Lieux de mémoire to Realms of Memory. Preface to the English-language edition’, in P Nora 
& L D Kritzman (eds), Realms of Memory. The Construction of the French Past, i: Conflicts and Divisions 
(New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), xvii. 
112 Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, 7. 
113 ibid., 12. 
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conceptual and mental sites rather than physical ones, include those that are 
topographical or architectural. Nora asserts that 
Even an apparently purely material site, like an archive, becomes a lieu de 
mémoire only if the imagination invests it with a symbolic aura. A purely 
functional site, like a classroom manual, a testament, or a veteran’s reunion 
belongs to the category only inasmuch as it is also the object of a ritual.114 
The sites are neither permanent nor static; they are concepts which are 
constantly recreated by use and reference, by rites and rituals. 
Topographical sites make up one kind of lieux de mémoire. They ‘owe 
everything to the specificity of their location and to being rooted in the 
ground – so, for example, the conjuncture of sites of tourism and centers of 
historical scholarship, the Bibliothèque nationale on the site of the Hôtel 
Mazarin, the Archives nationales in the Hôtel Soubise’.115 They are different 
from monumental sites of memory, Nora argues, because of their different 
attachment to the physical site. 
Statues or monuments to the dead, for instance, owe their meaning to their 
intrinsic existence; even though their location is far from arbitrary, one could 
justify relocating them without altering their meaning. Such is not the case 
with ensembles constructed over time, which draw their meaning from the 
complex relations between their elements: such are the mirrors of a world or a 
period, like the cathedral of Chartres or the palace of Versailles.116 
Aleida Assmann equates the topographical lieux de mémoire with the term 
Gedenkort. At the same time, she removes the connotation to the specific 
context of modernity’s break with tradition and memory, which Nora 
ascribed to them, and places them in the same category as the experiences of 
antëische Magie by Cicero, Petrarch, and Lipsius, reappearing over the 
course of Western history.117 The Gedenkorte are the result of breakdowns 
and ruptures of social contexts and cultural frames of meaning, Aleida 
Assmann asserts: 
Like tools and utensils that have lost their original function and links with 
daily life and have been collected as relics by museums, ways of life, 
attitudes, actions, and experience undergo a similar metamorphosis when they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 ibid., 19. 
115 ibid., 22. 
116 ibid. 
117 On Aleida Assmann’s different reading of Nora’s terms, see Familial places – Generationenorte and 
Heimat in this chapter. 
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are taken from the context of contemporary life and turned into national and 
cultural memories.118 
Gedenkorte are Erinnerungsorte, where the narratives of the past have been 
stabilised and turned into normative spatial frameworks of the cultural 
memory. They belong to the functional memory of society; the significance 
attributed to the places is defined and embraced by the dominant group(s), 
legitimising their version of the past. They support the dissemination of 
illustrative persons and events of exemplary deeds or terrible suffering. 
‘Bloodstained episodes of persecution, ignominy, defeat, and death have a 
prominent position in the mythical, national, and historical memory, and they 
become unforgettable if a group translates them into a form of binding 
remembrance’.119 It is the Gedenkort that stabilises the story of the cultural 
memory. We can compare the Gedenkort with the pathological permanences 
with institutionalised antëische Magie, places that have been turned into 
museums or documentation centres. Fundamentally a spatial framework of 
functional memory, the Gedenkort works on the level of remembrance of 
larger communities: nations, religions, people. 
Unsettled places – traumatische Orte 
If the Gedenkorte provide spatial frameworks for the functional memory, 
Aleida Assmann’s traumatische Orte can be seen to offer spatial frameworks 
for undecided and uneasy cultural memory. They are sites where affirmative 
construal is blocked, due to psychological pressure or social taboos, and 
cannot become Gedenkorte.120 On the level of the group, Aleida Assmann 
lets us understand that traumatische Orte could be seen to embody shameful 
elements that cannot be expressed, but remain inaccessible as unspeakable 
and ungraspable in the group that employs the site as a spatial framework.121 
On the level of society and culture, she argues, where a number of groups 
appropriate the same sites for their memory, memory processes become 
increasingly delicate. She points to the most emblematic of the traumatische 
Orte: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 323. 
119 ibid., 312. 
120 ibid. 
121 Cf. the concept of silence: ‘we cannot accept the commonplace view that silence is the space of forgetting 
and speech the realm of remembrance. Instead, we offer the following definition of silence. Silence, we hold, 
is a socially constructed space in which and about which subjects and words normally used in everyday life are 
not spoken. The circle around this space is described by groups of people who at one point in time deem it 
appropriate that there is a difference between the sayable and the unsayable, or the spoken and the unspoken, 
and that such a distinction can and should be maintained over time’. R Ginio, et al., Shadows of War: A Social 
History of Silence in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, CUP, 2010), 4. 
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The multi-layered complexity of Auschwitz arises not least from the 
heterogeneity of the memories and perspectives of those who claim the place 
as theirs and those who come to visit it. For the Poles who administer the 
camp in their own country and have made it a central place of memory in the 
history of their nation’s suffering, its meaning is quite different from that of 
the Jewish survivors, whereas Germans and their descendants will again see it 
quite differently from the descendants of the victims.122 
The place as a spatial framework supports a variety of functional memories, 
each one different for every group that sustains a relation to it: one emotional, 
the other historical, symbolic, or political. But even if it should enjoy relative 
stability of significance within each group, the equilibrium is challenged by 
the other groups’ views. Thus, the site is as much connected to the storage 
memory as to the functional memory; it offers all that one seeks in it or 
knows about it. It has a double character: an Erinnerungsort open for the 
projection of memories as well as a normative and affirmative Gedenkort, a 
spatial framework of the storage memory as well as of the functional 
memory. The traumatische Ort is unsettled. 
Reconsidering the spatial framework of memory 
This chapter has introduced the two modes of remembering proposed by 
Aleida and Jan Assmann to distinguish between two realms of Halbwachs’s 
collective memory. The informal communicative memory lives in the 
communicative situations of social groups and has its basis in the brains and 
its members’ acts of recollection. The cultural memory is administrated by 
specialists and institutionalised in order to pass down and stabilise 
remembering over generations. The remembrance is based in the cognitive 
faculties of the authorised notables and makes use of frameworks of memory 
and artefacts. 
Aleida and Jan Assmann have explained how material artefacts like books, 
artwork, buildings, or cities may be considered cultural memory by 
metonym. They are memories insofar as they refer to the act of memory that 
engages with them. I have argued that their role in such acts could be likened 
to that of the frameworks of collective memory, described by Halbwachs. I 
suggest referring to artefacts in general as external frameworks of memory 
and to the built environment, specifically, as an external spatial framework of 
memory. Describing material artefacts as frameworks and not as cultural 
memory may direct the attention to the act of remembrance as much as to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 A Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, 313–14. 
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materiality, avoiding hypostatisation of memory. Furthermore, as an external 
framework, the communicative as well as the cultural memory can be seen to 
employ the material surroundings; this enables the assessment of both kinds 
of remembering on one and the same site. 
In the second part of the chapter I introduced two concepts that describe 
certain roles of the spatial framework of communicative memory for 
families. I continued to introduce some distinctions to the spatial framework 
of cultural memory, between visible marks of explicit spatial frameworks and 
non-visible marks of the implicit spatial frameworks, and between 
frameworks of the canonised and active functional memory and those of the 
passive storage memory. I also suggested seeing, in the complex spatial 
schemes of knowledge organisation in archives, libraries, and museums, a 
metalevel of the spatial framework of cultural memory that draws on ancient 
mnemotechnics to improve the processes of localisation and retrieval by 
specialists. Finally, I introduced a selection of specific terms by Aleida 
Assmann that allows us to conceptualise a variety of places of memory in 
Western society. 
In the Introduction I referred to psychologists Amy Shelton and Naohide 
Yamamoto and asked whether this study could contribute to establishing a 
theoretical framework to organise the many different types of spatial 
representations in society and culture, to understand how they complement, 
interact, or interfere with one another.123 I proposed that Halbwachs’s 
conceptualisation of the spatial framework of memory could provide a step 
towards such a theoretical framework. In chapters one and two I investigated 
the original context of the term to establish a theoretical foundation and the 
basic definitions of the term, and in chapters three and four I followed the 
theory into the architectural discourse in the 1960s and saw how Lynch and 
Rossi developed it. The architectural contextualisation enriched the spatial 
framework of memory with several specifications. With the help of Aleida 
and Jan Assmann’s differentiation of the two realms of collective memory 
into communicative and cultural memory, I have demonstrated how the 
concept of the spatial framework of memory could be expanded to address 
not only informal, social settings, but also varying spatial practices in social 
and cultural remembering. This chapter has broadened Halbwachs’s term and 
introduced supplements to the overall theory, adding general distinctions and 
concise shortcuts to specific forms of spatial frameworks. 
I would suggest that Halbwachs’s original concept has been reinscribed 
into a new theoretical context to become a versatile theoretical framework, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Cf. Object of study in the Introduction. 
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which, against the background of collective, communicative, cultural 
memory, capacitates to address the gamut of architecture’s dynamic roles in 
social and cultural remembering. Also, if the theoretical framework is not 
exhaustive, to my meaning, it demonstrates a robust structure, which 
subsequently can take up further distinctions and specifications. I have placed 
the emphasis on contemporary, Western society, but have also referred to 
other examples, when these have added to the general postulations. It has led 
me to include specific concepts that could act as shortcuts to contemporary 
issues of spatial memory. I will summarise the proposed theoretical 
framework for studies of architecture and societal memory in its entirety in 
the Conclusion. Before that, in the next chapter, I will turn to the debate on 
the Government Quarter in Oslo to see what the spatial framework of 
memory may contribute to in order to assess the roles of the government 
architecture for familial, professional, art historical, and national memory, the 
alterations and rearrangements of its memory contents, and to discover 
specificities that may contribute to complementing aspects of the concept. 
 
6 
Disputed spatial frameworks of memory 
The Government Quarter in Oslo after the 22 July bombing 
And now, after the terror attack, there is no doubt that it will take 
a new and towering place in our collective consciousness … In 
our shared memory and in the history of architecture, Viksjø’s 
government high-rise will be standing steady as the mountain and 
as a composed and sophisticated piece of architecture and maybe 
also a symbol of the society we wish to be. The high-rise will 
continue to tower – not oppressively and brutally – but with a self-
consciousness that cannot be bombed to pieces.  
— Anne-Kristine Kronborg, ‘Folkets høyblokk’, 20111 
Friday 22 July 2011, at 15.17, an unknown Norwegian, Anders Behring 
Breivik, drives a delivery van into the Government Quarter in the city centre 
of Oslo (Figure 1).2 He parks it close to the wall, next to the entrance to the 
High-rise. At the time, the functions of the building include the Office of the 
Prime Minister and the Ministry of Justice, and it makes up the most 
prominent of the quarter’s nine buildings. Behring Breivik ignites the fuse of 
the 950 kilo fertiliser bomb at the back of the car and walks away. At 15.25 it 
goes off, severely damaging the High-rise, the R4 building, and the S block, 
and causing limited damage to parts of the Y block and the G block, all of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A-K Kronborg, ‘Folkets høyblokk’, OBOSbladet, /6 (2011), 13. All translations from Norwegian in this 
chapter are mine. 
2 Facts regarding the course of events on 22 July are taken from the official report A B Gjørv, et al., Rapport 
fra 22. juli-kommisjonen (NOU 2012:14, Oslo, Departementenes servicesenter, 2012), esp. 17–23. Information 
about the government property comes from H N Rygh & P Weiby, Faktaark Regjeringskvartalet (Oslo, 
Statsbygg, 2011). Several of the documents referred to in this chapter are available online (at the time of 
writing). See Works cited for online addresses. 
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Norwegian government (Figures 2–7).3 Additional buildings in a radius of 
about five hundred metres are afflicted, including damage caused to windows 
and interiors of about one thousand shops, cafés, and private businesses. 
Because the bombing occurs during the Norwegian general summer holiday, 
of the about 3,100 employees normally at work in the quarter only well over 
ten per cent are at work. Eight people are killed. Two hundred are injured, ten 
of them severely. Meanwhile, Behring Breivik drives his second car towards 
the island Utøya outside of Oslo and begins the massacre in the summer 
camp of AUF, the youth organisation of the Norwegian Labour Party, around 
17.21. 
The double one-man attack was the most devastating act of aggression on 
Norwegian soil since WWII. It has come to have profound influence on 
Norwegian society because of its impact on so many areas of society, 
targeting officials of the state administration and politically active youth from 
the whole country. This chapter will only address one of the many debates 
that followed the 22 July attack, only one of the processes of change that it 
spurred. As such, it extracts fragments of a societal context with the aim of 
illuminating the concept of the spatial framework of memory that this thesis 
postulates. I turn to the debate on the Government Quarter to observe how 
architecture that previously only sustained inert professional and disciplinary 
memory for architectural historians, overnight can come to be regarded as an 
essential vehicle for national remembering and sentiments. 
The start of the debate 
With an article titled ‘Considering tearing down the high-rise’ (‘Vurderer å 
rive høyblokken’), published in the morning the second day after the bombing 
of the Government Quarter in Oslo, the newspaper Aftenposten set the tone 
for an intense debate in the year that followed. It reported from a crisis 
meeting the government had held the evening before. Like the English word 
‘consider’, vurdere means to think carefully about something, to assess a 
situation before making a decision. In everyday language, however, it often 
implies a standpoint that the consideration is already drawn towards, in the 
sense of ‘Thinking about tearing down the high-rise’. Judging by the 
response, many readers seem to have understood the title in the second way, 
also if the article reports of the coming process of evaluation, quoting the 
Secretary General,4 Morten Ruud, of the Ministry of Justice: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The names of the buildings are literal translations of the official names of the buildings in Norwegian: 
Høyblokken (also H-blokken), R4, S-blokken, Y-blokken, and G-blokken. 
4 I have used the titles of officials at the time of the specific reference. 
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Figure 1. Aerial photo of the Government Quarter in Oslo, before the explosion. 
Figure 2. The High-rise after the explosion, seen from Einar Gerhardsens plass. 
 
 
Edifices 	  
 	  240 
Figure 3. The R4 after the explosion, seen from Grubbegata. 
Figure 5. The Y block in 2012, with temporary window covers. Seen from Johan 
Nygaardsvolds plass. 
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Figure 4. The S block after the explosion, seen from Einar Gerhardsens plass.
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Figure 6. The G block after the explosion, with temporary covers in the windows. 
Figure 7. Plan of the Government Quarter in Oslo. 
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A more long-term theme is if the worst destroyed buildings at all can be 
restored. ‘There has to made an assessment [vurdering] of whether the high-
rise and the other premises facing Grubbegata [the street in which the bomb 
went off; Figure 8] have to be demolished, or if they could be restored. It is 
too early to tell.’ … That assessment can only be done when the police have 
finished their investigation, and after the premises have been secured.5 
The same day, NTB, the leading Norwegian news agency, sent out a news 
message with an interview with the Public Construction and Property 
Management (Statsbygg), key advisor in construction and property affairs 
and property manager for the Norwegian government. It carried a more 
neutral title than the previous article, ‘Statsbygg does not know if the High-
rise has to be torn down’. On the question of whether the ‘famous landmark’ 
needs to be demolished, the Director of Communications in Statsbygg 
answers, 
‘We hear them saying that, but we have our own experts on building 
construction and securement who need to assess the situation before we 
conclude’ … Njaa Rygh denies that Statsbygg has started to work on a plan 
for what they will do if it shows that they have to demolish.6 
The next day, several newspapers ran the news message under the same title.7 
Before a week had passed, several architects and people of related 
professions had cried out in the press to state the architectural and historical 
importance of the High-rise, warning against drawing hasty conclusions with 
regard to demolition.8 In the half year or so that followed, the dispute over 
whether to tear down the damaged buildings or to restore them acquired 
momentum. The debate that unfolded came to involve architects, engineers, 
and art historians, but also influential politicians and leaders of governmental 
and non-governmental organisations working with architecture and 
architectural heritage. The proposals in the debate rested on one or several 
postulations, such as, if the buildings are torn down, the perpetrator gets his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ‘Vurderer å rive høyblokken’, Aftenposten Morgen, 24 July 2011, sec. 1, 24. I have chosen to write ‘High-
rise’ and ‘Government Quarter’, with capital letters, to reflect the common use of them as names or terms in 
Norwegian, similar to ‘the White House’ or ‘Westminster’. However, the use of capital letters differs in 
practice, also within the government, and in quotations I have used capital words only when the author has 
done it in the original Norwegian text. I use the official English names of organisations where such exist. 
6 K Norli, ‘Statsbygg vet ikke om Høyblokken må rives ’, NTBtekst, 24 July 2011. 
7 In the newspaper Romerikes Blad it was titled ‘Maybe has to be demolished’. ‘Må kanskje rives’, Romerikes 
Blad, 25 July 2011, sec. 1, 6. 
8 A Løken, ‘100 års krangel om maktens sentrum’, Aftenposten Aften, 28 July 2011, sec. Nyheter, 8; S 
Dahlum, et al., ‘Kan bli minnesmerke’, Dagens Næringsliv, 26 july 2011, 12; E Dokk Holm, ‘Demokratiets 
betong’, Dagens Næringsliv, 26 July 2011, 43; K Nipen, ‘Bygningene formet det nye Norge’, Aftenposten 
Morgen, 25 July 2011, sec. Kultur, 6. 
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way, or the quarter is an expression of Norway’s modern, political history, or 
the two buildings designed by Erling Viksjø are important contributions to 
history of art and architecture and an expression of democracy. The debate, I 
will argue, shows how architecture, which previously predominantly 
sustained an inert professional and disciplinary memory for architects, 
conservators, or art historians, or a spatial framework for the civil servants of 
the state administration, a zone de l’activité technique, overnight came to be 
regarded as an indispensable vehicle for national remembering and 
sentiments.9 Architecture, previously defined through aesthetic, practical, and 
representative functions, could be seen to transfigure into one or several 
cultural concepts and sets of symbols, circulated in the public sphere. 
This chapter offers an analysis of the debate. I view it through the lens of 
the theoretical framework provided by the spatial framework of memory, 
established in the previous chapters. With the help of the conceptual 
apparatus, I demonstrate how the government buildings provide Norwegians 
with a mental site for cultural and political memory, in addition to its role as 
a place for individual, familial, or professional remembering. The physical 
state of the buildings appears to be intrinsically connected with, not only the 
conceptual representations people make of the architecture, but, more 
importantly, the cultural values and conceptions of a national past that come 
to be associated with the representations.10 I will claim that such associations 
are not autonomously formed opinions of the individual, but notions shaped 
collectively; professionals and scholars take to instruct the public and 
politicians in the knowledge and interpretation of history, art, and 
architecture, and influential people, like political leaders and directors of 
architecture and heritage organisations, supply the arguments with 
legitimacy. When considering the debate, it is useful to reflect upon what 
kinds of professionals take part in the debate. While the government, 
represented by the Ministry of Government Administration, Reform, and 
Church Affairs, hereafter referred to as FAD, will eventually decide on issues 
pertaining to the future of the physical buildings, a possible memorial on the 
site, and the way in which the quarter will be used on a practical level, the 
processes of change in the conceptualisation of the Government Quarter 
depend on many other actors in the public. The reflections I offer here are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In this chapter, I do not intend to give the term ‘vehicle of remembering/memory’ the specific connotations 
as in Yosef Yerushalmi’s use in relation to the history and memory in medieval Jewry. Bearing his usage in 
mind, however, I use it a bit more freely as a trope. Y H Yerushalmi, Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish 
Memory (1982; repr. edn, Washington, UWP, 1996), xxix, 27–52. 
10 It is not my intention to write a critical history of the Government Quarter and, therefore, I do not assess 
whether claims by the debaters are historically correct or not. I am interested in the reasons for their claims and 
the role of architecture in supporting such claims. 
6   Disputed spatial frameworks of memory 
 	   245 
Figure 8. The street Grubbegata after the explosion. The G block in the background 
and the R4 to the left. 
Figure 9. The G block. 2006. 
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based on the exchange of opinions in the press and on documents and reports 
produced by the government, but also on my observation of its development 
over time as well as my involvement in it.11 I thus adopt a different approach 
than that employed in the previous chapters in order to address the processes 
that reshape the spatial frameworks of the Government Quarter and the 
dispute over what memories the buildings should associate. 
In the following, I will first consider how the Government Quarter may 
have acted as a spatial framework of memory before the bombing. The 
increase of media exposure in terms of graphic and written material leads me 
to discuss how the spatial frameworks of memory relating to the quarter start 
to change on 22 July 2011. Subsequently, I will consider the different parties 
of the debate and how contents associated with the buildings move between 
different groups, professions, and the general public. The movements suggest 
changes to an existing infrastructure of the nation’s functional memory and a 
prospective absorption of the Government Quarter into its canon of symbolic 
sites. I further assess the role of the buildings for use as a collective spatial 
mnemonic and look at the comprehensive legitimisation of the opinions in 
the debate in the winter 2011–2012. Finally, I will consider how the 
Government Quarter has turned into a receptive Erinnerungsort, probably on 
the way to become an affirmative Gedenkort. From the moment of the 
explosion, the representations of the quarter in multifarious spatial 
frameworks change fundamentally and begin to travel between groups and in 
and out of the country. Associated memories grow in number and 
importance. My reading emphasises the importance of the architecture, both 
as a physical location and in the form of mental representations, for the 
canonising processes of the nation, in the role it has been assigned as a 
vehicle of national memory. 
A spatial framework of memory 
The Government Quarter is located in the centre of Oslo with public streets 
running through it (Figures 1, 7). It comprises nine buildings, built over a 
century and a half, which are connected underground. Before the explosion 
almost 160,000 square metres gross floor area housed fourteen of the 
seventeen ministries and the Office of the Prime Minister.12 50,000 square 
metres were rendered unusable. The affected buildings were the 1906 
G block, designed by Henrik Bull, and the only part of a planned government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For the details of my involvement and the sources used, see The analysis of the debate on the Government 
Quarter in Oslo in the Introduction. 
12 Rygh & Weiby, Faktaark Regjeringskvartalet. 
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Figure 10. The High-rise seen from Einar Gerhardsens plass. 2009. 
Figure 11. The Y block before the explosion, seen from Akersgata. 
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Figure 12. The S block seen from Einar Gerhardsens plass. 1980. 
building complex to be built (Figure 9), the High-rise from 1958 (Figures 2, 
10) and the Y block from 1969 (Figure 11), designed by Erling Viksjø, the 
S block from 1978 (Figures 4, 12) and the R4 from 1988 (Figures 3, 13), both 
designed by Viksjø Arkitektkontor under the direction of Per Viksjø, Erling 
Viksjø’s son. 
Prior to the 22 July bombing Oslo citizens had walked through the quarter 
on their way to or from the commercial and leisure streets in the city centre 
or the neighbouring public library Deichmanske (Figures 14, 57). They may 
have passed in front of the High-rise in a bus or driven through the tunnel 
under the Y block (Figure 15). People who worked for the government and 
thousands of others who had their workplace in the area would know the 
streets and buildings from their everyday life. Visitors to Oslo from other 
parts of Norway, or from abroad, would not necessarily have passed by the 
buildings, located as they are in an area off the shopping streets, the cultural 
institutions, and the tourist trails. 
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Figure 13. Entrance to the R4. 1996. 
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Figure 14. The public library Deichmanske. 2005. 
Figure 15. The entrance to the Hammersborg tunnel underneath the Y block. The 
High-rise and the G block in the background.
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Figure 16. Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland and General Secretary Mikhail 
Gorbachev on the roof terrace of the High-rise. 1991. 
Figure 17. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg on the top 
floor of the High-rise. 2009. 
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Figure 18. The High-rise depicted on the first page of the supplement to 
Morgenbladet: ‘The Canon of Architecture. The Twelve Most Important Buildings in 
the Norwegian Post-war Period’. 
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Norwegians also knew the Government Quarter from political reportage in 
newspapers and on television. Press photographs show politicians posing in 
front of one of the buildings, or prime ministers, like Einar Gerhardsen, Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, or Jens Stoltenberg, receiving foreign heads of state on 
the top floor of the High-rise, like Nikita Khrushchev, Josip Broz Tito, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, and Barack Obama (Figures 16, 17).13 People with an 
interest in contemporary architecture and cultural issues in general may have 
picked up that the High-rise had been appointed the third most important 
building in the canon of Norwegian post-war architecture, selected and 
published in 2007 as an attachment to the commenting weekly Morgenbladet 
(Figure 18).14 
On different levels, most adult Norwegians possessed some kind of spatial 
and conceptual notion of the buildings in the Government Quarter, even if it 
was fragmentary. With Halbwachs it is possible to understand such a notion 
as a part of their internal spatial framework of memory, accumulated through 
sensory impressions from the site, by reading articles, or by seeing 
photographs and TV pictures. With repeated exposure, vivid percepts and 
distinct experiences are schematised into spatial images that come to act as 
interconnections of memories of events, emotions, and knowledge. Only by 
transforming the spatial memory into an abstracted notion, it becomes 
possible to navigate and localise oneself in a larger spatial environment like 
that of the Government Quarter, with its different streets, façades, and 
interiors. Such complexes of space are impossible to overview at one glance 
from any one standpoint; only with a model of spatial relations, conjured up 
in memory, is one able to handle the interrelations and hierarchies of visual 
landmarks and places within the environment. Also concerning the 
immediate situation of orientation, any environment needs to be internalised 
and conceptualised before it can appear as three-dimensional space to 
consciousness and not just visual stimuli. In people’s spatial framework of 
memory, the quarter would likely contain more detail for those who worked 
in or around the quarter, who occasionally passed by it, or who pursued an 
interest in the architecture or the political history. It was probably less  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Search performed in the NTBscanpix image database, <http://www.scanpix.no>, on 21 Apr. 2012. We see 
the prime ministers point away from the government building to other assets of Oslo, presumably to the fjord, 
to Holmenkollen ski jump, and to the nature reserves Nordmarka and Lillomarka. The High-rise did not have 
the same pictorial importance as the White House or the Reichstagsgebäude in Berlin. 
14 I H Almaas, et al., ‘Arkitekturens kanon. De tolv viktigste byggene i norsk etterkrigstid’, Morgenbladet, 30 
Nov.–6 Dec. 2007, suppl., 1–36. The jury consisted of editor of the Norwegian architectural review, Arkitektur 
N, Ingerid Helsing Almaas, Senior Curator Ulf Grønvold at the National Museum, President of the Association 
of Norwegian Architects (NAL), Jannike Hovland, Associate Professor Mari Hvattum and Postdoctoral 
Research Fellow Mari Lending at the Oslo School of Architecture and Design (AHO), and Professor Hild 
Sørby at the University of Stavanger. 
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Figure 19. The parliament building in Oslo. 2010. 
detailed and graspable for those who had only seen parts of it depicted in the 
press or on television. For most people, presumably, the concept of the 
quarter was more focused on the visually and politically salient High-rise, 
fairly often represented in media. Media had directed little attention to 
buildings like the R4 and the S block. 
For the inhabitants of Oslo, the quarter may also be the associative 
landscape of personal recollections of events that took place there; for 
example, the Hammersborg tunnel underneath the Y block keeps reminding 
me of the evening ten years ago when unknown people assaulted two friends 
of mine and me. Before 22 July, for Norwegians the Government Quarter 
also made up one of the central backdrops for the public mediation of the 
activities of the state administration, next to buildings like the parliament 
building (Figure 19) and the Royal Palace (Figure 20). Thus, on the level of 
the nation, I would argue, a shared denominator can be identified in the 
spatial framework of the collective memory of most Norwegians. The 
commonality lies less in the spatial layout and architectural details, of which 
the knowledge and mental capabilities may vary substantially, but rather in 
the status of the quarter as a conceptual site in memory, where associations 
and knowledge relating to the political life could be placed, organised, and 
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retrieved.15 We picture previous and present prime ministers receive foreign 
heads of state on the same roof terrace or on the same top floor. In 
photographs we see politicians of present and past administrations pose for 
the cameras outside the same entrance. As Halbwachs has suggested, these 
places can be thought of as a mental mise en scène, against which the events 
that we recall or learn of play out. They are mental representations of space 
in memory that do not exist as a number of individual images, one for each 
event we remember, but rather as a dynamic, but stable construct. The shape 
of one such place in the spatial framework of memory may take on different 
appearances according to each situation of recall, but it is still conceived of as 
one topographic or architectural place. It is the same place, the same 
building, at different times. 
We may refer to the shared mental image of space as the collective spatial 
framework of memory, an abstraction that denotes the shared denominator of 
all spatial frameworks held by the group members.16 However, the group is  
not only the sum of its members, but is reflected in every member who, from 
occasion to occasion, adopts the view of this or another group. Therefore, it is 
not only as a common denominator of individual frameworks that the 
collective framework can be understood, but also as a group-related construct 
that every member comes to sustain as part of his own framework and as part 
of his identity as a group member. The Government Quarter thus comes to 
make up spatial representations in the mind of the individual on the level of 
Figure 20. The Royal Palace in Oslo. 2010. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Cf. The spatial framework of memory and the material framework, Remember other things, and Collective 
landmarks in ch. 2. 
16 Cf. Frameworks of memory in ch. 1, the introduction to ch. 2, and Group images in ch. 3. 
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Figure 21. The statsrådssalen meeting room in the High-rise. 1958–59. 
individual experience, on the level of collectives, like the profession, and on 
the level of culture, like national politics and symbolism. The spatial 
knowledge of the quarter is the same, regardless of which group the 
individual places himself in, but each group identity directs the attention to 
certain places and parts of the buildings and supplies the spatial framework 
with sets of memories. 
Governmental zone de l’activité technique 
For people who work in the quarter, the civil servants and the administrative 
and technical staff, or for people who entertained everyday relations to the 
buildings for other reasons, the buildings would make up collective 
landmarks in the spatial framework of memory, the spaces interconnection 
points of informal social memory related to the professional environment.17 
Not only visually salient buildings, but any street, room, or corridor within 
this environment may have significance to the individuals and remind of  
things learnt or experienced in their career, or it may remind them of 
colleagues and a period of professional life. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Cf. Collective landmarks and Zone de l’activité technique et zone des relations personnelles in ch. 2. 
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The workplace of the government further makes up a spatial framework of 
the professional memory of the state administration, a zone de l’activité 
technique. The political and non-political government officials have 
accumulated a collective memory of written and unwritten regulations that 
direct their behaviour and routines. The techniques of the zone, Halbwachs 
explains, ‘consist in knowing and in applying the rules and precepts that in 
every epoch prescribe for the functionary in general terms the actions, the 
language, and the gestures of the function’.18 The buildings of the state 
administration come to signify hierarchies and roles and support 
administrative traditions over time. The prime minister needs to know how to 
perform his duties in specific forms and how to relate to his staff. Hierarchies 
of responsibility need to be retained by means of titles and roles. Meeting 
rooms, offices, and corridors come to organise spatially the rituals and 
procedures of the trade, not unlike the way the church interior supports the 
priest’s performance of the sacraments or the tennis court the game between 
the two players (Figures 21, 22). Portrait series on the walls maintain the 
knowledge of the genealogy of the state administration (Figure 23). The 
premises of the Government Quarter are thus not only the spatial framework 
of personal experiences related to the career, but more importantly an 
architectural apparatus for acquiring, sustaining, and disseminating the 
memory of highly specific behaviours of the officialdom, developed and 
modified continuously since the state first started to use the area. They  
Figure 22. The conference room in the addition to the High-rise, built in 1990. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 M Halbwachs, Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire, ed. G Namer (1925; facs. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1994), 
265. 
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contribute to securing order and continuity from one period to the next. 
Those who have embodied the spatial structures of the practice introduce 
their meanings to the newly arrived. The architecture influences the way in 
which the officials conceptualise their profession. 
Media exposure and revision of the framework 
Soon after the bomb went off, a torrent of photographs, videos, maps, 
graphics, written and spoken descriptions portraying the devastated territory 
saturated national and international media. I shall leave aside the 
international impact, especially in the other Nordic countries and in the rest 
of Europe, and focus on the national situation. In Norway the exposure was 
intense. A search in the NTBscanpix image archive with the search term 
‘regjeringskvartalet’ (‘the government quarter’) produces 120 times as many 
photographs dated to the one-year period following 22 July 2011 compared 
to the year before.19 A fifth of them, or almost 2,500 pictures, were published 
in the week after the bombing, which is more than one and a half times as 
many as those published in the preceding ten years. Also the exposure on 
television was exceptional. Most channels covered the events extensively. 
For instance, at 16.00 on 22 July, about half an hour after the explosion, the 
Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation NRK started broadcasting a television 
programme that would run continuously for 36 hours.20 On their website 
alone, a search for ‘regjeringskvartalet’ gives almost 5,000 hits.21 In addition 
to the media coverage, a number of people who were unfortunate to be in the 
area during or after the explosion were forced to take in the new environment 
by direct experience. Later, many came to see the site for themselves and 
others have passed by or observed the High-rise at a distance, visible as it is 
from various places in Oslo (Figure 24). 
Most Norwegians were subject to strong influence in the time after 22 July, 
and the previously held images of the Government Quarter in their spatial 
framework of memory were affected. The people who had only a vague 
understanding of the government buildings arguably developed a stronger 
one, and others, who knew them well, altered theirs and added details. New 
information, associations, and emotions would be supplied to the spatial 
configuration; the entrance to the building now became an immediate index 
of the position of the van that carried the bomb, of the hole it had blown in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Search carried out 7 Nov. 2012 on <http://www.scanpix.no>. An increase from 20 to 900 images can be 
documented from the year before the attack to the year after for the search term ‘høyblokken’ or ‘høyblokka’, 
the two alternate spellings of the definite form of ‘høyblokk’ (‘high-rise’).  
20 Gjørv, et al., Rapport fra 22. juli-kommisjonen, 22. 
21 Search carried out on 6 Nov. 2012 on <http://www.nrk.no/>. 
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Figure 23. Meeting room in the G block. 2006. 
Figure 24. The High-rise, seen from the opera house in Bjørvika. 2012. 
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Figure 25. The entrance to the High-rise, seen from Einar Gerhardsens plass. 
Figure 26. Still from the video shot in Grubbegata immediately after the explosion. 
The air is filled with dust. Left, the canteen of the High-rise, right, the R4. 
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the ground, of the people who had been killed in the reception and on the 
square, and of the rubble and destruction visible – all of which was uncannily 
encapsulated in the video a man shot when looking for survivors in the street 
Grubbegata, parts of which was broadcasted over and again on television in 
the following days, and which many can replay in their memory to this day 
(Figures 25, 26).22 For those directly affected, the quarter turned into a site of 
emotionally disturbing experiences and of mourning over lost family 
members or colleagues. It turned into a place of fear and shock. The 
attributes and connotations to people’s spatial frameworks changed overnight 
and so drastically that it is possible to talk of two different frameworks for 
each individual, one before and one after. The one epochal-spatial 
framework, to use the term I introduced in chapter two, ceased to exist on 22 
July 2011, or thereabout.23 From the moment of the blast a new framework 
came into being, gradually developing to become a more salient landmark in 
people’s memory, coming to carry immediate associations to terror and 
suffering and, with time, also aspects of national memory: political history, 
art, architecture, and resilience. The two frameworks become, so we should 
understand Halbwachs, two different paths of mind to access memory related 
to different periods. 
Attention has been directed to the fact that Halbwachs seldom addressed 
the role of media for the collective memory. For example, Astrid Erll and 
Ann Rigney have pointed out that Halbwachs was aware that ‘“media” of all 
sorts – spoken language, letters, books, photos, films – also provide 
frameworks for shaping both experience and memory’ but that ‘he himself 
did not discuss [it] at great length’.24 They illustrate Halbwachs’s awareness 
by referring to the famous passage in which he takes a walk in London. Upon 
seeing the well-known vistas of the city, he recalls what friends – painters, 
architects, historians – have told him, or what he read in Dickens’s novels as 
a child, coming to the conclusion that he is, actually, taking a walk with 
Dickens.25 As an extension of the observation, Erll and Rigney argue that 
cultural memory is essentially dynamic constructs, built through ‘repeated 
media representations, on a host of remediated versions of the past which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 A Helgesen, ‘Så noe han ikke burde sett’ [online video] (Oslo, Dagbladet, 22 July 2011) 
<http://www.dagbladet.no/2011/07/22/nyheter/innenriks/terroraksjon/oslo/bombe/17419976/> accessed 12 
Nov. 2012. Cf. the account of Helgesen in K Stormark, Da terroren rammet Norge. 189 minutter som rystet 
verden (Oslo, Kagge, 2011), 33, 49–50, 52.  
23 Cf. Time and the spatial framework of memory. 
24 A Erll & A Rigney, ‘Introduction: Cultural Memory and its Dynamics’, in A Erll & A Rigney (eds), 
Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 1. 
25 M Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, ed. G Namer (1950; crit. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997) [orig., 
‘Mémoire et société’ (1947)], 52–53. For a translation of the passage, see Collective memory in La Mémoire 
collective in ch. 1. 
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“converge and coalesce” into a lieu de mémoire’.26 They are primarily 
concerned with what Rigney elsewhere has called mobile media like texts or 
images.27 In Halbwachs’s writings on memory there are many references to 
other kinds of media of the collective memory. They could, however, rather 
be referred to by the term immobile media – with an intentional allusion to 
the German word for real estate, Immobilien – to denote the motionless 
property of land and buildings. 
I use Erll and Rigney’s point to highlight an aspect that was not included in 
Halbwachs’s original conception of the spatial framework of memory, but 
which I argue has been disclosed in this chapter’s study of the Government 
Quarter dispute. The bombing on 22 July 2011 caused an immense increase 
in the circulation of mobile media referring to the government architecture: 
images (photographs, video, TV pictures, drawings) and texts (articles in 
newspapers and periodicals, books). In this chapter I have indicated that such 
mediation has contributed to altering people’s internal spatial frameworks of 
memory, probably to a much larger degree than direct perception of the 
altered buildings. To a very small degree, and arguably mainly for those who 
were there at the time of the blast, visual impressions of the physical 
buildings contributed to people’s revised spatial framework of 
communicative memory. Different from the material framework of the 
Government Quarter, only existing as a singular, physical artefact, an 
immobile medium, the internal spatial framework of memory feeds from 
percepts originating in the materiality as well as in the mediations of it in 
images and text, the mobile media. The latter are not necessarily 
representations or remediations of the existing materiality, but can also be 
historical photographs or drawings, depicting earlier states, or plans 
suggesting a future condition. 
In the discussion of social morphology and the dual nature of space in 
chapter two, I referred to Halbwachs’s emphasis on the interchange between 
the spatial framework of group memory and the physical environment.28 The 
group makes its surroundings an externalisation of its spatial framework of 
memory, and the environment in turn becomes internalised as a revised 
spatial framework of memory. This chapter suggests that the external 
frameworks of the Government Quarter include immobile and mobile media, 
physical buildings as well as images and texts. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Erll & Rigney, ‘Introduction: Cultural Memory and its Dynamics’, 5.  
27 A Rigney, ‘Plenitude, Scarcity and the Circulation of Cultural Memory’, Journal of European Studies, 35/1 
(2005), 20. 
28 Cf. Topographie, Social morphology, and Dual nature of space in ch. 2. 
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Aleida and Jan Assmann have made the mobile and immobile media of 
memory the matter of importance in their model of memory. Rites, texts, 
images, buildings, and cities metonymically make up cultural memory; they 
are artefacts with which societies structure the recall of different pasts. In the 
previous chapter I referred to architecture as an external framework of 
memory. While this intuitively may be taken as a reference to the physical 
building, the immobile medium, my proposal is that to regard architecture as 
an external spatial framework is to refer also to its (re-)presentations through 
mobile media of images and texts. The High-rise of Viksjø, as an external 
and material framework, is not only the battered concrete building in the 
centre of Oslo, but also the photographs and drawings of it and the articles 
written about it. Together they offer a combinatory framework for 
communicative and cultural remembering. Such an attribution of a particular 
building to several kinds of artefacts may make it more logical to conceive of 
how architecture does not necessarily disappear from the functional memory 
of the nation when its material manifestation is destroyed. 
Parties of the debate 
The increase of public attention to the quarter’s ruined state, combined with 
private and public grief, paved the way for an active and emotive debate 
regarding its future. Pragmatically enough, it came to polarise itself on the 
options of demolition and restoration, especially with regard to the High-rise, 
the most contended of the buildings. Few people, if any, have argued for the 
demolition of the G block, the first building, inaugurated in 1906 and 
designed in a combination of art nouveau and Norwegian dragon style 
(dragestil; Figure 27).29 Likewise, there has been wide agreement that the R4 
and S block could be demolished. What I want to address here are the 
motives and arguments that surfaced in the debate, especially those related to 
the appeal for restoration of the High-rise and the Y block. I do not intend to 
consider the prospective states of the buildings or argue for demolition or 
restoration, but to scrutinise the societal and cultural memories that have been 
claimed to be lost if the buildings are demolished. I ask what notions of the 
national past the contributors suggest are remembered by the architecture and 
how such suggestions have contributed to initiating processes of altering the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The process of reviving the interest in the building’s architectural style was initiated already in the early 
1980s. Some of the rooms were restored to their original states and the Directorate for Cultural Heritage 
argued for its importance in a protection plan in 1986. S Tschudi-Madsen, ‘Enighed gjør stærk – symbolisme 
og stil’, in R Malkenes (ed), Den gamle regjeringsbygningen 100 år – et byggverk og et embetsverk ([Oslo], 
Finansdepartementet, 2006), 28. 
Edifices 	  
 	  264 
Figure 27. Stairs in the G block. Example of dragon style (dragestil). 2006. 
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Government Quarter in people’s spatial frameworks and the associated 
connotations. 
Halbwachs stressed the importance of the spatial framework of memory for 
the reconstruction of the past and of social relations, symbols, and beliefs of 
the family, the profession, or religion. Lynch acknowledged that ‘the 
question of meaning in the city is a complicated one. Group images of 
meaning are less likely to be consistent at this level … Meaning, moreover, is 
not so easily influenced by physical manipulation … The image of the 
Manhattan skyline may stand for vitality, power, decadence, mystery, 
congestion, greatness, or what you will … So various are the individual 
meanings of a city’.30 With this statement he discontinued the pursuit of 
meaning in city architecture and considered instead the legibility and 
structure of the built environment. Rossi acknowledged certain complexes in 
the city as permanent reference points for the citizenry, especially with regard 
to historical remembering, and Aleida and Jan Assmann have contributed 
with an analytical framework for assessing the politics of memory in nation 
states and cultures, precisely addressing the meaning of architecture. Let me 
take up the discussion where Lynch left, following in the spirit of Halbwachs, 
Rossi, and Aleida and Jan Assmann, in an attempt to reflect upon what the 
image of the Government Quarter in Oslo means for the different groups in 
the aftermath of 22 July and how such meanings have changed and been 
exchanged. 
The debate sees the distinction between several groups that can be said to 
have an interest in the future state of the Government Quarter. These groups 
are not clearly delineated or defined, and each individual may be a member 
of several of them. On the level of close relations, the employees of the left-
wing government make up the group targeted directly in the attack and whose 
future workplace depends on the outcome of the process. They have families 
and friends who are also affected. Other people, who happened to be in the 
quarter, make up another directly afflicted group. They belong to various 
groups and have not managed to unite their voices to the same degree as the 
officials. Other larger groups that have been targeted are the citizens of Oslo, 
who have had their city centre attacked, and the national and cultural 
fellowship of Norwegians that saw their democratically elected state 
administration assaulted. 
On the professional level, the governmental administration of politicians 
and civil servants has been severely afflicted. In addition to the traumatic 
experiences of some of the employees and the loss of colleagues, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 K Lynch, The Image of the City (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1960), 8–9. Cf. ch. 3. 
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approximately 1,580 workplaces were rendered unusable.31 Even though all 
political parties have been targeted in the attack on the parliamentary system, 
the Norwegian Labour Party (Ap), whose youth organisation AUF was 
targeted on Utøya the same day, can be singled out as a separate interest 
group, with its values and its representatives directly targeted. 
Practising architects make up another professional group with an interest in 
the debate, as do the related and partly overlapping groups of architectural 
historians, conservators, artists, and art historians, distributed over a number 
of state institutions and non-governmental organisations with concern for the 
built heritage. Other professionals who have engaged in the debate include 
sociologists, geographers, psychologists, and engineers. Naturally, several of 
the people who have spoken out belong to two or more of the groups; one of 
the involved architects has a daughter that survived Utøya, and the state 
officials of the government were themselves targets in the bombing and have 
colleagues who died or were injured, thus giving their position a combined 
professional and private character. 
Many, but not all of the people of the parties have their residence in Oslo 
and consider themselves as part of its citizenry. Most of the people 
mentioned are nationals of Norway; the cultural fellowship has frequently 
been evoked in the debate. Only to a limited degree has the fellowship of 
European and Western culture been capitalised upon in the debate, in the 
form of references to Norway’s connection to an international art scene, 
represented in the Government Quarter by the artwork of Pablo Picasso 
(Figure 28), to the government’s appeal to foreign governments and 
specialists, which resulted in the report by Statsbygg, published online on 26 
January 2012, and to the turn to Ground Zero as a referential situation.32 
These are essentially the groups that make up the parties of the dispute.  
The people who speak out act implicitly or explicitly on the behalf of one 
or several of the groups. It can be observed in the debate how individuals 
take on the role of either self-declared or formally assigned spokespersons, in 
some cases against the will of other group members. The contributors could 
be seen to compete for influence on the general public, readers who 
themselves belong to one or several of the groups involved. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Statsbygg, Regjeringskvartalet. Føringer for videre arbeid (Oslo, FAD, 2012), 5. 
32 For Picasso, see Nipen, ‘Bygningene formet det nye Norge’; S E Hansen, ‘‘Picasso-veggen’ er blitt et 
symbol’, Østlandsposten, 13 Aug. 2011, 22–23; L Anker, ‘Regjeringsbygget: fra Grubbegata til New York: 
Pionerarbeid med Picasso’, Alle tiders, /2 (2011). For the report, see nn. 31, 69, and 89. On the references to 
Ground Zero, see M Ekman, ‘Merket av minner’, Stavanger Aftenblad, 10 Sept. 2011, sec. Debatt, 37; K 
Knutsen, ‘Kampen om Ground Zero’, Stavanger Aftenblad, 12 Sept. 2011, sec. Debatt, 26; ‘Vil lære av 
Ground Zero’, Dagens Næringsliv, 24 May 2012, 48; ‘Aasrud til Ground Zero’, NTBtekst, 25 Sept. 2012. 
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Figure 28. Artwork by Picasso is drawn up on the wall before it will be sandblasted by 
Carl Nesjar, left. On a landing in the High-rise. 
Figure 29. Public meeting at Oslo Museum, 25 Oct. 2011. From the left: Lars Roede, 
Erling Fossen, and Janne Wilberg. 	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Communicative and cultural memory in the debate 
In the communicative situations of informal social circles, individuals 
circulate memories – experiences, information, opinions, and emotions. The 
future of the Government Quarter is only one of several interconnected issues 
that have been discussed and thought over intensively in most areas of 
society after 22 July 2011. The circulation takes place in the homes, among 
friends, in the workplaces, in social media, and in radio programmes, 
television shows, or public meetings (Figure 29).33 Such arenas cater for 
occasions on which the collective memory of diverse groups interacts, 
spreads, and develops. With Aleida and Jan Assmann’s terminology, they can 
be understood as platforms for informal and everyday communicative 
memory, where individuals ground the present experience and prospective 
future in shared conceptions of the past.34 The communicative memory is the 
realm of collective notions of the past, distributed in the minds of individuals, 
biologically based in their brains. In the minds of Norwegians, the 
government buildings make up the spatial framework used for arranging the 
various associations to the quarter. 
In the debate in the press the communicative memory comes in contact 
with the formal cultural memory of groups with responsibilities for the 
administration of national history and the history of architecture and art.35 If 
the communicative memory, according to Aleida and Jan Assmann, is 
characterised by transience and non-specialisation, the cultural memory is 
distinguished by stability and specialisation. Through interviews and letters 
to the editors of the newspapers, historical narratives and motives are drawn 
up and professional opinions voiced. In this manner, the cultural memory 
moves from one professional or political milieu to another, as well as into the 
everyday discussions of Norwegians – professionals and laymen alike. The 
cultural memory flows into the communicative memory and adjusts it. The 
readers expand their knowledge, revise their symbolic connotations, and alter 
their opinions and emotions. Cultural ideas are formed and consolidated on 
the level of the individual. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Public meetings that addressed the architecture in the Government Quarter after 22 July include the debate 
in the Oslo Museum, 25 October 2011, with talks by Lars Roede, Erling Fossen, Peter Butenschøn, and Janne 
Wilberg (Figure 29), the seminar on AHO, 2 November 2011, with talks by Lars Roede, Hans-Henrik Egede-
Nissen, and myself, the meeting of the senior group of the Oslo Architectural Association, OAF Senior, 16 
November 2011, with a talk by Ulf Grønvold, and the seminar at AHO, 12 March 2012, with talks by Randall 
Mason, Christian Ebbesen, and myself. There have also been several discussions in radio and on television. 
34 Cf. Communicative memory in ch. 5. 
35 Cf. Two realms of the past in ch. 5. 
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On the level of the professional and academic parties involved, the debate 
can be regarded as a process of formation and revision of the cultural 
memory. Perspectives on the issue are externalised from reflective minds into 
published texts. Well-formulated arguments reach a number of readers upon 
publication and are stabilised in the public sphere, as they are archived in 
libraries and databases. For art or architectural historians, the communicative 
memory may consist of the actively communicated knowledge of their 
disciplines, that which is talked about in the corridors, in seminars, or in 
conferences. What their discipline can relate to in total, however, may be 
thought of as its cultural memory: the scholarship, the lectures, the 
exhibitions, the articles, and the books; the collections of documents and 
drawings in archives and storages, the library collections of books, the 
conferences, and the totality of material buildings. 
The canon and curriculum of the discipline – that which is most talked 
about, dealt with, and considered the most important – are the active 
foreground of this stockpile of traces and indexes of the past. Aleida 
Assmann calls it the functional memory.36 It is a minor selection of the 
cultural memory that is held active by the discipline and that serves to 
legitimise the current worldview of the discipline. The rest, the totality of 
documentation – heterogeneous, fragmented, and not yet or no longer 
actualised – belongs to what she names the storage memory. It is carefully 
guarded and monitored in archives, libraries, and storages as well as in the 
stock of physical buildings and buried remains. It contains material for the 
potential revisions of the functional memory. 
Canonisation of Viksjø’s architecture 
At the time of the bombing, the oeuvre of Erling Viksjø (1910–1971), 
architect of the High-rise and the Y block, had already started to move from 
the storage memory to the functional memory of the discipline. Through 
public dissemination it had slowly began to be promoted as part of the 
functional memory of the nation. A public reappraisal was offered in the 
1999 exhibition on Viksjø’s architecture at the Norwegian Museum of 
Architecture (Norsk Arkitekturmuseum). In the foreword to the exhibition 
catalogue, curator of the exhibition Eva Madshus writes: 
Today, many young people are intensely preoccupied with the functionalism 
of the 1930s. Other people lead campaigns to revive classicism. For the time, 
however, a shadow lies over the 1950s and 1960s. The Norwegian Museum of  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Cf. Functional memory and storage memory in ch. 5. 
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Figure 30. Detail drawing of naturbetong, donated to the Norwegian Museum of 
Architecture in 1999. Dated 11. Oct. 1961. 
Architecture has therefore chosen to direct the attention to a misjudged epoch 
and an underestimated architect in this exhibition on Erling Viksjø.37 
Madshus also points to important factors for the production of the exhibition. 
Hallvard Trohaug decided to write a doctoral dissertation in art history on 
Viksjø at the same time as the exhibition was planned, and Per Viksjø, Erling 
Viksjø’s son, donated his father’s archive to the museum (Figure 30). The 
donation of the archive makes material traces of the past at the disposal for 
research; it widens the available storage memory. The dissertation points to 
these and other traces, selects, and supplies them with meaning; the 
exhibition and the catalogue distribute the findings to professionals and the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 E Madshus, ‘Forord. En utstilling om arkitekt Erling Viksjø’, in H Trohaug (ed), Arkitekt Erling Viksjø 
(Oslo, Norsk arkitekturmuseum, 1999), 2. The catalogue contains a professional biography, an introduction to 
naturbetong (the patented technique for concrete casting and surface treatment developed by Viksjø and civil 
engineer Sverre Jystad and used in the Government Quarter), a selection of works, including the Government 
Quarter high-rise, a text on the art in his buildings, an essay on monumentality in Viksjø’s architecture, and a 
CV.  
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Figure 31. Cover of the catalogue of the 2010 exhibition Brytninger: norsk arkitektur 
1945–1965, depicting a Viksjø façade with naturbetong. 
general public. These are changes to the structure of a delimited field of the 
cultural memory that enables the transport of Vikjsø’s oeuvre from the 
storage memory to the forefront of the history of architecture, and suggests 
that it is included in a revision of the functional memory of national art 
history. 
Other attempts at reappraisal of Viksjø’s architecture include the protection 
by the Cultural Heritage Management Office in Oslo (Byantikvaren) of three 
of his office buildings in Oslo in 2007, the inclusion of the High-rise in the 
post-war architecture canon by the weekly Morgenbladet the same year 
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(Figure 18), and the national protection of Viksjø’s Tromsø Bridge in 2008.38 
In 2010 an exhibition on post-war modernism, in which Viksjø’s architecture 
played a central role, opened at the The National Museum of Art, 
Architecture and Design (Nasjonalmuseet for kunst, arkitektur og design), a 
newly founded institution into which the Norwegian Museum of Architecture 
had been subsumed (Figure 31).39 At the time of the explosion, FAD and 
Statsbygg had nearly finished a state property protection plan 
(landsverneplan) for the quarter that included protection of all buildings 
except for R4, but it had not been formally passed.40 In August 2011, as a 
direct response to the bombing, the National Museum launched an online 
exhibition devoted exclusively to the High-rise, based on documentation 
from when the building was new (Figure 32).41 
Canonisation of the Government Quarter 
Whereas dissertations, catalogues, or exhibitions, produced within and 
largely for the professional and scholarly communities, may have limited 
distribution to the general public, appeals through letters to the editors of the 
most-read newspapers spread over a larger community. They cross the 
boundaries of groups and are available to everyone. Not all initiatives have 
come from those who have a desire to speak out; much of the debate has been 
arranged by the newspapers in the form of interviews of persons whose 
opinions the editors consider relevant to bring into the discourse. In the first 
weeks of the debate the range of cultural motives quickly establish 
themselves. One of the leading Norwegian newspapers, Aftenposten, 
interviewed Lars Roede, architect and previous director for Oslo Museum, 
for the 25 July issue. In the article written by Kjersti Nipen, he explains that 
the attack ‘hit the architectural centre point for Norwegian nation building’.42 
The architecture of the Government Quarter, according to Roede, has been 
the centre of Norwegian history since 1814, the year Norwegian sovereignty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For a more comprehensive introduction to the re-evaluation of Viksjø’s architecture, see L Maliks, ‘Kan en 
bygning være demokratisk?’, Fortidsvern, /4 (2011), 16–17.  
39  Cf. the catalogue: E Johnsen, et al., Brytninger: norsk arkitektur 1945–65 (Oslo, Nasjonalmuseet for kunst, 
arkitektur og design, 2010). 
40  Cf. the working document: Beskrivelse av verneforslag for regjeringskvartalet og Victoria terrasse. Høring 
av delplan av Landsverneplan for Fornyings-, adminstrasjons-, og kirkedepartementet (FAD),  (Oslo, FAD 
Statsbygg, 2010). Riksantikvaren was involved in the process and had agreed with FAD’s selection of 
buildings to be protected. Riksantikvaren & A Skjetne, Telephone conversation and email correspondence with 
M Ekman, 13 Mar./14. Mar. 2013; Riksantikvaren, ‘Bygningene i regjeringskvartalet’ [website], updated 8 
Aug. 2011, <http://www.riksantikvaren.no/?module=Articles;action=Article.publicShow;ID=129444> 
accessed 10 Mar. 2013. 
41  Nasjonalmuseet for kunst, arkitektur og design, ‘Erling Viksjø og Regjeringsbygningen’ [website], updated 
[Aug. 2011], <http://harriet.nasjonalmuseet.no/regjeringsbygningen/index.html> accessed 22 Apr. 2012. 
42 Nipen, ‘Bygningene formet det nye Norge’. 
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Figure 32. First page of the online exhibition of the High-rise architecture, launched in 
Aug. 2011. 
Figure 33. The church Trefoldighetskirken. 
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Figure 34. Empirekvartalet with Rikshospitalet and Militærhospitalet. The High-rise is 
under construction between the buildings. 1956.  
was transferred from the king of Denmark to the king of Sweden and the 
Norwegian constitution was written. The institutions and buildings, not only 
those of the government, but also of the public library Deichmanske (Figures 
14, 57), the church Trefoldighetskirken (Figure 33), and the quarter 
Empirekvartalet with buildings like Militærhospitalet and Fødselsstiftelsen 
(Figures 34, 35), have contributed to the formation of the nation. The first 
government building, the reader learns, was designed by Henrik Bull and 
completed in 1906, the year after the dissolution of the union with Sweden, 
and it mirrors ‘the need of the state to mark a solid nation’. Roede also 
mentions the High-rise and the Y block, designed by Viksjø, and asserts that 
‘These remain the foremost exponents of modernism in Norway in the 
1950s’. 
The journalist further lets Roede state the importance of the material 
techniques used by Viksjø in the façades and point to the integrated art in the 
concrete walls, signed Pablo Picasso and Carl Nesjar, concluding that it is ‘A 
central work of Norwegian architecture’. The article also refers to comments 
by Nina Berre, Director of Architecture at the National Museum. Berre 
emphasises the unique material techniques developed for the High-rise and  
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Figure 35. Empirekvartalet with Militærhospitalet and the new High-rise. c.1958 
argues that they are an expression of Norwegian modernism. As one of the 
most important post-war buildings 
the High-rise can also be considered as a symbol of the social democracy that 
evolved in Norway, with the grid architecture that parcels the building into 
series of rectangles. ‘This equality and regularity can symbolise the 
democratic values the building represents’, Berre says [Figure 36].43 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 ibid. Leif Maliks and Ulf Grønvold later reject that the architecture of the High-rise could represent 
democracy. Maliks, ‘Kan en bygning være demokratisk?’, 18; U Grønvold, ‘Maliks, Viksjø og bevaring’, 
Fortidsvern, /1 (2012), 28. Grønvold argues that ‘A raster façade is neither democratic – nor social democratic. 
If it expresses something it is order and rationality. Therefore it is as straightforward with a rasterised façade 
on high-rises that house multi-national corporations on Manhattan and Norwegian bureaucrats in Akersgata’. 
Anne-Kristine Kronborg has also been sceptical about such symbolism. Kronborg, ‘Folkets høyblokk’. 
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Figure 36. The grid façade of the High-rise. 1959.  
The reader should understand that the quarter is ‘a continuous cavalcade of 
Norwegian architecture’ and that the High-rise is ‘the masterpiece of Erling 
Viksjø’. Nipen concludes the article by quoting from the previous year’s 
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proposal by Riksantikvaren, the Directorate for Cultural Heritage, to protect 
the buildings of the Government Quarter because ‘the [building] complex 
documents the evolution of the state [statsmakten] and mirrors the attitudes 
and available resources framing its evolution. The Government Quarter 
possesses a large symbolic value related to the development of modern 
Norway’. 
It could be useful in this context to bring into the discussion Rossi’s term 
fatto urbano.44 It refers to buildings or building complexes that are physical 
constructions as well as mental conceptions. The fatto urbano is the 
amalgamate of the material framework and a spatial framework of memory, 
to which Rossi believes the citizens’ collective memory is bound – its history 
of coming into being, events of a social or political character that took place 
there, and its role in the city history. It does not consider architecture as 
physical artefacts isolated in the present, but as entities stretching out in time 
as historical objects and products of the citizenry. For Rossi, the fatto urbano, 
as the history of its own coming into being, eventually becomes the reason 
for its own existence. 
In articles like that by Nipen, the Government Quarter is presented not 
primarily as physical buildings with architectural qualities. Largely, it is 
presented as an associative structure of the mind, a spatial framework of 
memory for Norwegians, which ought to connote historical memories and 
symbolism. The grid architecture of the façades of the High-rise, we are 
asked to accept, is not only pleasing to the eye, but should connote equality 
and democracy. The building does not just display modernistic forms, but is 
the foremost exponent of modernism in Norway. Bull’s building was erected 
in a pivotal period of Norwegian history, and we are told to see the building 
in this historical context. I would suggest that the Government Quarter in the 
debate is proposed as a fatto urbano, that is, as much a cultural product of the 
collective of Norwegians over two hundred years as the site of architectural 
remains. According to Roede, Berre, and Riksantikvaren, and others who 
rally to their support within the next months, the quarter consists of physical 
buildings of high architectural quality, but it is also a mnemonic for 
Norwegians, reminding of narratives deemed important to the nation. It is 
physical and mental, individual and collective, contemporary and historic. Its 
physicality points to the processes of its coming into being, to its different 
historical states, and to affiliated events. It is indicated that the latter are the 
former’s raisons d’être. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Cf. Fatto urbano in ch. 4. 
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Revision of the functional memory of Norway 
This early article asserting the importance of the political history and the 
history of architecture and art is prototypical of many of the coming 
contributions. It brings knowledge of historical events and processes from 
academic environments into public circulation, but the ‘facts’ come as ready-
made selections, carefully construed for the national self-awareness. The 
buildings are ‘central works’ and ‘masterpieces’ that ‘document’ and ‘mirror’ 
political processes of ‘nation building’ and ‘symbolise social democracy’. 
Both 1814 and 1905 are referred to in the article, the most emblematic years 
in the historical chronology of Norway’s self-image, also when none of the 
political processes of those years explicitly are claimed to have exerted 
influence on the coming into being of the architecture. This may be read as 
an attempt to secure the canonisation of the buildings and the associated 
narratives by linking them to already canonised history. The gregariousness 
(Halbwachs) of the different memories seems to spring from a wish to 
legitimise some of them by the means of other, already established ones. The 
articles do not so much contribute to the public debate with facts from critical 
history, but rather position the government architecture in relation to 
established lieux de mémoire (Nora), the symbolic nodes and connection 
points of the national memory.45 The debate, positioned at the intersection of 
the communicative and cultural memory of overlapping professional and 
national interests, I believe, can be regarded as the public arena for shaping 
the active memory of the nation. In the wake of 22 July, it is the process of 
rearranging the functional memory, the small operative and inhabited fraction 
of the cultural memory, which is sanctioned by the cultural fellowship of the 
Norwegian nation. Articles like Nipen’s implicitly suggest that the 
architecture of the Government Quarter, at least the buildings by Erling 
Viksjø and Henrik Bull, should take the place of architectural sites in a 
national canon, as a spatial framework of the functional memory of the 
nation. 
To some degree, the quarter was already a part of a spatial framework of 
national memory, but rather to recall political events of the government and, 
as I suggested earlier, the visits by foreign heads of state. It did not, to a large 
extent, connote nationalistic pride or a mythical story of nation building and  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Cf. Affirmative places – Gedenkorte in ch. 5. There are certainly similarities between the suggested character 
of the Government Quarter in Nipen’s article and the topographical lieux de mémoire. The latter ‘owe 
everything to the specificity of their location and to being rooted in the ground – so, for example, the 
conjuncture of sites of tourism and centers of historical scholarship, the Bibliothèque nationale on the site of 
the Hôtel Mazarin, the Archives nationales in the Hôtel Soubise’. P Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les 
Lieux de Mémoire’, Representations, 26/1 (Apr. 1989) [Fr. orig. (1984)], 22. 
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Figure 37. Demonstration in support of Palestine in front of the High-rise. 2010. 
sovereignty. On the contrary, several contributions to the debate have pointed 
out that the Government Quarter lacked the symbolic quality that can be 
found in the parliament building or in the Royal Palace. Journalist Marie 
Simonsen argues that the buildings of the Government Quarter 
are primarily a workplace, not a symbol most people or the government have 
a strong relation to … Before 22 July few knew [the High-rise as a concept 
referring to the prime minister], which is likely because journalists do not use 
the High-rise as a metaphor for the government or for power. The building has 
never been synonymous with the prime minister. In fifty years it has not 
managed to become a symbol, even if it has Picasso on the walls … if 
anything, it symbolises the labyrinths of bureaucracy.46 
In a dispute in Fortidsvern, the periodical published by the Society of the 
Preservation of Norwegian Ancient Monuments (Fortidsminneforeningen), 
the topic is addressed again. Architect Ulf Grønvold argues that the High-rise 
symbolises the executive power of the democracy and that media uses 
pictures of it as an illustration of that power.47 He also refers to that political 
demonstrations address the government at the High-rise and not at the Royal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 M Simonsen, ‘Bygg en ny åpenhet’, Dagbladet, 27 Jan. 2012, sec. Meninger, 3.  
47 Grønvold, ‘Maliks, Viksjø og bevaring’, 28. 
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Palace (Figure 37).48 Art historian Leif Maliks argues that it is the Royal 
Palace that represents the executive power of the state. It is in front of this 
building that every new government is portrayed by media after having 
received its blessing by the head of state, the king (Figure 38). He 
nonetheless admits that symbols of the national memory could change. ‘It 
does not prevent that events like those of 22 July could dislocate such 
connotations, but they probably do not alter fundamental facts; potent 
symbols rarely come into existence overnight’.49 
Earlier I pointed to the increase in images associated with the Government 
Quarter. Searches carried out in the Nordic media archive Retriever Research 
similarly illustrate the dramatic increase of the use of the term 
‘regjeringskvartalet’ in journalistic material.50 Prior to the attack the total 
amount of articles in paper-based Norwegian periodicals containing the term 
amounts to a little less than 7,000. One year after the attack the number of 
articles including the term has more than doubled to well over 15,700. The 
occurrence of the term increased from almost 600 articles the year before to a 
little less than 9,000 in the year after, or more than fifteen times the 
Figure 38. The new government of 2009, posing for in front of the Royal Palace. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 U Grønvold, ‘Erling Viksjø og syndefallet’, Fortidsvern, /3 (2012), 29. 
49 L Maliks, ‘Kan en bygning være demokratisk?’, ibid./4 (2011), 31. 
50 ‘Regjeringskvartalet’ most often refers to the Government Quarter in Norway, only occasionally to similar 
sites in other countries. 
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Figure 39. The High-rise. 2008. 
frequency.51 I believe there is a reason to believe that a symbolic concept of 
the Government Quarter and the High-rise that Simonsen, Maliks, and 
Grønvold discuss could be about to be established, although maybe with 
different connotations than only to the executive power. What these 
ultimately will be is still open for debate, but that the events relating to 22 
July will have a share seems to me to be beyond doubt. The symbol may not 
necessarily find a new form overnight, but the process that has supplied the 
collective national memory with a character of instability and prospect of 
change was initiated the second the bomb went off. 
A memory walk through the Government Quarter 
The establishment of the Government Quarter as a site of the nation’s 
functional memory is partly the result of the massive media focus since 22 
July. Maliks suggested that national symbolic connotations could be 
dislocated. I believe there are several indications that the 22 July events are 
influential enough to cause the creation of a new, potent symbol of the 
Government Quarter in the course of a few years. Important to that symbol is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For the term ‘høyblokken’ or ‘høyblokka’, the increase is about thirteen times compared to the previous year. 
It is probably not as indicative, since the term more often relates to other high-rises than ‘Regjeringskvartalet’ 
relates to other government quarters. 
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the mental image of the architecture that people need in order to structure 
historical and political connotations. As a spatial framework of national 
memory it needs to be defined and construed. 
With defined I mean, in this context, the processes of finding shared, 
architectural features or places, the common denominators that most people 
will include in the image of the quarter in their own internal spatial 
framework of memory. The contributions of the architects and art historians, 
I would suggest, have it as one of their unspoken agendas: what aspects or 
places in the quarter are worth knowing? After having been exposed to 
countless pictures, reports, and opinions, some places or features appear as 
more important: the two main façades of the High-rise – and not the façades 
of the Y block, G block, S block, or R4 – with the grids of concrete elements 
that circumscribe the windows (Figures 36, 39); Grubbegata and the entrance 
to the High-rise from that side, which in our memory includes the image of 
the bomb van, the crater after it, and the rubble after the explosion (Figures 8, 
10, 25, 40); the landings of the stairs of the High-rise with the integrated 
artwork sandblasted into the concrete walls (Figure 41; Not, however, the 
artwork in conglo-betong, a conglomerate concrete technique with a polished 
stone surface employed in the façade of the annex on the Akersgata side of 
the High-rise; Figure 42); the materiality of the naturbetong in the concrete 
surfaces of the High-rise and the Y block (Figures 43, 30; Not, however, the 
granite of the G block façade; Figure 6); etc.52 It also seems that people are 
more willing to recognise as important the buildings that have been designed 
to have a monumental character, in the sense of being impressive and 
representative, like the High-rise and the G block, than those with less self-
aggrandising style, like the Y block, the S block, and the R4. 
With construed I refer to what these places point to in terms of cultural 
memory, beyond their pure form. We learn to interpret the raster façade as 
markers of ideals of the architectural period of modernism, representing 
equality and democracy with architectural form.53 The gaping windows – at 
least this is my impression from the many depictions – used in media in the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 After 22 July 2011, conglo-betong has not been mentioned once in the printed press. It appears, however, in 
the August 2011 Internet exhibition of the National Museum: Nasjonalmuseet for kunst, arkitektur og design, 
‘Innledning. Erling Viksjø og Regjeringsbygningen’ [website], updated [Aug. 2011], 
<http://harriet.nasjonalmuseet.no/regjeringsbygningen/docs/innledning.html> accessed 10 Dec. 2012. 
‘Naturbetong’, on the other hand, appears in more than fifteen articles. Search performed in Retriever on 10 
Dec. 2012. 
53 Critique has been directed at the suggestion that the architecture connotes equality and democracy. See e.g. 
Kronborg, ‘Folkets høyblokk’; Maliks, ‘Kan en bygning være demokratisk?’. 
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Figure 40. Grubbegata Street after the explosion. The Y block to the left and the S 
block to the right. 
Figure 41. Artwork on the landings in the High-rise. c.1959.  
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Figure 42. Conglo-betong in the façade of the High-rise annex. 
Figure 43. Naturbetong. 
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days that followed 22 July seem to portray feelings of suffering, loss, and 
grief (Figure 44).54 The entrance used to refer to photographs depicting the 
coming and going of politicians. Now it rather reminds of the dead and 
wounded and the vulnerability of the state administration. The street 
Grubbegata is directly linked to the discussions of security before and after 
22 July. The artwork by Carl Nesjar, Pablo Picasso, and others is said to 
point to the young generation of artists and to relations with the international 
avant-garde at the time (Figure 28).55 Nils Anker, a representative of 
ICOMOS, lets us understand that the ‘natural concrete’, naturbetong refers to 
the granite façades of the first government building by Bull and offers an 
interpretation of a ‘peculiar Norwegian character’.56 
Some references are visible in the materiality, such as, for instance, the 
fenestration of the façades of the High-rise, the surface treatment of the 
concrete, or the sandblasted artwork. These belong to what I have earlier 
referred to as explicit aspects of the spatial framework of memory.57 They are 
formal expressions in the material intended by the architect and artist. To the 
explicit spatial framework belong also the marks of damage from the 
explosion (Figure 45). They are visible, but not originally intended. When it 
is argued that the Viksjø buildings should be restored to make it impossible 
to see any marks of the explosion in the materiality, it expresses a 
disinclination to let the quarter become an explicit spatial framework, a 
reminder of the 22 July events.58 It implies that the explicit sides of the 
framework are believed to be effective mnemonic cues and that it is possible 
to forget or ignore the associations of the spatial framework as long as the 
visible signs are not present. 
Other references to cultural memory are not expressed in the architecture. 
They form implicit parts of the spatial framework that are ‘raised to the status 
of signs’, not ‘accentuated by signs’, as Jan Assmann formulates it.59 Fully 
restored buildings, or parts of buildings that have not been damaged, would  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Cf. e.g. the use of photographs of the High-rise façades on the first page of Aftenposten, 23 July 2011, photo: 
Paul Audestad and in Ekman, ‘Merket av minner’, photo: Tommy Ellingsen; K Ervik, ‘Terrorangrepet i Oslo. 
Politiet bekrefter at det var en bilbombe’ [online article] (Oslo, TV2, 7 Nov. 2011) 
<http://www.tv2.no/nyheter/innenriks/politiet-bekrefter-at-det-var-en-bilbombe-3545063.html> accessed 23 
July 2011, photo: Aleksander Andersen/Scanpix. 
55 Other artists represented include Inger Sitter, Hannah Ryggen, Odd Tandberg, Tore Haaland, and Kai Fjell. 
Several contributors have elaborated on the art in the building. See e.g. Hansen, ‘‘Picasso-veggen’ er blitt et 
symbol’; A Løken, ‘Kunsten sto støtt’, Aftenposten, 23 Aug. 2011, sec. Nyheter, 16; H L Jenssen, ‘Maktens 
høyblokk’, Dagens Næringsliv, 17 Feb. 2012, sec. D2, 11–24. 
56 N Anker, ‘Et hus til ettertanke’, Aftenposten, 2 Nov. 2011, sec. Debatt, 24. 
57 See Explicit and implicit spatial frameworks of memory in ch. 5. 
58 Hans-Henrik Egede-Nissen put forward this opinion in the seminar at the AHO, 2 November 2011. 
59 J Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization. Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination, tr. 
D H Wilson (Cambridge, CUP, 2011) [Ger. orig., Das kulturelle Gedächtnis (1992)], 44. 
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Figure 44. The first page of Aftenposten. 23 July 2011. 
recall the events of 22 July and aspects of the political history, despite the 
lack of any explicit signs. As a site of antëische Magie (Aleida Assmann), it 
reminds us of what we have learnt to associate with the spatial framework of  
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Figure 45. The damaged canteen annex. The draped High-rise in the background.  
that place.60 The sensory involvement with the materiality intensifies the 
experience of our historical memory. Like for Cicero and his friends, who 
vividly pictured Plato walking in the ruins of the academy in Athens, for 
Norwegians to stand in the Government Quarter may intensify their feelings 
and imagination related to 22 July, even if all visible traces should have been 
concealed. Many Norwegians went to the site where it happened; to observe 
for oneself and walk through the surroundings seems to intensify the 
experience. Their visit capitalises on the antaeic aspect of historic events. If 
the event, like Antaeus in the myth, loses contact with the ground, it becomes 
deprived of the potency of the material site in our imagination. On the site, 
history and the past concretise into tangible impressions. Even newly 
designed government buildings, erected in the place of the existing, would 
probably carry connotations to the 22 July events and to Norway’s political 
history before and after, even without any visible signs. If the architecture of 
Viksjø was razed, new architecture may not be able to free itself from 
associations of what has been lost and what has taken place there.61 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Cf. Imaginative places – antëische Magie in ch. 5. 
61 Cf. Berlin Stadtschloß that has not been forgotten decades after its destruction or the recently demolished 
Palast der Republik. Cf. n. 90. 
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For the explicit spatial framework, like for the implicit, more knowledge is 
needed than what we get from the visual observation. We need to know in 
what way this concrete façade differs from any other concrete façade and 
why it is important or beautiful. Regardless of whether it is explicit or 
implicit, in the framework the building is essentially an index pointing to 
other realms of knowledge, written down in books and documented in 
libraries, storages, and archives. Having learnt something about the art and 
the architecture, for example in newspaper articles, as individuals we may go 
back in our minds to the places of the spatial framework to localise and 
reconstruct our memory of those readings or add new facets to existing 
memories. Similar to the passing from place to place, from locus to locus, in 
the mental architecture of the classical art of memory and picking up mental 
images that we have placed there as reminders of things we want to 
remember, we can move from place to place in our mental representation of 
the Government Quarter and be reminded of the most important issues or 
symbols related to it.62 In our minds we can trawl through our spatial 
framework, ‘walk’ from Grubbegata (Figures 8, 40) to the entrance (Figure 
25), via the windows and the concrete in the façade (Figures 36, 43), to the 
art in the landings (Figures 28, 41), to the rooms on the top floors where 
prime ministers held meetings and received guests (Figures 16, 17, 21, 22).63 
Throughout the mental walk we pick up associated memories of things we 
learnt from media or elsewhere. The spatial framework of memory enables 
the reconstruction of other memories as an intuitive art of memory. 
The scholar can perform the same mental walk, but at each place pick up 
things not from his own memory, but from artefacts like literature, drawings, 
or photographs. In this process of cultural remembering – which I have 
employed myself in the writing of this chapter – the mnemonist scholar can 
retrieve, organise, and compile statements and significations and assess their 
validity and relevance.64 If the art of cultural memory, described in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 For a systematic overview of the rules of places and images in the antique art of memory, see H Blum, Die 
antike Mnemotechnik (Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1969), 1–37. For an English summary of Blum’s account, see 
M Ekman, ‘Edifices of Memory. Topical Ordering in Cabinets and Museums’, in J Hegardt (ed), The Museum 
Beyond the Nation (Stockholm, The National Historical Museum, 2012), 66–68. Other introductions to the 
principles include H Hajdu, Das mnemotechnische Schrifttum des Mittelalters (1936; facs. edn, Amsterdam, E. 
J. Bonset, 1967), 16–17, 21–28; F A Yates, The Art of Memory (1966; repr. edn, London, Pimlico, 1992), 17–
41. Halbwachs demonstrated a similar technique in his account of walking through London, bringing to mind 
what he has read in books or what a historian friend or painter has told him of the famous vistas. The passage 
is quoted and translated in its entirety in Collective memory in La Mémoire collective in chapter one. 
Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 52–53. 
63 For the reader who is unfamiliar with the buildings of the Government Quarter, the photographs that 
illustrate this chapter offer a possibility to create a preliminary spatial framework of the architecture, as a 
ready-made series of mental places. 
64 For a discussion on remembering by means of artefacts, see External frameworks of memory in chapter five. 
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previous chapter, normally is a highly specialised technique for organising 
spatial complexes of memory and knowledge in purpose-built edifices like 
museums or libraries, the practice of structuring cultural memory by means 
of the spatial framework of the government architecture becomes an informal 
and spontaneous art of cultural memory.65 Instead of an arrangement of 
rooms, tables, and shelves, the places and features of the buildings make up 
what I have called second-degree cultural landmarks, which offer associative 
intersections with external frameworks of articles, books, and photographs. 
The choice of places and features emphasised in the public debate 
corresponds to the selection of places in the architectural discourse. After 22 
July a great number of photographs depicted the R4 building on fire (Figure 
3). Its architectural value, however, has been considered to be considerably 
lower than Erling Viksjø’s buildings, and so the contributors to the debate 
have simply avoided referring to it, leaving it unsaid that it could be 
demolished.66 The architects and art historians instead put forward in the 
debate the key buildings and architectural features that they argue should be 
included in the collective spatial framework of the new national memory, and 
they supplied it with a set of associations and references. What was proposed 
for the nation already existed in the functional memory of the disciplines of 
art and architecture. 
Phases of the debate 
About five or six dozen newspaper articles and a dozen or two articles in 
periodicals, in my opinion, make up the core of original contributions to the 
debate in the first half-year or so. The opinions come from architects, artists, 
architectural historians, and art historians – several of them hold, or have 
held, prominent positions in cultural and academic institutions. Some also 
come from other professions related to urban planning and the building 
industry. Most people express their views in interviews or letters to the 
editor. In addition, there are dozens of government-produced documents and 
reports and numerous journalistic reports on the development of the different 
processes related to the quarter. Looking back at the debate of the first half-
year or so, one and a half years later, I see a development in three phases. 
The first two or three weeks saw an immediate response by people who 
contributed to quickly mapping different aspects of political history and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Cf. An art of cultural memory in ch. 5. 
66 The R4 building was the only building in the quarter not to be included in the suggested protection plan for 
the Government Quarter, authored by FAD and Statsbygg in 2010. It was suggested that the G block, the High-
rise, Møllergaten 19, the R5, the S block, and the Y block as well as the avenue of linden trees in front of the 
High-rise were protected. Beskrivelse av verneforslag (FAD). 
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history of art and architecture that would form arguments for the restoration 
of the High-rise.67 The reasoning is sketchy rather than coherent and 
characterised by urgency. 
The next three months, approximately until November 2011, consisted of a 
consolidation of the arguments. It could appear as a communal enterprise, in 
which individual professionals and scholars seemed to feel obliged to fill in 
where they saw aspects or details missing, with respect to architecture, art, 
and history, but also to commemoration policies after 22 July and to 
psychological issues relating to the employees who worked in the buildings.68 
The different aspects are discussed in depth, filled in, and supplemented. 
After that phase, in my view, little has been added to the perspectives, 
concerns, and symbolism already presented in the debate.69 
The third phase turned the debate in a different direction. On 8 December 
2011 Statsbygg delivered a report to FAD that included several externally 
produced documents.70 FAD announced that it would publish the report in the 
first week of January 2012 together with its decision on what to do with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 From the first week: Nipen, ‘Bygningene formet det nye Norge’; ‘Etterkrigshistoriens viktigste politiske 
monument’, [online video] (Oslo, NRK, 26 July 2011) 
<http://www.nrk.no/video/fundamentet_ser_ut_til_a_vaere_inntakt/3959CE1C49FB4189/> accessed 5 Dec. 
2012; Dokk Holm, ‘Demokratiets betong’; E Johnsen, ‘Ikke riv høyblokka’, Dagsavisen, 28 July 2011, sec. 
Meninger, 5; Løken, ‘100 års krangel om maktens sentrum’. From August: D Hvoslef-Eide, ‘Bør bli stående. 
En viktig del av vår arkitekturhistorie’, Aftenposten Aften, 4 Aug. 2011, sec. Debatt, 18; M Ekman, ‘Et sted for 
å minnes’, Aftenposten Aften, 11 Aug. 2011, sec. Debatt, 16; Hansen, ‘‘Picasso-veggen’ er blitt et symbol’; 
Løken, ‘Kunsten sto støtt’. 
68 Contributions from September include: E Fossen, ‘Pixel Power’, Estate Magasin, 9/4 (Sept. 2011); Ekman, 
‘Merket av minner’; Knutsen, ‘Kampen om Ground Zero’. From October: S Lillebø, ‘Står til Dovre faller’, 
Klassekampen, 1 Oct., sec. Kultur & Medier, 38–39; J S F Aartun, ‘Tanken på å vende tilbake på jobb i tiende 
etasje gir meg fysisk ubehag’, Dagens Næringsliv, 13 Oct. 2011, 28; E Fossen, ‘Dovre faller. Når ble 
høyblokka like hellig som Max Manus?’, Klassekampen, 13 Oct. 2011, sec. Meninger, 21; J S F Aartun, 
‘Kjemper for høyblokken’, Dagens Næringsliv, 14 Oct. 2011, 24; J S F Aartun, ‘Veldig vanskelig situasjon’, 
Dagens Næringsliv, 19 Oct. 2011, 6; L Sandberg, ‘Kulturminnvernets selvmord’, Aftenposten Morgen, 22 Oct. 
2011, sec. Kultur, 10–11; A S Austegard, ‘Rive eller bevare?’, VG, 29 Oct. 2011, 49. From November: Anker, 
‘Et hus til ettertanke’; I H Amundsen, ‘– Høyblokka bør bli minnested’, Dagsavisen, 3 Nov. 2011, sec. 
Samfunn, 7; G Brochmann, ‘Vel bevart’, Dagbladet, 3 Nov. 2011, sec. Meninger, 56; O Skjæveland, ‘Mer 
demokrati – ny arkitektur’, Aftenposten Aften, 3 Nov. 2011, sec. Debatt, 20; E Viksjø, ‘La høyblokken stå!’, 
Aftenposten Aften, 8 Nov. 2011, sec. Debatt, 14.  
69 I argued for this in the seminar at AHO, 12 March 2012. I based my assertion on a comparison of recent 
debate articles (November 2011–March 2012) with the classification of the arguments of the debate so far, 
which I presented at the seminar at AHO, 2 November 2011. Parts of the report about the architecture of the 
Government Quarter, written in November 2011 for FAD and Statsbygg by Elisabeth Seip, are based on the 
classification of perspectives presented at the November seminar. Statsbygg & E Seip, Regjeringskvartalet 
etter 22.7.2011 (Oslo, FAD, 2012). The media analysis report carried out by Statsbygg also gives an overview 
of the perspectives in the debate as well as maps the role of the contributors. Statsbygg, Medieanalyse – 
regjeringskvartalets framtid – aktører med meninger (Oslo, FAD, 2012). 
70 ‘Rapporten om høyblokken i Oslo er klar ’, NTBtekst, 8 Dec. 2011. The report is available at 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fad/pressesenter/pressemeldinger/2012/rkv.html?id=670543>. 
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Government Quarter.71 The media had already reported that a working group 
existed, and many feared that the conclusion in January would suggest 
demolishing the High-rise.72 It was a reasonable concern. A few weeks earlier 
Rigmor Aasrud, Minister of Government Administration, Reform and Church 
Affairs (FAD), had said that if the report showed that the constructive parts 
of the High-rise had been weakened in the explosion, it would be torn down. 
Also if it had not been weakened, she opened up the possibility of 
demolition, as one of two scenarios.73  
In the months from November 2011, until some weeks after the report was 
eventually published, on 26 January 2012, the debate flourished. The 
contributions of the third phase were not so much aiming at supplying the 
debate with additional facts or opinions, but at supporting the circulating 
statements with legitimacy. Most of what was said repeated the claims of 
earlier statements. After that the debate activity was limited and the media 
focus was directed at the trial of Anders Behring Breivik, which took place 
from April to June 2012. 
Legitimisation 
Shortly before Christmas 2011 the Director General of the Directorate for 
Cultural Heritage, Jørn Holme, called for the restoration of the High-rise, 
paralleling a prospective reconstruction with that of the highly symbolic 
Håkonshallen in Bergen, a royal residence and banquet hall from the 
thirteenth century that was damaged by an explosion in 1944 and 
reconstructed between 1955 and 1961 (Figure 46). Holme explained that 
‘Like a history book the Government Quarter recounts the development of 
the Norwegian state, from simple conditions to one of the richest countries in 
the world’.74 He affirmed the qualities of the architecture, the treatment of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 FAD, ‘Rapport om regjeringskvartalet kommer i januar’ [website], updated 8 Dec. 2011, 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fad/aktuelt/nyheter/2011/rapport-om-regjeringskvartalet-kommer-i-
.html?id=666214> accessed 11 Mar. 2013. 
72 S S Hanssen, ‘Sperrer av UD’, Dagsavisen, 29 Oct. 2011, sec. Samfunn, 8; J S F Aartun, ‘Disse avgjør 
høyblokkens skjebne’, Dagens Næringsliv, 2 Dec. 2011. 
73 Before Christmas, Aasrud was asked about her opinion on the concrete High-rise: ‘I believe that the debate 
about the buildings is irrelevant in a situation where many people were killed. And I have to admit – I grew up 
in the countryside and I do not think such concrete blocks are beautiful. But I promise that it will not have an 
influence on the decision I take and the advice I give my employees … Security will be important and matters 
much to me … Functionality is also important … We need to consider issues of conservation … The feelings 
of the employees are also important.’ O Mjaaland & W Fuglehaug, ‘Riksantikvaren krever fredning av 
Høyblokken ’, Aftenposten Morgen, 21 Dec. 2011, sec. Nyheter, 4–5. Already a few days after the bombing, 
Aasrud had expressed doubt that the High-rise could be restored: ‘With my naked, untrained eye I get the 
impression that it will be extremely demanding to restore the government block [the High-rise]. The damage is 
so enormous’. Dahlum, et al., ‘Kan bli minnesmerke’. 
74 J Holme, ‘Høyblokken – et nasjonalt monument’, Aftenposten Morgen, 21 Dec. 2011, sec. Debatt, 6. The 
Directorate had already in early August expressed that they wanted to wait until more was known about the 
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Figure 46. Håkonshallen, Bergen. Construction begun in the 1240s.  
concrete, and the integration of the art. The High-rise turned into ‘a building 
that expressed new ideals about the role of art in public environments. … 
Architecture and pictorial art became so intimately combined that they appear 
inseparable’. 
In a similar manner, representatives of most of the organisations concerned 
with cultural heritage and the built environment entered into the debate to 
sanction the case for restoration of the High-rise and the Y block. The 
Foundation for Design and Architecture in Norway (Norsk Form), official 
advisor to the Ministry of Culture, referred to the buildings as ‘a historical 
point of reference in our democracy’,75 the Cultural Heritage Management 
Office in Oslo (Byantikvaren) appealed for not making the mistake of tearing 
down a building that likely will be valued in the future,76 and Oslo Museum 
emphasised the role of the High-rise as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
condition of the buildings before taking part in the debate. At the time, FAD and Statsbygg worked on a 
protection plan in collaboration with Riksantikvaren. Cf. n. 66. 
75 H M Eriksson & A V Bermann, ‘Vern det beste – riv resten’, Dagens Næringsliv, 1 Feb. 2012, 50. 
76 M Stige, ‘Unngå ny rivetabbe’, ibid., 23 Dec. 2011, 70. 
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a materialised storyteller of history. It says much of the development of the 
Norwegian modern democracy, and represents important architecture 
historical values. Furthermore, it is obviously important urban history. And, as 
we have seen, tragically, in relation to 22 July, new layers are constantly 
added to that history. Because the building holds many histories and symbolic 
values, we hope that the building will be preserved.77 
Also non-governmental organisations were asked about their views. A voting 
member of ICOMOS’s international scientific committee on 20th Century 
Heritage, Nils Anker, stressed that the building was a symbol of ‘the welfare 
state’s belief in the future and its optimism. The restored building could also 
symbolise that the most destructive forces could not break the government or 
the democratic values of our society’.78 The organisations Society for the 
Preservation of Norwegian Ancient Monuments (Fortidsminneforeningen) 
and Norwegian Heritage (Norsk Kulturarv) both argued that the decision 
should be raised from the level of FAD to the level of the prime minister.79 
The representatives of museums and cultural heritage organisations could 
be regarded as the notables of the disciplinary memory of art and architecture 
in a similar manner as Halbwachs saw notaries, auctioneers, and union 
secretaries as authorised representatives of legal memory.80 The conservators 
and architects are appointed by the municipal or state administration or by 
peers in the organisations to advice and make judgements in certain matters. 
The institutions they head should administer the cultural memory upheld by 
the historic buildings and environments, just like the institution of the notary 
public ensures the remembrance of transactions of land and contracts. 
In the same period, the journalists brought other notables into the debate to 
give their legitimising opinions. Leading parliamentary politicians were 
consulted to account for the position held by the parties, as were central 
politicians of the Oslo municipality, like the Governing Mayor and the Vice 
Mayor for Environment and Transport.81 A former prime minister also gave 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 O Østrem, ‘Utsettelse = bevaring?’, Klassekampen, 5 Jan. 2012, sec. 1, 27.  
78 Anker, ‘Et hus til ettertanke’. 
79 Østrem, ‘Utsettelse = bevaring?’; ‘Kulturnytt’, [online audio] (Oslo, NRK, 4 Jan. 2012) 
<http://podkast.nrk.no/program/kulturnytt.rss> accessed 9 Nov. 2012. Secretary General of 
Fortidsminneforeningen, Elisabeth Seip, gives her support for the preservation of the High-rise, quite aware of 
the secrecy surrounding the report she had authored for Statsbygg and FAD, which had not yet been published. 
E Seip, Conversation with M Ekman, 6 Nov. 2012; Statsbygg & Seip, Regjeringskvartalet etter 22.7.2011. 
80 Cf. Notables of memory in ch. 2. 
81 Erik Solheim of the Socialist Left Party (SV), Minister of the Environment with responsibilities for cultural 
heritage, stresses that the building is a symbol of the rebuilding after the war, of international modernism, and 
of the welfare state. Ø B Skille, et al., ‘Erik Solheim: – Høyblokka må stå’ [online article] (Oslo, NRK, 25 Jan. 
2012) <http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/norge/1.7968844> accessed 12 Nov. 2012. He will later add that ‘We have 
a national and international obligation to take care of [the High-rise].’ E Solheim, ‘Stygt storting?’, 
Dagsavisen, 21 Feb. 2012, sec. Meninger, 5. Knut Arild Hareide, leader of the Norwegian Christian 
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his opinion.82 Other legitimising voices active in this period include CEOs of 
significant Norwegian property developers,83 prominent firms of architects,84 
the artists who executed the original artwork of the building,85 and the 
daughter and grandchildren of Erling Viksjø.86 Also, at least three times, in 
opinion polls Norwegians were asked for their views on whether to tear down 
the High-rise or not.87 Another process of legitimisation is related to the 
debate that went on at the same time concerning where, and in what form, the 
official memorials after 22 July should be placed. I will return to address that 
process later. 
The Government Quarter, a Gedenkort 
Aleida Assmann has pointed to how the official functional memory serves to 
legitimise regimes.88 By the selection of canons of political history, literature, 
music, art, and architecture, as well as of the sites to which these official 
memories are attached, the dominant cultural and political sphere directs the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Democratic Party (KrF) and leader of the Parliament’s 22 July committee, argues that the High-rise should be 
torn down because of reasons of economy, function, and security. ‘Hareide: – Høyblokken bør rives’, 
NTBtekst, 19 Dec. 2011. He later explains that ‘I recognise the many cultural heritage values in the building 
but, obviously, we cannot keep all old buildings.’ Jan Tore Sanner, deputy of the Conservative Party of 
Norway (H), and Gjermund Hagesæther of the Progress Party (Frp) support the decision by the ministry to 
postpone the conclusion. Their parties have not concluded on whether they favour demolition or restoration. 
Trygve Slagsvold Vedum of the Centre Party (Sp) and Ola Elvestuen, deputy of Norway’s Social Liberal Party 
(V) and Vice Mayor for Environment and Transport in Oslo, hope that the High-rise can be saved. M Rønning, 
‘Tommelen opp for utredning av høyblokken’, NTBtekst, 26 Jan. 2012. Governing Mayor in Oslo, Stian 
Berger Røsland (H), argues that a highly symbolic building such as the High-rise should be restored to its 
previous state. ‘Byrådslederen vil ikke endre Oslo etter 22. juli’, NTBtekst, 21 Nov. 2011.  
82 Kjell Magne Bondevik (KrF) argues for the demolition of the R4 and the S block and for the restoration of 
the High-rise. K M Bondevik, ‘I et fornyet regjeringskvartal’, Aftenposten Morgen, 31 Jan. 2012, sec. Debatt, 
6. Later, in June 2012, other former prime ministers are consulted: Kåre Willoch (H) hopes it will be 
preserved, Thorbjørn Jagland (Ap) is of the opinion that the symbolic values of restoration as well as of 
demolition have been exaggerated, and Odvar Nordli (Ap) says he would not miss the building, if it was torn 
down. T Bergsaker & S Prestegård, ‘Splittet. Eks-statsministre har ulikt syn på høyblokkas skjebne’, 
Dagbladet, 29 June 2012, sec. A, 8. 
83 ‘Eiendomstopper vil bevare høyblokken’, Aftenposten Aften, 30 Nov. 2011, sec. Nyhet, 10. 
84 Jenssen, ‘Maktens høyblokk’. 
85 A Christiansen, ‘En kunstner av de sjeldne’, Aftenposten Morgen, 13 April 2012, sec. Kultur, 6–7; Jenssen, 
‘Maktens høyblokk’. 
86 Jenssen, ‘Maktens høyblokk’; Viksjø, ‘La høyblokken stå!’; ‘Tviler på argumenter’, Dagens Næringsliv, 23 
Dec. 2011, 66; A B Johnsen & T Solberg, ‘Farfar og far tegnet regjeringskvartalet. Nå advarer han mot å rive 
høyblokka’, VG, 28 Jan. 2012, 13. 
87 In Nov. Aftenposten reports 70 per cent of 13,000 voters in favour of tearing down the High-rise. O 
Mjaaland, et al., ‘Bør Høyblokken rives?’, Aftenposten Morgen, 22 Dec. 2011, sec. Nyheter, 9. A technical 
weekly notes 54 per cent for tearing down in a similar poll of 4,465 respondents. Of the women voting, 52 per 
cent are in favour of keeping the building. Younger people are more willing to demolish it and three of four 
architects are of the opinion that the High-rise should be kept. J Seehausen, ‘Delt i synet på høyblokka’, 
Teknisk ukeblad, 158/36 (3 Nov. 2011), 6. On the day of the publication of the Statsbygg and FAD report, 
Ipsos MMIS undertakes a poll with a ‘country-representative selection of the population’ with 470 
respondents. 53 per cent vote for demolition and only 35 per cent want to keep the building. A A Kristiansen, 
et al., ‘Folket er splittet om høyblokkas skjebne’, Dagbladet, 27 Jan. 2012, sec. A, 10–11. 
88 See Tasks of functional memory and storage memory in ch. 5. 
6   Disputed spatial frameworks of memory 
 	   295 
attention to certain symbolic entities of the past. The unwanted elements of 
the cultural memory are kept outside of circulation and influence by means of 
censorship, destruction, neglect, and ignorance. The process of legitimisation 
of historical and symbolic perspectives on the government buildings in Oslo 
offers a complementary perspective to Aleida Assmann’s. In a parliamentary 
democracy like that of Norway, with free speech, the public debate takes the 
form of a struggle for influence over a changing functional memory of the 
nation.89 Whereas several of the contributors are official advisors to the 
government, the interchange of arguments has, to a large degree, been 
exposed in media. The decision-making processes are kept within the 
government, but the documents produced by and for the government as a 
basis for decisions have been published on the Internet after the decisions 
have been made, at least this is what FAD claims. 
On the one hand, the process of legitimisation reveals itself as a didactic 
dissemination and repetition of certain themes, in the hope of establishing the 
Government Quarter as a spatial framework of national memory. It is my 
impression that the implicit aim of those in favour of restoration is to 
transfigure the quarter into a Norwegian Gedenkort, a normative site for the 
commemoration of exemplary deeds and heroic suffering in Norwegian 
history. As a Gedenkort, the quarter can be added as a cultural landmark in 
the greater spatial framework already supporting the nation’s functional 
memory: sites of decisive historic battles, like those in Hafrsfjord (late ninth 
century, Figures 47, 48) and in Stiklestad (1030, Figure 49), royal residences 
like Håkonshallen (1240s–, Figure 46), Akershus Castle and Fortress (1290s–
, Figure 50), and the Royal Palace (1849, Figure 20), and modern political 
sites like the parliament building (1866, Figure 19) and Eidsvollbygningen 
(c.1770, Figure 51). 
I observe that the contributors aim at consolidating the selection of values 
and symbols to be collectively associated with the spatial framework of the 
Government Quarter. It is a process of turning the functional memory of the 
history of art and architecture and the current communicative memory of 
collective grief into a stable functional memory of the nation, bound to the 
site and publically recognised. In order to be embraced by Norwegians in 
general, I get the impression that the complexity of historical and art  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 In what may seem as its zeal for complying with the ideas of free speech and transparent political processes, 
FAD published all attachments to Statsbygg’s report of November 2011, including a document written by the 
German Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) that was marked with ‘VS – Nur für 
den Dienstgebrauch’, a confidential document on the disposition, planning, and security of German 
government buildings, not to be circulated publicly. It was later blanked out in the online document. Statsbygg, 
Questions from the Norwegian Directorate of Public Construction and Property regarding experience with 
planning and operation of government buildings (Oslo, FAD, 2012). 
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Figure 47. Battle at Hafrsfjord, late 9th c. Painting by Ole Peter Hansen Balling. 1870.  
Figure 48. Monument over the battle at Hafrsfjord by Fritz Røed. 1983.
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Figure 49. Depiction of St Olaf being killed at Stiklestad in 1030. Olavsfrontalet, 
early fourteenth century, Nidaros cathedral, Trondheim. 
Figure 50. Akershus Castle and Fortress, Oslo. Construction begun in the 1290s. 
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Figure 51. Eidsvollbygningen. c.1770. 
Figure 52. The rows of linden trees in front of the High-rise. 2008. 
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historical narratives bound to the buildings needs to be simplified and 
preferably tied to existing cultural symbols. For instance – and this is not my 
recommendation of how to do it, but an extrapolation of how the site could 
ideally look according to such a line of thinking – a Government Quarter 
Gedenkort that captures select events in Norway’s modern history in an 
intelligible manner could include: one, the rows of linden trees lining the 
entrance on one side of the High-rise (Figure 52) and the only remainders of 
Empirekvartalet from the period following 1814, when the status of 
Christiania (Oslo) changed from a provincial city of Denmark to the capital 
city of Norway; two, the 1906 building, the first government building to be 
erected on the site, tied in time to Norwegian autonomy following the 1905 
dissolution of the union with Sweden; three, the High-rise as the marking of 
the social democratic welfare state after WWII, with concrete art associated 
with the international art world through Picasso; and four, a reminder of 22 
July in the form of a memorial or visible marks from the explosion. For a 
publicly embraced Gedenkort, symbolic conciseness allows for better 
remembrance; details should be left to the notables of the national memory, 
like historians and architectural historians, and other material remnants than 
those mentioned are preferably removed to not obscure the simplicity of the 
normative site of memory. 
On the other hand, and more explicitly than the aim to establish the quarter 
as a spatial framework of the nation’s functional memory, the legitimising 
voices contributing to the debate attempt to influence the decision making of 
the government with regard to the question of demolition or restoration. 
Vanished architecture does not necessarily lead to the forgetting of it or its 
cultural connotations – compare, for instance, with the disputes over the 
demolition of Palast der Republik in Berlin and the prospective 
reconstruction of Berlin Stadtschloß on the same site (Figures 53, 54).90 
Indeed, even if there are no physical remnants, the known location as such 
seems to be enough to ground remembering, as Halbwachs demonstrated 
with regard to the legendary topography in the Holy Land, where no material 
traces from the environment of the time of Jesus remain.91 In Stiklestad, to   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 For memory perspectives on this debate, see A Assmann, Geschichte im Gedächtnis. Von der individuellen 
Erfahrung zur öffentlichen Inszenierung (Munich, C.H. Beck, 2007), 123–31; B Jager, ‘“Verlust der Mitte”’, 
in A Dessingué et al. (eds), Flerstemte minner (Stavanger, Hertervig, 2010); S Flamm, ‘Der Palast der 
Republik’, in E François & H Schulze (eds), Deutsche Erinnerungsorte, ii (Munich, Beck, 2001). 
91 M Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire des évangiles en Terre sainte. Étude de mémoire collective, ed. 
M Jaisson, Quadrige (1941; 1971; rev. 2nd edn, Paris, PUF, 2008), 113. Cf. Topographie in ch. 2. 
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Figure 53. Palast der Republik, Berlin. 1977. 
take a Norwegian example, nothing remains of the battleground from 1030, 
only the place names in the area.92 And like the chapels built by Christians 
from the fourth century onwards on sites accounted for in the Gospel, a 
church was erected in 1180 on the spot where it was said that St. Olaf had 
perished a century and a half before (Figures 48, 55). 
Despite such considerations, the debate on the Government Quarter in Oslo 
seems to imply that the preservation of certain of its buildings provides the 
ultimate legitimisation, suggesting its transfiguration into a cultural landmark 
in the spatial framework of national memory. A decision to restore some of 
the buildings is perceived as an acknowledgement of the values and symbols 
ascribed to them by the milieus concerned with architecture and cultural 
heritage. If the government does not follow the advice given by the 
institutions it has authorised would be understood as an expression of 
distrust. 
The report ‘The Government Quarter. Provisions for subsequent work’ 
(‘Regjeringskvartalet. Føringer for videre arbeid’) by Statsbygg, with 
supplements written by external consultants, was published online by FAD 
on 26 January 2012.93 It offers a number of conclusions to direct the  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 For memory perspectives on Stiklestad, cf. A Eriksen, ‘Fra tid til sted – mellom historie og minne’, in O 
Skevik & P S Raaen (eds), Helligdom og verdier ved to årtusenskifter (Verdal, Stiklestad Nasjonale 
Kultursenter, 2004); E Følstad, et al. (eds), Stiklestad og andre minnesteder. Foredrag i 2004 og 2005 (Verdal, 
Stiklestad Nasjonale Kultursenter, 2006). 
93 Statsbygg, Regjeringskvartalet Føringer, 3. Cf. n. 70. 
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subsequent work and four scenarios for the planning processes. The report 
recommends co-locating government premises in the quarter for reasons of 
departmental interaction, security, and its 200-year tradition as a site for the 
state administration. It further concludes that it cannot be verified whether 
there will be any psychological effects on the victims and their relatives, if 
the damaged buildings are torn down or restored, respectively, but it asserts 
that, according to a consensus in the ‘specialist literature’ (faglitteratur), a 
memorial should be established in respect of the victims, and the building 
parts most associated with the attack should preferably be modified to 
provide no visual reminders. Of the damaged buildings, not counting the G 
block, the High-rise is regarded as the most important, followed by the Y 
block. The report also concludes that only minor damage has been inflicted 
on the primary load-bearing structures of these buildings, but considerable 
damage has been caused to façades, interiors, and technical installations. 
On the press conference on the occasion of the publication of the report, 
Minister Aasrud of FAD emphasises that no decision has been made with 
regard to what buildings should be restored or demolished, but she informs 
that the investigations and development of scenarios, including several stages  
Figure 54. Postcard with Berlin Stadtschloß. 1920s. 
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Figure 55. Stiklestad church. 1180. 
of quality assurance, will continue until the end of 2012.94 She invites the 
public to contribute, especially through the blog that FAD keeps open for 
comments until 1 April 2012, and announces that the decision will finally be 
made in 2013.95 The debate sees little activity during the summer and autumn 
2012,96 but a group of consultants have been appointed to develop different 
scenarios for the buildings of the quarter to be finished in the summer 2013.97 
On 1 January 2013, in a comment to the press, Minister Aasrud encourages a 
new debate about what should be thought of when building a new 
Government Quarter, and who is of what opinion.98 She further mentions that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 R Aasrud, ‘Regjeringskvartalets framtid’ [speech manuscript], Press conference about the future of the 
Government Quarter in Oslo, 26 Jan. 2012. 
95 FAD, ‘Fremtidens regjeringskvartal’ [website], updated 1 Apr. 2012, 
<http://blogg.regjeringen.no/regjeringskvartalet/> accessed 6 Dec. 2012. 
96 Some of the few contributions in this period include: C Paludan-Müller, ‘Hva skal vi ta vare på?’, 
Dagsavisen, 4 Sept. 2012, sec. Meninger, 4; L Maliks, ‘Å drøfte vernepolitikk: Tilfellet regjeringskvartalet’, 
Fortidsvern, /4 (2012). 
97 The consultants are Metier AS, OPAK AS, and LPO arkitekter. FAD, ‘FAD har valgt konseptvalgsutredere’ 
[website], updated 13 July 2012, 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fad/aktuelt/nyheter/2012/konseptvalgsutredere.html?id=696773> accessed 
14 Mar. 2013. 
98 H Høiness, ‘Aasrud: Vil ha ny debatt om regjeringskvartalet’, NTBtekst, 1 Jan. 2013. One of the few 
responses to her call include an appeal for a restoration of the High-rise that includes the removal of the floors 
added on top of the building in 1990. A Engh, ‘Riv det nye påbygget’, Aftenposten Aften, 11 Jan. 2013, sec. 
Debatt, 12. Cf. Høyblokken i Regjeringskvartalet. Påbygg for Statsministerens kontor og lokaler for 
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some buildings have to be demolished because of their bad conditions. It 
does not seem to apply to the High-rise, of which she says that the ministry 
will need to consider what the most appropriate way of using the building is, 
practically and concerning heritage values. She reports that the ministry also 
looks at possibilities of incorporating the Deichmanske library building into 
the Government Quarter. At the time of the final editing of this chapter, 
March 2013, the future state of the High-rise and the quarter is still 
undecided. 
Commemoration of the 22 July events 
Considerations of how the Government Quarter may function as a national 
site for the memory of the 22 July bombing and the Utøya massacre has only 
been discussed to a limited degree in the first year of the debate. A number of 
people have commented on where a memorial could be located, but few have 
reflected on how it could be organised and what roles it might take publicly.99 
One of the latter was Ketil Knutsen, historian and memory scholar, who 
offered a reflection on national policies of remembrance in his comparison of 
a prospective site for remembering of 22 July and the newly opened 
memorial at Ground Zero, New York. Pointing to the political function of 
national memory, he suggests that 
The potential of the monument [minnesmerke] is that it functions as a constant 
reminder of who we are and where we are going as a nation through its 
physical presence in a landscape where people travel. In this way, it socialises 
new generations into society, builds common identities, and communicates 
values. In many cases, places of memory [minnesteder] could also be used to 
justify political projects.100 
With reference to historian Jan Bjarne Bøe, Knutsen suggests that a site of 
commemoration, like that of the Government Quarter after 22 July, 
constitutes a marker that directs the attention to a certain side of the past, as a 
guideline for the present and direction for the future. With its form and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
regjeringen. Fornying av heisene og nytt ventilasjonsanlegg,  (Ferdigmelding nr. 360, Statens bygge- og 
eiendomsdirektorat, 1990). 
99 On the location of the memorial site, see e.g. W K Riaz & J-A Berg-Jacobsen, ‘Bjørvika? Tullinløkka? 
Rådhusplassen? Regjeringskvartalet?’, Aftenposten Aften, 2 Aug. 2011, sec. Nyheter, 4. 
100 Knutsen, ‘Kampen om Ground Zero’. As far as I know, Seip offers the most comprehensive reflection on 
memorial sites in her text on the Government Quarter written for Statsbygg. Statsbygg & Seip, 
Regjeringskvartalet etter 22.7.2011, 17–25. Bjørn Jacobsen draws on the experiences from Oklahoma and 
suggests a combined museum and memorial for 22 July, for instance in Frognerparken. B B Jacobsen, 
‘Minnesenter i Oslo’, VG, 2 Aug. 2011, 39. I have argued for the mnemonic potential of the Government 
Quarter after 22 July, regardless of whether it is chosen as a memorial site, and for the prospect of making a 
historical documentation centre in the quarter. See e.g. M Ekman, ‘Regjeringskvartalet og minner’, 
Dagsavisen, 21 Dec. 2011, sec. Meninger, 4; Ekman, ‘Merket av minner’. 
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choice of site, the monument offers an index to who and what should be 
remembered and forgotten, respectively. 
In the previous chapter I distinguished between originally intended 
architectural features and later added marks as two explicit aspects of the 
spatial framework of memory. These are associative signs, visible in the 
architecture and therefore different in character from the implicit aspects that 
are projected on to features of the architecture. A built memorial to the 
victims of the 22 July events could make up an explicit framework of 
memory. The architecture is ‘accentuated by signs’ (Jan Assmann) that are 
placed there deliberately to remember certain things. The existing buildings, 
if they are restored, may instead be seen to constitute an implicit monument 
of the explosion; it is ‘raised to the status of signs’. The associative images 
exist in the minds of Norwegians as automatic connotations when they see or 
think of the government buildings, but neither architectural elements nor 
damages caused by the explosion remind of the bombing. Different from the 
former, the latter will not only point to 22 July memories, but also be capable 
of recalling political history and aspects of the history of art and architecture 
that precedes the attack. 
Concerning the question of whether or not the Government Quarter should 
be made into a memorial to the 22 July events, the debate on the demolition 
or preservation of the High-rise becomes entangled with other debates that 
have characterised the public sphere since July 2011. In the aftermath of the 
bombing in central Oslo and the massacre on Utøya, the government gave the 
Ministry of Culture (KUD) the mandate to form a group that should evaluate 
the establishment of minnesmerker or minnesmonumenter (both 
approximately ‘monuments’ or ‘memorials’) to honour the dead, the 
survivors, the rescue teams, and the volunteers.101 On 22 December 2011 the 
group was organised under the direction of former Minister of Culture, Åse 
Kleveland, and came to include the secretary general of KUD, the director 
general of FAD, representatives of the support groups of victims from the 
two sites and their relatives, and the secretary general of the youth 
organisation AUF. At the beginning of the report, the group makes a 
distinction of terms by introducing a third term that had not been included in 
the mandate: minnested (approximately ‘place of memory’). The group 
defines the terms minnesmerke and minnesmonument as ‘a designed element,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Å Kleveland, et al., Steder for å minnes og påminnes – innstilling vedrørende minnesteder etter 22. juli 
(Oslo, Kulturdepartementet/KORO, 2012), 5. In Norwegian dictionaries monument and minnesmerke refer to 
(historical) reminders in the form of a memorial stone, statue, or building. Minnesmonument, literally ‘memory 
monument’ (‘monument’, from Latin monere, ‘remind’), appears like a neologism and tautology. 
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Figure 56. Memorial stone erected on Nisseberget, Oslo. 1941. 
permanently placed in the public space to remind of a person or event’.102 
They come as signs or boards in stone or bronze, or as reliefs, busts, statues, 
or buildings with clear references to the object of remembrance. Minnesteder, 
they say, are more dynamic places that could, but do not need to, include 
clear references to what should be remembered through descriptions or 
monuments. Equally important, they argue, a minnested is ‘a place for 
reflection on an event and its consequences’ that, different from minnesmerke 
or minnesmonument, does not direct the attention to only one incident, but 
could cater for other memories. It could consist of a larger site, thus not 
restricting itself only to a minnesmerke or a minnesmonument. It ‘appears as 
less static and controlling’, they assert. 
As a surprise to many, the group ends up suggesting a national place of 
memory, or minnested, of the bombing of the Government Quarter to be 
located at Nisseberget, in the park surrounding the Royal Palace in central 
Oslo. Nisseberget did not play any role during or after the 22 July events, but, 
as the broadcasting company NRK was quick to point out, it had been the 
place for a memorial stone erected by the Quisling-led Nazi government in 
1941, in honour of the Icelandic historian and poet Snorri Sturluson (1178–	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 ibid., 8.  
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1241; Figure 56).103 The recommendation rests on practical grounds, the 
group asserts, and it is only because of the uncertainty of the reconstruction 
processes in the Government Quarter that they do not suggest the latter as the 
national place of memory. In its evaluation of the different places, however, 
the report emphasises the ‘obvious relevance’ of the Government Quarter 
because of its ‘proximity to the event, from the beginning one of the criteria 
for a place of memory in Oslo’.104 It also states that ‘The place is already 
established as a place of memory that people go to’, and if it is not chosen for 
a national place of memory, a ‘beautiful and dignified marker [markering] 
over the deceased’ should be established on the site. The group delivers the 
report to the government on 25 April 2012. On 22 June the same year, only 
weeks after Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg has visited the memorial on 
Ground Zero in New York, Minister of Culture Anniken Huitfeldt and 
Minister Aasrud announce that the future Government Quarter will include a 
national place of memory as well as a monument (minnesmerke) for the 22 
July bombing.105 A temporary place of memory will be located between the 
Y block and the Deichmanske library for the period in which the quarter will 
remain a building site (Figure 57). Public Art Norway (KORO), the 
government’s professional body for commissioning art in public spaces, is 
appointed for the task of establishing the sites.106  
In his article on the importance of place in Halbwachs’s writings on 
memory, Gérôme Truc has shown how the designation of a place for 
commemoration in another place than on the site where the commemorated 
event took place frees the latter to be what he, with Kenneth E. Foote, calls 
rectified. The place is restored to normal order, so that it can be used like 
before the event.107 The proposal to position a memorial for 22 July victims 
at Nisseberget may mirror a pragmatic stance of the group to rectify the 
Government Quarter for the need of the state administration, avoiding the  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Sturluson wrote a history of Norwegian kings from mythical times until 1177. T Staude & E Berg, ‘Vil 
plassere 22. juli-minnesmerke på samme sted som nazist-bauta’ [online article] (Oslo, NRK, 25 Apr. 2012) 
<http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/1.8100492> accessed 13 Nov. 2012. 
104 Kleveland, et al., Steder for å minnes og påminnes, 24.  
105 ‘Vil lære av Ground Zero’. In September 2012 Minister Aasrud of FAD also travels to Ground Zero to 
learn: ‘Aasrud til Ground Zero’. Kulturdepartementet, ‘Pressemelding 65/12. Nasjonalt minnested i 
regjeringskvartalet’ [press release], Oslo, 22 June 2012. 
106 The mandate for KORO also includes the commissioning of a permanent place of memory on the mainland 
at Utøya. KORO, ‘Mandat’ [website], updated 16 Nov. 2012, 
<http://www.koro.no/no/prosjekter/prosjekter_i_arbeid/web/statlige_bygg/minnesteder_etter_22juli/mandat/> 
accessed 14 Mar. 2013. The temporary place of memory in the quarter should be completed before 22 July 
2015. 
107 G Truc, ‘Memory of Places and Places of Memory: For a Halbwachsian Socio-ethnography of Collective 
Memory’, International Social Science Journal, /203–204 (2012), 154. 
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Figure 57. Arne Garborgs plass, the site chosen for the temporary place of memory. 
allocation of space to a place of memory and its association with 
connotations to the terrorist attack in the centre of political representation. 
A receptive place 
With Aleida Assmann, an Erinnerungsort can be described as a remaining 
physical site that has ceased to function as a collective spatial framework of 
the communicative memory of one or several groups.108 The material remains 
are emptied of the active memory of the groups that used it and left open for 
new constructions of meaning. The absence of living memory, Assmann 
suggests, has to be replaced by linguistic transmission. It needs to change 
from being a spatial framework of communicative memory to one of the 
cultural memory. Since 22 July, all professional activity that made use of the 
affected buildings has stopped and moved to other, temporary premises, 
except for the work of clearing the debris and safeguarding the thousands of 
graded documents that had been spread by the blast. According to 
Statsbygg’s calculations, the affected parts of the quarter will remain a 
building site until sometime between 2018 and 2027, depending on the 
choice of scenario.109 The discontinuation of active use of the site by different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Cf. Receptive places – Erinnerungsorte in ch. 5. 
109 Statsbygg, Regjeringskvartalet Føringer, [28]. 
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groups, especially by the government administration as a part of their zone de 
l’activité technique, suggests the status of the quarter will be as an 
Erinnerungsort, at least until it can be used again by state officials and 
citizens. The debate has demonstrated that the site has been considered to be 
receptive to meaning, in the sense that it has been understood to be able to 
reflect new values, which were not previously associated with it, at least not 
by Norwegians in general. The material remains, which most people cannot 
get access to see, other than through media representations, do not 
necessarily tell us anything through their materiality. It is the contributors to 
the debate who suggest the selection of important parts and places within the 
quarter, and ascribe to them the meanings we should recall upon seeing them 
or thinking of them. 
It is possible to argue that the Government Quarter is not an 
Erinnerungsort. The groups who used to work in the site continue to 
function, but in other locales, and those engaged in the debate more than 
before use the spatial framework of the site for professional and political 
considerations. Nonetheless, there has been a break in the active use of the 
site that will stretch out in time for so long that most other groups, except for 
those working on its reconstruction, will focus less and less on the quarter. 
People may pass through the area on a daily basis again, but there will be few 
mediated images of politicians in front of the High-rise or on its top floor 
other than in reportages relating to 22 July commemorations or the process of 
reconstruction (Figure 58). It will cease to function as a spatial framework of 
the zone de l’activité technique of the government administration. New, 
temporary premises will support the rituals for the next couple of years or 
decade. The rupture also made groups that did not previously focus their 
attention on the buildings attentive to it, like practising architects and 
conservators. The public engagement with the site, greater now than before 
the blast, seems to point to a need for filling in the emptiness of meaning 
after the government administration left the site, in a manner that reminds of 
Aleida Assmann’s Erinnerungsort. 
In the conclusion of his study of the legendary topography of the Holy 
Land, Halbwachs postulates two basic laws that seem to govern the 
organisation of cultural memory in places. He suggests that sites that have 
previously been consecrated with cultural memories easily attract new 
memories. Even memories of events that have nothing in common, he 
reasons, nonetheless come to strengthen each other by being situated in the 
same place. Collective memories, so he suggests, display ‘a kind of  
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Figure 58. 1st anniversary of the 22 July bombing and Utøya massacre at the 
Government Quarter, with Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and HM King Harald V. 
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gregarious instinct’.110 He infers this from the observation that most places of 
Jesus’s life, as they were accounted for in the Gospel, made use of sites that 
already carried strong symbolism in the collective memory of the Jews. So 
Jesus is said to have been born in Bethlehem, the city of David, and to have 
died in Jerusalem, the great religious centre of the Jews.111 It appears as if 
such a gregarious character of collective memory can be identified also in 
relation to the Government Quarter, at least when considering the many 
representatives of the political and cultural establishment who have laboured 
to bind to the quarter a multiplicity of memories. They have referred to a 
variety of aspects of political history and the development of the modern 
Norwegian state, to history of art and architecture, and to the remembrance of 
the events of 22 July, many of which are bound to other symbolic 
crystallisations of national remembering: to the state administration of the 
new nation after 1814 and the sovereign nation after 1905, to the social 
democratic welfare state’s development after WWII, and to a liaison in the 
Norwegian art world with an international celebrity like Picasso. 
The aspects that have been given prominence in the debate seem not to 
compete with associations and symbolism bound to other sites of the nation 
and the state, but to provide supplements. The Government Quarter fills in 
and adds to the memories affiliated with the parliament building (symbol for 
parliamentary democracy and the representation of the provinces), the Royal 
Palace (the residence of the head of state, the king, and the making of Oslo 
into a capital in the nineteenth century), or the Eidsvoll building (the writing 
of the Norwegian constitution). These complementary aspects, together with 
the gregarious character of the memories, suggest the validity and vitality if 
the Government Quarter was turned into a new, affirmative Gedenkort for the 
Norwegian nation. As a spatial framework of the functional memory of the 
nation, it would rise from the ruins of the Erinnerungsort and from the 
rupture of social and cultural frames, caused by the bombing and the 
massacre. It remains to be seen if the government will decide to tear down 
some of the historical relics of the proposed revision of the spatial framework 
of the functional memory of the nation. 
It is tempting to conjecture that the process of creating a commonly 
embraced cultural concept of the Government Quarter may already have 
come so far as to no longer be dependent on the physical buildings. The 
quarter seems to be on its way to transfigure into an immaterial entity. If all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Halbwachs, La Topographie légendaire, 145. Cf. Gregariousness and the distribution of collective memory 
in ch. 2. 
111 ibid., 139–44. 
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existing architecture is torn down, the spatial framework of the quarter loses 
its material part, left as an empty site, just like the one where the Berlin 
Stadtschloß and the Palast der Republik stood in Berlin, reconstructed only in 
memory or through photographs. It would contribute to making the place 
even more abstract, with a mythical rather than real character. Such a place is 
a Gedenkort without physicality, an incorporeal entity, located as an image in 
the collective spatial framework of memory. The symbol may not be 
weakened, but it may be strengthened, compared to if the buildings are left 
standing. 
The orchestration of the spatial frameworks of memory 
In the Introduction, in relation to Astrid Erll’s article ‘Travelling Memory’, I 
raised the issue of the travelling character of architecture and of spatial 
frameworks of memory. The debate over the Government Quarter is an 
example of cultural processes that redefine the spatial frameworks affiliated 
with the quarter. They move, change, split up, consolidate, and are 
exchanged. The one physical site finds its representation in multifarious 
spatial frameworks of memory, spread over the minds of many individuals 
and groups. What I have shown here is how the rupture caused by the 
explosion sparks reactions in certain milieus. By making public their 
opinions, they contribute to redefining those of other groups. We have seen 
how the spatial frameworks of the Government Quarter, with the symbolic 
weight ascribed to them by architectural historians and others, have 
embarked on a journey, implicitly in the hope of being established in the 
national fellowship, explicitly to restore some of the damaged buildings. I 
have also conjectured how the spatial frameworks of memory, because of the 
drastic increase of media exposure, for most people, have become clearer 
images that carry with them different and stronger connotations. 
As an immediate consequence of the bombing, the spatial framework of the 
Government Quarter also travelled outside of Norway in countless 
photographs and headlines, to establish itself as one of the sites via which the 
Western world recalls terrorist attacks, akin to Oklahoma in 1995, New York 
and Washington DC in 2001, Madrid in 2004, or London in 2005. In this 
comparative act, the Norwegians also needed to understand their own site of 
terror in relation to established conceptions that had travelled to Norway 
from abroad, and relate it to political motives quite different from the latter 
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three examples.112 The bombing itself may be seen as an act that defies a 
presumed permanence of architecture, but regardless of whether the buildings 
will come to stand or be torn down, the explosion came to act as a catalyst for 
processes of cultural change. The architecture proved not to be permanent in 
terms of its national conceptualisation, but was destabilised overnight. The 
multitude of spatial frameworks that existed in the memory of the different 
groups began to be revised and exchanged between them. The modification 
processes implicating these mental images will, no doubt, influence the future 
physical state of the Government Quarter. In the Introduction, I suggested 
that the title Edifices referred to the representation of the singular physical 
building in a plurality of spatial frameworks, and that the term points to the 
ambiguity of architecture as, on the one hand, a construction of form and 
material and, on the other, as thought constructions in memory. The 
discussions of this chapter imply that to use the word in the plural also 
mirrors architecture’s multiple representations over time and in different 
immobile and mobile media. 
 
Figure 59. Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, HM Queen Sonja, Secretary to the Gov. 
Nina Frisak, and HM King Harald V meet in the Government Quarter, 24 July 2011. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Cf. the study by Michael Rothberg in which he argues that memory articulated in the public sphere 
necessarily cross-references and borrows from that of other cultural spheres: ‘pursuing memory’s 
multidirectionality encourages us to think of the public sphere as a malleable discursive space in which groups 
do not simply articulate established positions but actually come into being through their dialogical interactions 
with others’. M Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory (Stanford, SUP, 2009), 5. 
  
Conclusion  
Let us now gather our thoughts, close our eyes, and go back in 
time to the furthest point possible for us, so far as our thoughts can 
still focus on scenes or on people that we store in memory. Never 
do we go outside of space.  
— Maurice Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, 19971 
Images of space in memory appear to be fundamental in processes of social 
life and culture. In this thesis I set out to identify a theoretical framework that 
could organise different types of spatial representations and the way they 
may complement, interact, or interfere, to be employed in studies of 
architecture and memory in the humanities. Through analyses of selected 
works of Maurice Halbwachs, Kevin Lynch, Aldo Rossi, Aleida Assmann, 
and Jan Assmann, and in the study of the debate over the Government 
Quarter in Oslo after 22 July 2011, I have successively outlined up a concept 
of architecture and memory. Before contemplating the results, I will 
summarise its main features. 
The spatial frameworks of memory 
Different from the previous chapters, in the following I intend to consider the 
spatial framework of memory as a theoretical framework under one, as a 
synthesis of several lines of thinking. Therefore, I will not account for the 
indebtedness of the different aspects to the different theorists, as I have 
previously done, but instead outline the basics of the concept seen in its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 M Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective, ed. G Namer (1950; crit. edn, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997) [orig., 
‘Mémoire et société’ (1947)], 236. 
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coalescence. It may be useful to compare with the schematic overview in 
Figure 60, below, while reading the following. 
Summary 
In its most fundamental understanding, the spatial framework takes the form 
of stable but dynamic notions, accumulated over time in the memory of 
individuals. Schematised and abstracted, these spatial representations need to 
be actualised in order to reconstruct other memories. Pertaining to physical 
counterparts or being of entirely fictitious or imaginative character, the 
spatial frameworks can be manoeuvred in thought to get access to other, 
similarly stable frameworks – social, temporal, and linguistic. In this manner, 
they take on the role of spatial mnemonics, an innate equivalent to the use of 
mental places in the art of memory. We remember space in order to 
remember other things. 
Subsuming under the term a variety of conceptual distinctions, the concept 
rests on two postulates. First, architecture, seen from a memory perspective, 
always exists in plural. From the perspective of the individual, the spatial 
framework that corresponds to a building, a city, or a landscape, together 
with its connotations, takes on a different character, depending on the group 
that he for the moment identifies with. His framework offers a point of view 
on the collective framework of each group. Seen from the perspective of 
society, the physical environment is mirrored differently in the spatial 
framework of every specific group. There are as many frameworks as there 
are groups that sustain a relation to that part of the environment. Furthermore, 
over time, the framework of space takes on new forms and recalls different 
memories, thus existing in plural also for each individual and for every 
group. I have referred to such temporally delineated frameworks as epochal–
spatial frameworks of memory. 
Second, recollection is assumed to be an individual act, biologically based 
in the brain, but by definition conditioned by social collectives. Following 
Halbwachs, this thesis does not recognise a dichotomy between individual 
and collective memory as two different types of remembering. Differently, 
the collective is thought of as inherent to individual thought, questioning 
perspectives that regard individual recollection as isolated from social 
settings. The individual places himself in relation to the group and makes use 
of the collective frameworks of thought when he localises and reconstructs 
the past, whether in private or in social settings. The frameworks of social 
relations, of time, and of space are constructs originating in social interaction 
and distributed in the memory of the group members. The individual has his 
own perspective on the collective frameworks of the group, and the group’s 
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collective frameworks can be regarded as a common denominator of the 
individual outlooks on the framework. 
In acts of remembering, the individual may actualise the spatial framework 
in memory, but he could also employ percepts from the environment. The 
latter have been referred to as material or external frameworks of memory, 
suggesting their similar role as catalysts for processes of remembrance such 
as that of the internal spatial frameworks. It is only with reference to the 
cognitive act that material artefacts could be considered as memory, 
metonymically speaking. To differentiate between architecture as internal 
and external spatial framework of memory is to recognise the dual nature of 
space. 
An aspect of the dual nature of space is what can be referred to as social 
morphology or the study of the material form of societies, the family, the 
state, or industrial companies. Dominant groups in a part of space externalise 
onto the physical environment the forms they have conceived in the 
collective spatial framework of their minds. It turns into a material 
framework for all the groups that move through the space or have a relation 
to it, and it is internalised as the new spatial framework of their memory. 
Through the work of representatives like politicians, urban planners, 
architects, or other influential professions, which in the context of social 
remembrance can be called notables of memory, larger societies like the 
citizenry of a town or a nation constantly alter the material surroundings 
according to changes in their internal framework (to cater for growth, 
transport, trade, etc.), which in turn is revised to correspond to the 
environment’s current physical state and to be used as a new basis for 
decisions. In this way, we can speak of a territorialisation of the physical 
landscape by the collective memory of the ruling group, an investment of 
mind in matter. To consider the mechanisms of social morphology and the 
dual nature of space suggests a shift from regarding physical environments as 
original and primary and their representation in memory as their reproduction 
or something that comes after, to recognising the conceptions of space as 
inherent to social memory dynamics, sometimes preceding, sometimes 
following, and sometimes differing from the external material forms. 
Central to the definition of the mind-internal spatial framework is that its 
actualisation in memory primarily is a means to localise other memories – 
experiences, people, emotions, history, or symbolism. When the act refers to 
informal and everyday situations in which group members informally search 
for the past, it takes place in the communicative memory. Such acts play out 
in the company of the family, friends, or colleagues and are characterised by 
reciprocity of roles, non-specialisation, and changeability. When the act of 
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remembering refers to formal and institutional situations, in which 
specialists, the notables of memory, search for the past with the support of 
artefacts like books, artwork, buildings, or archives, databases, or cities, it 
can be considered as part of the cultural memory. While earlier high cultures 
may have drawn a distinct line between the realms of communicative and 
cultural memory, our contemporary society rather sees a sliding scale, where 
internal and external frameworks of the memory are employed together and 
in different configurations, and where memory contents move from one side 
of it to the other. 
Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish between explicit and implicit 
spatial frameworks. Explicit frameworks or aspects of frameworks denote 
intended or unintended visual marks, like style, ornamentation, patina, or 
damage. They are accentuations by signs. The architecture has been created 
or altered to provide cues to certain memories. For implicit frameworks or 
aspects of frameworks, the architecture is correspondingly raised to the status 
of signs; it is semioticised. It comes to associate certain memories over time 
without referring to them by formal cues. Both the explicit and implicit 
aspects of the spatial framework of memory are only indexes that point to 
other frameworks or to different memories and are not in themselves self-
explanatory. The architectural style of a building requires pre-existing or 
additional knowledge of architectural history, either from memory or from 
books, in order to be recognised. A building in which a historic event took 
place, but where the materiality was not altered as a result of the event, does 
not, by its appearance, denote what happened and cannot be understood 
without certain knowledge of history, either brought there or acquired on the 
site. 
Moreover, the spatial framework may either support the storage memory or 
the functional memory of the discipline, the society, or the nation – the two 
extremes of a perspectival scale of the cultural memory. As spatial 
frameworks of storage memory, the spaces of archives and libraries support 
the institutionalised work with the heterogeneous and contradictory mass of 
traces from the past, all the bits and pieces currently not ordered into coherent 
narratives. Spaces of exhibition halls in museums, normative sites of 
commemoration, and carefully selected historic and political buildings, on 
the other hand, structure the legitimisation and identity building of the 
functional memory. They organise and disseminate the canons of national 
history, art, architecture, etc. 
Within the spatial framework of an environment – the neighbourhood, the 
city, or the country – some spatial entities stand out because of their 
significance to the processes of remembering. Such entities can be identified 
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on, at least, four levels of societal memory. One, on a perceptual level, 
visually salient buildings or environmental features stand out as universal 
landmarks of orientation, supporting the cognitive act of identifying our 
whereabouts and finding the way in larger areas of space that we cannot 
overview in one glance. The thesis has not addressed the landmarks of 
orientation in detail, but acknowledges the study of imageability of 
environments as a bordering field of study and which becomes relevant as a 
subsocial level of the spatial framework of memory. 
Two, on the social level, collective landmarks are shared locations of the 
group and associative connection points between the landmark and points of 
reference in its social and temporal frameworks of memory. For instance, the 
homes of family members make up such intersections in the communicative 
memory of the family, offering themselves as mnemonics of relatives, family 
history, and values. We may speak of a tendency towards gregariousness of 
memory in the collective landmarks, indicating that sites already invested 
with memories seem to attract new memories. 
Three, the cultural landmarks of historical buildings, places of 
commemoration, or museums are points in the framework where informal 
social groups’ everyday practices of communicative memory interact, 
overlay, or come into conflict with the institutionalised cultural 
remembrance, performed by notables of memory like historians, art 
historians, or conservators. They provide transfer points, where the content of 
the functional memory of the nation is disseminated to be taken up by the 
communicative memory, but also where the processes of dissemination 
occasionally go in the other direction. With the term fatto urbano we could 
understand such cultural landmarks not only to serve both the communicative 
memory and the cultural memory, but also to make up external and internal 
spatial frameworks and have explicit as well as implicit aspects. The term 
thus points to the amalgamation of materiality and collective imagination, of 
general history and collective memories, pointing to such publicly important 
architectural objects or complexes as intricate cultural composites. 
Four, the second-degree cultural landmarks offer intersections between 
different external frameworks of memory in the architecture of archives, 
storages, and libraries. The landmarks are components of the specialised 
mnemonic I have called an art of cultural memory, in which classifications of 
art, history, or science are organised into spatial systems of buildings, rooms, 
shelves, tables, and archival cabinets. The landmarks act as referential 
indexes to other external frameworks of the cultural memory, artefacts or 
other classifications. 
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Conceptual shortcuts 
In addition to the general theoretical framework summarised above, I have 
also suggested including an apparatus of conceptual shortcuts to point to the 
shape and use of spatial frameworks in particular cultural contexts. The 
entourage matériel denotes the environments and material objects families 
surround themselves with and invest their memory in. Generationenort 
describes the accumulations of entourage matériel over centuries, places in 
which generations embed and structure their collective memory. I have 
suggested Heimat as a corresponding term to describe situations where such 
an intimate chain of attachment to the entourage matériel is broken, but 
where the previous Generationenort is maintained as a spatial framework of 
collective or cultural memory, in migrated and diasporic communities. 
A number of distinctions specify the roles spatial frameworks take in 
specific contexts of social remembrance. In the zone de l’activité technique, 
the spatial layout of the buildings and premises of a profession is employed 
to organise and pass down the informal and formal memory of precepts, 
rituals, and hierarchies. In the material landscape the topographie structures a 
set of religious beliefs through mnemonic sites, exemplified through the 
erection and administration of chapels and churches in the Holy Land in the 
places of significance in Jesus’s life according to the Gospel. Religious 
collective memory, moreover, can be seen to support and stabilise itself 
through the reproduction of spatial frameworks in the material architecture of 
churches and chapels. 
What is left after a site has ceased to function as a spatial framework for a 
group is an Erinnerungsort, a place whose remaining and meaningless 
materiality is in need of reinterpretation and redefinition. The result of such a 
process may be a Gedenkort, a place that normatively construes the past by 
means of the site, or a traumatischer Ort, in which the site’s affirmative 
interpretation is blocked because of disputed, unspeakable, or shameful 
elements. A central feature of these places lies in the phenomenon of 
antëische Magie, the strengthening of an individual’s or a group’s historical 
imagination through the visual appropriation of the physical environment 
where historic events are said to have taken place. 
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Figure 60. Schematic overview of the spatial framework of memory. 
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Further studies 
During the work with the thesis several issues have surfaced, which only to a 
limited degree were treated in the main sources or which deviated too much 
from the main concern. This study has been suggested as a contribution to the 
establishment of a theoretical framework of architecture and memory in the 
humanities, and some of the following issues could indicate further areas of 
study that might complement it. 
Central to the notion of collective memory are the social groups. In acts of 
remembrance, the individual places himself in the position of the group and 
reconstructs the past by means of collective frameworks. In his three books 
on memory Halbwachs refers to a multitude of different smaller or larger 
groups, but rarely discusses what makes up a group or what defines the 
specific groups that he analyses.2 Lynch and Rossi also presuppose the 
existence of social and cultural groups, but offer few descriptions. The same 
applies to Aleida and Jan Assmann. Scholarship in sociology and social 
psychology could arguably provide conceptual tools for the assessment of 
groups in relation to the spatial framework of memory on the micro level, for 
instance the delineations and overlaps of groups, group conduct, the 
dynamics between the collectivity and the group members, etc. On the macro 
level of society, other fields of study could also contribute to understanding 
the complexity of group identities and dynamics in relation to space: 
nationalism, globalism, transnationalism, migration, diaspora, etc. 
Various aspects of time are important features in the theories of 
Halbwachs, Rossi, and Aleida and Jan Assmann, and my analysis of the 
dispute over the Government Quarter in Oslo has demonstrated dramatic 
alterations to the spatial frameworks over a fairly short time period and a 
rapid change from a condition of stability of meaning to a more volatile state. 
Exchanges of and alterations to the spatial framework cannot be assessed 
without considering time. A central aspect of the plurality of the spatial 
framework of memory lies in the temporal accentuations; certain frameworks 
stay stable within a group for a long time, but suddenly the inertia is 
challenged by external forces, like when the bomb detonated in the 
Government Quarter. Terms like Ruth Klüger’s timescape and my epochal-
spatial framework of memory suggest possible paths of analysis, but offer 
relatively crude chronological images. Other philosophies of time may be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Halbwachs studied definitions and dynamics of groups in other contexts, for instance in social classes: M 
Halbwachs, The Psychology of Social Class, tr. C Delavenay (London, Heinemann, 1958) [Fr. orig., Esquisse 
d’une psychologie des classes sociales (1955)]. 
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more useful for assessing the development of frameworks over time and the 
interchange between groups. Chronological perspectives may seem too 
limited in their one-dimensional scale, just as it may be to consider the 
travels of the spatial framework.3 I would like to raise the question of 
whether the spatial frameworks of memory should be studied in their 
orchestration over time, with an allusion to musical notations and the 
transport of motifs by different instruments, changing in intensity over time, 
sometimes appearing in chorus, and sometimes as individual voices. An 
analysis of group-bound frameworks’ developments over time could expose 
the totality of the arrangement of architectural representations, which, like a 
symphony, is only possible to perceive as an accumulative product of time 
and social interaction. To analyse the orchestration of the memory related to 
a site, as I have attempted to do in chapter six, may appear as the dissection 
of the cultural composite that Rossi has termed fatto urbano into its various 
components: the affiliated groups and their notables of memory, the 
processes developing over time, the forums of memory exchange, the various 
spatial frameworks and landmarks, and the associated values and memories. 
A further aspect that I have only briefly touched upon in the thesis is the 
mediation of spatial frameworks through mobile media (Rigney), such as 
photographs, drawings, and texts. What is the difference between built 
architecture and mediated representations of it, when it comes to their role as 
a framework of memory? What about replicas of architecture in other places, 
e.g. plaster casts in museums or reconstructions of historic architecture – are 
they to be considered as mobile or immobile media? To what extent should 
virtual worlds in computer games or websites be considered as locations 
(immobile media) or as documents (mobile media)? Studies of these and 
other questions of media and mediation of architecture could make an 
important complement to the study of the spatial framework of memory. 
Lastly, I should mention the relation of the spatial framework of memory to 
scientific studies. Scholarship in geography, psychology, and neuroscience 
has expanded the theories of how man perceives, cognises, and remembers 
space. Studies in spatial cognition, context-dependent memory, situated 
cognition, cognitive maps, way-finding, spatial memory, etc. could broaden 
the understanding of the basic mechanisms that underlie the social and 
cultural functions of the spatial framework of memory. In this thesis such 
aspects have predominantly been represented by the work of Kevin Lynch. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For a study of different patterns of time and temporal continuity in collective memory, see E Zerubavel, Time 
Maps. Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past (Chicago, UCP, 2003).  
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Widening such perspectives may inform the study of architecture and 
memory in society. 
Application 
The concept of the spatial framework of memory has intentionally been 
outlined as a free-standing theoretical framework. It is, to a large degree, 
rooted in memory studies in sociology, architecture, and Kulturwissenschaft, 
but in addition it draws on a plethora of other humanistic perspectives. Its 
position at the intersection of the different fields suggests its usefulness in a 
variety of contexts. It is not my intention to limit the scope of possible 
application and elaboration; instead I leave to others to determine its potential 
and limitations. Nonetheless, from my standpoint and with my experience, I 
would like to suggest a few directions into which it could be fruitful to take 
the concept of the spatial framework of memory, anticipating some of its 
reasonable applications. I am aware that because some of the following 
pertains to professional practice I run the risk of being accused of confusing 
the critical responsibility of the scholar with the creative and operative task of 
the architect, planner, or conservator. Such was Peter Collins’s critique of 
architectural historians, who ‘breathe too heavily down practicing architects’ 
necks [overlooking] the crucial difference between the theory and the history 
of architecture; between the way buildings are built and the way they were 
built’.4 A similar concern has recently been voiced by memory scholar 
Jeffrey K. Olick, who fears that memory studies has become part of and 
economically dependent on the memory industry, and that its critique and 
theories increasingly are employed and applied outside of academia.5 I will 
not address such questions in depth here, but merely suggest that there is 
reason to hope, at least for an architectural theorist with a background in 
practice, that critical theoretical thinking should, and could, underpin 
professional work. 
In the Introduction I argued that architecture and place have been criticised 
as too permanent or stable features in studies of memory, despite the 
historiographies of places of memory in anthologies like Les Lieux de 
mémoire, which have demonstrated that memory attached to such places 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 P Collins, Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture 1750–1950 (1965; repr. edn, Montreal, McGill 
University Press, 1967), 295–96. 
5 J K Olick, ‘Worlds of Memory’ [conference paper], Towards a Common Past?, Lund University, 14–16 May 
2012. 
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certainly changes over time.6 As a counterargument, the concept of the spatial 
framework of memory may demonstrate precisely the transience and 
multiplicity of place in social memory. With the study I contend that place 
and architecture are of great importance to sociocultural memory, not due to 
their presumed stability, but because of the cognitive advantages that 
physical or mental places have for the organisation of the past, especially 
with regard to social and cultural collectives. Cities, landscapes, and sites 
need to be addressed in memory studies – not at the cost of other objects of 
study, but as a fundamental and integrated aspect of the processes of 
communicative and cultural memory. To dissect the spatial frameworks of 
memory means to confront readings of the environment that regard it as 
something singular, stable, and permanent. 
In studies of diaspora, migration, and (post-)national identity, space often 
takes the form of memory constructions. The homeland is constructed anew 
in the host country, its framework strongly influenced by, or set up against, 
the new environment and its cultural and political connotations. Space takes 
on a temporal character; the place one came from is linked to periods of the 
past and the new place to the present life, for better or for worse. I have 
previously sketched out how Halbwachs’s spatial frameworks of memory can 
be used to reflect on the complexities of space in contexts of displacement 
and repatriation.7 The concept put forward here offers a larger analytical 
framework that can contribute to the assessment of place in migratory and 
diasporic communities and the dislocation of meaning and identity related to 
places that seem to follow the displacement of the group. 
Processes of memory politics linked to the built environment, like the one I 
have addressed in chapter six, and to the construction and administration of 
memorials could benefit from analyses of their cultural-political organisation. 
The spatial framework of memory could contribute to dissecting the different 
stakeholders, interests, and memories, and their connection to physical or 
mental spaces or objects. Awareness of the mechanisms of social memory 
and of groups’ differing construal of place can be heightened and the 
foundation for making decisions enhanced. With the distinction of internal 
and external frameworks the attention could be directed not only to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 P Nora (ed), Les Lieux de mémoire, 3 vols. (Paris, Gallimard, 1984–1992). In Engl. as P Nora & L D 
Kritzman (eds), Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past, tr. A Goldhammer, 3 vols. (abridged 
edn, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996–1998) [Fr. orig., Les Lieux de mémoire (1984–1992)]. 
7 M Ekman, ‘Remembering Home. Displacement, Return, and Spatial Frameworks of Memory’, in J Muñoz-
Basols & M David (eds), Defining and Re-Defining Diaspora: From Theory to Reality (Oxford, Inter-
Disciplinary Press, 2011). 
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physical artefact, but also to the specific group images, acknowledging the 
plurality of architecture in memory. 
In professional milieus of urban planning and cultural heritage 
conservation, the spatial framework of memory could help rethink existing 
theories for urban and rural landscapes’ relations to the past. In the work with 
registration and plans, its apparatus of distinctions could address the various 
historical memories or symbolism bound to locations and architecture and 
distinguish between institutionalised memories (history, art history, 
architectural history) and the informal communicative memory of local 
communities. The accountability for such issues may further the appreciation 
of the built environment as a spatial framework of the collective memory of 
families and neighbourhoods in places where the architecture has little or no 
importance for written history or for architectural history. It can also provide 
tools for assessing various kinds of intangible or immaterial heritage bound 
to architecture, but not expressed visually in it, like traditions, professional 
rituals, and cultural symbolism. 
As a last example I will mention how aspects of the theoretical framework 
could be advantageous for investigating the organisation of knowledge 
artefacts in architectural space, as I have briefly touched upon in chapter 
five.8 In studies of museums, libraries, or archives, the notion of the second-
degree cultural landmark as a cognitive support for what I have called an art 
of cultural memory could prove a relevant theoretical perspective. It 
emphasises the role of spatial representations in memory for the classification 
and architectural organisation of knowledge.  
A theoretical framework for studies of architecture and memory 
Through a rereading of Halbwachs’s writings on memory, with a particular 
focus on space, I have suggested the concept spatial framework of memory as 
a theoretical framework for humanistic studies of architecture and memory. I 
have proposed complementary specifications of the concept by looking at its 
transformations in the writings of architects Lynch and Rossi in the 1960s 
and in the works of memory scholars Aleida and Jan Assmann in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Finally, I have demonstrated the theoretical framework in the 
analysis of the debate over the Government Quarter in Oslo after the 
bombing on 22 July 2011. In the Conclusion, I have summarised the findings 
and suggested possible studies that could complement the concept and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See An art of cultural memory in ch. 5. Cf. also M Ekman, ‘Edifices of Memory. Topical Ordering in 
Cabinets and Museums’, in J Hegardt (ed), The Museum Beyond the Nation (Stockholm, The National 
Historical Museum, 2012). 
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indicated areas of application. The theoretical framework proposed in the 
thesis offers an understanding of architecture as edifices rather than a 
building: as the multiple spatial frameworks of different groups, media, and 
times and as complex systems of notions and beliefs. It is time to leave it to 
the readers to assess. 
The study has only scratched the surface of the potential use of the 
theoretical framework that the spatial framework of memory makes up. I 
have outlined some of the main realms of a dynamic and pluralistic concept 
for studies of architecture and societal memory, while others remain to be 
uncovered in evaluations and elaborations by future scholarship. 
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